Relational Meanings
of the Noun אִישׁ (ʾîš) in Biblical Hebrew

by
David E. S. Stein

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Declaration

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ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary, cross-linguistic investigation of the word *ʾîš* (אִישׁ), including its feminine and plural forms, noted more than ten distinctive features compared to other general human nouns in the Hebrew Bible: shorter, more frequent, more broadly dispersed, more relational senses, etc. To explain these features, this noun was classed with those showing similar distinctions: English *man/woman*, and French *homme/femme*. Such unusually useful nouns were named "workhorses." Given that corpus and cognitive linguists have observed discourse-modulating functions and underspecified semantics for *man* and *homme*, these concepts were deemed applicable to *ʾîš*.

The analysis looked at relational meaning (i.e., relating the referent to something else) on two levels: *informational* (within the world depicted by the text), and *discourse* (ensuring good communication). Cognitive science, information theory, discourse analysis, and cognitive linguistics sources together suggest that the mind thinks in terms of *situations*—especially those that involve a human *participant*. During communication, the audience constructs a discourse model that tracks a depicted situation and its participants. The speaker deploys nouns so as to manage that model.

It was hypothesized that workhorse nouns succinctly label the participants in a prototypical situation as such, thus increasing the efficiency of communication and cognitive processing, as the audience situates and re-situates participants in its discourse model.

On the discourse level of meaning, workhorse nouns then offer efficient access for elaborating upon a participant. They can also function efficiently like pronouns due to pragmatic enrichment; and thus they can even be applied to non-human entities.

On the informational level, pragmatic enrichment likewise often creates additional meaning, ultimately producing both sortal senses ('adult male/female', 'human being') and relational ones ('husband/wife', 'party [to a conflict]', 'agent [on behalf of someone]', etc.) via the cognitively licensed extensions of meaning known as metonymy and narrowing.

The development of a workhorse's various meanings from a basic concept is also described in terms of changes in focus on the attributes within a Barsalou cognitive frame.

Theoretical predictions were tested on the biblical corpus, confirming that *ʾîš* is the default label for participants in prototypical situations, and that it is used where participation is relevant or consequential. The hypothesized semantic structure and evolution explained the word's "grammatical" usages and otherwise-puzzling behaviors. Longstanding interpretive cruxes were resolved. Thus the hypothesis evinced greater explanatory power and economy than the existing notions of *ʾîš* in Biblical Studies.

The findings not only observe for *ʾîš* the same discourse functions that linguists had found for *man* and *homme*, but also provide motivations for those functions, while identifying additional functions that seem to apply to workhorse nouns as a class. The study closes with discussions of the role of gender, the life cycle of workhorse nouns, and implications for Modern Hebrew and for other languages.

OPSOMMING

Hierdie interdissiplinêre ondersoek, oor tale heen, van die woord ʾîš (אִישׁ), insluitende die vroulike en meervoudsvorm daarvan, het tien onderskeidende kenmerke in vergelyking met ander naamwoorde wat na mense in die algemeen verwys in die Hebreeuse Bybel. Dit is, hulle is fonologies korter, kom meer dikwels voor, kom meer versprei voor en het meer dikwels 'n relasionele betekenis, ens. Om hierdie eienskappe te verduidelik, is die naamwoord as dieselfde klas beskou as die wat soortgelyke onderskeiding in Engels (*man/woman*) en Frans vertoon (*homme/femme*). Sulke ongewoon handige naamwoorde is "werkperde" genoem. Aangesien korpus- en kognitiewe taalkundiges vir *man* en *homme* diskoersregulerende funksies en 'n ondergespesifiseerde semantiese betekenis onderskei het, is hierdie konsepte beskou as ewe toepasbaar op ʾîš.

Die analise het hierna relasionele betekenis (met ander woorde, dit wat die referent met iets anders in verband bring) op twee vlakke ondersoek: op die vlak van *inligting* (in die wêreld soos uitgebeeld in die teks) en op die vlak van *diskoers* (wat verseker dat kommunikasie goed verloop). Bronne in die kognitiewe wetenskap, inligtingsteorie, diskoersanalise, en kognitiewe taalkunde suggereer almal saam dat die verstand werk in terme van *situasies*—veral die wat 'n menslike *deelnemer* betrek. In die kommunikasie-proses skep hoorders 'n diskoersmodel wat die situasie en die deelnemers daaraan afbeeld. Die spreker gebruik naamwoorde om die model te kan bestuur.

Die hipotese is gestel dat werkperdnaamwoorde deelnemers aan 'n prototipiese situasie bondig as sodanig benoem. Op die wyse vergemaklik hulle die effektiwiteit van die kommunikasie en die kognitiewe verwerking daarvan, soos die hoorders die deel-nemers in hulle diskoermodel situeer en hersitueer.

Op die diskoersvlak van betekenis bied werkperdnaamwoorde op die wyse effektiewe toegang tot maniere om deelnemers verder te omskryf. Hulle kan as gevolg van pragmatiese verryking ook effektief soos voornaamwoorde funksioneer; hulle kan selfs op nie-menslike entiteite van toepassing gemaak word.

Op die inligtingsvlak skep pragmatiese verryking dienooreenkomstig dikwels by-komende betekenisse. Dit produseer uiteindelik sorteerbetekenisse ('volwasse man/ vrou', 'menslike wese') en relasionele betekenisse ('man/vrou', 'betrokkene [aan 'n konflik]', 'agent' [namens iemand anders], ens.) deur middel van die kognitief-geoorloofde betekenisuitbreidings bekend as metonomie en spesifisering.

Die ontwikkeling van werkperdnaamwoorde se verskillende betekenisse vanaf 'n basiese konsep is ook beskryf in terme van die verandering van die fokus van attribute in terme van 'n Barsalou-kognitiewe raamwerk.

Teoretiese voorspellings is getoets aan die hand van Bybelse korpora, Op die wyse is bevestig dat ʾîš die verstek-etiket is vir deelnemers aan 'n prototipiese situasie, en dat dit gebruik is waar deelname relevant is of uit 'n situasie voortvloei. Die hipotetiese semantiese struktuur en evolusie verklaar die woord se 'grammatikale' gebruike. Andersins is enigmatiese gebruike en 'n aantal lankbestaande probleemgevalle opgelos Daarom het die hipotese 'n groter verduidelikende waarde en effektiwiteit as bestaande opvattings van ʾîš in die Bybelwetenskappe.

Die studie het nie net bevind dat ʾîš dieselfde diskoersfunksies het wat taalkundiges aan *man* en *homme* toeskryf nie, maar bied ook verklarings vir daardie funksies. Dit identifiseer ook bykomende funksies wat aan werkperdnaamwoorde as 'n klas toegeskryf kan word. Die studie sluit af met besprekings van die rol van geslag, die lewensiklus van werkperknaamwoorde en die implikasies vir Moderne Hebreeus en ander tale.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Abbreviations and Sigla

CJPS = *The Contemporary Torah: A Gender-Sensitive Adaptation of the JPS Translation* (2006)

DBHE = Diccionario Bíblico Hebreo-Español (1993)

DCH = Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (1993–2016)

DCHR = Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, Revised (2018)

ESV = English Standard Version (2001; rev. 2016)

HALAT = Hebräisches und Aramäisches Lexicon zum Alten Testament ([1967] 1995)

HALOT = The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (2001)

LXX = Septuagint translation

NETS = New English Translation of the Septuagint, second printing, corrected (2014)

NIDOTTE = New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology & Exegesis (1997)

NIV = New International Version (1973; rev. 2011)

NJPS = New Jewish Publication Society translation (1981; rev. 1999)

NRSV = New Revised Standard Version (1989)

OED = Oxford English Dictionary (online)

SAIN = my coined acronym for *s*ingular, *a*bsolute, *i*ndefinite, and *n*onspecific (noun usage)

TLOT = Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament ([1971] 1997)

TWOT = Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980)

▲ = Prompt to the reader, to sketch the situation schematically as a relational triangle.

* = (*Prior to a text or utterance*) Hypothetical, as distinct from attested.

* = (*In a grammaticality judgment*) Ungrammatical utterance.

? = (*In a grammaticality judgment*) Less acceptable.

= (*In a grammaticality judgment*) Grammatical, but with a different meaning.

< > (*Around a word or phrase*) = Refers to a concept, rather than to the word(s) that describe(s) it.

{ } (*Around a translation's attribution*) = The rendering has been adapted with respect to its underlined or bracketed portion, such as by transliterating a term of interest.

Glossary: Definition of Key Terms

Given that many of the following terms—especially the linguistic ones—are used in different ways by various scholars, I set out my own usages here, for the sake of clarity.

Ambiguity   The quality of an utterance that makes it difficult to discern which of a word's senses is salient in a certain case; underspecification in the utterance. A property of *instances* (tokens) rather than types. Interrelated with the word's *vagueness*.

Anaphor   A word that is used to make another reference to a discourse-active participant.

Antecedent   The initial referring expression in the set of a given text's co-referential referring expressions.

Bible, the   The Hebrew Bible specifically.

Biblical Studies   Scholarship—from antiquity onward—on the Hebrew Bible specifically.

Changed label   (In a text that is making a co-reference) The substitution of a different substantive label for the primary referring expression. Also known as *changed reference*.

Coherence   The ability of a text or utterance to make sense in terms of the audience's familiar experience and expectations.

Concept   An assembly of accumulated experience (knowledge) that is used in making predictions about the world, including about the meaning of an utterance.

Construal   The human ability to conceive and depict a given situation in alternate ways. Also, the constructed result of that process of interpretation.

Construction   A conventionalized linguistic expression that carries out a particular communicative function, and that combines words in such a way that the combination predictably affects the audience's interpretation of those words.

Co-reference   Making reference to the same referent as a prior referring expression.

Co-text   The linguistic (textual) environment in which the word in question is used.

Default   During the audience's interpretation of an utterance, the noun sense to be tried first, by virtue of its being the most cognitively accessible or entrenched. The expected label (if one is warranted) for a referent. Compared to other possible labels, it is considered to be unmarked.

Deixis   A speaker's use of language to direct the audience's attention to someone in particular; pointing via words; using a deictic expression.

Denotation   The extent of the eligible referents for a given noun. Also called *extension*.

Description   What a label says about its referent; the schematic, parametric lexical concept that a word evokes.

Designation   Making reference to a certain type of referent.

Determiner   What combines with a noun to form the type of referring expression known as a definite description, which indicates that the speaker considers the referent to be identifiable by the audience. The definite article is the most prominent kind of determiner.

Diachrony   How language use changes over time.

Discourse   Speech or text consisting of at least one sentence, which is used to communicate between a speaker and an audience.

Elliptical   Involves the speaker's elision of a normal—and therefore expected—element in a locution, which the audience can recover from the context, as if it had been stated.

Emotion   The cover term for one's beliefs, attitudes, and feelings with respect to someone, all of which reflect an underlying sense of closeness or distance.

Expression   The cover term for a word, phrase, or sentence.

Expressive   evaluative; pointedly expressing an attitude toward, or emotion about, the referent.

Face   A person's public self-image.

Frame   A pre-existing knowledge structure (situation) that is associated with a word.

Grammatical   Pertaining to how the words in an utterance relate to each other, as a matter of linguistic coding.

Grammaticalization   The process in which a given word (or expression or construction) comes to be used in a greater number of semantic/pragmatic and/or syntactic contexts, while becoming more schematic in its meaning contribution on the informational level (Haas 2007). Alternatively, the process by which a noun develops a grammatical function over time (Hopper and Traugott 2003).

Head   The single term that liaises semantically with the rest of the text, on behalf of the referring expression (also known as a noun phrase). This semantic head may differ from the syntactic head. I treat Hebrew numerals as quantifiers rather than as the head term of their referring expressions.

Idiom   An expression whose distinctive overall meaning cannot be generated from its individual parts (Babut 1999:14–28).

Implicature   An additional unstated meaning in the speaker's utterance that the audience must assume in order for that utterance to make sense.

Inflection   The patterned alternation of a word's form according to considerations of grammatical or referential agreement, such as number and gender. A Hebrew noun's gender is fixed, strictly speaking; nonetheless, I use the term *inflection* loosely, in analogy to the inflection of the noun's corresponding verbs and adjectives. Such usage expresses the fact that a Hebrew speaker must likewise *choose* between available alternate forms of the word in question.

Lexical gender   A noun's semantic gender specificity (or lack thereof).

Lexical sense   A cluster of similar attested usages of a word that points toward a meaning that has become institutionalized in the language and thus cognitively entrenched. Such a meaning is more rapidly accessed than meaning that is calculated ad hoc. An emergent phenomenon that arises from language use, while having psychological reality. See also *sense*.

Lexicalization   Making reference to someone via a label (word), as distinct from discussing that referent via more subtle means. A function of the referent's degree of activation in the audience's discourse model, as perceived by the speaker.

Linguistic   That which is communicated via language, as distinct from via gesture or via implications based upon the context of use.

Meaning   The concepts that a regarded object (including a word or an utterance) activates in one's mind. An utterance is *meaningful* to the extent that it has a role in constraining the audience's interpretation of that utterance, or reducing the audience's uncertainty about what the speaker meant to communicate. An utterance's *meaning* is roughly what the audience infers that the speaker intended to evoke in the audience's mind. A word's *meaning* is what its presence contributes to the utterance's meaning, in the context of communication.

Member   One of the individuals composing a group that has a distinct and ongoing identity.

Metonymy   An associative mental process that links a whole with its parts, and thus also the parts with each other, enabling the most salient one of them to stand for the other(s) in an utterance.

Minimal pair   Two syntagms (phrases) that differ in only one notable respect.

Onomasiology   The study of the various terms that are used to express a given concept.

Participant   A (typically adult) person, or a group of people, that takes part in the situation. Participants inhabit the mental model of discourses in which a speaker is depicting either the real world or an imagined world.

Party   A participant in a prototypical situation. In socially defined frames, each of the parties has certain customary relationships with the other parties, together with attendant privileges, responsibilities, and culturally expected behaviors.

Pleonasm   An expression that seems redundant on the informational level.

Pragmatic   Relating to how the conditions of linguistic communication affect meaning.

Pragmatic enrichment   The process of meaning-making that an audience employs automatically when making sense of an utterance, based on implications in context and the premise that certain things go without saying.

Pragmatics   The study of speaker meaning as distinct from word or sentence meaning. (Yule 1996:133).

Presupposition   Something that the speaker apparently assumes to be the case.

Primary referring expression   The initial label for a participant in the discourse, which becomes the default label in any subsequent co-references that warrant relexicalization.

Pronoun   A referring expression that is used only when its referent is already discourse active (identifiable and accessible to the audience); it does not individuate or classify its referent, apart perhaps from schematic indications such as grammatical number or gender concord.

Prototypical situation   A situation that is constituted by its two parties and some third element of concern between them.

Proximal   A type of deictic expression that indicates that something is near to the speaker.

Reference   The speaker's use of a referring expression to enable the audience to identify (in its discourse model) what the speaker is talking about. Alternatively, the result of that act: the audience's mental representation of some entity (whether concrete or abstract; and whether corresponding to something in the "real world" or not) to which a speaker is directing attention by using a referring expression.

Reference point   A conception that is prominent and therefore is used as a starting point from which to apprehend a larger conception of which it is a part (Van Hoek 2003:180). An entity that is conceived in such a way as to afford mental access to another entity (Langacker 2015:134).

Referent   The person to whom the speaker has made reference via the referring expression in question; the one whom the speaker is talking about.

Referential gender   An utterance's characterization of a referent as being socially gendered (or not). A function of the specificity of the reference.

Referring expression   A linguistic form whose use by the speaker enables the audience to identify (in its discourse model) what the speaker is talking about.

Residual meaning   A word's "dictionary definition"—also known as its citation meaning. The postulated "residue" of meaning when the word is removed from a context of use.

Salience   Contextual relevance; prominence; notable significance.

Scalar implicature   An implicature that relies upon an unstated scale of values that is part of the conceptual frame that is invoked by a word's use.

Script   The culturally shared outline of what participants normally do and say at each stage in a certain frequently recurring sequence of events. Speakers and audiences draw upon this mutual knowledge structure when communicating about such a sequence of events.

Selectional preferences   The constraints on a word's normal collocates, as recognized by the language's native speakers, who will say that certain words "go together" (or not). Alternatively, from a functional perspective: the kind of predications that must be true when a given label is used to refer to someone (Givón 2018:235). Also known as *selection restrictions* or *co-occurrence preferences*.

Semantic bleaching   The observed aggregate loss over time, or in certain constructions, of a word's contribution on the informational level of meaning.

Semantics   Meaning as encoded in language, when the latter is imagined as if isolated from context or in a generic context.

Semasiology   The study of the various meanings that a lexical (word) form can occur with.

Sense   See *lexical sense*. A word's sense may be construed in terms of either a shared conceptualization by speakers of a speech community, or the construal of an individual speaker based upon personal experience. Alternatively, the information that a noun phrase is evoking about the mentally represented entity that it is referring to, when deployed in an utterance.

Situation   The setting in which an object of our regard is placed (physically or metaphorically) in some relation to its surroundings or circumstances. Situations consist of elements that are configured in relationships with each other.

Synonym   A label from within the same semantic domain that is a potential substitute in a given instance. I use this term loosely, as a matter of rough equivalence (for words do not have true synonyms in the strict sense). Alternatively, a word that has one or more senses in common with the word in question. A key part of a word's meaning contribution is the implied contrast with the impact of its synonyms.

Utterance   A continuous portion of speech activity or text that can be regarded as grammatically independent of preceding and following portions.

Vagueness   The quality of meaning that is evoked by a word with minimal semantic content, such that it can be used in many applications; underspecification in the *word's semantic potential*. A property of the word's *type* rather than its instances. Interrelated with an utterance's *ambiguity*.

Zero anaphora   The maintaining of reference during an utterance by implication only, without using a referring expression. (In Hebrew, a verb's inflection for number and gender is sometimes considered to be tantamount to zero anaphora for its subject.)

1 Introduction

> Le seul véritable voyage, le seul bain de Jouvence,
> ce ne serait pas d'aller vers de nouveaux paysages,
> mais d'avoir d'autres yeux, de voir l'univers avec les yeux d'un autre….
>
> —Marcel Proust[1]

1.1 A Word That Matters

In the Hebrew Bible, the second most frequently occurring common noun is אִישׁ (*'îš*).[2] Including its feminine counterpart אִשָּׁה (*'iššâ*) and their respective irregular plural forms אֲנָשִׁים (*'ănāšîm*) and נָשִׁים (*nāšîm*),[3] it appears nearly three thousand times.[4] It played a significant role when the Bible's composers expressed themselves, for they employed it prominently when expressing concepts of human nature and when designating divine agents. Hence the composers of theological dictionaries regularly include an article on אִישׁ. Hebraists commonly gloss the masculine singular form אִישׁ as 'man' or 'person'.[5]

This noun is said to be a *human noun* (or *personal noun*).[6] That is, part of its semantic contribution is to classify its referent as a human being. Other nouns in this semantic domain include:[7] *nepeš* 'person', *'ādām* 'earthling', *geber* 'he-man', *'ĕnôš* 'human being'.[8] In some cases, the pair *zākār* 'male' and *nəqēbâ* 'female' also offers an alternative.

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[1] The novelist's Narrator states: "The only real journey, the only bath [in the Fountain] of Youth, would not be to go to new landscapes, but to have other eyes—to see the universe through the eyes of another.…" (1923:75). Translations throughout this dissertation are my own, unless otherwise noted.

[2] In comparison, the Bible's most frequently occurring common noun is בֵּן 'son, offspring, member', especially when including its feminine counterpart בַּת 'daughter'. Outside of indicating a patronymic or matronymic—which I exclude because in those cases I consider this relational noun to be part of that person's name—it occurs well over four thousand times, according to my Accordance searches (Hebrew Masoretic Text with Groves-Wheeler Westminster Hebrew Morphology, v. 4.20).

[3] On the irregular nature of our noun's feminine and plural forms, see below, note 12.

[4] The number of instances is disputed. An Accordance search (above, n. 2) for the common nouns אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה yields 2968 instances, while *TLOT* totals 2964 (Kühlewein 1997a:98–99; 1997b:187–88); and *DCHR* states 2959 (Clines 2018b:309; 2018c:594), per Even-Shoshan's concordance (1982a:55; 1982b:125). Because the present study does not account for every instance, I have not tried to resolve the discrepancy.

[5] On the main reason for this dual gloss, see below, §1.6.6.

[6] For a millennium, biblical dictionaries have classified אִישׁ as a noun (while perceiving some pronoun-like usages); see also the distributional analysis in Forbes 2009. In this study, I too will consider אִישׁ a noun, meaning that it is regularly *used as a noun* in order to evoke certain effects in the audience's mind (§4.4).

[7] As reflected in synonym-oriented dictionaries: Bedersi ([13th century] 1865); Tedeschi (1879); Luzzatto (1888); Even-Shoshan (1982a:49); Clines (2018b:327); cf. *Zohar* 3:48a–49a (Matt 2012:298–305). More specialized nouns in this semantic domain are much less common and thus disregarded. I exclude nouns that describe their human referents only as a collective ("mass nouns"); see below, Chapter 4, note 15.

Simple glosses of Hebrew are provided for the benefit of non-Hebraist readers; but see below, note 21.

1.2 A Word with a Distinctive Nature

The noun אִישׁ is remarkable in many ways. Compared to the aforementioned nouns that share its principal semantic domain, the masculine form אִישׁ is:[9]

1. Phonologically shorter.
2. Easier to pronounce.
3. Far more frequent.
4. More broadly dispersed throughout the biblical corpus.
5. More semantically mutable.
6. The only one that is
   a. Used in situations where its presence seems semantically superfluous.
   b. Matched with a feminine counterpart form that is used regularly.[10]
   c. Regularly used in pronoun-like ways.
7. Applied most widely—well beyond human beings.
8. More often used in a relational sense.

(In the next section, these distinctive characteristics will be documented and discussed.) This long list of distinguishing features suggests that אִישׁ functions quite differently from its ostensible synonyms in Hebrew. Our noun is in a league of its own.

Consequently, special considerations and/or methods are warranted in order to understand how and why this noun is used in the Bible—and what it contributes to the meaning of a biblical text. Those who attempt to analyze אִישׁ only via the already established methods for nouns are likely to miss something important about the word in question.[11]

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[8] In this dissertation, most Hebrew words are transliterated into roman script, according to the schema of the Society of Biblical Literature, rather than presented in a conventional Hebrew (actually Aramaic) typeface. This measure is intended to make the present study more accessible to non-biblical scholars. Given the significant cross-linguistic implications of my research, my hope is that this study may attract the attention of such readers. Despite this preference for transliteration, I make three exceptions and retain the Hebrew script: (1) For the noun under study, which appears frequently enough that its various forms should quickly become recognizable to all readers. (2) For displayed quotations from the Hebrew Bible (which meanwhile warrant a special typeface that situates the Masoretic accents precisely), which are followed by an English rendering. (3) For extracts by scholars who wrote in Hebrew, since—like the extracts from all "foreign" languages—those quotations are followed by an English rendering.

[9] Linguists have long observed that some of these features are highly correlated. For example, a word's frequency of occurrence predicts its acoustic duration—that is, frequently used words tend to be short (Zipf 1929; Levshina 2018:50; Baayen et al. 2016:1175). However, causation has not been established: "it is not immediately clear whether the two are in a causal relation, and if so, in which direction causality flows" (ibid., 1205).

[10] The feminine noun form אִשָּׁה appears in 782 instances (Even-Shoshan 1982b); it is counterposed with אִישׁ hundreds of times.

[11] The established methods for studying the meaning of Biblical Hebrew nouns include the onomasiological approaches to fields of concepts, including concrete ones (cutting tools, Koller 2012), and more abstract ones (glory, Burton 2017); and semasiological approaches, e.g., for *zera'* 'seed, offspring' (De Regt 1997).

Therefore I have sought additional guidance outside of Biblical Studies. I have noticed a similar word in each of two other languages—words that have been studied in the linguistics literature—and learned from what has been observed about them. Then I have identified the communicative and cognitive considerations that are shared by the usage of all three words. Finally, I have applied those insights to hundreds of instances of אִישׁ. As we shall see, this simple stratagem has proven to be highly rewarding.

1.3 Exploring the Distinctive Features of This Noun

1.3.1 Length, pronunciation, frequency, and dispersion

Of the characteristics listed above, the first three are consequential, although establishing them is trivial: (1) *Phonologically shorter*: The basic form אִישׁ is only one syllable long.[12] (2) *Easier to pronounce*: It is articulated with hardly any movement of the mouth or tongue, as the reader is welcome to verify. (3) *Far more frequent*: Its status as the second-most-frequent common noun in the Hebrew Bible was noted at the start of this chapter. This high ranking applies all the more so within the semantic domain of human nouns. As shown in Table 1.1,[13] the masculine form אִישׁ alone appears almost three times more often than *nepeš*, four times more often than *ʾādām*, 33 times more often than *geber*, and 52 times more often than *ʾĕnôš*.

As for the fourth characteristic, evincing a *broader dispersion*,[14] אִישׁ again stands out among its peers: it uniquely appears in all 24 books (Table 1.1, col. 3);[15] and the five books with the most instances of אִישׁ together account for 46% of its count, which reflects the lowest degree of concentration (Table 1.1, col. 4). In contrast, at the other end of the

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[12] At the same time, our noun's other forms—its plural and feminine counterparts as listed at the start of this chapter—are noticeably more complex than usual for Hebrew nouns. Such irregularity is actually normal for frequently used words: irregular feminine and plural forms are the result of natural forces that shape the signals of language so as to make them more efficient. The most commonly occurring words are actually the most likely to have irregular ("suppletive") forms (Bybee and Beckner 2015:966), because that is where such heightened phonological contrasts are the most useful for ensuring rapid and accurate communication (Ramscar and Port 2016:71). Such a word's frequent usage meanwhile enables its irregular forms to be sustained—that is, to be remembered by language users (Haspelmath 2006:48).

[13] Like the analysis in Stein 2008a, this table conservatively focuses only on the masculine forms of אִישׁ. Because its feminine forms lack the ability to represent human beings without regard to gender, they are not appropriate to this kind of comparison with other human nouns.

[14] The category label is *dispersion* in cognitive linguistics (Baayen et al. 2016:1186); *contextual diversity* in psychology (ibid.); and *distributional consistency* in computational linguistics (Zhang et al. 2004).

[15] Several ways of enumerating the Bible's books have existed since antiquity. In this study, I have adopted the classic rabbinic enumeration of 24 biblical books. According to this perspective, Samuel, Kings, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles each count as one book, as does the "Twelve Minor Prophets." While this approach may not reflect a uniform compositional origin, it does respect each book's own history of development and preservation. In any case, it is adequate for the heuristic purpose for which it is applied herein.

scale, *'ĕnôš* appears disproportionately in its top five books—98% of its total instances (with just two books accounting for 74%); and in 18 books it is altogether absent.

Table 1.1 A Comparison of Masculine אִישׁ with the General Human–Noun Cohort

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Synonym	Frequency	Distribution (in 24 bks)	% in Top 5 books	Feminine Form?	Plural Form?	No. of Senses	Relational Senses	Apposition Instances
אִישׁ	2179	24	46%	Yes	Yes	12	7	>116
nepeš	754	22	49%	No	Yes	12 [16]	4	7
'ādām	552	21	61%	No	No	7	2	4
geber	66	14	70%	?? [17]	Yes	3	2 [18]	7
'ĕnôš	42	6	98%	No	No	3	0	1

Data for columns 3–4 from Accordance analytics tables; for the other columns, from *DCH* (Clines 2013–2018).

1.3.2 Semantic mutability

If nouns were people, the prototypical ones would be known for taking a stand—and then sticking to it. When such nouns are presented to us in isolation, we can readily, as the linguist Roz Ivanič has written, "conjure up a relatively clear and unchanging picture" (1991:94). However, our noun is not like that; its semantic profile is diffuse. That is, whereas performing a standard word study on *'ādām*, *geber*, and *'ĕnôš* yields a coherent profile, that approach fails miserably for אִישׁ (or for *nepeš*).[19] That is one reason why lin-

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[16] Only 7 of the listed senses qualify for the domain of human nouns: 3 sortal senses, and 4 relational senses. Of the latter, 3 senses resemble pronouns: *nepeš* is often used like a personal, reflexive, or possessive pronoun (Clines 2001b:732–33) but typically for people in rather extreme circumstances. On *nepeš* in Leviticus, see below, §8.2.3. *Nepeš* is a human noun in a minority of cases. According to Brown et al. (1906c:660), it indicates a person 144 times, not including the pronoun-like usages.

[17] Based on morphology, the expected feminine counterpart of *geber* is *gəberet*. As an absolute noun, the latter form appears only once, in an obscure utterance (Isa 45:7; cf. v. 5, and Koehler and Baumgartner 2001c, 2001d:176), where it is unconnected with *geber*.

[18] *DCH* notes that the noun *geber* can "perhaps" in a few cases be construed as akin to a pronoun (Clines 1995a:313). However, most of these usages can be explained as creating scalar implicatures that exploit the word's connotations of manliness and power: the given predication applies "even to a *geber*"—and thus to everyone. (On scalar implicatures, see §8.2.1.)

[19] In Biblical Studies, a standard word study first compiles all instances of a given term, and then distills and collates what those usages variously indicate about their referent. The English lexicographer Patrick Hanks recommends a similar procedure for constructing a "cognitive profile" for most nouns (2013:134–36). However, undertaking this process for אִישׁ results in too many internal contradictions to be useful; the result is diffuse and amorphous.

guists would say that it is *more semantically mutable* than the other nouns in its cohort.[20]

The widespread usage of אִישׁ appears to have proliferated, over time, an unusually wide range of distinct senses (Table 1.1, col. 7).[21] In other words, אִישׁ is defined *situationally* more than most nouns are. Its semantic contribution is unusually dependent upon its context—typically, upon the classes of contrasting referents. For example, our noun has the striking ability to (repeatedly) designate both the possessor of a certain characteristic and the possessor of its opposite. As exemplars, let us consider (in turn) two personal attributes: age, and social rank.

Our noun אִישׁ variously denotes persons of all ages. True, many of them are adults—as some dictionaries note (e.g., Bratsiotis 1974:223). When counterposed with a term for another age-related stage (e.g., *yəlādîm* 'children' in Ezra 10:1), אִישׁ labels the adults.[22] Similarly, in Deut 1:31, אִישׁ is applied to someone (nonspecific) who is caring for his son. And in legal settings it often applies to parties who have clearly reached legal majority (e.g., Deut 21:18). However, in such usages, adulthood is arguably a pragmatically enriched connotation of אִישׁ as a matter of salience (Chapter 7). For meanwhile, a number of other (lesser-known) instances suggest that אִישׁ can also be conventionally applied to children:[23]

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[20] On mutability (and why it matters), see Sloman et al. 1998; Ahrens 1999; Fauconnier 2004; Gentner and Asmuth 2008; Asmuth and Gentner 2017. Mutability correlates with *abstractness* and *generality*. That is, more mutable terms tend to be more abstracted from experience, and their use tends to evoke fewer semantic features.

[21] I have tabulated the glosses in *DCH* as a heuristic device. Dictionary glosses are rough measures (de Blois 2010b:3–4); as James Barr has said, they merely "indicate the sort of area in which the Hebrew meaning must lie" (1992:145). I fully agree with Barr that "the meaning itself, for the user of the dictionary, must remain within the Hebrew" (ibid.).

[22] Milton Eng depicts אִישׁ as describing *prime adulthood in the human life cycle* (2011:127). His semantic study of אִישׁ from a life-cycle perspective (ibid., 97–102) cites six passages in support. Of these, I find Gen 2:24 as plausibly indicating *young* adulthood; and Jer 6:11 as plausibly indicating, as Eng asserts, "the middle stage of life between 'young' and 'old'" (ibid., 102). However, the other four cited instances are unconvincing: Gen 4:23 tells us about relative ages only if we construe the parallel nouns literally and as contrasting rather than co-referential (but see next note); 1 Sam 2:32–33 is said to contrast אֲנָשִׁים with *zāqēn* 'old person', yet אֲנָשִׁים is used there predicatively, not referentially—and the MT reading is elliptical or idiomatic, if not unreliable (cf. LXX πεσοῦνται ἐν᾽ ρομφαίᾳ ἀνδρῶν and 4QSam^a *ypwlw bḥrb ʾnšym* 'they shall die by the sword of men/adversaries'; Tov and Polak 2009, ad loc.; McCarter 1980:89); 1 Sam 17:33 arguably *overlaps* אִישׁ—functioning as a role term, not necessarily an age grade—with the abstract life stage of "youth" (*naʿûrîm*), rather than contrasting the two; and Jer 51:22 deploys a series of merisms, such that no explicit set of age grades is in view. On Eng's thesis, see below, note 27.

[23] I intentionally do not cite Gen 4:23, where אִישׁ appears as a poetic parallel to, and in apparent co-reference with, *yeled* (normally: 'child')—as if to equate those terms with regard to their referent's age. That usage of *yeled* qualifies as an exploitation rather than a norm (below, §1.6.4), for presumably no one would boast about killing a child. Thus the speaker is likely using the term to disparage his (adult) victim:

- In Num 30:4; 31:18, 35; and Judg 21:14, אִשָּׁה denotes girls (or females too young to be married).[24]
- In Gen 4:1, אִישׁ is applied to a newborn.[25]
- In Isa 66:13, אִישׁ is the label for a crying infant in need of maternal soothing.[26]
- In more than a dozen cases, the same party is labeled co-referentially both as אִישׁ and as *na'ar* 'youth, squire'.[27]

Another age-related indication of semantic mutability is found in the narratives about Jacob in Genesis, where the label אִישׁ is used pointedly for both the sons' father (42:11, 13—where *'āb* 'father' would be a natural substitute) and for the father's sons (34:7, 43:15—where *bānîm* 'sons' would be a natural substitute).

In contrast, the general synonyms for אִישׁ are never applied specifically to children.

A similarly wide range of application is found for the attribute of *social rank*. Here, too, a co-existence of opposite meanings is evident in the biblical corpus. In a number of instances, אִישׁ indicates *subordinate* status, as reflected in many dictionaries.[28] However, a number of other cases meanwhile suggest a *superior* status (e.g., Mic 7:6); already the earliest dictionaries noted a usage that Koehler and Baumgartner (2001a:43) call "indication of rank." Among the synonyms for אִישׁ, only *'ādām* is ever applied both to low and to high-ranking persons (Gesenius [1829] 1835:24; Clines 2018b:150).

'a mere kid; a punk'. (For *yeled* as indicating incompetence, see 1 Kgs 12:8 and Dan 1:4.) In this case, אִישׁ is labeling the victim only secondarily in terms of age, but primarily as a party to a conflict (below, §6.9).

[24] For analysis, see notes 168, 179, and 185 for the book of Numbers in Stein 2014.

[25] Some interpreters construe אִישׁ in this verse as 'a *male* child' (e.g., Bratsiotis 1974:223), but this is unjustified because the text makes no contrast on the basis of sex—and anyway the conventional way to express a newborn's male sex is the noun *bēn* 'son'. Some other scholars construe our noun metonymically, as meaning 'a man—*in potential*'. Granted, in Job 3:3 *geber* seems to be employed in that anticipatory manner in a similar birth-announcement setting—but then that prompts the question as to why that label was not used here, instead of אִישׁ. Furthermore, I find it implausible that at this juncture, Eve would be celebrating the prospect of her son's adulthood as *the most significant outcome of her recent birthing experience*. For relational construals by Ibn Ezra and Naḥmanides, see §3.4. For my own interpretation, see §6.3.2.

[26] This verse should be read in context with the preceding three verses. See below, §6.5.3.

[27] Gen 19:4; Josh 6:22–23 (although LXX harmonizes); Judg 8:14; 17:7–8; 21:11–12, 14 (feminine); 1 Sam 25:9, 11; 30:11, 13; 30:17; 2 Sam 1:2, 13; 20:11; 1 Kgs 11:28; 20:17; 2 Kgs 5:23–24; 9:4, 11; Zech 2:5, 8; Ruth 4:11–12 (feminine). These counterexamples challenge Eng's thesis (above, note 22), for they far outnumber the two solid instances that support his view. Eng treats only one of these cases: he lists Zech 2:8 in the appendix table, p. 147, which holds that the reference of *na'ar* is to the prophet—not to the party labeled in v. 5 as אִישׁ—while summarily dismissing the differing opinion in Meyers and Meyers (1987:152).

[28] See under glosses such as "companion or follower" (Loewenstamm and Blau 1957:101); "retainers, followers, soldiers" (Brown et al. 1906:36), "servant, member of retinue" (Clines 2018b:310), and "in association with someone" (Koehler and Baumgartner 2001a:43).

A mutable noun is one that combines readily with other words. We could say that it is chemically reactive as opposed to inert. In this respect, אִישׁ stands apart from the other nouns in the semantic domain of human nouns. For example, it is far more likely to participate in grammatical appositions (Table 1.1, col. 9).[29]

1.3.3 Apparent superfluity and a feminine counterpart

Another distinctive feature of אִישׁ is that in some biblical cases, it is conspicuously present yet is held to contribute little semantic meaning. For example, as the Israelites are conquering Jericho, their leader Joshua takes initiative to keep a promise to protect the household of someone who had helped them, namely Rahab (Josh 6:22):

אָמַר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֹּאוּ בֵית־הָאִשָּׁה הַזּוֹנָה

Joshua said . . . "Go into the prostitute's house . . ."   (NRSV; NIV; ESV)

Here Joshua refers to Rahab via an appositive noun pair, which is marked by the definite article: *hā'iššâ hazzônâ*, which literally appears to mean 'the womanly-prostitute woman'. Our noun אִשָּׁה seems redundant. Why not simply use the feminine noun phrase *hazzônâ* 'the womanly-prostitute'? (Various answers are discussed in §6.8.4.) In contrast, the other Hebrew human nouns are never deployed with such apparent gratuity.

As for the existence of a regularly used feminine counterpart term, this feature has its uses. It enables אִישׁ to *point clearly to specific individual referents and to gender-based groups, and to distinguish between them*. Thus אִישׁ is more versatile than its cohort nouns.

1.3.4 Distributive/Reciprocal constructions, extending beyond human individuals

On hundreds of occasions, אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה is applied distributively ('each one') or reciprocally ('each other' or 'one another'), to indicate the interactions between a given set of human beings and other entities. Among the synonyms of our noun, only *geber* 'he-man' is attested in such usages, and it is questionable whether they are truly pronoun-like.[30]

An additional distinctive characteristic of אִישׁ is that it is *applied more widely than to human beings*. This feature has been emphasized in many dictionaries (starting in the 10th century; Skoss 1945); indeed, the variety of this noun's extensions is impressive. On several dozen occasions, אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה is applied distributively or reciprocally not only to human beings but also to the members of a wide range of sets:[31] animals (buzzards, sheep) and their body parts;[32] concrete inanimate objects (gemstones, brackets for bronze

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[29] At the other extreme (low "reactivity"), *'ādām* never appears in the Bible in the construct state or with a pronominal suffix (Grant 1977:9).

[30] Distributively: Joel 2:8; Lam 3:39. See above, note 18.

[31] For biblical citations, see Stein 2008a:15–16; below, §8.4.10.

[32] Two pairs of instances in Gen 7:2 apply referentially and nonspecifically to all kinds of land animals. However, this may be a linguistic exploitation rather than a normal usage. On the distinction, see §1.6.4.

lavers, cloths, fabricated images of cherubim);[33] deities or spiritual creatures and their body parts; and abstract groupings (households, Israelite clans/lineages, tribes, nations). In addition, in numerous instances, our noun functions like an indefinite pronoun.[34] These abilities are not shared by other general human nouns, except *nepeš* to a lesser extent.[35]

1.3.5 Relational senses as a distinguishing feature

It appears that scholars have long understood אִישׁ as a prototypical noun, describing its referent *sortally*—as a member of a "sort" (as in the question "What *sort* of thing is this?"). Such a noun instructs the audience to regard the referent *in terms of its intrinsic features*. At the same time, scholars also agree that אִישׁ occasionally describes its referent *in terms of a role*: husband, warrior, subordinate, etc. That is, it functions much like a relational noun—one that is conceptually dependent upon another party. In addition, it often relates its referents to a group or set of entities (especially in its pronoun-like usages). In these ways, אִישׁ highlights a *relational* aspect of meaning (as well as, or instead of, its sortal aspect).

At least some lexicographers believe that אִישׁ possesses more relational senses, and a greater proportion of such senses, than the other nouns in its semantic class (e.g., Table 1.1, col. 8). Furthermore, a thorough comparison of the usage of the noun *'ādām* with that of masculine forms of אִישׁ (Grant 1977:2, Table 1, category D; cf. Stein 2008a) found a dramatic difference between the two terms: whereas אִישׁ is used most often (66%) to regard its referent as a *member of a defined group or class* (i.e., relationally), this is almost never the case with *'ādām* (<1%).

A similar distinction, albeit less extreme, is apparent for אִישׁ versus *nepeš*. Although the latter noun is employed as the regular constituent term for certain groups (e.g., Gen 36:6; Lev 7:20; Num 31:35), as a human noun it is most often used without a defined group in view. Similarly, *geber* relates its referent to a group (or to other parties in a situation) in roughly 1 out of 5 cases;[36] and *'ĕnôš* in perhaps 1 out of 7 cases.[37]

In short, אִישׁ stands out among its peers for its ability to relate individuals to a particular group, community, or to other parties in a given situation. Relationality is a distinctive and abiding aspect of the meaning of אִישׁ.

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[33] Stein 2008a:15 also mentioned "stars in the sky" (Isa 40:26) as an entity to which אִישׁ is applied. However, that instance is best seen as part of an extended metaphor of personification (Olyan 2012:193–95). That is, the prophet is not applying the noun אִישׁ directly to stars as such.

[34] Pronoun-like usages are widely noted in the dictionaries, especially Schökel 1993.

[35] The noun *nepeš* is applied to animals as a possessed quality; see Clines 2001b:730, s.v. "being, creature."

[36] Candidate instances include: Exod 10:11; 12:37; Josh 7:14, 17, 18; Jer 31:22; 41:16; 43:6; 44:20; Joel 2:8; Job 16:21; 1 Chr 23:3; 24:4; 26:12. Evaluating them is beyond the scope of this study.

[37] Candidate instances include: Jer 20:10; Ps 55:14; Job 9:2; 15:14; 25:4; 33:26.

Note that of all the distinctive traits listed, relationality is the one that most directly impacts the meaning contribution of our noun. Being the most salient aspect in terms of meaning, it is of greatest interest to me as a student of the Bible. That being said, to assess relational meanings is not a trivial endeavor. Consequently, in order to truly understand our noun's nature, I have made relationality the featured aspect of this study.

1.4 Problem Statement and Focus

The problem that this study seeks to address is how to account for the aforementioned distinctive features of אִישׁ coherently. Given the many ways that this word is special, how are they related to each other? As a promising way to answer that question, the focus of research will be on *integrating three main concepts*. The first of these is, as the title states, this noun's many *relational* meanings—that is, its contributions to meaning aside from a straightforward description of intrinsic features ('man/woman' or 'human being'). Relational usages will provide a key to understanding its other distinctive features.

The second concept is that a concern for *communicative efficiency* and *cognitive preference* play a central role in accounting for our noun's distinctive usages.[38]

And the third main concept is the intersection of a pair of special noun classes. One class is known as *general nouns* (semantically underspecified), *generic nouns*, or *ground nouns* (pointing to ontological categories); and the other class is called *human nouns* (customarily referring to humans).[39]

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[38] In cognitive psychology, noun labels that are short, easy-to-pronounce, and frequently used (like אִישׁ) are said to be characteristic of terms for what have been called *basic-level categories*. Such categories have been shown to be cognitively favored in a variety of ways, leading to a preference in some circumstances for the *basic-level terms* that point to those categories. (For discussions, see Taylor 2002:131–32; Murphy 2002:199–242; Ungerer and Schmid 2006:64–75; Cruse 2011:62; Hajibayova 2013; Evans 2019:267–99.) Important work on the application of this idea to *human beings* has appeared (Downing 1977, Cantor and Mischel 1979, Downing 1980; and more recently Mihatsch 2017). However, this line of research still leaves too many operational questions unanswered for my purposes. Consequently, the concept of the basic level will not be discussed in this study.

[39] For an overview of the related linguistics literature and the various overlapping terms used by linguists, see Adler and Moline 2018.

To date, within the published literature of Biblical Studies, the special properties of these classes of nouns do not seem to have been considered. In addition to conducting computerized literature searches, I have consulted various works by biblical scholars that apply linguistic categories to Ancient Hebrew (e.g., Bodine 1992; Bergen 1994; Silva 1994; Groom 2003; Van Wolde 2009; Shead 2011; and the work of Christo van der Merwe and his students).

A similar concept from the generative linguistics tradition (Huang 2010)—a class of *light nouns*, described as "semantically generalized or bleached" (Yap and Wang 2011:61)—was recently introduced into Biblical Studies by Grace Park to analyze a Hebrew nominalizer (2015), borrowed from the study of Asian languages. However, that category was not applied to human-referring nouns, which are of interest here, and so the label "light noun" will not be further considered in the present study.

1.5 The Audience for This Dissertation

The target audience for this dissertation is unusually wide ranging. Among biblical scholars, the noun אִישׁ plays an important role in the study of diverse topics: theology (e.g., Bratsiotis 1974), gender roles (e.g., Murphy 2019), history of religion (e.g., the review of Hamori 2008 by Stein 2009), societal structure (e.g., Chaney 1999), the semantics of the human life cycle (Eng 2011), participant reference (e.g., Revell 1996), and of course Hebrew grammar (e.g., van der Merwe et al. 2017). Among linguists, our noun has received sustained attention in the study of language typology (e.g., Bar-Asher Siegal in press). Meanwhile, the treatment of general nouns and/or human nouns—which figure prominently in this study—has aroused broad interest across the spectrum of linguistics: functional linguists (e.g., Halliday and Hasan 1976), corpus linguists (e.g., Schnedecker 2018a), cognitive linguists (e.g., Mihatsch 2017), computational linguists (e.g., Elmiger 2018), and lexical semanticists (e.g., Fasciolo 2018). Yet no field of study seems to have fully reckoned with the phenomenon that is of interest here. As a prominent researcher on general human nouns concluded five years ago, that category remains *un terrain d'exploration quasi vierge* 'almost virgin territory for exploration' (Mihatsch 2015a:59).

Three consequences of this unusual situation are worth mentioning. First, this dissertation is written in a relatively non-technical manner, so as to be comprehensible to a wide range of readers. Even so, a special challenge has been the choice of terminology. Because this dissertation touches upon many fields of knowledge (including subdisciplines of linguistics), it surely uses certain words in a different way than any given reader is accustomed to. Consequently, if what I seem to be saying sounds wrong or baffling, please consult the Glossary: Definitions of Key Terms. (A term that does not appear in that list is intended in a non-technical sense.)

Second, the treatment of theory is spread widely yet thinly. Wherever possible, I reason from first principles and back up the conclusions with data, rather than relying upon a single theoretical school.

And the third consequence of the diverse audience is that when sourcing linguistic scholarship, for the reader's convenience my citations tend to cite a summary treatment—preferably already within Biblical Studies, or within a recent handbook—rather than the (presumably less accessible) *locus classicus* within the relevant subdiscipline. Unfortunately, space does not permit the consideration or listing of all relevant references.

1.6 Basic Assumptions and Approach

1.6.1 The dataset (corpus)

This study assumes that the biblical text provides accurate evidence of the Ancient Hebrew language, for my particular purposes. One of the benefits of focusing on a commonly occurring term like אִישׁ is that the likelihood of its actual usage being accurately repre-

sented in the biblical record is far higher than for the other words that biblical scholars ponder. Even though the biblical corpus gives us only a limited sample of Ancient Hebrew (Sáenz-Badillos 1993:53; Alter 2004:xxix; cf. Clines 2018a:12, 30), it reliably reflects the actual use by ancient Israelites of its highest-frequency words.[40] Thus for אִישׁ, the risk of sampling bias is relatively small.

What exactly is the "biblical text"? In general I will restrict myself to instances of אִישׁ where the ancient textual witnesses do not seem to differ as to the reading. I grant that the original biblical text cannot be established with certainty, due to a lack of extant evidence, as well as to its transmission history, which has interwoven continual errors and losses with continual attempts at correction and reconstruction (Stein 1999; Tov 2001: 166, 171, 177, 189–90).[41] In practice, I will quote from the Masoretic Text.

Regarding the content of the biblical text, I make two working assumptions, suited for the global scope of the analysis that I will undertake: (1) the composers chose their words carefully—for they were seeking to motivate their audience; and (2) the text is *isotropic*—that is, prevailing patterns of the usage of our noun apply uniformly over time, and across books, genres, dialects, and other causes of variation in language use. (These assumptions will need validation at the end of the study.)

Although the data are "noisy"—there can be meaningless variation between composers/performers of the text, and even the same speaker will vary their wording slightly from one telling to the next[42]—I will explore how far a linguistic-oriented, semantic and pragmatic analysis can take us.

1.6.2 Defining the "word" of interest

There is reason to question this study's focus on the meaning contribution of an individual word, given that a good case can be made that words do not really exist, and that they are not stored in a mental lexicon with assigned meanings. Words are an analytical construct (Lamb 1999:282; Evans 2009; Turner 2015:230; Ramscar and Port 2016). Nonetheless, a one-syllable noun remains a recognizable entity in its own right, whose presence or absence in an utterance evidently makes a difference. As the linguist Dwight Bolinger has written, "The comparative stability of the word, its relatively permanent investment in meaning, is what sets it apart from the higher impromptu assemblies" ([1980] 2014:27). That is sufficient assurance for my purposes.

I have chosen to consider together, by default, all forms of אִישׁ: the masculine singular, feminine singular, and their respective plural forms. That is, I treat those forms as as-

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[40] This applies even to the assessment of word frequency itself (Ramscar and Port 2016:64).

[41] For sobering cautions about the difficulties in interpreting the biblical text as linguistic evidence, see Holmstedt 2009b and Naudé 2003.

[42] On lectal variation in languages in general, see Geeraerts et al. 1994.

pects of the same word. True, both old and new reasons argue for separate treatment. The older reason is reflected in lexicographic tradition, which classifies words according to their verbal roots. Thus the feminine counterpart אִשָּׁה usually appears in an entirely different entry from אִישׁ per se (e.g., Koehler and Baumgartner 2001a, 2001b; Clines 2018b, 2018c). Likewise in the earliest dictionaries, אִישׁ was listed separately from the masculine plural אֲנָשִׁים, for the same reason (e.g., Bedersi 1865 [13th century]).

The newer reason for separate treatment is reflected in corpus linguistic methodology. It has been empirically demonstrated that singular and plural forms of a human noun have different distributional and collocation patterns, as do the masculine versus feminine forms in languages with two or three semantically based grammatical genders (Mahlberg 2005; Schnedecker 2018a; Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018). For example, as is well known, in Hebrew the feminine forms cannot make generic reference.

Nonetheless, three reasons have led me to opt for integrated treatment. The first is that due to the phonological phenomenon known as suppletion (see above, note 12), the auditory or graphical variance among the four forms exaggerates their differential meanings. The second and most important reason is that all four forms share many of the same distinctive functions—that is, functions that are not shared by other general human nouns. Ultimately, I am interested in what lies behind a speaker's decision to use any one of these four forms *rather than* an entirely different label (or rather than a pronoun, or nothing at all). And third, the aggregated data is an inherently richer and more reliable source for establishing both patterns of use and the norms of meaning contribution.

Consequently, this study views אִישׁ as a single word whose form is inflected for number and gender according to the particulars of a given referential situation.

1.6.3 A simple convention for depicting a communication situation

By convention, when I discuss communication, I refer consistently to a "speaker" (as opposed to a writer) and an "audience" (as opposed to a listener or reader). I thus remind myself of two facts that seem salient for biblical scholars: (1) language was initially developed as an oral experience, which is recapitulated as children learn their mother tongue; and (2) in the ancient world, the Bible was mainly a set of orally performed literary works—that is, social experiences—for which the written text served as the script.

My use of the term "speaker" often artificially represents the biblical composers as a singular body, while "the audience" is styled as a singular collective "it." (I imagine the audience facing a theater stage as an attentive throng—yet one that jointly constructs a shared discourse model.) A single speaker and a monolithic audience are simplifications of reality that I have adopted for convenience in description.

1.6.4 Background: Linguistic theory and how language works

The following concepts, gleaned from many fields of linguistics, have informed my over-all approach to Ancient Hebrew in the present study; I present them here for the sake of general orientation, given that they are not universally accepted in Biblical Studies (or in linguistics, for that matter). As for the specific key concepts that underlie the present study, they will be laid out in Chapter 4.

An eclectic approach to theoretical understandings seems warranted when exploring phenomena that transcend any particular discipline. Language—especially an ancient one that is being deciphered outside of its original social setting—is such a complex phenom-enon that it can be profitably approached from many points of view. For a given topic, I have attempted to consult multiple disciplines if they have addressed it, to confirm con-sistency despite those disciplines' possibly divergent theoretical, methodological, and authoritative commitments. Of course, my own commitment to learn from many theoreti-cal perspectives warrants my paying attention to the compatibility of their assumptions and approaches. Discussions about theoretical validity and compatibility will take place largely in the footnotes.[43]

The questions I have posed are best addressed by combining usage-oriented, commu-nication-oriented, and cognitive approaches to language.[44] Background concepts include:

- *Language use is about communication.* Because the goal of language use is com-munication, the elements of language arise from speakers' responses to communi-cative needs. In other words, a term's meaning is discovered only in the context of its actual use. (Bybee and Beckner 2015)

  Communication is made up of two complementary processes: the speaker sig-nals; the audience interprets.[45] The *speaker*'s effort consists of signaling not only the intent to communicate, but also the communicated message itself. The speaker formulates an utterance that constrains the audience's interpretation of the speaker's meaning (or reduces the audience's uncertainty about what the speaker means) just enough to get the message across—based upon the speaker's assessment of what the audience is most likely to assume.[46] In so doing, the speaker draws upon the re-

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[43] On theoretically eclectic methods, see Cook 2018; Moshavi and Notarius 2017; Runge 2014.

[44] "*Cognitive* linguistics and *functional* linguistics … should be regarded as complementary and mutually dependent aspects of a single overall enterprise" (Langacker 1996:333). For a cogently integrated applica-tion of these two approaches to Biblical Studies, see Van Hecke 2011.

[45] This pair of processes comprises the beating heart of relevance theory, where they are called *ostension* and *inference*, respectively (Sperber and Wilson 1987). The speaker's effort consists of signaling not only the intent to communicate, but also the communicated message itself.

[46] "The more information that the speaker assumes the hearer is able to access in the processing of an utter-ance, the less explicit the utterance can be" (LaPolla 2003:117–18; so also Piantadosi et al. 2017).

sources of a particular language. Each language has evolved its own conventions—that is, its speakers' ways of constraining the audience's interpretation—based on what has seemed important in that society. As functional linguist Randy LaPolla has noted, "Language is the unintended byproduct of [speakers'] attempts to communicate effectively (constrain the addressee's inferential process effectively) on an individual level" (2003:123).

The *audience*'s effort, in turn, consists of not only inferring that the speaker wishes to communicate something, but also of noting the utterance's form, while assembling a context in which that utterance makes sense (or achieves relevance). That is, the audience infers the speaker's overall point, presuppositions, intended references, intended senses of the uttered words and structures, and intended unstated implications—all as needed to readily construe that utterance as both coherent (within the discourse) and informative. The audience's interpretation consults its knowledge of general background assumptions, contextual and co-textual information, and general principles and conventions of language use. All aspects of interpretation involve *inference*—that is, "the creation of a set of assumptions, a context, which can be added to whatever part of the signal or message has been recovered up to that point (it is a dynamic process) to deduce the most likely form and possible motivation for its production" (LaPolla 2003:135; cf. LaPolla 2014, 2015; Ramscar et al. 2010; Traugott and Dasher 2002:17–18).

- The audience's prediction follows from the speaker's cue; it leads to a given expectation (Ramscar et al. 2010:912). The learning process is driven by discrepancies between what is expected and what is actually observed ("error-driven learning"). Any difference between the expectations prompted by a given cue and what is observed produces learning. As an utterance is encountered and interpreted, its words serve as both *cues* (prompts to prediction) and *outcomes* (the subject of prediction). The audience looks for—and attends to—those cues that reliably minimize error in prediction. "Communication can thus be seen as a process of aligning a speaker and a listener's predictions" (Ramscar et al. 2010:943).

- *The nature of using a term to make reference.* Although we conventionally speak about a referring expression as "pointing" to its referent, it does not actually do so. Rather, successful reference is a matter of the audience's learning to predict the speaker's intent: "the imperative 'look at that chair!' works communicatively because there is an object present that successfully cues the word 'chair'" (Ramscar et al. 2010:940). The mental association between that object (more precisely, its mental representation) and the linguistic term, if proven to be predictively reliable, is then thought of informally as the "meaning" of the word *chair*. It becomes a learned convention of communication (ibid., 947).

- *Norms and Exploitations.* Successful communication is built upon shared expectations. That is, language users construe the meaning of an utterance against the backdrop of what they understand to be conventional usage. Phrasing that is frequent and recurrent is treated as *normal*. Idiosyncratic expressions may signal a rare norm (such as an idiom), or perhaps an exploitation. An *exploitation* is a deliberate departure from normal word use—for marking the topic as unusual, or for verbal economy, or for rhetorical effect, etc. An exploitation sends a meaningful signal via its flouting of expectations. The dichotomy between norms and exploitations is a heuristic; those "opposing" uses of a word actually lie on a continuum. Procedurally speaking, because an exploitation takes the norm for granted, the latter must be well understood in order for the audience to wrest the proper meaning from the former. Consequently, given a word of interest, it is particularly desirable to study those usages that are repeated and reinforced (Hanks 2013).

- *Utterances as a sequence of signals.* Communication is a sequential process; therefore, the speaker must actively manage the order and the combination of uttered words. A text forms a sequence of signals that initiate a process of generating meaning for the audience. Each signal offers a further clue, and thus it guides the process of interpretation. (Hardmeier and Hunziker-Rodewald 2006)

- *Discourse model.* In communicative situations, the audience forms a mental representation of what the speaker (or writer) is depicting. That representation is known as the "discourse model" (or as the "situation model"). It is populated by participants that the audience must keep track of. This internal model is like a puppet theater that faithfully instantiates the reported situations and events that the speaker telegraphs from another location. Successful communication requires that the speaker attend to and manage the audience's discourse model, particularly with respect to its participants (Lambrecht 1994; Kintsch 1998; van Berkum et al. 2007; Aitchison 2012:89).

- *Meaning potential.* Each word has its own set of properties that—together with salient aspects of the context—renders plausible a given usage and its interpretation. Through recurring usage, certain specifications of the word's contribution to meaning have become well-worn tracks, which can be abstracted as the word's "sense" in such contexts. Meaning potential includes not only referential use and descriptive sense, but also the word's particular tendencies to appear (or not) with certain other words and in certain situations (Norén and Linell 2007).

- *Distinguishing among word senses.* The various senses of a polysemous word may be distinct on a gradient, due to the influence of context in actual use. "Some word senses, while appearing to be distinct in certain contexts, appear not to be in

others" (Evans 2019:451). Meanwhile, some senses are more independent of context than others (ibid.).

- *Cognitive semantics.* Word meaning should be viewed in terms of what words access—namely, concepts about the world. Because a word's usage operates against the background of one or more conceptual domains (or frames), our ascertaining its meaning contribution entails that we describe several factors: the relevant domain; the particular aspect of the domain that the word highlights ("profiles"); and the usage's presupposed knowledge or conceptual structure (Cruse 2011:207–09; Van Wolde 2009:104–29).

- *A word's meaning versus the knowledge that it accesses.* I do not employ the working assumption of some cognitive linguists that no practical distinction can be drawn between word meaning and world knowledge. Rather, words as communicated signals evoke a limited, parametric meaning, which in turn accesses larger knowledge structures (Evans 2015, 2019:458–92). The distinction is not only "necessary, important and feasible" (Löbner 2013:293–98; here 294) but also psychologically real (Evans 2015:266–70 and Hanks 2013).

- *Words neither have content nor convey meaning.* As a matter of English idiom, we say that speakers "convey" semantic "content" via words. More precisely, however, in actual language use, a speaker's utterance prompts an audience to construct meaning by making inferences about the speaker's choice of words in the context of that utterance. Words *evoke* meaning in the mind of the audience (Reddy [1979] 1993; Seto 2003:201; Fauconnier 2004; Turner 2015; Ramscar and Port 2016).

- *A lexico-grammatical cline.* In a given natural language, there is no clear line that separates its lexicon from its grammar, or its open-class ("content") words from its closed-class ("function") words (Contini-Morava and Tobin 2000). Hence the language's stock of resources can be modeled as a continuum ("cline") with lexical functions at one end, and grammatical functions at the other end (Anstey 2006).

- *Interpretation of nouns within a paradigm of options.* A noun does not have a fixed meaning. What matters is what that label is expected to mean in the given context, and its place within the language's existing system of lexical contrasts (Ramscar and Port 2015, 2016). The idea that a listener ascertains why a speaker/author employed a particular word *as opposed to other available words* is a fundamental concept in both cognitive linguistics and structural linguistics. In Biblical Studies, it has been implicit in the dictionaries of synonyms (above, note 7) and was famously championed by James Barr (1968:14–15).

- *How a word's meaning grows and changes over time.* After a word in a given language comes to be conventionalized as having a certain phonological form, presumably it begins with a single meaning that corresponds to that form. Over time,

that word may develop additional conventionalized, cognitively entrenched meanings ("senses"). Furthermore, its prototypical meaning may shift over time to one of its newer meanings, while still preserving the initial meaning as a less salient option (or even dropping it altogether). A word's various senses are presumed to develop in ways that are both cognitively motivated (i.e., according to natural thought processes) and pragmatically motivated (i.e., according to context), extending the earlier meaning(s). Taken together, a word's senses bear a "family resemblance" to each other. (Geeraerts 2010:229–33; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Malt 1991)

• *Procedure for determining an ancient word's meaning: seek explanatory parsimony.* When investigating the meaning of a particular word in Biblical Hebrew, "the safest approach is to start with the assumption that there is one single concept behind [it]"; afterward, check how well that assumption holds up across all of the word's instances, and how well it explains the word's behavior (de Blois 2010a:5).

1.6.5 What is "relational meaning"?

For the purposes of the present study, *relational meaning* is manifested when our noun is used as a prompt for the audience to *relate its referent to something else*. That is, the meaning contribution of אִישׁ in that utterance is something other than an invitation to the audience to regard the referent only in terms of intrinsic features—as an adult male (or female) or as a person.

As will be discussed in Chapter 2, relational meaning can be generated on one (or both) of two levels: the informational level and the discourse level. On the informational level, אִישׁ can be used to profile its referent in terms of another participant (an individual or a group) in the depicted situation, or in terms of a standard role in that situation. And on the discourse level, אִישׁ can be used to manage its referent's perceived relationship to other referents, as represented in the audience's mind. Thus relational meaning is a rich and complex topic.

Relational manifestations of אִישׁ are many and varied. In the course of this study, they will come into view in turn, like the petals of an unfolding flower.

1.6.6 (Masculine) Gender

The present study will bracket what is usually understood to be a significant semantic feature of the masculine form אִישׁ: gender—in particular *referential gender* and *lexical gender*. There are two reasons for doing so.

First, in most cases in which masculine singular אִישׁ is used, the referent's gender is simply not specified. An analysis of the tallies by Alison Grant (1977) according to her

categories shows that most instances of masculine אִישׁ are employed in such a way that they *do not specify* the gender of their referent (see Table 1.2).[47]

It is a basic property of Hebrew that referential gender is specified neither by grammatically masculine singular nouns that are employed in nonspecific reference, nor by masculine plural nouns (Stein 2008c; Stein 2013).[48] Applying these criteria to Grant's figures, it appears that referential gender is communicated by *fewer than a third* of the Bible's instances of masculine אִישׁ (31%).[49]

Table 1.2 Referential Gender in the Use of Masculine אִישׁ for Human Reference

Label	Category description: reference type	Count	
UNSPECIFIED REFERENTIAL GENDER			
	Anyone or everyone belonging to a particular group (plural form)	501	
	Each and every member of a particular group of human beings	369	
	Anyone belonging to an undefined (yet circumstantially male) group	190	
	Anyone belonging to a defined (yet circumstantially male) group	165	
	Anyone otherwise belonging to a defined group	128	
	Anyone—without clear specification of gender, nation, or other defined group	91	
	Nonspecific human beings	31	
	SUBTOTAL	**1477**	(69%)
SPECIFIED REFERENTIAL GENDER			
	Anyone or everyone belonging to a particular group (singular collective use)	244	
	A particular individual	429	
	SUBTOTAL	**673**	(31%)
	TOTAL	2150	(100%)

[47] This finding is consistent with 20 biblical dictionary entries that have refrained from characterizing אִישׁ as primarily "male" in meaning (Stein 2019, Excursus 8). In contrast, one of the most recent entrants holds that אִישׁ refers "more often than not [to] the male sex" (Sigrist 2014, s.v. Lexical Information > אִישׁ). That statement ought to be construed as reflecting the social gender of the referents (as identifiable by other means) rather than the lexical sense of, or the referential-gender ascription by, the term אִישׁ itself.

[48] Further support for this claim is based upon the observation that in nonspecific reference, a given referent exists only in the discourse, not in reality (Frajzyngier 1991:244; Haspelmath 1997:109; see below, Chapter 8, note 2). The linguist Zygmunt Frajzyngier has shown that many languages make *fewer coding distinctions* in their system of reference for the discourse level of meaning than for the informational level (1991; in Frajzyngier's terms: the "domain of speech" versus the "domain of reality"; see below, §2.3). Evidence that Hebrew is one such language includes not only nouns such as אִישׁ but also pronouns: Hebrew's distinctions in referential gender include a default-masculine encoding for singular-addressee, interrogative, and indefinite pronouns in an *irrealis* setting (i.e., referring only within the discourse); in contrast, in a *realis* setting such pronouns' referential gender must reflect their referent's social gender (cf. ibid., 247–48).

[49] Adapted from Grant 1977, after subtracting 20 non-human and 6 "miscellaneous" references. Grant provided almost no illustrations of how she assigned specific instances to her categories. Nonetheless, the main conclusion is not sensitive to potential disagreement regarding individual instances.

A converging line of evidence comes from my experience as revising editor for the CJPS translation (Stein et al. 2006), the gender-sensitive adaptation of the NJPS translation of the Torah. As described below (§3.5), we restricted the use of *man* in English as a rendering for אִישׁ only to where the Hebrew term means simply an 'adult male' in the absence of a more salient relational meaning. Out of 458 instances of masculine singular אִישׁ in the Pentateuch, only 62 meet that criterion.[50] In other words, in more than 86% of the cases, maleness is at most a secondary (and superfluous) semantic contribution of אִישׁ.

Both results imply that the Bible's composers use the "male" noun אִישׁ mostly in order to communicate *something else about its referent besides gender*. Now, by setting gender aside as a category of analysis, we can (and should) open up the space to ask what *is* being communicated in the vast majority of cases. Meaningful answers to this question, if they are found, will serve to validate my strategy of setting gender aside temporarily.

The second reason for bracketing gender is that even for a reference that would specify referential gender, it is unclear whether אִישׁ in the biblical period was considered to be lexically gendered—or merely grammatically so, with local pragmatic enrichment supplying the inference of gender (or not), on an ad hoc basis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, nearly all of this noun's biblical usages are ambiguous with respect to lexical gender. The exceptions are eight passages found in six books, where in definite reference אִישׁ clearly applies to a mixed gender group.[51] The vexed question of the lexical gender of אִישׁ is treated in Stein 2019, which finds that (1) lexical gender is a gradient aspect of the semantics of masculine nouns that have feminine counterparts (in languages with semantically based grammatical gender)—with all such nouns being in effect slightly lexically gendered in specific reference, and (2) the degree of lexical gender can change over time; e.g., אִישׁ evinces a much lower level in the Bible than in Rabbinic texts.[52]

1.6.7 What constitutes proof?

Before proceeding to consider similar nouns in Chapter 2, let us pause to ponder how a hypothesis can best be confirmed or disconfirmed. As per proper scientific method, my research is designed to be judged by whether its explanation for the observed phenomena is "better" than that of the existing accounts. A hypothesis is superior to the extent that it can account elegantly for at least most of the data, while resolving existing cruxes—

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[50] Out of those 62 instances, at most 4 involve reference to a specific individual (Gen 37:15, 17; 49:6; Lev 24:10 [second instance]); the rest make reference to a nonspecific type of adult male. In all 62 cases, the qualities of adulthood and maleness were evident from the context, thus constraining the interpretation.

[51] Gen 17:23; Exod 35:21; Lev 14:11; 17:4 (first instance); 17:9; Deut 29:19; Judg 9:49; 1 Chr 16:3. For an analysis, see Stein 2019, Excursuses 2 and 4.

[52] Meanwhile, the feminine form אִשָּׁה consistently remains a referentially and lexically gendered term.

particularly the most important ones (Voelz 2008). And as the historical linguist Pedro Beade has put it, "the best falsification in any science is a better hypothesis" (1989:180).

I will advance a hypothesis that leads me to make "predictions" as to how אִישׁ is expected to behave in the biblical corpus. I use that word advisedly because—even though the test data are fixed and more than a millennium old—I usually did not know the outcome in advance. Thus the hypothesis testing was, for me, a voyage of discovery and confirmation.[53] Nonetheless, the reader is welcome to think in terms of *implications* rather than *predictions*.

To decide between possible competing explanations in a given instance (such as an interpretive crux), I follow what has been called "explanatory parsimony": the favored interpretation makes *the fewest (and least-cost) assumptions* and involves *the fewest propositions*, and is consistent with what is known about how human beings use language. For language processing in particular, the favored construal is one that "readily yields a coherent and informative result."[54] Such an outcome will be taken as confirmation of the theory—if that construal can be applied systematically in similar situations and constructions. Hence I will alternate between considering individual cases and looking for *recurring patterns* of usage. This approach prudently grounds the theoretical claims in actual usage situations, while guarding against relying upon ad hoc, special-pleading explanations.

In other words, after formulating a hypothesis I will rely upon deduction to formulate its logical consequences as predictions. Then I will subject those predictions to empirical testing. If such testing shows that the predictions come true, this validates the hypothesis. Or more precisely, it fails to falsify the hypothesis, so that it survives in order to be subject to future testing (Givón 2018:226).

1.6.8 The role of analogy

In this study I draw many analogies (sometimes expressed as a metaphor). I have three reasons for doing so. First, the accumulation of knowledge is a matter of relating new information to what we already know. Knowledge is analogical at its core (Gentner and Colhoun 2010; Gentner and Hoyos 2017).

Second, even the most basic concepts in linguistics are analogies. Concepts such as <word> and <noun> and even <language> are mere reified approximations of reality (Ramscar and Port, 2015, 2016). They claim that "language is *like* this simplified model."

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[53] See Daniel Kahneman's criterion for scientific rigor: "The ultimate test of an explanation is whether it would have made the event predictable in advance" (2011:200).

[54] These points are fully argued and exhaustively documented in Stein 2018 and Stein forthcoming. Space constraints do not permit their rehearsal again here.

And third, when it comes to offering alternative hypotheses, scientists must suggest to their audience, "Think about it this way—instead of that way," where *way* refers to some analogy. Ultimately, the scientific enterprise is, as one science writer has put it, "a form of competitive storytelling" (Harman 2018).

All analogies will break down if stretched too far. Yet as my engineering training has led me to understand, when scholars construct explanations for an observed phenomenon, we need to get only *close enough for the particular purpose at hand*. So the question to pose about my recourse to analogies is not whether they are conventional or proper, but whether they succeed in illuminating the subject.

1.6.9 Outline of the argument

In the next chapter, I will begin to draw lessons from the study of two other languages that can potentially be applied to אִישׁ. In Chapter 3, I will summarize the Biblical Studies literature on the relational meanings of אִישׁ, including many controversies, to highlight what the field can learn from a new analysis of our noun. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will review humans' communicative need for nouns like אִישׁ and construct a model of how such nouns function in the mind. In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I will test the model's predictions, thus explaining distinctive aspects of the behavior of אִישׁ that have eluded other approaches, as well as resolving longstanding interpretive cruxes. Finally, in Chapter 9, I will validate this study's assumptions and discuss its implications not only for Ancient Hebrew but also for other languages.

2 Workhorse Human Nouns

> *Everything in a text does something.…* What seems redundant on one level might be doing something extra on another level.… What seems redundant locally might be securing more long-range cohesive connections.
>
> —Francis Andersen (1994:106; emphasis in original)

As discussed in the previous chapter, the noun אִישׁ is remarkable among its fellow human nouns. In at least two other languages, a particular human noun possesses a similar set of distinctive characteristics. A variety of linguistic theories have made observations about those nouns. This chapter adduces those observations and tentatively applies them to אִישׁ.

Specifically, this chapter observes that אִישׁ closely resembles the English human noun *man* and the French human noun *homme*. All three words are used in similarly distinctive ways that produce special cognitive and linguistic effects. I therefore will argue for considering these three words as forming their own linguistic category.

2.1 Our Distinctive Noun Is Not Alone

What do linguists already know about nouns like אִישׁ? Quite a lot, it turns out.…

2.1.1 To find the real comrades of אִישׁ, look in other languages

Our noun in Biblical Hebrew (a Semitic language) can be productively likened to well-studied words in English (a Germanic language) and in French (a Romance language).[1] Table 2.1 aligns the masculine form of אִישׁ with English *man* and French *homme*, with respect to the distinctive characteristics of אִישׁ that I identified in Chapter 1. For each noun, the comparison made is to the cohort of other fairly general human nouns in that particular language. For English, the operationalized cohort is: *adult*, *guy*, *human being*, *individual*, *person*, *soul* (as gleaned from thesaurus websites). For French, it is: *être humain*, *gens*, *humain*, *individu*, *particulier*, *personne*.[2]

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[1] The English language is considered "Germanic" partly on the basis of the source of its everyday vocabulary—a categorization that applies to our English word of interest, *man*.

[2] For both English and French, my data is sometimes imprecise—yet sufficient for this purpose. The individual claims are not very controversial; the main conclusion is not sensitive to errors in individual entries.

The class of human nouns is not small; a computational linguist has compiled a list of approximately 60,000 in French alone (Elmiger 2018:188). However, for this study I am focusing on those few nouns with relatively *general application*—which have special properties. On such distinctions, see also Mihatsch and Schnedecker 2015; Schnedecker 2015; Mihatsch 2015a, 2015b; Schnedecker 2018b; see below, note 7.

Of the many functions that in Hebrew are concentrated in אִישׁ, in present-day French some are more broadly distributed among the set of general human nouns. Nonetheless, *homme* stands apart from most other human nouns in a variety of respects that it happens to share with אִישׁ; cf. Mihatsch 2017; Cappeau

Table 2.1 Similarly Distinctive Features of Three Human Nouns

Feature	Hebrew אִישׁ	English *man*	French *homme*
Phonologically short	✔	✔	✔
Easy to pronounce	✔	✔	✔
Frequently used	✔	✔ [a]	✔ [e]
Highly dispersed	✔	✔ [b]	✔ [f]
Highly semantically mutable	✔	✔ [c]	✔ [g]
Employed even where apparently superfluous	✔	✔ [d]	✔ [d]
Matched with a regular feminine counterpart	✔	✔	✔
Used in pronoun-like ways	✔	✔ [d]	✔ [d]
Applied to non-human entities	✔	✔ [d]	[h]
Often used in a relational sense	✔	✔ [d]	✔ [d]

NOTES: **a.** *Man* (masculine singular) is the 11th most-frequent common noun in the Bank of English corpus; in its cohort, it is the most frequently used noun (Mahlberg 2005:51). **b.** My own intuition as a native speaker.   **c.** More so than the other terms in its cohort: *OED* lists more than 50 senses for (masculine) *man*, although many are now rare or obsolete. "*Man* enters into an almost unlimited number of phraseological collocations in which it is connected by a preposition with another noun," as well as 63 phrases, seven types of compounds (262 listed), seven expressions, and twelve syntactic collocations. **d.** See discussion below.   **e.** Corpus frequency counts (in thousands): *homme + femme =* 648 + 623 = 1,271; *personne* = 1,211; *individu* = 71; *humain* (including adjectival use) = 132.[3]   **f.** For the set of 10 genres within a certain large corpus, the 7 genres with the most instances of *hommes* (plural) together accounted for 81% of its total count, which reflects the lowest degree of concentration among its plural and collective peers; cf. its even more numerous synonyms, *gens* and *personnes*, at 94% and 93%, respectively (see Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018:76).   **g.** More senses than any other in the cohort (*Le Petit Larousse Illustré*, 2003). "Il est clair que l'interprétation d'homme varie selon les contextes, ce que prouverait la diversité des [80] synonymes qui lui sont reconnus" (Schnedecker 2018a:18; cf. Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018:65–66).[4] Also, compared with its cohort plurals or *gens*, the plural form *hommes* is the only one that appears with a full range of determination; and it combines readily with a wider range of group terms, e.g., *associa-*

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and Schnedecker 2018. Furthermore, the plural noun *hommes* is most likely to be found today in literary genres, where it is used more often than its cohort plurals or *gens* (ibid., 76–77). In this respect it is a good match for אִישׁ in the biblical text—a literary work. In any case, in this study I include older (archaic or rare) usages of *homme* and *man*, as well. The Bible reflects a thousand years' worth of usage of אִישׁ, after all.

[3] *Source*: Leipzig Corpora Collection (2019), from 2012, counting also the plural and capitalized forms.

[4] "It is clear that the interpretation of *homme* varies according to the context, which is shown by the diversity of its [eighty] recognized synonyms."

tion de hommes (Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018:71–72).   **h.** The consulted dictionaries and articles do not mention such a sense.

CONCLUSION: The words אִישׁ, *man*, and *homme* each stand out from their respective cohort nouns in similar ways. When viewed against the background of the other human nouns, these three words resemble each other greatly.

2.1.2 Defining a new class: workhorse human nouns

The three nouns in question are both distinct enough from their respective cohorts and similar enough to each other that they deserve to be classed together. (This restricted class of one distinctive noun in each language is meant to include any other language's noun that shares most of the listed features.) Therefore I will give it a name. In honor of their being so markedly useful, I call them "workhorse human nouns."[5] For convenience, however, I often shorten that label to "workhorse nouns" or even simply "workhorses."[6]

As we shall soon see in more detail, both *man* and *homme* have been categorized by linguists as among the *general human nouns*.[7] That is, these words belong in the class of denotationally defined *human nouns* that overlaps with the functionally defined class of *general nouns*.[8] Consequently, I will apply what is known about general human nouns to our noun. I will also note what is distinctive about our tiny class of workhorses within its larger class. In subsequent chapters, this straightforward approach will explain a great deal about how אִישׁ functions in the Bible.

This chapter will document various functions and properties of *man* and *homme*. Generally it will suffice to cite examples of the masculine forms, which is my default because they offer both the generic and the gendered usages. Constraints of space and time unfortunately have not permitted my adding examples for *woman* and *femme*.

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[5] I mean *workhorse* in the sense of 'a markedly useful or durable vehicle' (*Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary*), where "vehicle" is applied metaphorically. These nouns are quite serviceable, and that is why they are employed so frequently. (Whether similarly distinctive nouns exist outside the semantic domain of human beings is beyond the scope of this study.)

[6] I treat *man/woman/men/women* in English as a single word whose form is inflected for number and gender, and similarly *homme/femme/hommes/femmes* in French. For convenience, I usually refer to these clusters simply as *man* and *homme*, respectively. This corresponds to my treatment of אִישׁ (§1.6.2).

[7] Alternatively, they have been called *human general nouns*. The preferred terminology depends upon whether one's starting point is *human nouns* (focusing on the semantically general ones among them) or *general nouns* (focusing on those with broad application and with properties as described in the next note). Both directions of study are instructive. In the linguistics literature, human nouns are also known as *personal nouns* or *anthroponyms*.

[8] General nouns resemble superordinate terms (hyperonyms) in that they are semantically underspecified and likewise participate in reference strings. However, they are considered a distinct nominal category due to various important discourse and perspectival roles that they often play (Adler and Moline 2018:5–6, 13; Schnedecker 2015).

2.2 Abandoning Certitude about Workhorse Nouns

We may not be able to understand workhorse human nouns as long as we are sure that their meaning contribution begins with 'adult male' (or 'adult female') or even 'human being'. As already noted in §1.6.6, the masculine form אִישׁ usually does *not* mean 'adult male' in actual practice.[9] Nor does the generic idea of 'human being' seem to be a significant part of the meaning contribution of אִישׁ, given the competition from general nouns in the human domain. In the Bible, the noun *'ādām* is used of "mankind, or men in general" more than ten times as often as אִישׁ (331 versus 31 instances; Grant 1977:2–3), while still another word in the same cohort (*'ĕnôš*) is likewise used for mortal humankind in contrast to deity. It appears that אִישׁ is relied upon to make some other contribution(s).

This is not to deny that the categories of 'adult male' and 'adult female' are arguably basic to society and even universal (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2013:50–53). However, those concepts are not always expressed by the same word over time (Grygiel 2012). Nor are they necessarily expressed by a single word (as attested by the Japanese plural *otoko no hito* 'men'). And in different languages, the same set of functions may be spread differentially across that language's set of general human nouns.

Let us be careful not to confuse the history of the *concept* with the history of the *word form*. The following brief review—a composite picture drawn from numerous sources—can remind us all that those two aspects of language can take very different paths.[10]

- In proto-Semitic, the concept 'adult male' was probably expressed by something other than אִישׁ. (No such word form is found in most Semitic languages.) Meanwhile, however, the concept 'adult female' must have been expressed by a precursor of אִשָּׁה. (That word form has cognates even in languages that lack אִישׁ: Ugaritic, Akkadian, Arabic, Ethiopic.)
- The Latin *vir* 'man' passed into Old English (*wer*)—but not Old French (*home*). Conversely, the Latin *femina* 'woman' passed into Old French (*fame*)—but not Old English (*wif*). The Middle English *woman* derives from the Old English compound *wifmann* 'womanly human being'.
- The English word form *man* has shifted its meaning through the ages. It may derive from the Indo-European **man(c)r* 'hand, power'. By the time of Old English, it is conventionally said to have meant 'human being'. In the Middle English period, it displaced *wer* as the term for 'adult male human being'.
- The French word form *homme* 'man' has also seen its meaning shift over time: it derives from the Indo-European *gome 'earth', which evolved into the Latin *homo* 'human being', and from there to Old French *home* 'man'.

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[9] Nor is אִישׁ reliably among the nouns used to describe a human-like appearance; see Chapter 7, note 29.

[10] *Sources*: The dictionaries cited in this chapter and the next; Curzan 2003; Grygiel 2012; Rauer 2017.

When people think about a word's meaning, we tend to start with its "dictionary definition"—also known as its *residual* (or citation) meaning.[11] However, although such abstractions are useful in everyday life, they can also be quite misleading. During actual linguistic communication, audiences do not process a word on the basis of its residual meaning. According to the cognitive linguist Gilles Fauconnier, "These defaults are not a basis for constructing the more elaborate meanings, rather they are special cases.… They are psychologically real, but not theoretically fundamental" (2004:668–69).

This is especially true of workhorse nouns. Given their highly mutable nature (i.e., context dependence), their *residual* meaning is largely irrelevant. In her 2005 monograph, the corpus linguist Michaela Mahlberg examined the usage patterns of twenty high-frequency noun forms in mainstream British English.[12] Among them was a set that I am treating as a single workhorse noun: *man*, *woman*, *men*, and *women*. Mahlberg found that residual meaning usually had little to do with the actual function in texts of these general human nouns (ibid., 126, 170, 126, 114):

> If they are isolated from text, only a few of their characteristics become obvious, and these are mainly concerned with physical features.… [In contrast,] in the texts, the uses of the people nouns are not primarily concerned with physical features.… The people nouns illustrate aspects of social experience.… In texts, features of people's characters and personalities are important, as well as relationships between people and the way in which people see one another.

As Mahlberg concludes, "This situation has consequences for the meaning of words." At least among English speakers, what matters is *how human beings interact with others*. They employ people nouns accordingly. Yet that salient concern and its consequent usage patterns tend not to be noticed when we look at a workhorse noun in isolation—which is why it has taken a corpus linguist to point these facts out to us.

Consequently, the residual (dictionary) meaning of workhorse nouns will hardly figure in the present study. For I will remain focused on the relational functions that make such words more meaningful than when they are viewed in isolation.

2.3 Two Levels of Meaning

I am about to discuss the special qualities of workhorses. However, before we get onto that main road, we must go back and pick up an important set of passengers—the two

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[11] I adopt the term *residual* herein from the lexicographer John Sinclair, who wrote that such a meaning "has to be strongly enough associated with the particular word that it is recalled on citation [by itself], and it cannot rely on people being able to imagine a suitable cotext" (as cited in Mahlberg 2005:60). Figuratively speaking, it is the postulated "residue" of meaning that remains after a word is fished out of the lake (that is, its context in language use) and allowed to dry in the sun.

[12] The specific corpus was the British English component of the Bank of English as of October 2000; it consisted mainly of journalistic material in the form of full texts from 1990–2000 (Mahlberg 2005:42).

levels (or dimensions) of meaning that received a passing mention in §1.6.5. They are:

- *informational level*—saying (or more formally: predicating) things about the referent who is participating within the world depicted by the text; and

- *discourse level*—managing the communication, by manipulating the status of participants in the audience's discourse model.

As mentioned, relational meaning can be generated on one (or both) of these two levels. On the *informational* level, relational meaning includes word senses such as 'husband/wife', 'subordinate', 'agent', etc. They relate the referent to another party or situation in the depicted world. On the *discourse* level, it includes the three main functions of situating a participant, elaborating upon that participant, and re-situating that participant under new conditions.[13] Both a sampling of word senses and the aforementioned discourse functions will be detailed further, in this and succeeding chapters.

Language operates on multiple levels because cognition does.[14] The idea that communication is multi-leveled (or multi-layered or multi-dimensional) is shared by many disciplines.[15] Expressing this idea in terms of *levels* of meaning is of course a metaphor. As a model of reality, it turns out to be valuable for understanding referring expressions in general, which must operate on at least two levels at once.[16] For understanding work-

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[13] The discourse level of meaning matters in part because, as the cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker has stated, "An expression's meaning cannot be reduced to an objective characterization of the situation described: equally important for linguistic semantics is how the conceptualizer chooses to construe the situation and portray it for expressive purposes" (1991:315).

[14] Cognitively speaking, the relationship between the levels of meaning is *metonymic*—that is, associative. As T. Givón has emphasized, "Anything that is within the cognitive network is in principle 'related to' anything else within the network" (1982:107). Consequently, the mind jumps readily from one level to another, or is active on more than one level at a time, as guided by considerations of salience.

[15] Roughly similar distinctions are drawn as follows. In *discourse analysis*, specifically Systemic Functional Linguistics: between "ideational," "textual," and "interpersonal" functions (Martin and Rose 2007:8). In *information-structure* studies: between "the text-internal world" and the "text-external world" (Lambrecht 1994:36–37). In *cognitive linguistics*: between "word-to-world" versus "word-to-word" reference (Evans 2019:460–64). In *relevance theory*: between "conceptual" and "procedural" meaning (Grisot 2017; Scott 2016; Carston 2016; Wilson 2011; Scott 2011). In *computational linguistics*: between "informational" and "intentional" levels of discourse (Moore and Pollack 1992; Kehler 2004:260–61; Hobbs 2004:737–38); or between "subject matter relations" versus "presentational relations" (Grosz and Sidner 1986). In *historical pragmatics*: between "the world being talked about" and "the speaker's organization of that world" and "subjectivity" (Traugott and Dasher 2002). In *grammaticalization theory*: between *de re* versus *de dicto* meaning (Frajzyngier 1991). Given that each of these disciplines uses its own terminology for distinctions that are roughly analogous, I have followed their example by using terms that best fit this study's purpose.

[16] This idea is akin to the distinction between *sense* and *reference* articulated by the logician Gottlob Frege (McGinn 2015:1–33; Givón 2018:242; cf. Silva 1994:102ff.; Carson 1996:63–64). A referring expression's "sense" (what it says about the referent) is its contribution to the *informational* level, while its "reference" (its signal to enable the audience to predict that the speaker wants to predicate something about that refer-

horse nouns, it seems to be essential. Ultimately, what qualifies workhorses as such is that unlike most words, these nouns function on two levels *in proportions that vary widely from one instance to another*. This is the secret to a workhorse noun's highly mutable nature.

The key principles to remember about the levels of meaning are: (1) Although they are distinct, they are connected. (2) The elements of discourse always relate to each other on more than one level. (3) When speakers and their audience account for how meaning is generated within a discourse, they always attend to more than one level at a time.

Above, I listed the informational level first because it is presumably more obvious or familiar to the typical reader. Yet for workhorse nouns, this is not the order of importance. As we shall see, the second level (*discourse*) is where they most consistently make a contribution to meaning.

The distinctive features of workhorse nouns surely affect how they generate meaning, in a systematic and integrated way. I will now examine these nouns in light of the above two levels of meaning—while addressing those levels in reverse order. Because the informational level is actually the least explored in the literature, I will save it for last.

2.4 The Meaning of Workhorse Nouns on the Discourse Level

In matters of diplomacy, when a delicate situation in some corner of the world needs attention, one doesn't necessarily dispatch the subject-matter expert who brings a profound depth of knowledge. Rather, one may prefer the generalist who has a calm presence, and who knows how to establish rapport.

Discourse is like diplomacy. Certain communicative tasks require subtlety—a light, responsive touch. As we shall see, such tasks may call for a workhorse human noun. They are the envoys of the discourse world. Their functions include the following types.

2.4.1 Cohesion

The functionally oriented linguists Michael Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan observed that the English noun *man* is often employed to designate a discourse-active referent instead of a pronoun (1976:274–75).[17] They offered the following exemplar. (Crucially, as they themselves noted, the noun phrase *the man* is prosodically unstressed.)

> "Didn't everyone make it clear they expected the minister to resign?"
> "They did. But it seems to have made very little impression on the man."

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ent) is its main contribution on the *discourse* level (see Ramscar et al. 2010). By their very nature, *nouns always operate on both the informational and discourse levels* (cf. Frajzyngier 1991:219). See below, §4.4.

[17] Their function-oriented methodology relied upon applying their keen powers of discrimination and personal intuitions to real texts. They were mainly concerned with the interaction of grammar and lexicon, and thus with how well *man* fits in, or straddles, those two categories.

Halliday and Hasan noticed that *man* behaves here much like a pronoun. They claimed that what is evoked on the informational level by *the man* is no greater than would have been achieved by *him*. In such usages, they assigned *man* to a functionally defined class that they called *general nouns* (1976:274, 276),[18] which they described as

> a small set of nouns having generalized reference.… a borderline case between a lexical item (member of an open set) and a grammatical item (member of a closed system).… General nouns are … often interpretable only by reference to some element other than themselves.

These authors further observed that when a writer or speaker refers to a given party again, a general noun may be used rather than a semantically richer one—including a proper noun. In their view, employing *man* in this way makes the text more cohesive.[19]

Expressed in terms of communicative goals ("information transfer"), we can say that improved cohesion translates into a reduced processing load for the audience. And thus the latter can grasp the writer's message more readily. From a functional viewpoint, then, cohesion is merely *a by-product of the speaker's effort to communicate effectively*. A speaker does not deploy a workhorse noun strictly for cohesion's sake.

As for French, in a corpus study of the French noun *homme* (masculine form only),[20] Catherine Schnedecker (2018) confirmed that in her corpus, *homme* displayed the same cohesive function that Halliday and Hasan had observed for *man*. The French noun's anaphoric usages—wherein it, rather than a pronoun, substitutes for a more specific label—accounted for 30% of its singular instances and 14% of plural instances (2018:17).

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[18] Similar functional classifications of nouns have been variously labeled in the literature: low content nouns, unspecific nouns, advance/retrospective labels, anaphoric nouns, container nouns, carrier nouns, broad sense nouns (or labels), under-specified nouns, summit nouns, and more (Adler and Moline 2018:8). See above, note 8; below, §5.2.2.

[19] "Cohesion expresses the continuity that exists between one part of the text and another" (ibid., 299). This aspect of connectedness has been elaborated by many scholars, such as Mahlberg: "Cohesion can contribute to the readability of a text and have an impact on the comprehensibility and clarity of the argument" (2006:364). The cohesive effect of a general noun in (usually anaphoric) co-reference is *weaker* than a definite pronoun, yet *stronger* than simply reiterating the referent's name (Halliday and Hasan 1976:279). General nouns, the authors explain, improve textual cohesion via their semantic relation of *inclusion* within the scope of a prior label (ibid., 274, 280; Halliday and Mathiessen 2013:642–43). However, other scholars have recently called this explanation into question (below, §5.2.1).

[20] Schnedecker examined 400 occurrences of *homme*: 200 singular and 200 plural, taken from the database Wortschatz, which is said to be fairly representative of standard contemporary French usage. Of those instances, however, 87% involved specific deixis. She recognized this proportion as being unusually high—an artifact of the corpus. (Cf. Mahlberg's corpus, where 40–50% of her 400-token sample involved specific deixis; 2005:115–16.) That being said, Schnedecker's skewed sample helpfully oversampled the anaphoric pronoun-like usages (discussed below), which are fairly rare when speakers refer to someone in general.

2.4.2 Handling discourse participants

Mahlberg's corpus study of *man*, *woman*, *men*, and *women* found that the English work-horse noun carries out significant discourse-enhancing functions. I will illustrate them below with examples for (masculine singular) *man*.[21] This noun[22] often served either to introduce a specific party into the discourse (what Mahlberg called "the introducing func-tion," as in #33), to contribute additional information about them ("the characterising function," #14),[23] or the definite-deictic, co-referential usage usually known as anaphora ("the continuity function," #83) (2005:109, 131–33).[24]

```
14     express a sweetness for Alan Sugar, a man who's been subjected to more abu
33       a round of house calls. One elderly man gave him a generous urine sample
83        ly. ¶ As he hurled himself at the man, the Russian spun sideways then h
```

Mahlberg also offers an additional concept, called the "support function" (2005:113):

> a noun fulfils the support function if it occurs in a structure where its meaning is mainly textual and its word meaning gets less emphasis.[25]

and she cites an example from her English corpus (ibid.), where the fact that the referent is an adult male is already obvious (as also in her #14, above):

```
68     s that her husband is a good-tempered man who cared for their children. To
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Similarly for French, Schnedecker's study found that *homme* is used to execute a va-riety of discourse functions. Illustrated below with examples from her corpus (2018:11–

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[21] Mahlberg's examples are displayed in a standard keyword-in-context (KWIC) format, which truncates the text at a specified number of characters on either side of the word of interest. As will become apparent below, the resulting concordance window aligns the excerpt on the researcher's word of interest. The "14" in the margin indicates that this instance is the 14th entry in her 100-token sample for *man*. In the corpus-linguistics literature, instances are customarily displayed and compared in a monospaced font, as shown.

[22] More precisely: the entire referring expression—and not only the noun as its head term. In this study, I often follow Mahlberg's expedient: "The functions are not fulfilled by the noun alone, but for the sake of brevity I will talk about the noun having a particular function" (2005:107).

[23] Common English examples (with various prepositions) include: "he's a man *with* a mission"; "he's a man *without* shame"; "he's a man *of* his word." Mahlberg includes in this category also characterizations made by comparison ("playing *like a man possessed*"; 2005:108), as well as usages where an indefinite general noun–headed phrase serves in context as a unique referring expression—as in the following obser-vation about a particular rugby player: "The average supporter will wonder how a man who was a squad member at England Colts … can make such a smooth transition.…" (ibid., 109).

[24] A recent corpus stylistic study of one American novel has highlighted the cumulative impact of what Mahlberg (2005) called the "characterising function." The most frequently occurring common noun in the book under study was *man*. Observing it was most often employed with "evaluative adjectives or phrases" about a specific character, the researcher concluded that this novel "foregrounds the presentation of male characters' qualities" (Wijitsopon 2018:18).

[25] I.e., its meaning is mainly on the discourse level while nearly nil on the informational level; see below.

12, 15), they include: to introduce new referents (#46); to characterize a discourse-active referent—either directly (#78) or by providing an *élément cadratif* 'frame of reference' (#38); or to admit additional classifying information into the discourse (##41, 50).[26]

38   *En <u>homme</u> qui aime le consensus, Hubert Falco sait que … les oppositions seront nombreuses.*
        As a <u>man</u> who likes consensus, Hubert Falco knows that … the objections will be numerous.

41   *Mais Zakaria Boualem, <u>homme</u> plein de ressources, a une autre solution.*
        But Zakaria Boualem, a resourceful <u>man</u>, has another solution.

46   *Roxy s'éloigne et finit par rencontrer un <u>homme</u> mystérieux.*
        Roxy moves away and ends up meeting a mysterious <u>man</u>.

50   *La prestation de serment … du Dr Goodluck Jonathan … marque l'apogée*
        d'un <u>homme</u> à l'ascension fulgurante.
        The swearing-in … of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan … marks the apex for a <u>man</u> with a meteoric ascent.

78   *Vous dites souvent que vous n'êtes pas un <u>homme</u> riche…*
        You often say that you're not a rich <u>man</u>…

Two questions arise from the above attestations. First, with regard to the introducing function, one could ask why speakers in both English and French tend to label their new referents (in specific reference) with a workhorse noun (as in #33 and #46 respectively), rather than with another human noun. What is it about *man/woman* and *homme/femme* that makes those the preferred terms?

The second question regards the need to employ these nouns at all, for the other discourse functions. In the French cases, arguably the same messages could have been conveyed with an adjective alone ('not rich'), or a relative pronoun ('who is resourceful'), or an indefinite pronoun ('one who likes consensus', 'someone with a meteoric rise'). Schnedecker thus remarks upon the strangeness of such discourse usages (2018:18).

This question is sharpened by observing that in such usages, very little informational meaning is contributed by the workhorse noun itself. This is apparent in the English examples #14, #68, and #83 above. The residual meaning of the label as 'adult male' is old news; the referent is already active in the discourse—he is already known to be a man.[27] As Mahlberg observes with some puzzlement, "the text already contains more information about the person than the noun alone could provide" (2005:113). So why is the audience being told something that they already know? Why not describe the referent via another label that either is more specific (on the one hand) or less clinical (on the other)? These questions about workhorse nouns will be addressed in Chapter 5.

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[26] Similarly, a study of plural and collective human general nouns has found that more often than the rest of this cohort, *hommes* is likely to appear with an adnominal complement; and it uniquely can be modified by either qualifying or classifying adjectives (Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018:73–74).

[27] The writer presupposed a knowledge of the following background facts: Alan Sugar was a business magnate who owned a football (soccer) team—whose fans had a famously low opinion of him.

2.4.3 Pronoun-like usages

A workhouse noun (or, as discussed below, an alter ego) is sometimes used to direct the audience's attention not merely to a single referent, but to any number of potential referents within a specified (or implied) set. Yet this is what is prototypically accomplished by certain types of pronouns—including indefinites (e.g., 'anybody'), distributives (e.g., 'each'), and reciprocals (e.g., 'one another'). Usually, linguists consider such a task to be a grammatical function. However, the regulation of reference is actually an extralinguistic (pragmatic) matter. Therefore the pronoun-like function of workhorses is best considered to take place on the discourse level.

The linguistic typologist Martin Haspelmath discusses a class of *generic nouns*—defined as "lexical nouns that denote basic ontological categories" such as <human being>. Both the Modern English *man* and Modern Hebrew אִישׁ are exemplars (1997:28).

Regarding the English language, the word *man* was indeed previously employed as an independent subject pronoun in its Old English and in Middle English phases. Back then, it was a sister form of *mann* 'human being'. It was, for example, included as an element in compound indefinite pronouns such as *every man*, which competed in usage with the indefinite pronouns *everyone* and *everybody*. Such pronominal usage of *man* faded away prior to the Modern period, as the full noun became more frequently used as a gendered referring expression in cases with specific reference (Laitinen 2012:637). Nonetheless, some present-day usages are quasi-pronominal (*OED* s.v. 17a), as in the following two examples drawn from Mahlberg's corpus (2005:131):

```
05        When a man's gotta do what a man's gotta do, especially if he's d

15      of every day are almost more than a man can endure. For myself I honestly
```

In these instances, the sense of the phrase *a man* is 'anyone in that situation'.

Haspelmath has observed that in many languages, generic nouns have developed into indefinite pronouns outright; and in some cases, the latter is found alongside of that generic noun's continuing nominal usages (1997:28). This is true in French.[28] The full-

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[28] Kuteva et al. (2019:279–80) list two other languages in which a word for 'man' seems to have developed into a distinct indefinite pronoun: Icelandic and German. In those languages, the respective source nouns might be classed as workhorse nouns, given also that they are close cognates of English *man*. In some other European languages such as Abruzzese, nouns for 'man' have evolved more modestly into a human non-referential indefinite marker; see Giacolone Ramat and Sansò 2007.

The linguist and grammarian Lewis Glinert (1982:460–61) claims that Modern Hebrew has likewise developed a homonymous indefinite pronoun אִישׁ alongside the noun אִישׁ. However, although Haspelmath (1997) accepted that argument, I find it questionable. Of Glinert's three cited defining characteristics of אִישׁ as an ostensible indefinite pronoun, the first is spurious. As discussed below (§8.2), nouns used in singular absolute form, indefinite deixis, and nonspecific reference can appear *only* in non-assertive contexts, contrary to Glinert's assumption. Thus such usages cannot help us to distinguish nouns from pronouns.

fledged indefinite pronoun *on* is a fraternal twin of *homme*—both having derived from the same parent in Old French.[29] In classifying *homme* as a workhorse noun, I credit to it the development of its twin's pronominal functions. (It's a familial achievement.) Regardless, *homme* itself is considered to be a synonym of *quidam* or *quelqu'un* 'someone', suggesting occasional pronoun-like usage.[30]

Many languages lack the kind of dedicated indefinite human pronoun that French has developed. Those languages employ alternative ways of expressing the same concept. One such way is via the relevant generic noun, which accomplishes by lexical means what indefinite pronouns accomplish by grammatical means (Haspelmath 1997:52–53). The generic noun that normally expresses the concept 'person' is deployed so as to express a semantically paler notion: 'someone' (ibid.).[31] That is, when such a noun is used to make indefinite reference, it behaves much like a pronoun (e.g., appearing without modifiers and saying relatively little about its referent).[32]

Regarding generic nouns, Haspelmath repeatedly remarks that when they are used in the same environment as is typical for indefinite pronouns, their semantics and characteristic behavior make them nearly indistinguishable from their more grammatical cousins (1997:182; cf. 10, 27–29, 53):[33]

The other two criteria that Glinert mentions do not pertain to Biblical Hebrew. (1) The frequent modification of biblical אִישׁ by partitive phrases is a behavior shared by other nouns in the corpus (as noted by Moshavi 2018:50; e.g., Gen 2:23); it is not restricted to pronouns as in Modern Hebrew. (2) Unlike what is claimed for Modern Hebrew, the biblical אִישׁ (in singular form, indefinite deixis, and nonspecific reference) *can* take modifiers as normal nouns do (e.g., Gen 29:19; Num 17:5; Deut 17:15).

[29] Over time, what originally in Latin had been a single word with more than one form (*homo* 'human being') split into pieces as the Old French two-case system dissolved. The Old French nominative-case form *hom* 'man', which derived from the Latin nominative *homō*, became the modern indefinite pronoun *on*; meanwhile, the Old French oblique-case form *home* 'man', which derived from the Latin accusative *hominem*, became the modern noun *homme* (Wikipedia contributors 2019).

[30] *Petit Robert* 2017 (in Cappeau and Schnedecker 2018:68); SensAgent (dictionnaire.sensagent.leparisien .fr/homme/fr-fr/). Meanwhile, other French human nouns can likewise occasionally behave like indefinite pronouns: in some situations *personne* has the sense of 'no one, anyone'; and *individu* can mean 'anybody', according to *Le Petit Larousse Illustré* 2003.

[31] This approach is consistent with the language typologist Nobuko Sugamoto's gradient view of semantic "pronominality"—her coinage for assessing the degree of pronoun-like qualities. (This is the inverse measure of what some other linguists have called "nouniness.") She proposed this concept in order to explain *why some nouns have both nominal and pronoun-like uses*. As she wrote, "Such words share the fact that they are broad in meaning, hence high in semantic pronominality. Nouns of high semantic pronominality are more likely than nouns of low semantic pronominality to function also as pronouns" (1989:271). On the continuum between nouns and pronouns, see also Fasciolo 2012.

[32] See also Hopper and Thompson (1984:717): low categoriality in the case of nouns means that they are less prototypically "nouny" in such usages—which includes a reduced semantic potency.

[33] So also Curzan 2003:64, regarding *man* in Old English.

> It is not always easy to tell whether we are really dealing with pronouns, or whether true nouns are used as alternatives to indefinite pronouns.

2.4.4 Meaning on the discourse level: Summary

Both *man* and *homme* regularly fulfill a variety of discourse functions. (1) They can make the message easier to grasp (which has been noticed in the form of improved textual cohesion). (2) They can manipulate the participants that are mentioned in the discourse, in a variety of ways that will be discussed in later chapters. (3) They (or their alter ego, namely a distinct indefinite pronoun) can refer singly to a set of otherwise unspecified individuals, in the same way that several kinds of pronouns do. In short, with respect to discourse, these nouns are versatile.

2.5 The Meaning of Workhorse Nouns on the Informational Level
2.5.1 Both full and muted meanings

At times, as is well known, the workhorse nouns *man* and *homme* are used to describe human beings as a class of entities within the larger field of living beings. They represent the concept of 'human being' as part of a taxonomy. For *man*, this can be seen in its species-generic usages—distinctively without a definite article in Middle and Modern English—such as in a 1994 British newspaper article (*OED*, s.v. 2a):

> But <u>man</u> is a problem solving animal and his ingenuity is endless.

In French, this is exemplified by the regular use of *homme* as a basic classifier term in the dictionary definitions of more specific human labels (Schnedecker 2018a:1, citing *Trésor de la langue française informatisé*):[34]

Mécanicien:	<u>Homme</u> chargé de la conduite et de l'entretien des machines et des moteurs à bord.
Roi:	<u>Homme</u> qui règne (politiquement).
Soldat:	<u>Homme</u> qui sert dans une armée à quelque titre que ce soit.

In the majority of instances, however, workhorse nouns actually say very little about their referents.[35] During her corpus study of English, Mahlberg found a significant number of instances of *man/woman* where their informational contribution seemed trivial (above, §2.4.2). This finding prompted her to wonder whether general nouns like *man* are really nouns at all (2005:166). And to those types of usage can be added the quasi-pronominal instances discussed above in §2.4.3, for likewise they are not deployed to evoke semantic features about their referent.

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[34] '*Mechanic*: <u>Man</u> in charge of the operation and maintenance of engines and motors on board'; '*King*: <u>Man</u> who rules (politically)'; '*Soldier*: <u>Man</u> who serves in an army in any capacity whatsoever'.

[35] In Mahlberg's 100 sample instances of *man*, only 7 were used to denote a taxonomic class (2005:102–3).

In addition, workhorse nouns often do not seem to participate in ordinary taxonomy; for example, it is odd in English to say that "a mechanic is a type of <u>man</u>."

Regarding French, we have seen that *homme* is (like other semantically general nouns for human beings) often used in attributive contexts and in pronoun-like usages. In such cases, it does not situate its referents within a hierarchical taxonomy; it can be considered semi-lexical (Mihatsch 2017).

What lies behind this apparent dual nature of workhorses—cognitively speaking—and how it relates to their ability to function so easily on more than one level of meaning, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

2.5.2 The application (extension) of man to non-human entities

In English, *man* has been applied conventionally to a few kinds of inanimate referents (*OED*, s.v. 24, 25, 27).[36] Perhaps the most common application is to denote game pieces, such as in chess, checkers, and backgammon. I grew up playing a board game called *Sorry!*, which included the following rule (Parker Bros. 1939:5; boldface in original):[37]

> Once a <u>man</u> has been moved into **Home** <u>it</u> is **Out of Play**….

The co-referential pronoun *it* shows that the designation *man* was not a personification.

Another longstanding denotation has been (sailing) ships, with perhaps the best-known example being the expression *man-of-war* to label a combatant warship. A third usage is attested among mountain-climbers, to denote a cairn or "a prominent mass of rock forming part of a mountain" (*OED*, s.v. 27), as in this example (Jones 1897:243):

> …a little further northwards it shows a sudden drop to the level of the Low <u>Man</u>,
> the immense buttress that from below hides the true summit altogether.

If we ask why such entities are called *men*—and not, say, *people* or *individuals* (let alone *sheep* or *daffodils* or *books*)—we can already see that much of the answer comes from the workhorse noun's distinctive features: easy to pronounce quickly; highly available (due to high frequency and broad dispersion); and highly mutable. These features lend themselves to extended meanings—including apparently the application to non-human entities. In Chapter 5, I will discuss the cognitive motivation involved.

2.5.3 Relational meanings

In defining workhorse nouns, I asserted that they have many relational senses.[38] That is,

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[36] Similarly, *guy* can denote an animal or object, particularly a small one.

[37] In subsequent editions of this game's rules, the designation *man* was changed to *piece* and then to *pawn*.

[38] It is beyond the scope of this study to document that the relational usages of *man* and *homme* are relatively more frequent or more variegated than those of their respective cohort nouns. For *man*, this fact is obvious to me as a native speaker; and for *homme* it is obvious to the native speaker whom I consulted.

on the informational level, these nouns can point to their referent as *situated with respect to* some other entity. Let us look at our English and French exemplars, mostly by using dictionary entries as a proxy for corpus investigations.

Since its earliest attestations in Old English, the noun *man* has been used to describe a variety of roles or status positions. These are relational meanings. Many such senses are listed in Table 2.2, excerpted from a dictionary (with a few added examples).

To that list, an additional sense can be added from *OED* (s.v. 20c): "one's representative or envoy *in* a specified place." The best-known example is the title of a bestselling satire of the espionage world by British novelist Graham Greene, *Our Man in Havana* (1958), which became a major motion picture comedy-thriller (1959). In that locution, the related entity is the principal whom the referent is representing as agent.

Table 2.2 Some Distinct Relational Senses of *Man*

Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (as of 2019) — sense entry	Example	Background Entity
1 a : a member of the human race	every *man* must now do his duty	Species (as a group)
2 b : a male human being belonging to a particular and usually specified category (as by birth, residence, or membership) — sometimes without regard to sex when the sex of the individual is not significant to the relation indicated	an experienced *man* of business The *men* of Watsonburg rotated shifts voluntarily our fellow country*men* have each done his or her bit to aid the common cause	Group or category
c (1) : HUSBAND	I'll have to ask my *man*	The other spouse
e : a prosperous or successful person : a person of consequence or high estate	The Negroes are keeping their cool . . . , giving the man a chance. (1968)	Society (rank)
3 : a human male that serves or is subordinate to another or others (including: vassal; (*pl.*) members of a fighting force—especially of the ranks; personal attendant; (*pl.*) working force (as of a factory)	Robin Hood and his merry *men* the guerrillas had upward of 7000 *men* the enemy lost heavily in officers, *men,* and matériel the *men* have been on strike for several weeks	Lord / Commander / Master / Company (business)
b : holder of an office or position of prominence	the present *man* is much inferior to his predecessor	Office / Post
d (1) : the individual one requires or has in mind	he's your *man*	Possessor
5 : the individual best suited or adapted (as to a particular job or responsibility)	he's the *man* for the job—if you can get him	Situation at hand
7 b : one of the players on a team	nine *men* on a side	Team
12 : one extremely fond of or devoted to something specified	I am a Tarriff *Man*	As specified

In some of its senses, *man* is subject to grammatical possession (e.g., *your man*), which is a syntactic sign of relational salience.[39] Semantic frames are also crucial. The

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[39] This selectional tendency is shared with other general human nouns only in the plural (*guys*, *people*).

cognitive linguist Marcin Grygiel explains that some usage contexts call for *man* to be characterized relative to conceptual domains (aside from 'adult male' or 'human being'), such as "occupation/profession," "warrior/soldier," or "husband/male spouse" (2012:82). Within those role-oriented frames, relational meaning is evoked.

Regarding *homme* in French, its relational senses—as gleaned from various dictionaries[40]— include: 'member of an army', 'subordinate', 'one who is capable of fully assuming his responsibilities in a society', and 'human being considered as a social being'. During the monarchy, the expression *homme du roi* 'king's man' described anyone who had a commission from the king. Finally, here are a few additional relational attestations from the dictionary popularly known as *Le Littré* (1880):

> *Dans le siècle où nous sommes, Il faut fuir dans les bois et renoncer aux <u>hommes</u>.*
>> In this century, we must flee into the woods and renounce <u>men</u>.

> *J'irai avec mon <u>homme</u> souper chez vous.*
>> I'll go with my <u>man</u> to dinner at your place.

> *Monsieur, vous êtes mon <u>homme</u>, votre famille m'est connue,*
> *et je vous donne ma nièce en mariage.*
>> Sir, you are my <u>man</u>; your family is known to me; and I give you my niece in marriage.

2.6 Summary

Having considered the shared behaviors of both *man* and *homme*, I can make the following generalizations about the character of workhorse human nouns. First, if we made recourse to the notion of a lexical-grammatical cline (above, §1.6.4), we would have to fit workhorse nouns on such a cline at more than one location, due to their mutability.

And second, regarding each of the two levels of meaning under consideration.…

Discourse meaning.   Workhorse nouns regularly fulfill a variety of functions:
- As anaphors, they make the text's message is easier to grasp, which has been noticed as an improvement in textual cohesion.
- They can manipulate the audience's mental representation of participants that are mentioned in the discourse, in a variety of ways.
- They can refer to a set of otherwise unspecified individuals, in the same way that several kinds of pronouns do.

Informational meaning.   On this level, the meaning contribution of workhorse nouns varies widely. Often they directly prompt hardly more information than pronouns do. Their extension beyond human referents is not automatic (e.g., unattested in French), but neither is it surprising. And they often characterize their referent as situated with

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[40] *Le Littré* (1880); *Larousse* (2003); *Petit Robert* (2017); SensAgent (2019). See above, note 30.

respect to some other entity. In so doing, they manage—via indirection—to evoke more information about their referent than their cohort labels (such as English *individual* or *participant*, or French *individu*) can do.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

This review of corpus and other usage data leaves us with something of a puzzle: why the workhorse nouns are employed the way that they are—and how they function. Because such questions cannot be answered with the methods used thus far, I will soon turn to communicative and cognitive considerations (Chapter 4).

But meanwhile, in Chapter 3, let us assess how what I have collated about the relational senses of *man* and *homme* compares with what biblical scholars have been saying about אִישׁ. How well do those two fields of scholarship align? Have we perhaps learned something about אִישׁ (at least in theory) that biblical scholars had not already noticed?

3 Relational Meanings of אִישׁ in Biblical Scholarship

> Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch
> ihre Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit verborgen.[1]
>
> —Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953:50)

Typically, students of the Hebrew Bible have ignored certain facts discussed in Chapter 1, namely that אִישׁ is highly semantically mutable and polysemous, and in particular possessed of many relational nuances. Instead, they have treated it like an ordinary human noun, applying its residual meaning (the dictionary gloss of 'man' = 'adult male') as if that should be simply "plugged in" to a given instance as a default.

Where the mechanical construal of our noun is perhaps most apparent—because it is well entrenched—is in the interpretation of two famous passages in Genesis: Abraham's encounter with three visitors (18:2, labeled as אֲנָשִׁים), and Jacob's "wrestling" with an intruder (32:25, labeled as אִישׁ). Nearly all of the dozens of scholars who have interpreted those passages automatically apply an 'adult male' meaning to אִישׁ, even though that approach yields readings that admittedly make little sense. Ironically, instead of questioning their basic semantic assumption, many scholars celebrate those passages' enigmatic nature—and even draw theological lessons from that ostensible fact.[2]

In this chapter, I highlight the more occasional awareness of relational meanings of our noun (aside from the widely recognized 'husband/wife') in prior biblical scholarship. I survey that scholarship in light of this study's declared categories of analysis (§§1.6.4; 2.3). In so doing, I intend no disrespect to my predecessors' categories and terms. I have imposed the chosen categories only because, as later chapters will show, they are illuminating for the particular problem under study.

A standard literature review would not be suitable, for to my knowledge no scholar since Joseph Ibn Caspi nearly seven centuries ago (below, §6.3) has attempted to explain what makes אִישׁ distinctive among human nouns in Biblical Hebrew. The first two known systematic treatments of the extent of its relational meanings were made in the thirteenth century (Moses Naḥmanides and Abraham Bedersi), with little progress since. Based on the information available, Hebraists have addressed only a few of the distinctive characteristics of אִישׁ that I listed in Chapter 1 and explored in Chapter 2 via the varieties of relational meaning that can be apportioned to the two distinct levels of meaning. Thus far, the treatments of how אִישׁ functions have been fairly cursory. Ironically, it appears that אִישׁ has not received sustained attention because it is too commonplace and too familiar.

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[1] "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (Part I, No. 129; Anscombe's translation).

[2] These observations are thoroughly documented in Stein 2018. On Gen 18:2, see further below, §7.5.6.

3.1 Meaning on the Discourse Level

In Biblical Studies, discourse analysis and participant-reference tracking are two well-studied analytical modes.[3] They address what Mahlberg has called the "introducing" and "continuity" functions of general nouns in discourse; however, they do not attend to what she calls the "characterising" and "support" functions (above, §2.4.2).

Meanwhile, lexicographers and grammarians have viewed our noun by default on the informational level, except when some particular behavior of אִישׁ has forced them to consider it a grammatical term. Such cases correspond to those usages of English *man* and French *homme* that have been described as operating mainly on the discourse level. In Hebrew, such usages are of three main types: where our singular noun heads an apposition with a human noun, and yet its presence seems superfluous from an informational standpoint; where our singular or plural noun heads certain types of construct expression; and where our noun seems to act like a pronoun. A respective example of each type follows (Lev 21:9; Gen 9:20; Exod 5:9).

וּבַת֙ אִ֣ישׁ כֹּהֵ֔ן כִּ֥י תֵחֵ֖ל לִזְנ֑וֹת

When the daughter of <u>a priest</u> profanes herself through prostitution.… (NRSV)

וַיָּ֛חֶל נֹ֥חַ אִ֥ישׁ הָאֲדָמָ֖ה וַיִּטַּ֥ע כָּֽרֶם׃

Noah, <u>a man of the soil</u>, was the first to plant a vineyard. (NRSV)

תִּכְבַּ֧ד הָעֲבֹדָ֛ה עַל־הָאֲנָשִׁ֖ים וְיַעֲשׂוּ־בָ֑הּ

"Let heavier work be laid on <u>them</u>; then they will labor at it.…" (NRSV)

Such usages are fairly opaque on the informational level.

Dictionaries.[4]   Among lexicographers, the first to note the אִישׁ-headed appositions appears to have been Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, when he produced a second edition of Johann Simonis' well-regarded dictionary (1793). He simply recorded some appositions while glossing them to show they meant the same as the appositive term alone. Eichhorn's precedent has largely been followed ever since.[5]

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[3] Here I allude to the considerable scholarship that has productively applied these fields to the Bible during the past quarter-century, including impressive work by Longacre (2003), Bandstra (2008), Revell (1996), Heimerdinger (1999), Polak (2013; 2015; 2017), De Regt (1999; 2013; 2019a; 2019b), Levinsohn (2007), and Runge (2006; 2007; 2010; and with Westbury: 2012a, 2012b). For convenience, I will largely refer to this body of work via Runge's synthesis.

[4] The present study uses "dictionaries" as a catch-all term that includes publications that call themselves a "lexicon" or "thesaurus"—as well as a concordance if it lists lexical senses. I also place the theological dictionaries in this category, for they likewise seek to characterize our noun. For annotated bibliographies of biblical dictionaries, see Brisman 1987, 2000; Segert 1991; Téné et al. 2007.

[5] Shortly after Eichhorn, Gesenius followed suit ([1829] 1835), as have those who based themselves on the latter's work. For example, in the Brown-Driver-Briggs adaptation of Gesenius' *Lexicon*, the article on אִישׁ

From a more grammatically oriented angle, Schökel broadly observes (1993:57):

> *Cuando אִישׁ precede a un adjetivo, participio, sustantivo dependiente, sustantivo en aposición, puede equivaler al articulo indeterminado* un*.… A veces no se traduce ex-plícitamente, o porque va sobreentendido o por formar parte de un predicado: en tales casos la equivalencia es ø.*

> When אִישׁ precedes an adjective, participle, dependent noun, [or] noun in apposition, it can be equivalent to the indefinite article *a.…* Sometimes it is not translated explicitly, because either it is understood or it is part of a predicate: in such cases the equivalence is ø [null].

Presumably the intended equivalence is one of function: both אִישׁ in Hebrew and an in-definite article in Spanish are used to introduce new participants into the discourse.

When אִישׁ is used as *a vehicle for elaborating about a participant* (as in Gen 9:20), a similar shortcut approach is taken: lexicographers typically gloss selected construct ex-pressions as if they were conventional idioms. Perhaps the most comprehensive acknowl-edgement appears in *TDOT* (Bratsiotis 1974:223–24):

> Physical or spiritual qualities are often expressed by the use of *ʾish* in the construct … [or] as a term to designate an office, a profession, and a rank … [or] as a term used to indicate that one was of a certain nationality … or to indicate inhabitants of a land.

And as for pronoun-like usages, often a sampling is glossed with the most similar pronoun (or paraphrase) from the language in which that dictionary is written (e.g., Gese-nius [1829] 1835:85). Schökel stands out by making an outright declaration with regard to cases like Exod 5:9, cited above: *Con una persona como antecedente y precidido de artículo, equivale a pronombre* 'With a person as antecedent and [when] preceded by an article, it is equivalent to a pronoun' (1993:58).

Grammars. Among the grammarians, the most sustained treatment is probably that of Waltke and O'Connor (1990:230; similarly 252).[6] In discussing apposition, they describe אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה as "the broadest possible generic terms for people," explaining:

> The appositive often provides further information about the subclass to which the lead-word belongs. The pattern may involve a *sortal*, that is, a broad class term followed by a somewhat narrower term, of the same type.

With regard to construct relations, they again invoke the notion of "the generic noun of class" when accounting for the presence of אִישׁ in a phrase that classifies Noah, Gen 9:20, above (ibid., 241). Elsewhere, they hold that construct chains that are headed by אִישׁ are

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cites several instances under the rubric of "often prefixed to other nouns in apposition" (1906a:36), without further remark on the resulting meaning of that construction. An even longer list of appositions appears for אִשָּׁה but with glosses that are equivalent to the appositives (1906b:61). Koehler and Baumgartner likewise follow Eichhorn's approach for אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה ([1967] 2001a:43; 2001b).

[6] Other authors more succinctly classify the appositions as a collocation of genus and species labels: Joüon (2006:449); Arnold and Choi (2018:29–31). Alternatively, Van der Merwe and colleagues perceive that in such appositions "the second member specifies the status of the first member" (2017:263).

"conventional idioms," in which the genitive serves to specify "the nature, quality, character, or condition" of the referent. The authors explain that "these locutions supplement the meager stock of adjectives in Hebrew" (ibid., 149).

And as for pronoun-like usages, the reference grammar of Van der Merwe and colleagues is typical, for it simply notes that אִישׁ "may be used to refer to an unspecified, representative person," without further comment (2017:311).

Other scholarly treatments, such as those that attribute certain pronoun-like usages to grammaticalization and semantic bleaching (two concepts borrowed from historical linguistics), will be discussed in later chapters. In the meantime, it is safe to say that the question of how the various so-called grammatical usages of אִישׁ function to facilitate discourse—that is, how they serve as a strategy for efficient communication—has not yet been addressed.

3.2 Meaning on the Informational Level (Introduction)

According to our findings in the previous chapter, we can expect אִישׁ to operate on the informational level in three respects. First, it would show itself on this level in an "on-again, off-again" manner. How biblical scholars have addressed this aspect was already addressed in the previous section: in certain grammatical constructions, such as apposition, אִישׁ is considered to be mute on this level.

The second distinctive feature on this level is the noun's occasional extension to non-human entities. In Biblical Studies, this is attributed to the linguistic processes known as grammaticalization and semantic bleaching. (See the discussion below in §9.4.8.)

The third distinctive feature on this level is the plethora of relational senses. Indeed, multiple relational nuances of our noun have been asserted—and contested—among scholars for more than a millennium. Not surprisingly, the debate has centered around certain instances—for relational meanings are highly context-dependent and often difficult to distinguish precisely.

The subsequent sections (3.3–3.5) identify and contextualize various biblical scholars' evaluations of relational usage of אִישׁ. They present representative treatments that highlight the main areas of disagreement.

To my knowledge, no monograph on our noun has been published. Prior scholarship on its relational aspects is reflected in three scholarly genres: dictionaries; plain-sense commentaries (often including glosses or their own translations);[7] and sustained treatment in journals or books. I will discuss each type, in turn, in order to emphasize the contrasting views within each genre. This "siloed" approach admittedly understates the extent to which scholars have been consulting and citing each other's work across genres.

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[7] On the contours and boundaries of "plain-sense" interpretation, see Stein 2018:546n8 and the contrast with midrash on 566–67.

That being said, it nonetheless surfaces the controversies that a student of the Bible who seeks aid in understanding אִישׁ will encounter upon turning to any of these genres.

3.3 Relational Senses of אִישׁ in Biblical Dictionaries

Every dictionary that I consulted recognizes relational nuances of our noun.[8] Yet lexicographers differ greatly as to when and where they detect such meanings. Here I focus on six cases where at least two lexicographers cite the same instance while disagreeing as to its meaning.

Gen 43:3   הָעֵד הֵעִד בָּנוּ הָאִישׁ   *DBHE*, as noted above, treats such usage as equivalent to a pronoun (Schökel 1993:58, §4a). I.e., our noun has no labeling role in this instance. In contrast, the *Lexham Theological Wordbook* construes this instance *relationally*: "Judah refers to Joseph as 'the man' … in the sense of 'the authority in question.' … The Hebrew term … primarily denotes that person's *role or function*."[9]

Num 12:3   וְהָאִישׁ מֹשֶׁה   In this appositional expression, *DBHE* treats the usage as grammaticalized (i.e., no semantic content); thus it glosses אִישׁ with a demonstrative pronoun: *el tal Moisés* 'that Moses' (Schökel 1993:58, §4c). In contrast, others appear to construe it *relationally*—describing it as an honorific epithet—such as Gesenius, who then glosses אִישׁ as *summus* 'chief' ([1829] 1835:84, §1f).[10] Similarly, Zorell adduces this instance under the rubric *vir auctoritate, gradu, munere aliis eminens (nostrum "Herr")* 'an authority, high-level, eminent role (our "sir/lord")'—explaining that the apposition singles out Moses as such a man ([1940] 1960:45, §1d). And *DCHR* newly glosses as "Lord," apparently influenced by Joüon (see below) (Clines 2018b:310, §4b).

Jud 7:14   גִּדְעוֹן בֶּן־יוֹאָשׁ אִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל   Everyone grants that our noun has a relational sense in the expression אִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל; however, they disagree as to what that sense is. In some dictionaries, it is simply 'member [of the named group]'—hence a gloss such as *Israelit* 'Israelite' (Gesenius et al. 1987:51, §7). In contrast, in six other works, our noun describes an elevated status or role. One such dictionary offers the gloss *noble y jefe del pueblo*[11] 'noble and chief of the community' (Ibn Danān [1468] 2004).[12]

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[8] For this study, I consulted forty dictionaries, sampling from across a thousand-year period and six languages: Judeo-Arabic, Hebrew, Latin, German, English, and Spanish (see Stein 2019, Excursuses 3 and 8).

[9] Emphasis added. That interpretation is then used to illustrate a generalization: "also functions as a term of association" (Hernandez 2014, s.v. Lexical Information > אִישׁ).

[10] Although a connotation of prominent social status is itself relational (in its situating the referent in society, with an intrinsic comparison to ordinary folks), some scholars explain its derivation in sortal terms, as the fulfillment of true masculinity (e.g., Jacob 1922:124–25). Gesenius appears to be in this camp; he explains this usage (preceding a name) as an extension of the honorific usage of such nouns preceding a gentilic term, as attested by the analogous Greek noun *anēr* in the Christians' New Testament.

[11] The editor of the critical edition rendered into Spanish from the original Judeo-Arabic.

1 Sam 26:15 הֲלוֹא־אִישׁ אַתָּה   Many dictionaries construe אִישׁ here in terms of in-trinsic manly qualities, either via a gloss (e.g., *viro strenuo et forti* 'a vigorous and brave man'—Simonis and Winer 1828:53, §a) or by listing this instance under that kind of rubric, such as in *TLOT*: "specifically characterizes typical masc. properties such as strength, influence, courage" (Kühlewein 1997a:100, §2b).[13] In contrast, at least eight other dictionaries construe it relationally, as indicating an *elevated status or role*, including: ראש ונשיא 'chief and leader' (Ibn Janaḥ 1893); גדול 'eminent' (Kimḥi 1847); ראש הגדוד ואדון החיל ושר הצבא 'military commander' (Bedersi 1865); and מצוין והחשוב 'distinguished and important' (Fuenn 1887). Even Forster (who prid-ed himself on independence from rabbinic influence; 1557) classified this instance under the usage rubric of *ad res gerendum publicas, idoneus est, et adhi betur, inter´que honoratiores cõnumeratur* 'used for the conduct of public affairs, and for those who are counted among the respected'. Tedeschi (1879) features this verse as his sole proof text in the characterization of anyone designated as אִישׁ, namely: ועל יד מעלליו נודע שישנו בעולם 'by his exploits it is made known that he exists in the world'.[14]

1 Kgs 2:2 וְחָזַקְתָּ וְהָיִיתָ לְאִישׁ   Whereas many dictionaries construe אִישׁ here as in-dicating manliness, strength, or vigor (intrinsic characteristics), Bedersi ([13th c.] 1865) construes it in terms of a role, as שר נכבד 'esteemed ruler' (relational); and *DCHR* classifies it under a sense glossed as 'prince, leader' (Clines 2018b:310, §4b).

Psalm 49:3 גַּם־בְּנֵי אָדָם גַּם־בְּנֵי־אִישׁ   Whereas a few dictionaries construe אִישׁ here as indicating strength or vigor (intrinsic characteristics), most of them construe it as indicating elevated social status. Such opinions include: *notat nobiliorem* 'connoting nobles' (Gesenius [1829] 1835:85[15]); *Standesbezeichnung: d. Vornehmen* 'indication of rank: the distinguished people'[16] (Koehler and Baumgartner [1967] 1995:42, §3a); and "important persons" (Clines 2018b:310, §4b).[17] Still others take the unusual step of acknowledging both of those views, while expressing their own uncertainty in the matter (Sukenik 1950; Bratsiotis 1970; Kühlewein 1997a [originally published in 1971]).

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[12] Zorell ([1940] 1960) adduces this instance under the same "authority" rubric as Num 12:3, cited above; Forster (1557) adduces it under the same "public affairs" rubric as 1 Sam 26:15, cited below.

[13] Clines classifies this instance under the sense "mortal, as distinct from God" (2018b:310), which is an intrinsic quality—but that sense seems difficult to justify here; it may well be an error.

[14] I render with the masculine pronouns advisedly, because Tedeschi meanwhile understands אִישׁ to de-scribe *hazzākār mimmîn hā'ādām* "the *male* of the human race."

[15] At §1m, Gesenius cross-references his article on *'ādām* (p. 24, §1c), where this verse is adduced.

[16] Rendering by M. E. J. Richardson (Koehler and Baumgartner 2001a:43).

[17] Forster (1557) adduces this instance under the same rubric as 1 Sam 26:15, cited above.

3.4 Relational Senses of אִישׁ in Commentaries

The entries in this section are restricted to samples from various Hebrew and English sources, as these suffice to show that relational construals of אִישׁ have long been debated in exegetical and academic tradition (see also below, note 45).

Gen 4:1 קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְיָ Because אִישׁ—which is normally understood to denote an adult male—here refers to a newborn, this instance has occasioned much comment. In contrast to the dictionary tradition, which holds that אִישׁ describes maleness even here, Ibn Ezra (c. 1160; version A) explained this usage as follows:

והאדם כאשר ראה שלא יחיה בגופו בעצמו לעולם הוצרך להחיות המין, על כן אמרה: קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְיָ

> *And the Human*—when he realized that he would not live forever in his own body, it became necessary to keep the [human] species alive; on this account she [Eve] said: "I created/gained an אִישׁ."

That is, אִישׁ here regards the newborn *relationally*, in terms of his role as a *member* of the human species. Another exegete, Moses Naḥmanides (c. 1260), perceived a different relational meaning. He paraphrased Eve's pronouncement as follows:

הבן הזה יהיה לי קנין לי״י, כי כאשר נמות יהיה במקומנו לעבוד את בוראו

> This son will become my asset [*qinyan*][18] for *Yhwh*['s sake]—for when we die, he will take our place in serving his Creator.

In other words, Naḥmanides construes אִישׁ here in terms of its occasional use to designate an *agent*—specifically, a lineal successor[19]—and also in terms of someone who acts on behalf of another party (in this case, by serving his deity). Cain is anticipated to serve as the agent both of his parents and of his deity. Naḥmanides thus views the naming statement as appropriately pregnant with meaning: both of those relationships are evoked by this single instance of the word.[20]

Gen 9:20 אִישׁ הָאֲדָמָה The earliest known comprehensive exposition on the subject of this dissertation appears in the comment by Moses Naḥmanides on this verse (which was cited as an example above, §3.1). Here I will reproduce his entire treatment. It discusses differing views, touches upon the wide range of possible senses of אִישׁ, and epitomizes the challenge for would-be interpreters:

פירש רש״י: אדוני האדמה, כמו: איש נעמי (רות א':ג'). ואינו כן, כי איש נעמי לשון אישות, כמו: איש ואשתו (בראשית ז':ב').
ואחרים אמרו: גדול האדמה וראשה. והביאו דומים לו: גדעון בן יואש איש ישראל (שופטים ז':י״ד), גם בני אדם גם בני איש (תהלים מ״ט:ג'), הלא איש אתה ומי כמוך בישראל (שמואל א כ״ו:ט״ו). ורבים לפי דעתם.

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[18] The exegete pointedly employs a noun that comes from the same root as the verse's verb.

[19] In this case, it applies to the successor (heir) of Adam and Eve.

[20] On this verse, see also above, Chapter 1, note 25.

ועל דעתי: גדעון בן יואש איש ישראל (שופטים ז':י"ד) ייחוס איש ישראלי. הלא
איש אתה (שמואל א כ"ו:ט"ו) שאין כמוך בישראל, וכן: התחזקו והיו לאנשים
(שמואל א ד':ט') שלא יהיו כנשים, גם בני אדם גם בני איש (תהלים מ"ט:ג') פלוני
הידוע במעלתו. אבל איש האדמה כמו: אנשי העיר (בראשית י"ט:ד), בעבור היותו
דר בכל האדמה, לא בנה עיר ומדינה שיתייחס אליה. וכן: איש שדה (בראשית
כ"ה:כ"ז) העומד שם כל היום תמיד. ובמשנה (משנה אבות א':ד'): יוסי בן יועזר איש
צרידה ויוסי בן יוחנן איש ירושלים. או שנתן לבו לעבוד את האדמה, לזרוע ולנטוע
בעבור מצאו הארץ שממה, שכל נבדל לדבר יקרא כן. אנשי העיר הם יושביה, ואנשי
דוד (שמואל א כ"ג:ג') עבדיו, ואיש האלהים (דברים ל"ג:א') המיוחד בעבודתו. וכך
אמרו בבראשית רבה (בראשית רבה ל"ו:ג'): איש האדמה בורגר לשם בורגרות,
ואמרו שהיה להוט אחר האדמה. והנה הוא ייחוס.

Rashi (c. 1090) explained אִישׁ הָאֲדָמָה as follows: “*the master* [*owner/lord*] *of the ground*; this is like the expression אִישׁ נָעֳמִי ‘husband of Naomi’ (Ruth 1:3) [i.e., in a relationship of control of, and responsibility for, his wife].” But this is not so. Rather, אִישׁ נָעֳמִי is an expression of the marital state, just as אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ (Gen 7:2) [expresses a mating partnership among animals]. Others[21] have said that it means ‘the outstanding one of the earth, and its leader’, and they brought proof from similar verses: *Gideon the son of Josh,* אִישׁ *of Israel* (Jud 7:14);[22] *both* [*you*] *offspring-of-*ADAM *and* [*you*] *offspring-of-*אִישׁ (Ps 49:3);[23] *Are you not an* אִישׁ? *And who is like you in Israel?* (1 Sam 26:15).[24] And there are many other similar verses, according to their opinion.

In my opinion: *Gideon the son of Josh,* אִישׁ *of Israel* refers to his affiliation, i.e., that he was an Israelite. *Are you not an* אִישׁ? means that there is no one else like you in Israel.[25] Similarly, *strengthen yourselves so as to be* אֲנָשִׁים (1 Sam 4:9) means that they should not be weak like women. *Both* [*you*] *offspring-of-*ADAM *and* [*you*] *offspring-of-*אִישׁ (Ps 49:3) [means ‘both you who are commoners and] you who are well-known due to their [high] station’.[26]

However, [returning to the verse at hand,] *an* אִישׁ *of the ground* is like *the* אֲנָשִׁים *of the city* (Gen 19:4) [in indicating their affiliation to a place], since Noah lived all over the earth—and never built a city or country to which he should relate himself. Similarly, *an* אִישׁ *of the field* (Gen 25:27) means one who constantly stayed there [i.e., outdoors]. In the Mishnah we find [similar cases, where our noun affiliates a person with their named community].

[Alternatively, *an* אִישׁ *of the ground* means] he was determined to work the ground— to sow and to plant—because he found the earth have been laid waste [after the Flood]; for those who dedicate themselves to a certain purpose are so called [i.e., אִישׁ of that purpose]. *The* אֲנָשִׁים *of the city* (Gen 19:4) means those who dwell in it [and are invested in

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[21] Presumably a reference to Kimḥi’s dictionary (c. 1200), where this claim is indeed made.

[22] Meaning that Gideon is being called a ‘chief of Israel’, according to Kimḥi (see previous note).

[23] Meaning ‘both you who are commoners and you who are of high station’, according to Kimḥi.

[24] Meaning “Aren’t you eminent?” according to Kimḥi.

[25] I.e., David is using the word אִישׁ to single out his interlocutor as a high-ranking official, as shown by his subsequent rhetorical question.

[26] Here the exegete appears to be agreeing with Kimḥi’s dictionary article.

its welfare]. *The* אֲנָשִׁים *of David* (e.g., 1 Sam 23:3) are his servants; and *an* אִישׁ *of God* (e.g., Deut 33:1) is one who is dedicated to divine service. And so the Rabbis have said in *Midrash Genesis Rabbah*: "*an* אִישׁ *of the ground* is so called just as a castle's guard is called by the name of the castle" (36.6). And the Rabbis also said (36.5) that Noah had a passion for agriculture. Thus [the noun אִישׁ is used here to signify] a relationship.[27]

Gen 15:10   וַיִּתֵּן אִישׁ־בִּתְרוֹ לִקְרַאת רֵעֵהוּ   In order to account for how it is that אִישׁ is used to refer to the pieces of a dismembered animal carcass, most scholars view this noun as semantically "faded" and acting like a distributive or reciprocal pronoun.[28] Somewhat surprisingly, the pioneering grammarian Ibn Ezra offers a *semantic* explanation.

ויתן איש בתרו   דע כי מלת איש כמו: בעל, וכן: אִישׁ מִלְחָמָה (שמות ט״ו:ג׳), וְהָאִישׁ גַּבְרִיאֵל (דניאל ט׳:כ״א), ופירוש בעל כמו: עצם הדבר, וכן: אִישׁ בְּלִיַּעַל (שמואל ב כ׳:א׳) סמוך, גם כן בחיות וביריעות [ובכרובים: וּפְנֵיהֶם אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו (שמות כ״ה:כ׳),] אִשָּׁה אֶל־אֲחֹתָהּ (שמות כ״ו:ג׳).

> Know that the word אִישׁ is like the noun *ba'al* 'master'; as in *an 'îš of war* (Exod 15:3); *the 'îš Gabriel* (Dan 9:21). The meaning of *ba'al* is 'essence of the matter', as in [the characterization] *a worthless 'îš* (2 Sam 20:1). Adjacent—so also with celestial beings [in Ezekiel's vision] and [Tabernacle] curtains [and cherubim: *their faces toward each other* (Exod 25:20;] *one to another* (Exod 26:3).

To paraphrase: This noun is *relational*—it designates an entity in terms of that entity's relationship to other things. Since the concept of being "related" includes the notion of spatial adjacency, אִישׁ can be applied in order to index any entities that are adjacent—even inanimate ones.[29]

Exod 11:3   הָאִישׁ מֹשֶׁה   Naḥmanides tersely comments on this expression, adding: המביא עליהם המכות '[As] the [visible] one who has brought the plagues upon them'. This alludes to Moses' functioning as the "front man"—the public representative who has been working to improve his deity's reputation. Naḥmanides thus seems to construe הָאִישׁ relationally, as a label that identifies Moses as his deity's *agent*. Likewise, Houtman perceives a relational contribution from this word; however, he considers it to be an *honorific epithet* (1993:6–7, 131). Hence he renders the apposition as "Mr. Moses" (ibid., 131).

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[27] Translation modified from that of Charles Chavel in Naḥmanides 1971:1:141–42.

[28] E.g., Gesenius and Kautzsch (1910:447–48); Ewald ([1878] 2004:41); *TLOT* (Kühlewein 1997a:102).

[29] Given the terse style of Ibn Ezra's commentary and the linguistic terminology available to him, this construal is not assured. (It differs from what seem to be the construals offered in medieval supercommentaries and in a recent English translation.) However, it seems the best way to make sense of his otherwise puzzling recourse to *ba'al*—a clearly relational noun—in order to explain the usage in question.

The likening of one sense of אִישׁ to *ba'al* (as 'master' rather than 'husband') is found already in Ibn Janaḥ's dictionary (c. 1030), citing (among other passages) Exod 15:3 and 2 Sam 20:1—like Ibn Ezra after him (Ibn Janaḥ 1875:40–41). Likewise Ibn Caspi's dictionary (c. 1340): נאמר בענין בעל "it is used with the [same] meaning [as] *ba'al*"; the editor's paraphrase there is המילה "איש" מציינת שייכות וזיקה 'The word אִישׁ indicates belonging and affinity' (Kahan 2014:100).

Num 13:2–3   שְׁלַח־לְךָ אֲנָשִׁים . . . כֻּלָּם אֲנָשִׁים   In its second instance (v. 3), אֲנָשִׁים seems superfluous if construed in sortal terms only. Not surprisingly, many commentators attribute a relational nuance, in order to yield an informative and coherent reading of both verses. To explain why the term is repeated, Rashi states that two meanings are being stated simultaneously:

כל אנשים לשון חשיבות הוא, ואותה שעה כשירין היו.

> Every [instance of] אֲנָשִׁים [in the Bible][30] [in indefinite absolute form] connotes [the referents' social, or perhaps discourse] importance—and at the same time, that they were [considered to be] fit [for the task].

Similarly, Ibn Ezra perceives that a relational characteristic is in view:

והטעם **אנשים** שהם ידועים גבורים, וכן: כֻּלָּם אֲנָשִׁים (במדבר י״ג:ג׳), וְחָזַקְתָּ וְהָיִיתָ לְאִישׁ (מלכים א ב׳:ב׳) כי איש היה.

> The sense of אֲנָשִׁים (in v. 2) is that the referents are known [as] stalwart, as in 'all of them are אֲנָשִׁים' (v. 3) and in 'Be strong so that you become an אִישׁ!' (1 Kgs 2:2)—for he [Solomon] already was a man.

Similarly, too, Kimḥi glosses כֻּלָּם אֲנָשִׁים (which he adduces at 1 Kgs 2:2) as: גדולים ונכבדים 'prominent and esteemed'.

Skipping to contemporary exegetes, Jacob Milgrom comments on verse 2 that אֲנָשִׁים "can refer to important and brave men,[31] such as the members of the city council (Gen 34:20; Judg 8:15–17). Thus the men were not ordinary military scouts … but distinguished leaders of each tribe.…" (1990:100). Likewise on verse 3 he offers the rendering 'all of them dignitaries', citing Rashi—and the Akkadian cognate of אִישׁ.

Likewise, Baruch Levine comments on verse 2 that אֲנָשִׁים "often implies status. This is true here, as is suggested by v 3" (1993:351). He cites Judg 18:2 and 20:12 as employing אֲנָשִׁים in this sense. Hence he renders the two phrases as: 'Dispatch important personages (v. 2) … all of them were important personages (v. 3)'.

3.5 Relational Senses of אִישׁ in Articles and Books

For each entry, this section offers a summary and then a brief critique. Discussion is limited to how each of the works is relevant to the present study.

I include two of my own publications because they have influenced the other scholars cited, and because the present study is revisiting aspects of my earlier work. (My two most recent scholarly contributions, Stein 2018 and 2019, differ from the preceding entries in that they arose during the preparation of this dissertation—covering special topics to an extent that could not be fully incorporated herein due to space constraints; their topics and findings will be treated at appropriate places in the present study.)

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[30] Such is the reading in some manuscripts. On this verse, see further below, §7.5.5.

[31] Here he cites Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Rashbam (Rabbi Samuel ben Meir).

Joüon 1925   The French scholar Paul Joüon, in this lexicological study, considered several biblical passages in which אִישׁ appears to take on a nuance of esteem or approbation. One set employs the expression בְּנֵי אִישׁ (Ps 4:3; 49:3; 62:10), which he glossed as *hommes importants* 'important men' (ibid., 312).[32] A second set uses אִישׁ in apposition with a name, such as הָאִישׁ מֹשֶׁה (Exod 11:3). In contrast to many scholars, Joüon perceived the apposition's head term to be an epithet. He rendered this expression as *le seigneur Moïse* 'Lord Moses', concluding that *une nuance analogue à «seigneur» apparaît dans le cas où* האיש *précède le nom d'un personnage important, généralement dans un contexte élogieux* 'a nuance similar to *lord* appears in the case where הָאִישׁ precedes the name of an important person, usually in a laudatory context' (ibid., 313).[33]

Critique: Unlike many scholars' glosses or renderings of the אִישׁ appositional construction in question, Joüon's construal fits the way that grammarians say that apposition-with-a-name is supposed to work (see below, §6.8). However, as other scholars have noted, it does not seem to fit the biblical instance where the same kind of apposition refers to a scoundrel (Jud 17:5). Furthermore, Joüon does little to situate his finding within the broader behavior of our noun. He does not mention several other biblical passages in which a nuance of esteem has been said to be salient (e.g., Num 13:3); nor does he attempt to explain *how* אִישׁ might have developed such a connotation—that is, how that nuance relates to other meanings of the word.

Jirku 1950   In a two-paragraph-long *Mitteilung* 'Note', the German scholar Anton Jirku proposes a solution to a crux in 2 Sam 10:6, 8, where (as he notes) the phrase וְאִישׁ טוֹב has long struck many scholars as odd for various reasons. He points to a usage newly known from Akkadian letters of Canaanite origin found at El Amarna, Taanach, and Mari—in which the cognate of אִישׁ appears in construct with a place name, as a label for the regent of a city. He suggests that in the biblical instances a similar meaning of *einen Regenten niederen Grades* 'a lower-level governor' would fit אִישׁ, which is likewise followed by a place name. Furthermore, in verse 6 it stands in syntactic parallel with מֶלֶךְ, thereby identifying it as a title. Jirku viewed this as the sole instance of such a usage in the Hebrew Bible.

Critique: Jirku's construal works well for verse 6, but less well for verse 8.[34] Space constraints apparently did not permit him to compare this instance with other biblical

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[32] Although Joüon does not mention it, a similar view was expressed more than six centuries earlier in rabbinic commentaries (Kimḥi 2010; Meiri 1970).

[33] Although Joüon does not mention it, the latter view had appeared in dictionaries (Simonis and Eichhorn, 1793; Gesenius ([1829] 1835) and in Ehrlich (1909:301).

[34] *HALOT* adduces and accepts Jirku's proposal (Koehler and Baumgartner 2001a:43; Koehler et al. [1974] 2001:372). Likewise the 18th edition of Gesenius (1987) mentions it, while preferring to construe the expression as a collective: 'men (inhabitants) of Tov', as in Fuenn 1887 and Brown et al. 1906.

passages in which a nuance of *authority or leadership* has been said to be salient (e.g., Gen 43:3; Josh 9:7; Jud 7:14). Nor does he explore how אִישׁ (or its cognates) might have developed such a connotation in the first place.

Speiser 1960   While examining biblical terms for human groupings in the context of the ancient Near East, E. A. Speiser noted the place of אִישׁ in relationship to those group terms. Citing 2 Sam 15:30; 16:18 as exemplars, he observed that the "indivisible unit" or "constituent member" of *'am* 'people' is אִישׁ 'the individual'—and that they share "approximately the same dialectical distribution" across West-Semitic languages (ibid., 160). In contrast, the "indivisible unit" of the group term *gôy* 'nation' is *'ādām*, which Speiser glosses as "the earthling, mortal, one of a crowd, or in short, a statistic" (ibid., 159). Given the ostensible correlation of אִישׁ with *'am* rather than *gôy*, Speiser noted that only the former group term has a "subjective and personal" nuance (ibid., 158) and a kinship connotation. Furthermore, he associated "the Hebrew pair" *'am* and אִישׁ with "a nonurban background, in common with other West-Semitic elements," and with a social context of "unremitting group effort and a constant struggle against rival groups" (ibid., 161)—in contrast to the Mesopotamian mode of existence. In short, the term אִישׁ represents an "individual in an originally nomadic-pastoral family" (ibid., 162).

Critique: Speiser emphasizes the collocation of אִישׁ with one group term, which raises the question of what it is about the semantics of our noun that prompts such a collocation. However, his focus on only two group terms leads him to overlook the fact that אִישׁ designates a "constituent member" of many other groups, as well. Indeed—despite Speiser's polemical characterization in binary terms—our noun arguably functions this way even with *gôy* (Exod 34:24; Josh 5:6; 23:9; Judg 2:21; Jer 22:8; Zech 8:23; Ps 43:1).

Crown 1974a   The Hebrew אִישׁ is cognate to the Akkadian (Standard Babylonian) term *amīlu*, which is recognized as able to designate "a person in relation to another person [or] to an organization" (Oppenheim et al. 1968:56–57). In the 14th-century-B.C.E. Amarna letters (written in Peripheral Akkadian), dealing with relations between the governments of Egypt and those of other lands including Canaanite city-states—which were then under Egyptian domination—the term *amīlu* was employed in that agency sense. On that basis, the late Alan Crown speculated in his Short Note that "it is most likely that the biblical Hebrew word אִישׁ is also used on occasion with the sense of prince, king, leader or agent for another" (ibid., 110). He identified three such instances, all in reported speech: David's charge to Solomon, וְחָזַקְתָּ וְהָיִיתָ לְאִישׁ (1 Kgs 2:2)[35]; an Israelite's reproof

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[35] Crown supported this construal from the tenor of David's instructions that followed his opening charge to Solomon, which focus on governance issues (ibid., 111). Crown's construal of 1 Kgs 2:2 was already known in biblical lexicographic tradition (see above, §3.3).

of Moses, מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט עָלֵינוּ (Exod 2:14)[36]; and Solomon's dedicatory prayer that quotes his deity, לֹא־יִכָּרֵת לְךָ אִישׁ מִלְּפָנַי יֹשֵׁב עַל־כִּסֵּא יִשְׂרָאֵל (1 Kgs 8:25).[37]

Critique: Crown took note of additional pre-Israelite evidence and applied it to more biblical usages than had Jirku 1950 (which he did not cite). Yet the same critique applies to both proposals; see above. Furthermore, despite his piece's air of certitude, the arguments are not conclusive, for alternative construals are plausible.

Crown 1974b In another Short Note, Crown similarly suggested that the Amarna references to messengers could inform our understanding of the terminology for messengers in the Hebrew Bible. He pointed out that the Akkadian cognate of אִישׁ played a prominent role in references to messengers, such as in a title for an Egyptian royal messenger. Crown implied that אִישׁ ought to be considered as a synonym or epithet for a messenger in the Bible.[38]

Critique: Despite its schematic nature, Crown's implication has merit, for אִישׁ is sometimes used not only in co-reference with *mal'āk* 'messenger', but also in reference to persons who are not labeled *mal'āk* yet nonetheless perform messenger functions (Stein 2018:547). Even so, Crown's insight seems to have been ignored by several authors of studies on messengers in the ancient Near East.[39]

Grant 1977 In one of the most comprehensive treatments of our noun, Alison Grant was the first to characterize relationality as an abiding aspect of its meaning. This arose after she contrasted its usage with that of the *'ādām* 'earthling'. (Her main interest was to clarify the meaning of *'ādām* in Genesis 1–3.) She concluded that the two words are deployed so differently that they can hardly be considered synonyms: "The distinction is preserved almost without exception throughout the whole of the Hebrew OT" (ibid., 2).

Grant came to this conclusion after examining all instances of אִישׁ in the Bible.[40] She classified each one by the nature of its reference—most basically, whether it was particular or general. Latent in her article are the distributions shown in the following table.[41]

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[36] Crown pointed out that our noun otherwise seems superfluous in this expression, noting that Moses' "manhood" is not in question. Interpreting the verse as "a sneering attack" on Moses' status and on his authority to interfere, Crown suggested this construal: "Who made you a ruler, a prince and a judge over us?" (ibid., 111).

[37] Crown construes the two terms אִישׁ and *yōšēb 'al-kissē' yiśrā'ēl* 'sitter/sitting on the throne of Israel' as coreferential; he views the latter phrase as an "explanatory gloss" on our noun (111–12).

[38] Lack of space constrained Crown from proposing any corresponding biblical instances (personal communication, 2005); his note was focused more on other terminology.

[39] In Stein 2018, I supported Crown's terse suggestion and elaborated upon it.

[40] Grant checked all instances that she could locate, namely 2174 of them. In comparison, Accordance lists 2187 instances—a difference of 13 (0.6%).

[41] Stein 2008a:3. That article contains a more detailed restatement and assessment of Grant's research.

Types of Reference	*Usage frequency*
Any or each member of a defined group or class	74%
Particular individual (definite or indefinite)	20%
Anyone (undefined group)	4%
General human reference	1%
	99%

Grant thus found that at most 20% of all instances of our noun point to someone specific as an apparently freestanding individual. Rather, in nearly 3 out of 4 cases, אִישׁ denotes *a member of a group or category*. That is, most biblical instances of this word seem to situate the referent *in relation to a group*. She drew the following conclusion (ibid., 9–10):

> *'ish* . . . relates primarily to an individual as a *member* of a particular group. . . . [Someone labeled as an] *'ish*, the particular man, would not be thought of as an individual with an independent existence, as would tend to happen in western thought, but always in relation to his particular group or community. It could also be used naturally for the whole community, not just made up (as we would tend to think) of separate individuals, but of units whose very definition already contains the idea of belonging.

Critique: Grant's attention to types of reference, and to what they revealed about the relationship of אִישׁ to groups, amounted to a breakthrough in the field. It allowed "the idea of belonging" to surface as a possible key to the semantics of אִישׁ. Unfortunately, her report did not include a tabulation of how she categorized each instance of our noun, to provide a basis for further analysis.

Rinaldi 1977 In a one-paragraph note, Giovanni Rinaldi contrasts אִישׁ with *'ādām*. In the process, he supports the construal of אִישׁ in Ps 49:3 in terms of social status (like various lexicographers and commentators, as well as Joüon, as noted above).

Kutler 1982 As part of a study of Israelite communal terminology such as *'am* 'people', and enlarging upon Speiser's (1960) insistence that אִישׁ stands for the constituent member of an *'am*, this structuralist analysis likewise defined אִישׁ solely in relation to *'am*, while contrasting it functionally with *'ādām*.[42] After noticing that אִישׁ often refers to soldiers, Kutler construed it as the characteristic label for soldiers. Similarly, as he notes, *'am* itself often refers to a body of troops. In contrast, *'ādām* almost never refers to soldiers. Thus he concludes: "the martial aspect of the *'îš* cannot be overstressed, for it is this ingredient which distinguishes the *'îš* from the *'ādām* and aligns the *'îš* with the *'am*" (ibid., 69). In addition, notes Kutler, אִישׁ and *'ādām* are distinguished by the fact that they "focus on different aspects of an individual's place in Hebrew society" (ibid., 74). I.e., *'ādām* can be a referring expression for a 'commoner' (Ps 82:7; Jud 16:17; Prov 18:16), and in this respect it contrasts with אִישׁ, which lacks that nuance (ibid.). Finally, Kutler

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[42] Kutler was apparently unaware of Grant 1977 or Rinaldi 1977.

states that he, like Speiser, understands that the *'am* originally referred to a "consanguineous unit," and that its military sense and that of אִישׁ are matters of transferred application, leading via semantic specialization to the additional meaning of אִישׁ as 'soldier'.

Critique: This study is stimulating in its viewing of some usages of אִישׁ in terms of their referent's relationship to a larger body. The structuralist method of focusing on a small number of binary oppositions seems to have led the author to overlook the fact that most instances of אִישׁ and of *'am* are unrelated to the military; that many of them associate אִישׁ with other social locations; and that those other instances might provide insight as to why they are employed in military contexts. Furthermore, Kutler does not seem to consider the possibility that when אִישׁ is used to refer to a soldier, it might not describe 'soldier' per se, but rather might be a general term that is preferentially applied to participants in various situations, including military ones. Finally, Kutler's claim that אִישׁ is sometimes used as a status term in opposition to 'a commoner' is a significant distinction. Yet he based that claim on more limited and ambiguous evidence than was offered by others who proposed this idea (e.g., Jacob 1922:124–25; Joüon 1925).

Gelio 1983   In tracing the pre-Hebrew history of אִישׁ, Roberto Gelio speculates that it shared a common origin with certain homophonic relative and demonstrative pronouns in related languages, such as Phoenician. Looking for traces of this connection in the Hebrew Bible, he discusses several passages (e.g., Zech 6:12; Exod 2:14; Jer 6:29) that he claims make better sense if אִישׁ is construed as either a relative or demonstrative pronoun.

Critique: If אִישׁ in Hebrew were functioning on occasion as a relative pronoun, that would obviously be a relational use, so this possibility is of course intriguing. However, I do not find the proposed resolutions of the cited cases to be compelling, for they do not yield a more coherent and informative construal of the texts in question. Nor do they always involve construal as a relative or demonstrative pronoun (e.g., for Exod 2:14).

Revell 1996   In his outline of the structure of Israelite society as reflected in the Bible's various designations of its members, E. J. Revell identified three sets of semantic categories that were used to describe characters' social position:[43] "One places the character in a general way, in terms of sex and other broad social categories. A second indicates kinship, and other forms of personal relationships, with other members of the society. The third deals with occupation and similar characteristics." He viewed the labels אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה as "generally used of persons who are adult and independent, in the sense that they are married, or of age to marry, and are not employed by others. The extent to which either of these features is relevant, however, is determined by other words used in the context." Thus they belong in the first semantic category; yet at the same time, under certain conditions they shift to the second category: "Both words are often bound to a name

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[43] Revell restricted his study to the narratives of the books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings; he was cautious in generalizing beyond that corpus.

or a personal pronoun, in which case they function as personal relationship terms corresponding to 'husband' and 'wife'" (ibid., 29–30).

Critique: Revell's lucid three-part schema of the semantic categories for personal labels offers a yardstick to measure how אִישׁ is used as a referring expression for human beings. At the same time, some of this schema's aspects are open to question. One issue is the usual question of words' *reference* versus their *sense*. Perhaps the claim that our noun is "generally used of persons who are adult and independent" is true as a matter of reference rather than of sense. In addition, as we have seen, some dictionaries and commentaries have suggested that there may well be a wider range of situations (and therefore more instances) in which our noun functions in Revell's second category (i.e., to indicate a variety of personal relationships) than he acknowledged.

Chaney 1999   In the Song of the Vineyard (Isa 5:1–7), the phrase *'îš yəhūdâ*, both as a vocative in verse 3 and as a referring expression in verse 7, is usually understood as a collective referring to the populace of Judah as a whole (ibid., 106). Chaney contends, however, that in light of the *social and economic backdrop* for this prophecy, the usual construal of the expression is unlikely in this particular parable. Rather, here it can refer "only to the top of the social pyramid … either to the ruling dynast of Judah or to its military aristocracy[, which was] a relatively small body of large and powerful landholders" (ibid., 105, 116).[44]

Critique: Although the evidence that Chaney presents is only circumstantial, it echoes the 'ruler/elite' sense posited by others (above, §§3.3–3.5). His case might be strengthened by considering it together with those instances. We should also consider the possibility that the particular reference that Chaney posits is the result of a novel metonym (rather than a conventionalized sense), in which the elite are designated—perhaps ironically—in terms of the populace whose interests they are supposed to represent.

Stein 2006   In the preface to CJPS, the gender-sensitive adaptation of the NJPS translation, I as the revising editor noted that I had made a special effort to clarify "which gender is in view" when the Hebrew text uses the masculine form אִישׁ (ibid., xxiv–xxv; xxxi). I explain: "my adaptation restricts the use of 'man' to mean 'adult male,' employing other words to cover the additional senses of *'ish*" (ibid., xxv). This procedural rule prompted a dedicated analysis of nearly all instances of אִישׁ in the Pentateuch, in order to ascertain which sense of אִישׁ was salient; that particular sense was then reflected in the English rendering. In that translation's appendix titled "Dictionary of Gender in the Torah" (ibid., 394), I further explained that

> the present translation takes as the primary sense of *'ish* (and its effective plural,

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[44] Alan Crown previously considered and rejected this idea, with regard to similar wording in multiple passages in the book of Jeremiah. He decided that the apparent use of אִישׁ as an "abbreviation" for the plural אֲנְשֵׁי in Jer 32:32 "inhibits the further exploration of this possibility" (Crown 1974:111).

’anashim) ‘a representative member of a group: a member who serves as a typical or characteristic example.’ Thus this term exemplifies the group-oriented thinking found throughout the ancient Near East.… The term ’ish presumes an inseparability from a larger entity.[45]

Critique: The CJPS translation methodology focused attention on the fact that most usages of אִישׁ that have little to do with gender (above, §1.6.6). That approach made it surprisingly obvious that the meaning of ‘adult male’ or even ‘human being’ was often inadequate to account for a given usage. That main finding is empirically robust, given that it is based upon an analysis of more than four hundred instances. However, the construal of particular instances might still warrant modification after further study.

Stein 2008a   Formally introducing my findings to the academy, I reviewed Grant 1977 and restated its conclusion with regard to our noun: “אִישׁ appears to be a term of affiliation” (ibid., 23), that is, “the noun denotes relationship either to a group or to another party” (ibid., 2). I then presented an abbreviated structuralist analysis of the semantics of אִישׁ. As a heuristic, I compared the behavior of אִישׁ (not including אִשָּׁה) to that of ’ādām ‘earthling’ and to that of bēn ‘son’. I found that אִישׁ was much more similar to bēn, which is “unquestionably a term of affiliation” (ibid., 7). In identifying various lexical and contextual meanings of אִישׁ, I went beyond Grant (who had expressed the meanings in terms of “membership” in a group) by proposing three types of relational roles that this noun calls attention to: *participant member*; *representative member*; and *representative on behalf of others*. In my syntagmatic (contextual) analysis, I gave examples of each type, while confirming that the feminine counterpart noun אִשָּׁה likewise shares these senses. As for usage distribution, I noted that more than 10% of biblical instances of אִישׁ seem to involve the referent’s *representation* of their own group or of another party. I also found— using rough calculations—that at least 87% of biblical instances of אִישׁ could be accounted for by construing it as a term of affiliation.

Critique: This is the most comprehensive examination published to date of our noun’s relationality. Its demonstration of the plausibility of its basic thesis was buttressed by a subsequent publication suggesting that אִישׁ may not be lexically gendered (Stein 2008c). At the same time, the known weaknesses of structuralist analysis need to be addressed, such as by considering communicative factors (discourse functions).

Van Wolde 2009   In sorting out how best to analyze the meaning of Biblical Hebrew nouns, Ellen van Wolde borrowed from Cognitive Grammar a distinction between *independent nouns* and *relational nouns*. The latter are “conceptually dependent in that

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[45] For a detailed analysis of how I arrived at the *contextual* sense of אִישׁ in most of its instances in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, see Stein 2014 (explaining a prior translation, in Plaut and Stein 2005, which was largely incorporated into CJPS—and which in certain instances have since superseded CJPS). For CJPS errata, see purl.org/stein/cjps-errata. On the two translation projects, see Stein 2008b.

the concept necessarily invokes in its base another entity and the relation to that entity" (ibid., 110–12). Applying this concept to Biblical Hebrew, Van Wolde classified אִישׁ as a relational noun. In terms of the nominal-profile model employed in Cognitive Grammar, the *trajector* is the individual referent, while the *landmark* is the group or representational authority with which that referent is affiliated (ibid., 117–18).

Critique: Van Wolde's consideration of cognition points us toward the creation of a semantic profile with psychological integrity. However, the linguistic category of "relational noun" may not be a good fit for אִישׁ. This noun's tendency to link its referent to other entities does not seem to be due to its intrinsic relational "content" (as with kinship terms, for example), so much as its *lack* of content.

Jay 2009   As part of a linguistics-informed examination of reciprocal constructions in Biblical Hebrew, Jonathan Jay studied constructions that feature אִישׁ. He noted that the role played there by אִישׁ is a natural application of its meaning if construed relationally (citing Stein 2008a).

Critique: Jay obliquely suggests that a relational construal of אִישׁ has played some role in the development of reciprocal constructions. This idea warrants consideration.

Bar-Asher Siegal 2012   While speculating on the diachronic development of reciprocal constructions involving אִישׁ, Elitzur Bar-Asher Siegal (who focuses mainly on syntax) observed that the pronoun-like use of אִישׁ is found also outside of those constructions in casuistic-law protases, "and thus we may assume that this development occurred independently of the reciprocal use" (ibid., 225).

Critique: Bar-Asher Siegal insightfully juxtaposes the casuistic and (what he defines as) reciprocal constructions, so that they shed light on each other. He also conceptually frames the grammatical role of אִישׁ in the constructions under study in terms of *membership in sets*—which parallels Grant's observation (1977) that in general, אִישׁ profiles its referent as the member of a group.

3.6 Summary and Conclusions

How have the insights from Chapter 2, which were based upon linguistic analyses of *man* and *homme*, stacked up against what biblical scholarsship has been saying about אִישׁ? With respect to the *discourse* level, the findings of those two fields of scholarship overlap. However, an opportunity for Biblical Studies to learn from linguistics presents itself.

As for the *informational* level of meaning, there too the class of workhorse nouns can teach us something. The notion of the multilevel operation of such nouns offers an alternative explanation (compared to "grammaticalization" or "semantic bleaching") for the frequently "grammatical" usages of אִישׁ, and for its apparently wavering semantic weight. Another notion, that of workhorse human nouns as predisposed to being applied to non-human entities, also appears to offer a fresh perspective.

The idea that אִישׁ has many relational senses—by which it situates its referent with respect to another entity—is no stranger to Biblical Studies. Both lexicographers and other scholars have long suggested that the import of אִישׁ is often relational. Its universally accepted sense of 'husband/wife' is merely a small part of the story. At the same time, the larger question of the *extent* of its relational meanings has long been controversial. Relational senses seem to have been neglected by some students of the Bible. In any case, the many relational meanings of the workhorse nouns in English and French now encourage us to expect such meanings for אִישׁ, as well.

Considering its ubiquity and its theological prominence, our noun has received surprisingly little attention with respect to its overall functioning and semantic structure. The question of the extent of relationality in our noun's use was discussed almost 750 years ago by Moses Naḥmanides of Girona.[46] His various comments on biblical passages, along with the contributions of a large number of scholars in the meantime, can be considered antecedents of the present study.[47]

As noted in §2.7, so far the investigation leaves us with three puzzles: why the workhorse nouns are used the way that they are; how they function the way that they do; and whether there might be some kind of underlying unity to how workhorse nouns operate. How do they improve communication? What are the cognitive motivations for their use? Can their distinctive features be viewed in an integrated fashion? In the next chapter, I will turn my attention to these considerations of communication and cognition.

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[46] See also the equally extensive discussion of relational meanings and other distinctive behaviors of אִישׁ in the dictionary of synonyms by his younger contemporary, Abraham Bedersi (first published in 1865). For my re-edited version with translation, see purl.org/scholar/bedersi.

[47] For similar antecedents on the individuating function of אִישׁ, see below, at the start of §6.3.

4 Situations and Their Participants

> Informing a hearer of something means informing him or her of some state of affairs, i.e. of something which necessarily involves not only *participants* but also *something to participate in*.
>
> —Knud Lambrecht (1994:46; emphasis added)

Because I happen to live at a far remove from the time and place when Ancient Hebrew was a living language, I must interpret its texts by reasoning from fundamental principles. The process of doing so will take us through the domains of several academic disciplines, including cognitive science; information theory and discourse analysis; and cognitive linguistics. I am not attempting to be exhaustive. Rather, I wish to draw a line of correspondence through the aforementioned fields as they relate to this study's concerns.

This chapter presents the primitives upon which my thesis in the next chapter will be based. None of the ideas mentioned herein is necessarily new. To students of the aforementioned fields, this chapter may even seem banal (until I wade into a linguistics controversy in §4.4.1). Yet this collation of basic ideas will set up their ready application to workhorse nouns in the next chapter—and that will be an innovation.

At the heart of this chapter's message is the fundamental cognitive importance of *situations*—especially those that involve a human participant—and the role of nouns when we communicate about them. I will now begin with two observations about *thinking*.

4.1 Basic Cognition: Distinguishing an Entity

4.1.1 Differentiating one thing from another

As the cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker has noted, *visual perception* is commonly taken as a model for understanding *cognition*, because the latter is grounded in the former (2015:121). I will likewise use it as a model here. So consider how we human beings distinguish a particular object that appears in our field of vision. Because the light from both that entity and its background strikes the retina at the same moment, it can be perceived as an entity only in contrast with its surroundings. As the cognitive scientist Stephen Grossberg puts it, "*All boundaries are invisible.… Every edge is an illusion*" (2017:94, 96; emphasis in original). In order to create the impression of a visible edge, our brains actively (albeit unconsciously) construct the object's boundaries. This feat is accomplished as the brain assesses the discontinuities in brightness and color between the entity and its background.

To generalize, our mind can construct its impression of an entity only as situated in its context. We recognize at the same time what the object of our regard *is*—and what it *isn't*. We differentiate; we profile the entity against some base or background.

4.1.2 Intrinsic features and extrinsic relationships

Viewing the aforementioned state of affairs from another angle, we can say that observers mentally represent the object of their regard in two aspects: its own *intrinsic* properties, and its *extrinsic* relationships. The human mind can recognize an entity as such only by having attended to *both* of those aspects. After that, it may attend consciously to one aspect at a time. But at first, the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects are faced simultaneously.

In particular, what it means to be a *person* consists of both intrinsic features and extrinsic relationships. As an observer, I can pay attention to either aspect. For example, of the many occasions when I think about my mother (who has just celebrated her 87th birthday), I sometimes profile her in terms of what are arguably *intrinsic* qualities, such as dietary preferences or sleeping habits. More often, I see her in terms of a *role* that she plays (e.g., a partner in ballroom dancing; the fashioner of matzah balls for chicken soup) or the encouragement that she provides to her family; these are matters of her extrinsic relationships. Which of those two aspects I pay attention to is a matter of *construal*.[1]

Cognitively speaking, we human beings rarely attend to an entity in terms of its intrinsic features only; more often, we are concerned with how that entity relates to some other entity (Barsalou et al. 2018). Especially when the subject of our regard is human beings, their external relationships are highly salient (Figure 4.1). As the corpus linguist Mahlberg observed after her study of people nouns (2005:114),

> When we talk about people, we do not talk about concrete physical features in the first place, although these features can play a role. What we talk about are perceptions of personalities.

Figure 4.1. A person's *extrinsic relationships* are usually their most salient aspect.

4.2 Cognitive Function: Assessing a Situation and Its Participants

4.2.1 Situations

A *situation* is the setting in which an object of our regard is placed (physically or metaphorically) in relation to its surroundings or circumstances.[2] A situation consists of elements that are configured in relationship to each other.

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[1] Construal is a key concept for Langacker, who defines it as "our ability to conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways" (2015:120). To me, this matches the word's non-technical sense, which is that the observer's interpretation of the situation is constructed from among competing possibilities.

[2] Alternatively and more dynamically: "We define a situation as a setting where agents encounter other agents, objects and events" (Barsalou et al. 2018:2).

According to the cognitive psychologist Lawrence Barsalou and colleagues (2018:1), *situations* are what the human brain primarily represents and processes. They call this "the brain's most basic function" (ibid., 2). That is, it situates (perceived or conceived) items within their context; and it attends to the relations among those items.[3] Situations and the relatedness of their elements lie at the heart of cognition.

The aesthetic philosopher Philip Jackson once asked rhetorically: "Why bother to identify objects within situations?" He then offered three incisive answers: humans cannot help doing so; it is useful; and it is enjoyable (1998:25).[4] I will focus on the second of those reasons: To think about an item in terms of its situation has a *function*. Quite simply, it enables us humans to accomplish our goals (to live and thrive). Hence, like Barsalou and colleagues, I assume that the fundamental purpose of humankind's concepts is "categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action" (2018:1).

Most if not all of human affairs (events, activities, etc.) can be said to comprise an initial situation, a series of interim situations, and a concluding situation. In the situations that matter to us, one important element is—not surprisingly—*human beings* (including ourselves). And when a situation involves people, we refer to them as *participants* in that situation. Within the social realm, a *situated* person is seen as embedded in relations of many kinds—emotional, kinship, business, social status, membership, etc.

Image by Jim Haberman   Courtesy of Jodi Magness

Figure 4.2. Prototypical situations are many and varied. (Detail from Huqoq synagogue, depicting the building of the Tower of Babel; 5th century CE)

One recurring type of situation arises when *two participants each have interests that can (or seem to) differ* (Figure 4.2). These affairs are of many subtypes, e.g., a joint project, sexual activity, a proceeding, a lawsuit, a conflict, a contest, an agreement, or a transaction. In such cases, the participants practi-

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[3] As Barsalou and colleagues have noted: "Much work from the feature listing paradigm [used in cognitive-psychology experiments] demonstrates that people generate broad situational content when producing features for specific [entity] concepts … such as chair, dog and banana" (2018:9; see references there).

[4] Regarding the first reason given, Barsalou and colleagues believe that the brain's architecture contains "two basic kinds of neural systems: (i) systems that process the *elements* of situations, and (ii) systems that *integrate* these elements into broader patterns—situated conceptualizations—to support comprehension, prediction and action" (2018:2).

cally define the situation in themselves. They are constitutive. In English, these participants are typically called *parties*; and I will refer to such situations as *prototypical* ones.[5] Prototypical situations will prove to be a key element in my argument.

4.2.2 Taking advantage of the gestalt construal of situations

When people think about a participant within a situation, they are thinking beyond that figure's intrinsic features. The human mind apparently employs different representations when regarding an entity in isolation (in terms of intrinsic features) versus in terms of a relational role (Markman 2004). As the cognitive psychologists Arthur Markman and Hunt Stilwell have pointed out (2001:332, emphasis added),

> the feature-based view assumes that category labels refer to a category representation that consists of some collection of features.… [In contrast,] role-governed categories invert the traditional way of looking at category representation, because they suggest that *categories are defined by their position within a more global relational structure that is superordinate to the category label.*

The distinction has been confirmed by cognitive psychologists Micah Goldwater and colleagues, who concluded that "when people consider *role-governed* categories, they focus on ways that their [i.e., the category's] members relate to other entities, whereas when people consider *feature-based* categories, they focus on just the members themselves" (2011:361, emphasis added; see also Goldwater et al. 2015).[6]

This aspect of cognition has an important implication for communication. Because the audience's mind treats prototypical situations as a cognitive gestalt or schema, then with regard to evoking such a situation, speakers can resort to an *underspecified* (relatively ambiguous) description. They can mention only *some* of a situation's facets—and even do so rather vaguely—in order to evoke the *whole* picture schematically in the audience's mind.

4.2.3 Triangles: A heuristic device

A situation—that is, its elements and the relationships among them—can be expressed schematically in terms of *triangles*. In the prototypical situation described above, two corners of a triangle can stand for the two parties involved, while the third corner stands for whatever is at issue, or saliently shared, between them. To give a simple example, when two people meet in order to study an ancient text together, this can be readily represented as a triangle whose three corners consist of Person *A* and Person *B* and the text in question, as shown in Figure 4.3.

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[5] A situation with only one participant is therefore not prototypical, for the purposes of this study.

[6] For documentation of the human propensity to create a category that consists of abstract relations between a set of elements, see Rehder and Ross 2001.

Figure 4.3. A prototypical situation can be readily depicted schematically as a triangle.

Triangles are useful for modeling how situations are initially constituted—and how they change. For as a pioneer in using triangles to analyze human relationships has pointed out, the triangle is "the smallest stable relationship unit" (Kerr and Bowen 1988:134).[7] Not surprisingly, triangles have been invoked as a tool in discourse analysis. Perhaps the most well-known model is the Stance Triangle, which portrays two interlocutors who are mutually regarding a third entity (Du Bois 2007:164):[8]

> The three nodes of the stance triangle represent the three key entities in the stance act, namely the first subject, the second subject, and the (shared) stance object. The three sides of the triangle represent vectors of directed action that organize the stance relations among these entities.… Two of the three sides represent evaluative vectors directed … toward the single shared stance object.… Concomitant to evaluating a shared stance object, stancetakers position themselves [and] define alignment with each other, whether the alignment is convergent or divergent.

In the present study, triangles will be used to comprehend how a speaker and an audience use language to communicate about situations. They will highlight how the mention of only part of the triangle (labeled with a workhorse) can evoke the entire schema in the audience's mind. My shorthand way to represent a triangle such as in Figure 4.2 is:

$\blacktriangle$ = Person *A* + Person *B* + Ancient text

Readers of this study who see such an "equation" are encouraged to sketch out for themselves a triangle that models the depicted situation, copying each of the terms as the label for one of the corners. Few people can properly visualize the situation without this aid.

4.3 Communicative Function: Handling a Situation and Its Participants

In §1.6.3, I presented the concept of an audience's *discourse model* as fundamental to this study's understanding of how communication works. That model keeps track of various sets of *situations* and their *participants*.[9] By the term *participant* I mean a typically

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[7] My analyzing depicted situations in terms of *triangles* is inspired by their prominent use for analyzing interpersonal dynamics within the fields of family systems theory and family therapy. This heuristic device seems to have first been articulated by the psychiatrist Murray Bowen ([1971] 1978:198–200; see also Kerr and Bowen 1988:134–62; Richardson 1995:51–69).

[8] As Du Bois notes, "The model—a 'geometric metaphor'—has been applied to a wide range of interactions" (2007:169).

[9] Indeed, in psycholinguistics, the discourse model is known as a *situation model* (Van Berkum et al. 2007).

adult person, or a group of people, who is involved in the situation at hand.[10]

In communication, one of the speaker's main tasks is to manage the model's cast of participants. This task involves inducing the audience to perform, on cue, three distinct mental acts: (1) constitute a mental representation of each participant—some of whom may be new; (2) absorb supplemental data about its participants; and (3) revise the situation around the participants as needed. In this respect, communication is a matter of synchronization between speaker and audience.[11] Discourse analysis and participant-reference tracking are two well-studied analytical modes that account for how speakers and audiences accomplish this task (e.g., Lambrecht 1994; see also above, Chapter 3, note 3).

4.3.1 Three synchronization functions in discourse

To prepare us to grasp what the speaker's use of language needs to accomplish with respect to situations and their participants, I will now detail the three aforementioned aspects of the speaker's task of managing the discourse.

Introducing and Situating a New Participant.   When an intended referent is not yet active in the discourse, an initial referring expression must prompt the audience to "open a file" for the new participant within its (the audience's) discourse model. That participant may be an individual or a group that is wholly new to the discourse. Alternatively, if a group is already discourse active, the "new" participant may be a subset of that group, as that subset is set off distinctly from the larger group.

Similarly, in computational linguistics, one of the coding methods used for abstracting the basic semantic structure of a text is framed similarly: in terms of *scenes* and *participants*. That is, a discourse's basic elements are assumed to be its descriptions of *scenes* (which are defined as situations or events mentioned in the text), whose basic elements are its *participants* (Prange et al. 2019:166–67).

According to the theory of discourse processing developed by the cognitive psychologists Anthony Sanford and Simon Garrod (e.g., 1998), knowledge is organized in the mind in terms of specific situations, which they call "scenarios." In their view, the most basic operation in understanding an utterance is to *recognize the presupposed situation*, in order to apply what is already known about such situations.

And in cognitive linguistics, the discourse model has been described in terms of a "stage model" (e.g., Van Hoek 2003:173–75), in which cognitive processing effort is needed so as to access the conception of each referent that is held "on stage" in the audience's mind. Alternatively, as John Taylor puts it, "referring expressions designate things that exist in … a 'mental space', that is, a *situation* as conceived by a language user" (2002:72; emphasis added).

[10] Participants inhabit not only the real world, but also the mental model of any discourse in which a speaker is reflecting that world—or even an imagined world. (When I discuss the extension of workhorse nouns to non-human referents, then those elements of the situation are called participants, by extension.)

[11] "It is only by constant recourse to the hearer's knowledge context … that we communicate using human language" (Givón 2018:266).

The speaker ensures that the new participant is not only introduced but also *situated* within the discourse model. To be situated means to be anchored to some existing element in the model—such as a prior participant, or a recognized social role (e.g., midwife, king, etc.), or a known locale. The speaker prompts the audience's act of situation by predicating something about the participant. Predication typically occurs via the description embedded in the speaker's referring expression, as well as via an accompanying clausal predicate or nonrestrictive apposition.

Situating a new participant can be tantamount to prompting the audience to constitute a whole new situation in its model. This can be accomplished by the speaker's mere mention of that new participant and of the salient relationship to an existing participant. In effect, the two participants provide the necessary mooring at two corners of a triangle, for erecting a model of the new prototypical situation under discussion.

Elaborating upon a Participant. Subsequent to a participant's initial presentation, the speaker may wish to supply more data. (A supplemental description may note the referent's qualities, habits, roles, status, past accomplishments, etc.) Using the "file" analogy mentioned above, we can say that the speaker needs to induce the audience to access the file that had been opened for the participant in question, so as to attach that new data to it. As we shall see, the speaker can provide a linguistic signal that alerts the audience to perform that task within its discourse model.

Re-situating a Participant. As the depicted situation develops and changes, the speaker needs to prompt the audience to update its discourse model accordingly. In particular, one or more participants may need to be *re-situated*, because their relations with other elements in the model have shifted.[12] Expressing the possibilities in the graphical terms of triangles, we can say: the shape of existing situational triangles may be altered; new triangles may be added alongside existing ones; and old triangles may fade away.

When the speaker wishes to describe a shift in the situation, it can be more readily processed by cuing the audience beforehand to re-open its file for the central participant.

4.3.2 Type as participant: Nonspecific reference and the discourse model

The notion of participant applies not only to identified individuals, groups, or subgroups, but also to nonspecific *types* (or *classes*) of persons. For a type likewise receives a representation within the discourse model.

When a speaker makes reference to a type, some linguists—the most widely cited being T. Givón (e.g., 2018:241–46)—call such usage *non-referential*, on the grounds that it does not point to anyone in the speaker's real world. However, that terminology discour-

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[12] It is the speaker who decides whether a participant's situation has changed to a significant extent, for this is a matter of construal.

ages our noticing an important fact. As both Givón himself (ibid., 244) and cognitive linguists emphasize, language use involves reference to entities in the *mind*—specifically in the audience's discourse model—rather than in the real world. When discussing a *type* of entity (such as people), the human mind conjures and maintains some kind of representation; and the speaker manages that production.[13] So like Haspelmath (1997:109; see below, Chapter 8, n. 2), whenever a speaker discusses a type, rather than calling such usage non-referential, I instead call it *nonspecific* reference.[14]

4.4 Nouns in Language: Pointing to Participants within Situations

As we have seen, some kind of linguistic signal can help to prompt the audience to constitute and situate a new participant within its discourse model. Likewise, such a signal can help to prompt the audience to incorporate new data about that referent, as well as to re-situate the referent in light of added developments. This is where nouns come into the picture.[15] Nouns thus play a key role in human communication about situations and their participants. For how does a speaker induce the audience to alter the participants in its discourse model? Via referring expressions—in which nouns are central.

Introducing a participant requires the involvement of a noun; a pronoun cannot accomplish this function (Hopper and Thompson 1984:709).[16] Speaking loosely, we can say that both a noun and a pronoun "point to" their referent. Crucially, however, their information-structure implications differ. A noun's use in a referring expression prompts the audience to infer three additional types of information about its referent:[17] existence as an individuated entity; intrinsic features (or properties); and relationship to other entities. Let me spell out each of these aspects in more detail.

4.4.1 Asserting existence and individuating a referent

As noted above, when a speaker needs to invite the audience to assign a spot in its dis-

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[13] I.e., even when the referring noun is under negation, the audience must nonetheless open up a file for its hypothetical referent so as to record that participant as missing within the discourse scene.

[14] I reserve the term *non-referential* for when a noun is used in a clausal predicate (e.g., אִישׁ in Gen 6:9).

[15] The following discussion of nouns is tailored specifically to human nouns as the focus of this study. Meanwhile, I am excluding all mass nouns that cannot be used to *individuate* a referent ("quantify over individuals"), since that is the key function of interest (see below). On the cognitive distinction between *mass nouns* and *count nouns* (for those languages that make such distinctions), especially with respect to individuation, see Barner and Snedeker 2003; Cheung et al. 2012; Fieder et al. 2014.

[16] This generalization holds even when the new participant belongs to a group that is already active in the discourse: "The separation of an individual from a group necessitates the use of a lexical noun phrase" (Runge 2007:103).

[17] These three types of inference impact both the informational and discourse levels of meaning (§2.3).

course model for a new participant, or to locate its representation of a participant so as to enter a revision, the standard alert signal is a noun. It functions that way because a noun's utterance amounts to a performative act of *individuation*: both the speaker and the audience must conceive of the entity as a single whole, while distinguishing the entity in question from everything else. This, as the linguist Ronald Langacker points out in his theory of Cognitive Grammar, is a matter of construal.[18]

To make this point clear, let us pause to consider what a noun actually is.[19] (That is not as easy as it may sound![20]) Langacker defines a noun semantically, as profiling a concept that he calls a THING[21]—which he defines in terms of two basic cognitive operations: "any product of grouping and reification" (2013:105; 2017:95).[22] That is, the act of des-

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[18] The American philosopher John Dewey had likewise distinguished between an entity and the cognitive result of our regarding that entity (Jackson 1998:25; Duff 1990). On construal, see above, note 1.

[19] For millennia, astute observers of language have noted a difference between expressing something via a noun rather than via an adjective or verb (e.g., Beruriah in the Babylonian Talmud, *Berakhot* 10a; Evans 2019:468–69). Psycholinguists and language-acquisition specialists have experimentally confirmed such distinctions; the word class of nouns is psychologically real (Markman 1989:119–33; Gentner 1981; 1982).

[20] Linguists differ on what it means to classify a given word as a noun. They have attempted to define it from various angles: morphological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic. Achieving a scientifically rigorous and cross-linguistically valid definition is challenging (Luuk 2010:351; Lyons 1977:423). A few linguists prefer the view that "noun" is an emergent property, determined by a word's use (LaPolla 2014). The comparative linguist Christian Lehmann notes that "definitions of word classes—just as of any other grammatical category—are mixed definitions, combining semantic and structural criteria" (2013:54). For present purposes, only the semantic aspect is relevant.

[21] The small capitals indicate that this term is used in a technical sense. Although many linguists instead use the term *entity* for what nouns describe, Langacker employs that word to describe what a THING denotes (2013:98). Thus he considers a THING to be a cognitively constructed entity.

[22] Langacker justified his definition through methodical speculation. Converging evidence from the linguistic fields of typology, psycholinguistics, and semantic change has since offered robust empirical support for his semantic conception of the noun class (Mihatsch 2009). See also the discussion in Evans 2009:119–23. Langacker's basic view of noun function is not new. Among philosophers, it has long been known as *hypostatization* (Schmid 2000:368).

According to Forbes 2009:4, the notion of semantically defining the class of nouns "has been thoroughly discredited"; however, in support of this claim he cites only a brief, dismissive treatment by one linguist (Trask 1999). Miller-Naudé and Naudé (2016:3) likewise reject the semantic approach to defining word classes, on two grounds: (1) It is too difficult to falsify prototype-based semantics, "thus rendering it empirically questionable." (2) It is a circular endeavor, for it "requires Hebraists to determine first what a term in question means, which is intimately connected to its lexical category." These objections seem to miss their mark. Langacker formulates his semantic definition in a schematic way that does not restrict it to prototypes (2013:95). Furthermore, the semantic character of nounhood is an abstraction from the semantic contributions of innumerable nouns. As a lexical class, "noun" is a functional category; it has an independent semantic significance that constrains the audience's interpretation of a given label and its referential target (Evans 2019:464; cf. Langacker 2013:97–98; 103–8).

ignating something via a noun means that we are *treating it as a distinct unit* for the present purpose.[23]

Nonetheless, this definition of "noun" is actually too schematic, for its scope includes even pronouns, demonstratives, and articles—as Langacker himself notes (2013:122). In order to distinguish "lexical" nouns from those other categories, Langacker adds two functional distinctions. One of these is that a noun is used to *focus attention* on a referent, as a particular THING in our mental universe (2016:76–77).[24] Thus while the broader definition makes explicit the conceptual act of assembling the entity that is being labeled, this qualification adds the corresponding act of *individuation*. The prototypical use of a noun is as the head of *a referring expression whose referent is thereby individuated*. As the semanticist Dwight Bolinger memorably phrased it, "The quality of the noun is that it captures a concept on the wing and holds it still for inspection" ([1980] 2014:27).[25] And this simple quality accounts for nouns' vital role in managing the participants in an audience's discourse model (Figure 4.4).[26]

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Figure 4.4. A noun tells the audience to individuate its referent—prompting a mental sequence.

4.4.2 Referential coherence: consequential participants

Given the limited attention that human beings have available (due to processing capacity constraints, if not mortality), a speaker is expected to direct the audience's attention to

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[23] Here I have simplified Langacker's definition, which needlessly constrains a THING by requiring that it be made up of other entities. That requirement violates his claim that "the proposed schema makes no direct reference to physical entities" (2013:108), for it precludes the possibility that a THING might be indivisible by definition—e.g., the fundamental particles of matter known as quarks. It also forces him into awkward claims about how physical objects are perceived (ibid., 107). Better, the cognitive act of apprehending an object's "continuity" is what makes it into a THING, regardless of how many entities it might comprise. In short, "thingness" is a matter of construal.

[24] This feature explains why languages have nouns at all. It enables communication about things within the extra-linguistic world, as the parties establish a shared (or corresponding) reference to the objects of their regard. As the linguist Beatrice Warren has written, "Lexical meaning without a referent is unthinkable" (1999:216). Nouns are the linguistic handles for the pragmatic act of making reference. This fact is sometimes considered a definitional criterion in itself (Lyons 1977:438–50; Rijkhoff 2004:10).

[25] Individuation also crucially induces the referent's persistence in the mind as an *identifiable* entity. It supports what the philosopher Ruth Millikan (2018) has called "the most fundamental job that cognition has for any animal," namely "to be able to recognize the same thing again." The generative linguist Mark Baker (2003) likewise points out that whenever we employ a noun to label (characterize) its referent, we are stating the "criterion of identity" that is necessary for co-reference (i.e., participant-reference tracking).

[26] Langacker's second functional distinction will be discussed below, §4.4.4.

what is most important. Whenever a discourse's participants are depicted as materially altering the situation by their presence or their actions, we can describe their contribution as *consequential*. The speaker needs to ensure that the audience recognizes right away which participants are consequential—for the latter are somehow treated differently in the discourse model. As T. Givón has pointed out (1982:84–89; here 84; cf. 2018: 243–46), the nature of the reference (specific versus nonspecific) depends upon the

> *communicative intent* of the speaker uttering the discourse, specifically on whether a particular individual argument (noun phrase) is going to be *important* enough in the *subsequent discourse*, i.e. whether its *specific identity* is important, or only its *generic type membership*.

When the participant's contribution is consequential, the speaker necessarily conceives of that participant in specific terms, rather than as a generic type. Many languages employ special referent-coding devices that signal which new participants are important to the discourse.[27] Nouns may play a role in this, as part of a presentative device. (To some extent, these devices overlap with the ones used to signal referential continuity. Hence they can be difficult to tease apart.)

4.4.3 Referential coherence and re-situating a referent

A speaker's need to prompt the audience to "re-situate" a participant within its discourse model is what accounts for a number of participant-tracking devices, such as (in English) referring to participants at narrative junctures by name or via a noun phrase (rather than via a mere pronoun). Let us briefly review the relevant phenomena.

1. *Noun labels.*   As is well known, a discourse often includes numerous references to the same participant. In order for an audience to experience those references as coherent, a speaker must attend to maintaining their continuity (cf. Givón 2018:40–60). Continuity is signaled via a hierarchy of referent-coding devices.[28] In that hierarchy, the most cognitively accessible (already highly activated) referents tend to receive the least coding—just enough to preserve continuity. When a referent's presence is less predictable, the speaker provides more coding because the audience needs extra help to promptly adjust its discourse model. In this schema, the use of nouns is reserved for low-continuity communications, including the re-situating of participants as described above (ibid., 47).

In discourse analysis, *redundant relexicalization* (the speaker's deployment of a label beyond what is needed for tracking the participant) refers to the narrative convention by

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[27] Givón (ibid.; see also Lambrecht 1994:83), who names Modern Hebrew as one of the languages that offers such a referent-coding distinction. In §§6.4, 6.8.7, and 7.2.2, I will present evidence that this distinction existed already in Ancient Hebrew, although it manifested differently.

[28] I will not detail the hierarchy here. See, e.g., Runge 2006; 2007.

which a text signals the advent of a discrete plot development.[29] That is, the noun's very presence is significant, for it has a discourse function (Runge 2007:129):

> The redundant relexicalization of a participant [in a narrative context is] a pragmatic device [to] signal the beginning of a new unit where one would not otherwise naturally exist on the basis of discontinuity. This new 'chunk' represents what the writer conceives of as the next development in the discourse, related to what precedes but still distinct.

Actually, the same convention applies not only for narratives but also for communication generally—such as in procedural instructions (e.g., a recipe), where redundant relexicalization of a participant is warranted at significant junctures in the described procedure.

2. *Expansive labels*.   According to Runge's summary of how the human mind processes participant references, if the text refers to a participant in some expansive manner, then it is construed as a marked usage (2006:93; emphasis added; cf. 2007:103):

> Conversational implicatures [lead] us to expect that by default, a speaker will use the most *specific* referring expression available [and], by default, to use the most morphologically and semantically *basic* referring expression available.… If a speaker uses a non-default form in a context, then some meaning other than that communicated by the default is intended.

In other words, an expansive label is meaningful by its conspicuousness; it *overencodes* the referent. Runge explains that it calls attention to itself. In so doing, it signals that this particular term is thematically salient. This is known as *thematic highlighting* (ibid.).

3. *Changing the label*.   A speaker may employ a different label for participants than the one with which they were first introduced. The audience then presumes that this departure from expectation is meaningful—and interprets accordingly. In the scholarly literature, three reasons have been identified for a change in label. According to Runge and Westbury (2012b), a shift in designation functions "to recharacterize the participant or highlight some thematically important information."[30] In addition, Runge (2007:164–67) discusses a third possibility, that a labeling shift indicates a change in the narration's

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[29] Audiences have a sense of how succinctly and conventionally a given point can be made; and verbiage that is considered to be in excess of that baseline is construed as pregnant with added meaning. As Runge explains: "The semantic role of the marked expression then is not to disambiguate, but to signal redundancy in order to accomplish certain pragmatic effects" (2006:94–95n11). One function of overencoding a participant is to signal a narrative development; it thus segments the discourse into cognitively bite-sized pieces for easier processing (see ibid., 94n9). Even more blatant overencoding, which we will encounter later, draws the audience's attention to the speech or action that is about to be depicted, much like the European/American convention of a snare-drum roll or a bugle call to herald an important public announcement (see ibid., 99).

For a generally positive evaluation of Runge's analysis, see Van Peursen 2013.

[30] S.v. §2.6, "Changed Reference." See also Runge 2007:164, 196–97.

point of view ("*where* the camera is, the *vantage point* from which the scene is viewed"; ibid., 165). He adds that procedurally speaking, "a process of elimination may be used in isolating the most plausible effect(s) achieved in the context" (ibid., 167).[31]

Redundant relexicalization, overencoding, and changing the label are all communication devices that are based upon cognitive need. They are ways to prompt the re-situating of the participant in the audience's discourse model.

4.4.4 Nouns and the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy

In §4.4.1, I mentioned that Langacker has specified two distinguishing features of a "lexical" noun. There I discussed only the first one, a quality that results in individuation. The second of the distinguishing features that Langacker specified is that a noun *describes* its referent (2016:103–5). In other words, it points the audience toward what the speaker most wants us to understand about that referent, by designating it in terms of a particular *property*.[32] Givón observes that this is necessary "in order for our experience of referring entities to be meaningful," at least on the informational level (2018:242).

As noted above (§4.1), a referent can be viewed in a variety of ways, from a number of conceptual perspectives. Thus each distinct noun (or noun's sense) highlights a different aspect of the referent in question. The speaker's best choice of label depends upon the communicative purpose in the given context (Van Deemter 2016:12, 15, 28–29, 44, 80). In particular, a noun can regard its referent either in terms of *intrinsic features* or *extrinsic relationships*—as I shall now elaborate.

4.4.5 Sortal meaning and relational meaning

Typical nouns tend to regard their referent *sortally*; they answer the question, "What *sort* of thing is this?" in terms of its intrinsic features. Alongside this category of sortal nouns, another class of nouns tends to include a *relational* aspect in profiling the referent. That is, as the cognitive linguist Sebastian Löbner has written, these nouns "characterize their referents in terms of a particular relation to some other object" (2011:281). They are usually called *relational nouns*.[33] Prototypical examples include *mother*, *edge*, and *barrier*.

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[31] Stephen Levinsohn, a linguist and advisor of Bible translations, treats highlighting as a slowing-down of the pace of narration via added verbiage, such as participant labels (2007:79–82). I propose the audience's cognitive need to "re-situate" participants as a more direct explanation for the speaker's use of extravagant labeling. Nouns constitute situations, which verbs proceed to alter.

[32] A similar claim is made in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006:674), and in the theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM), as propounded by Vyvyan Evans (2015: 271). See also Van Deemter 2016:61–62.

[33] More precisely, sortal nouns should be called *sortal-only* nouns, while relational nouns should be called *relational-plus-sortal* nouns. However, for convenience I will use the standard labeling, which draws upon PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymy to call a category by its most salient feature.

Crucially, typically the same noun can be used either sortally or relationally (Löbner 2011:286; Fraurud 1990:414; Brenner et al. 2014; Löbner 2013, 2015, 2016); and either of those usages—if conventionalized in the language—can become a distinct sense of that noun. To give two examples among the human nouns in English, *child* has both a sortal sense ('nonadult') and a relational one ('offspring of someone'); and the same is true for *subject* (as sortal: 'person'; as relational: 'governed by the ruler of a state').[34]

The option of either a sortal or relational construal is available to audiences for two reasons, both of which were covered earlier in this chapter: a referent is always necessarily profiled in relation to a background, which conceptually links the object and its background to each other (§4.1); and in the referential world of the discourse, participants are conceptually linked to the other elements in their situation (§4.2). This is due to the natural cognitive processes of spreading activation and metonymic association (a matter of construal).[35] As Langacker observes (2015:126–27):

> Overtly mentioned elements are neither free-standing nor exhaustive of the situation described, but are embedded in a substrate providing the basis for a coherent interpretation. Reference to a single element may then be sufficient to evoke the entire conceptual complex. . . . Since meanings are never self-contained, the onstage conception recruits or elicits others, which in turn invoke still others.

Consequently, a speaker can use the label for a human participant (the "onstage conception") to call attention to that referent's *relationship* to another entity.

Given that both intrinsic or extrinsic features are potentially accessible, cognitively speaking, and given that the audience's language processor has the option to construe the noun according to either dimension, which one prevails? The answer is: the one that yields a more meaningful (coherent and informative) utterance.[36]

Linguists all seem to agree that a prototypical noun denotes its referent in a sortal manner rather than a relational one. The concept of a distinct class of relational nouns usually has been treated as a given—whose anomalous behaviors need to be accounted for while solving some other problem; thus it finds a place in many theories and models. Occasionally, however, the existence of such a distinction has been denied altogether (Adger 2013; Le Bruyn 2013; Le Bruyn et al. 2014). No monograph or even scholarly article (in any branch of linguistics) seems to be solely devoted to relational nouns.

[34] The formal semanticists Carl Vikner and Per Anker Jensen adduce numerous additional examples and classes of nouns that have both a sortal and a relational reading (2002:205).

[35] Psycholinguistic testing has shown that polysemous senses are primed when they are metonymically related (e.g., Foraker and Murphy 2012; see discussion in Falkum and Vicente 2015; cf. Srinivasan and Rabagliati 2015). No extra cognitive processing costs are involved (Piñango and Deo 2016; Zarcone et al. 2017; Frazier and Rayner 1990; Frisson and Pickering 1999; Bott et al. 2016).

[36] In general in language processing, the favored construal is the one that readily yields a coherent and informative result (for a fuller discussion and documentation, see Stein 2018; Stein forthcoming). These criteria fall squarely within the realm of pragmatics. See Ziegeler 2007; de Almeida and Dwivedi 2008;

4.4.6 Cognitive preference for entity concepts over relational concepts

Finally, let us consider why a speaker who wishes to characterize a referent relationally will often do so by using a noun that normally denotes an entity (rather than using a relational noun—or an even more relationally oriented term such as a verb or preposition[37]). The answer is because entity concepts can offer a better point of reference. It appears that human minds are attracted first and foremost to concepts that are expressed in highly individuable and concrete (entity) terms.[38] Psychological studies show that entity concepts tend to be *more accessible*, cognitively speaking, than the relational concepts that bind them together.[39] Because human participants are more concrete than the situations in which they participate, they have greater cognitive salience. In short, a speaker often invokes an entity concept as an indirect point of access—a kind of shortcut—in order to make a relational point.

4.5 Summary

The following basic observations about cognition and communication will enable us, in the next chapter, to make sense of how workhorse nouns are used.

The notion of an "isolated object" is something of a mirage; an object is known by the relationships that it upholds. Thus the human mind can construct its impression of an entity only as situated in its context. An observer mentally represents that object in two aspects: its own *intrinsic* properties, and its *extrinsic* relationships. We are most often interested in the latter, especially when the subject of our regard is a human being.

When viewed at a high level of abstraction, the human brain continually pays attention to *situations* and their elements. When the latter are human beings, we call them *participants*. In this study, a *prototypical situation* is composed of two human participants whose interests either align or differ.

Falkum and Vicente 2015:9–10. For a generative-linguistics perspective that recognizes pragmatic realities during a sortal-to-relational shift in a particular construction, see Alexiadou et al. 2007:474.

[37] On word classes as on a relationality continuum, see Gentner and Boroditsky 2001; Feist and Férez 2007.

[38] Empirical support for the notion of a cognitive preference for entity concepts comes from studies of language acquisition. In our early childhood, we initially construe relational nouns in sortal-only ("object reference") terms (Keil 1989; Hall and Waxman 1993; cf. Gentner and Boroditsky 2001:221). For example, *uncle* is interpreted as "a friendly man with a pipe." Likewise, *passenger* is interpreted simply as "person." Only at a later stage of development and exposure to language use do children add a relational component to such terms. Furthermore, as children we acquire the names of highly individuable objects and entities before those of less easily individuated objects (ibid., 222ff.).

[39] Cf. Langacker 2015:127 regarding "inherent prominence." For experimental evidence and discussion, see Markman and Stilwell 2001; Love and Markman 2003; Goldwater et al. 2011; Goldwater et al. 2015; Goldwater and Schalk 2016; Davis et al. 2017.

Because situations are construed by the mind as a gestalt, and because participants are construed in terms of the situation in which they are embedded, a speaker can mention only *some* of a situation's aspects, including only *some* of its participants, in order to evoke the *whole* picture schematically in the audience's mind.

During communication, an audience's discourse model keeps track of the depicted situations and their participants—who may be conceived of in either specific or nonspecific terms. The speaker must manage that model's cast of characters. This task involves cueing the audience to do at least three things within its model: (1) represent the depicted participants—some of whom may be new; (2) absorb supplemental data about those participants; and (3) revise the situation around the participants as needed. To provide the proper signals for these mental operations, the speaker employs noun labels. (Nouns may also play a role in a presentative device that signals a referent's importance.)

The signaling functions of nouns accords with their most basic role as the head of a referring expression, which *individuates* its referent within our mental universe. A typical noun also describes its referent in terms of a particular intrinsic property or cluster of properties. Even so, a given noun can usually be used to highlight either those features or one of the referent's extrinsic relationships.

All nouns in referring expressions have a relational function: they prompt the audience to attend to some entity in its discourse model. Hence they manage the reification and grouping of the elements in that model. Even on the informational level, entity nouns can be—and often are—used to evoke relational information. They can do so because a noun's most basic function—individuation—is implicitly a relational operation.

Finally, deploying a noun that evokes an entity concept (e.g., <human being>) also activates the referent's situated relationships—making the latter cognitively available. Consequently, if a speaker wishes to regard a referent *in terms of its relationship to another entity*, it can suffice to articulate the label for the entity itself. Indeed, an entity noun may be the preferred way to prompt a relational construal, because entity concepts tend to be more cognitively accessible. The audience will adopt a relational reading anyway if doing so yields a more meaningful text.

In the next chapter, I will explore the special role of workhorse human nouns when people communicate about situations and their participants.

5 Workhorse Meaning: A Communications Account

The obscure we see eventually. The completely obvious, it seems, takes longer.

—Edward R. Murrow[1]

Previous chapters have addressed the distinctive features of what I am calling workhorse nouns. Perhaps the most prominent is a high frequency of occurrence.[2] One could quip that if workhorse nouns have managed to reproduce so widely in their respective languages, they must be doing something right. Mahlberg interpreted the frequency with which *man/woman/men/women* occur in English as indicating their preferential status in discourse (2005:115). Ultimately she concluded (ibid., 175):

> The frequency of general nouns may be interpreted as some kind of unmarkedness that enables general nouns to contribute to the efficiency of texts: general nouns may be taken as default solutions to fulfil certain functions.

Now, how do workhorse nouns in particular "contribute to the efficiency of texts"? What exactly makes them "unmarked" or "default" solutions in linguistic communication?

I will now endeavor to lay out a hypothesis regarding communicative aspects that guide the use of workhorse nouns, in light of their distinctive features.[3] This approach unites cognitive, communication, and linguistic considerations; it also unites the two levels of meaning (§2.3). As we shall see, it leads to certain predictions regarding such nouns' patterns of use, which I articulate at the end of this chapter. In the following three chapters, I will then test those predictions on אִישׁ.

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[1] Prominent 20th-century American journalist (quotationspage.com/quote/40362.html).

[2] On the various impacts of a word's high frequency on its meaning, see, e.g., Horn 1984:30; Mahlberg 2005:161, 164; Bybee and Beckner 2015:965; Baayen et al. 2016:1177–78; Harmon and Kapatsinski 2017; Wijitsopon 2018.

[3] I do not employ the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to lexical semantics (Ye 2017), pioneered by Anna Wierzbicka, which has been applied in Biblical Studies (Kumon 2019). Although its notion of breaking down a word into "semantic primes" is appealing, its basic assumption that word meaning is compositional does not suit the high semantic mutability of workhorse nouns. The mismatch is evident from the proffered NSM definitions of *men* and *women* (Goddard 2012:722; Goddard and Wierzbicka 2013), which are supposed to apply to all instances of those words' use, as well as for their conceptual cognates in all languages. The semantic prime for human beings is said to be 'people', from which 'child' is derived; then 'women' is derived as *the kind of people whose body type allows them to bear a child*; and then 'men' is derived as *the kind of people who possess the sole other body type*. The suggestion that such definitions explain the way that the words *man* and *woman* are actually used in English (see Chapter 2) is simply not credible. See further the cogent critical review of NSM in Geeraerts 2010:132–37.

5.1 Designing an Ideal Signal for Managing Participants

Imagine that you are a speaker, standing in front of an audience, and you want to communicate something about one or more participants in a situation (or event). What would be the most efficient (least-cost) way for you to ensure that the audience divines your intended message?

As discussed in the previous chapter, a big part of your task is to manage the cast of participants in your audience's discourse model. At the very least, that management effort requires the introduction of each such participant. As we have seen, the prototypical signaling device for this purpose is an (undetermined) noun phrase. I submit that the *ideal* noun to use for this signal would be simple, straightforward, and streamlined. That is, it would carry a low cost for you as the speaker to articulate: it would consist of just one syllable that is easy to pronounce, rather like a beep. Furthermore, it would be easy for the audience to process mentally; it would be understood to mean "Create a file for a new participant, please."

In other words, the informational "content" of this ideal signal would consist of nothing beyond that idea of "insert a *participant* here" (which is thus a discourse function). It would be the linguistic equivalent of a photon in physics: an elementary particle that travels at the speed of light and has no mass, yet produces an excitation at its destination.

Indeed, given that so much of human cognition and communication are devoted to the activity of *situating and re-situating depicted participants*, precisely this kind of signaling must be in high demand. If so, then over time, in such frequent signaling, there would predictably be a modest yet relentless pressure to minimize the effort involved by both parties in the communication of this signal. There ought to be a word for this!

So perhaps—as a feature of at least some languages—a lexical unit that resembles this ideal signal has actually come into existence. Indeed, I submit that this kind of signal is precisely what I have called a *workhorse noun*. I will show that even as it is renowned for the paucity of its meaning contribution on the informational level, the workhorse has quietly been optimized for the speaker's management of the participants in the audience's discourse model (§2.5).

If we assume that a language's speakers, in the aggregate, strive for efficiency in communication, then it follows that they will tend to rely disproportionately upon words in the language that are easy to pronounce and/or easy to understand, and semantically highly mutable. That argument has been made on information-theoretic grounds and confirmed via various regression analyses on a lexical database (large tagged corpus) in three Germanic languages (Piantadosi et al. 2012).[4]

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[4] The languages are English, German, and Dutch. For a comparison of these authors' findings to a similar, classic argument presented by the linguist George Zipf, see Piantadosi et al. 2012:281, 287.

A speaker will tend to produce utterances that are underspecified because an audience is not only capable of "connecting the dots" via inference but also does so automatically. As the pragmaticist Stephen Levinson has pointed out, when it comes to human communication, "the essential asymmetry is: inference is cheap, articulation expensive, and thus the design requirements are for a system that maximizes inference" (2000:29). Consequently, the cognitive scientists Piantadosi et al. have argued that "any effort the speaker makes to express a distinction that could have been inferred is, in effect, wasted effort" (2012:284). Such conditions of communication favor the development and deployment of workhorse nouns, which (as we shall see below) are semantically thin—at least in terms of featural information.

5.2 A Semantic Structure with Three Aspects

As discussed in §2.6, workhorse nouns contribute meaning that can resemble that of disparate kinds of substantives: full sortal nouns, pronouns, and relational nouns. What semantic structure licenses such behavior? To answer, I must bring together three concepts: the distinction between taxonomies and ontologies; semantic dimensional density; and the relational use of nouns.

5.2.1 Ontological category, not a classification

In §2.6, I cited evidence that workhorse human nouns often do not seem to participate in an ordinary taxonomy of class inclusion. Along these lines, the French linguist Marco Fasciolo (2018) has discussed what he calls *noms du fond* 'ground nouns'.[5] This class includes unusually general terms such as *objet* 'object', *lieu* 'place', *chose* 'thing'. Such nouns represent ontological categories.[6] Unlike prototypical nouns, they do not classify their referents usefully; in predicative position, they do not provide any relevant information about the grammatical subject's referent (e.g., "a book is a <u>thing</u> with a cover and pages").

Regarding such nouns, Fasciolo strikingly states: *En toute logique, leurs contenus ne sont pas … des concepts* 'Logically, their [semantic] contents are not even concepts' (2018:6). More precisely, he asserts (ibid., 10) they are

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[5] Fasciolo reasons introspectively with grammaticality judgments of tailored examples, while citing the corpus studies and cognitive analyses of other scholars who have made this distinction between nouns that participate in taxonomies (superordinates) and those that do not (also known as *summit nouns*). Especially with respect to human nouns, see Mihatsch 2017:71–78; Adler and Moline 2018:5–6; see also Mihatsch 2007; Adler 2017, 2018; Benninger 2018. In contrast, Michael Halliday did not draw this distinction in the classic treatment of general nouns (Halliday and Hasan 1976; see above, §2.4.1), nor in more recent work (Halliday and Mathiessen 2013:646–47).

[6] According to Haspelmath 1997:28 (see above, §2.4.3), major ontological categories in languages include: person, thing, place, time, and manner. They reflect the way that the mind seems to organize experience.

> *la manifestation lexicale de … champs de cohérence. La nature de leur contenu n'est pas « cognitive », mais « ontologique »….*
>
> the lexical manifestation of … fields of coherence. The nature of their content is not "cognitive" but "ontological."

That is to say, ground nouns establish *les relations possibles entre les phénomènes* 'the possible relationships between phenomena' (ibid.). Fasciolo offers broad analogies: these nouns are foundational; they point to the ground upon which meaning is built. That is, ground nouns provide the underlying domain within which an utterance's meaning takes shape. But if that is so, then ground nouns are neither sortal nouns nor relational nouns. Rather, they exist outside of that standard dichotomy.

Fasciolo notes that one of the ontological categories that is expressed by ground nouns is <human being> (ibid., 12). This applies to all of the general human nouns in French, including *homme* (personal communication, 25 Sept. 2019).

5.2.2 Thin semantics

As is well-known, nouns as a class prompt more semantic information about their referent than pronouns do (Sugamoto 1989:270). Yet like most other linguistic categories, the class of nouns can be said to have gradations among its members.[7] One well-known dimension of those gradations is the amount of information that they evoke about their referent. Some nouns are semantically rich, regarding their referent in terms of a prominent characteristic, function, or role (e.g., *laptop*, *movement*, *communion*, *messenger*, *label*), while others are more understated (e.g., *fact*, *idea*, *claim*, *mistake*, *hope*). The cognitive linguist Hans-Jörg Schmid would say that the latter type of noun possesses a *low-dimensional semantic potential*.[8] This type is highly schematic—representing generalizations that are abstracted across more specific categories (Schmid 2000).[9]

Although Schmid was evidently thinking in taxonomic terms, the similar idea of a *low-dimensional semantics* can be productively applied to Fasciolo's concept of ground nouns. In their ontological persona, those nouns accomplish only one simple task: they

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[7] E.g., Ross [1973] 2004:387, cf. Aarts 2004:359–64, 366–68; Hopper and Thompson 1984.

[8] In linguistics, a noun's meaning is said to be semantically *nonspecific* when it contributes a highly restricted amount of information about its referent; or, in Schmid's words, "if it is determined by only one or a very small number of semantic dimensions" (2000:74). However, I will avoid using the term *specific* in this way, in order to reserve it for the referential aspect of a noun's use.

[9] According to numerous psycholinguistic studies, semantically low-dimensional terms are handled in the mind *in a different manner* than semantically rich terms are (Johns and Long 2019). Low-dimensional semantics is called by various names (evoking a variety of metaphors), including *underspecification*, *generality*, *low density*, *thin*, *empty*, and *low weight*. This quality links together two facts about workhorses: they are unusually mutable on the information level and meanwhile serve several discourse functions. It will be treated further below.

manifest a field of coherence. This model accounts for why they do not *classify* their referent. As Céline Benninger has stated with regard to the similar class known as *general nouns* (2018:125), the low-dimensional nouns, like pronouns,

> *se caractérisent par un contenu sémantique minimal, responsable de leur inaptitude à découper, par eux-mêmes, des segments de la réalité extralinguistique.*

> are characterized by a minimal semantic content, which is responsible for their inability, on their own, to slice extralinguistic reality into segments.

5.2.3 "Dual nature"?

It has been said that ground nouns that express the ontological category of <human being> have a cognitive "dual nature" (cf. Mihatsch 2017; Fasciolo 2018:12–13). That is, sometimes these nouns inform the audience by classifying their referent, as prototypical nouns do. Yet often—perhaps even in most of their usages—they involve little more information than pronouns do. Mihatsch and Fasciolo both speculate that this dual nature arises from the special interest that we people have for the subject of human beings—as if that interest warrants an unusually flexible means for describing and assessing the human endeavor.

It appears that workhorse nouns' thin semantics allow the speaker to dramatically alter their meaning contribution. They behave like the gauzy scrim across a theater stage: they appear opaque (one-dimensional) when a spotlight shines upon a scene in front; and they appear translucent (revealing relationships) when a scene in back is illuminated. What makes the difference is the lighting (usage in context).

5.2.4 The need for a third element: Multiple sortal and relational senses

With respect to workhorse nouns, the idea of a "dual nature" actually seems to be incomplete. For it does not account for one of their prominent semantic features: the plethora of their sortal and their relational senses on the informational level (§§1.3.5; 2.5.3).

In other words, we are looking at a class of nouns with: a fixed, schematic foundation, on top of which (in semantic space) a variety of contextually modulated contributions have been built. The latter include a workhorse's sortal meanings as well as its relational ones. There is for precedent this idea in Roz Ivanič's description of a similar class of semi-lexical nouns: "Semantically these nouns resemble pronouns in that their meaning is not self-contained. They have both a constant meaning and a variable meaning" (1991: 103). Here, the variable meaning may be either sortal or relational.

The proposed view portrays a type of noun that is not only easy for an audience to process,[10] but also takes advantage of humans' overall language processing approach.

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[10] "Words with multiple related senses tend to be responded to faster than words with fewer senses" (Falkum and Vicente 2015:4).

The psycholinguist Stephen Frisson has long argued that when an audience encounters a polysemous word, it initially activates an *underspecified* meaning that encompasses all established senses of that word; his robust experiments on the apprehension of the written word indeed seem to support his view (e.g., Frisson 2009, 2015). Frisson explains the workings of the audience's mind as follows (2015:18):

> By not immediately selecting a specific sense, processing can progress more smoothly as language users will not be faced with possibly extensive ambiguity, will not often assign the wrong sense of a word, and can use context to "home-in" on the intended sense.… The main idea is that initially no specific sense interpretation gets precedence.

In other words, even for words with many senses, processing *starts from a single meaning*. If that is indeed how the mind makes sense of language, then workhorses (as modeled in this study) are perfectly suited for the task of communication, given that their presumed *modus operandi* is to offer a thin, underspecified meaning "up front," while relying upon contextual cues (i.e., the audience's powers of inference) to fill in the intended force of the word's use.[11]

5.3 'Participant' as a Workhorse's Basic Meaning Contribution

I can unite all three aspects of the apparent semantic structure of workhorse nouns by considering how the ontological category information is refracted during linguistic communication. The shorthand explanation, which I will explain, looks like this:

Ontological category + low-dimensional meaning + individuate + situate = 'participant'

Having just discussed the first two terms of this conceptual "equation," I will now show how they fit together with its next two terms—which were laid out in Chapter 4—to produce the asserted meaning of 'participant' on both levels of meaning.

5.3.1 Individuation experts: Generalists with a specialty

Schmid, after studying a class of nouns with a low-dimensional semantic potential (see Benitez-Castro 2015 for a state-of-the-art review), pointed to the paradoxical utility of their gauzy presence. He concluded that such nouns are uniquely able to serve "higher communicative and cognitive functions" (2000:63). When a noun offers low-dimensional semantic information, it invites the audience to supply further specification as needed to yield an informative text—such as by connecting the word in question with something else in the text (ibid., 73–80). Furthermore, Schmid claimed, in some circumstances such

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[11] On the "thin semantics version of the underspecification approach" to polysemy, see also Falkum and Vicente 2015:4–5; Falkum 2015; it is compatible with the approach of some cognitive linguists (Evans 2015, Ramscar and Port 2015, and Fauconnier 2004).

nouns are *cognitively preferred* as labels. This is because "they are better conceptual reference points … and much more easily singled out for individual conscious awareness" (ibid., 368–69). This cognitive advantage ought to apply to workhorse nouns, as well.

Regardless of the degree of semantic meaning that a noun may evoke, whenever it is actually used in an utterance, it performs its primal, individuating function. Thus workhorse nouns *prompt the opening of an individuated space* within the discourse model for their referent—even when they are functioning in pronoun-like ways.

Paradoxically, then, although a workhorse noun often evokes only a schematic 'human' notion (§5.2.1), it still individuates its referent. That it does so is what differentiates it from a pronoun. Meanwhile, the fact that a workhorse noun *only* individuates its referent (and accomplishes little else) is what differentiates it from a prototypical noun.

Although semantically vague and not always able to classify their referents, workhorse nouns can actually speed the representation of a situation in an audience's mental model. Experiments by some cognitive psychologists give indirect support for this claim: (1) superordinate terms, which are relatively vague, evoke situated conceptions of their referents better than do more semantically specific terms (Murphy and Wisniewski 1989);[12] (2) the referring expressions that best aid in situating their referent are those with low semantic density (Son, Smith, Goldstone 2007);[13] (3) a complex process is easier to grasp via a schematic diagram than via more iconic pictures of the objects involved (Son and Goldstone 2009); and (4) a vague, schema-related label can assist in evoking relational meaning (Son et al. 2012). Translating such findings into the domain of workhorse nouns, we can conclude that when a speaker proffers a semantically rich label for a participant in the depicted situation, it can distract the audience from perceiving the situated relationships. Thus workhorse nouns are well suited for that crucial purpose of situating (or re-situating) participants. Sometimes, as a popular saying puts it, "less is more."

A workhorse appears to be the speaker's least-cost way to accomplish the discourse functions that I have discussed. This conclusion accords with a recent dissertation by the cognitive linguist Natalia Levshina on communicative efficiency in language (2018).[14] Communication involves costs—mainly the speaker's physical work to articulate an utterance. Consequently, an utterance is efficient, Levshina points out, when the speaker

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[12] As the authors conclude: "Using superordinates apparently involves accessing relational attributes among scene elements" (1989:584), at least "in familiar scenes when the members of the superordinate interact in some typical way" (ibid., 574). This finding is consistent with my proposal that workhorses are best suited for the efficient description of prototypical situations.

[13] This study focused on how young children learn relational patterns, which seems like a fitting analogue for how an adult speaker can best instantiate a depiction of situated participants. Its findings support the position that "less specified, less concrete, and sparsely detailed schemas direct attention to structure better than richly detailed concrete situations" (2007:31).

[14] Levshina confirmed experimentally that "language users have a bias towards efficiency" (2018:126).

spends "not more and not less energy than it is necessary" to invoke the desired intellectual and emotional changes in the hearer (ibid., 5). The human drive for efficiency thus favors a speaker's choice of words that are not only short but also easy to pronounce and to process. Furthermore, it favors the audience's interpreting an utterance in terms of schemas that have proven (by their frequency) to be highly probable, because such relational patterns avoid the effort needed for further calculation.

A workhorse noun is like a race car. The weight of the vehicle's frame, body, and interior are minimized—which enables it to reach its destination more quickly. Workhorse nouns are "big" enough to change the direction of discourse, yet "small" enough to avoid drawing undue attention to themselves. This means that they are suited for certain tasks that neither pronouns nor regular nouns can do. They accomplish just one thing—and they do it efficiently. Being a generalist (i.e., underspecified) is their specialty.

5.3.2 Defining participants primarily in terms of their participation

By definition, everyone in a given situation is a *participant* therein—regardless of the label used for them. By definition, all nouns individuate their referents. All nouns indicate their referent's *participation* in the depicted situation. Such a meaning is evoked unavoidably on the discourse level, because it is from here that a noun's reference emerges.

That being said, when a workhorse noun is employed as the signal for the audience to locate (or re-locate) participants within a situation, something unique occurs: *those participants are defined primarily in terms of their participation in that situation*. Paradoxically, due to the workhorse's default thin semantics, this becomes its way of profiling the referent: 'participant'. To draw a musical analogy, the tone emitted by a workhorse's use is distinctive in its purity.

Meanwhile, this subtle yet straightforward meaning is highly salient for the audience, given the human mind's inclination to dwell upon participants within situations (§§4.1–4.2), and given the communicative demand to manage participants in the discourse model (§4.3). It is a meaning that resonates strongly enough to motivate the use of a workhorse in diverse cases and widespread applications. It is the appropriate label whenever the spotlight is on the *situated participant* as such, rather than on either the intrinsic particulars of that participant, or the overall situation as construed more diffusely.

5.3.3 Evidence that workhorses mean 'participant' on the informational level

My surmise that 'participant' is an enduring meaning of workhorse nouns is not obvious (while occasional yet relatively concrete sortal meanings such as 'adult male' are much easier to grasp), so I will test it from a variety of angles. At the end of this chapter, I will incorporate a diachronic argument. For now, I offer three converging lines of supporting usage evidence, drawn mostly from English.

1. *As the default label for participants in prototypical situations.*[15] One example of such usage comes from Mahlberg's corpus (2005:132):

72   says. When <u>Daft</u> became <u>pregnant</u>, <u>the man</u> told her she must have an aborti

Here a salient meaning of *the man* is inferable via situational triangulation: 'the man who made Daft pregnant'. His status as that participant is readily evoked simply by *the man*; that is, its referent is identifiable from the situation alone—regardless of whether he has been mentioned in the discourse until this point. That a workhorse might be the preferred noun for handily constituting such situations is suggested by noticing that the following substitutions (labeling the same referent) do not permit the same inference:

> ?When Daft became pregnant, <u>the male</u> told her she must have an abortion.

> ?When Daft became pregnant, <u>the person</u> told her she must have an abortion.

> ?When Daft became pregnant, <u>the individual</u> told her she must have an abortion.

> #When Daft became pregnant, <u>the guy</u> told her she must have an abortion.[16]

In a telling case, the linguist Deirdre Wilson discussed the following minimal pair (1992). It is based upon a widely reported event, involving a famous Hollywood actor:[17]

> Sean Penn attacked a photographer. <u>The man</u> was quite badly hurt.

> Sean Penn attacked a photographer. <u>The man</u> must be deranged.

Each of those second sentences clearly shares the same referring expression. Each one manages to designate the intended referent in a sufficiently distinguishing manner. In the first case it labels the assault victim, whereas in the second case it labels the perpetrator.

On the informational level, the second sentence's referring expression is ambiguous. Yet in either case, it would register with the audience as a changed label—signaling thematic highlighting. And what is highlighted? The depicted *situation*. The workhorse noun focuses our attention not only on its referent (whichever party that happens to be!), but also *situates* him in the event in which he was involved. In short, this usage of *man* leads the audience to continue to regard its referent *as a participant* in the depicted situation.

(In contrast, if the speaker were to use a distinguishing label, the discourse's attention would be directed *away from* the initial situation. For example:

> Sean Penn attacked a photographer. <u>The paparazzo</u> was quite badly hurt.

This designation, too, registers with the audience as a changed label. But the thematic highlighting is now on the second party's *profession*. Consequently, the audience would

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[15] Such situations are defined by their participants (§4.2.1).

[16] In my view, *the guy* is acceptable only if the referent is already discourse-active; and it is disparaging.

[17] Wilson's paper was devoted to explaining how an interpreter would reliably resolve the referential ambiguity via considerations of relevance. I am taking her example in a different direction.

expect to hear next about the photographer's ability or inability to work—not about the conflict itself. That is, the attack situation becomes merely an initial condition.)

A final English example comes from my childhood in Arizona in the 1960s, when I had the pleasure of being on a school basketball team at age 11. When we played "man-to-man" defense, I would guard "my man." At that age, too, I used to ponder what my life would be like after I "grew up to be a man." In retrospect, in both of those domains the main issue was *participation*, as follows. When the word *man* was used on the court, nobody was pretending that we boys were adults; and it was a male-only league, so gender was not at issue. Nor was any contrast with non-human entities involved. Rather, *my man* referred to a *participant*—not only as a member of the opposing team, but also as someone whose position on the court needed to be tracked because it defined the situation (the game being a continual series of prototypical situations).[18] As for the prospect of growing up, in my mind, manhood was about my ability to *participate* in activities, deliberations, and decisions that I was currently excluded from.

As for French, the attested relational usage *Monsieur, vous êtes mon <u>homme</u>* 'Sir, you are my <u>man</u>' (above, §2.5.3) can likewise be handily explained as a succinctly expressed construal of the referent as a *desired party* to a proposed prototypical situation (marriage).

In short, when a speaker is describing a prototypical situation, the use of a workhorse noun functions, on the informational level, to construe the referent primarily as a 'participant'. Strikingly, the sparse intrinsic features (gender, adulthood, animacy, humanity) that are conventionally seen as central to the semantics of such nouns are actually secondary aspects of the communication.

2. *As the default label for participants in quasi-pronominal usage.* Where a noun is employed in singular, absolute form, with indefinite deixis and nonspecific reference—that is, it points to a *class* of entities abstracted from experience ("whoever fits the description")—it resembles an indefinite pronoun. One example of such usage comes from Mahlberg's corpus (2005:131; #6), which I will follow with a set of alternative labels:

> …or negotiate ordinary streets where <u>a man on a bike</u> becomes a major obstruction…

> …or negotiate ordinary streets where <u>a guy on a bike</u> becomes a major obstruction…

> …or negotiate ordinary streets where <u>a person on a bike</u> becomes a major obstruction…

> …or negotiate ordinary streets where <u>an individual on a bike</u> becomes a major obstruction…

> …or negotiate ordinary streets where <u>someone on a bike</u> becomes a major obstruction…

In the first (actual) case, two of the situational triangle's corners are constituted from the concepts evoked by the referring expressions *streets* and *a man on a bike*. Together with

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[18] See above, Table 2.2: "one of the players on a team."

the predicate term *major obstruction*, in light of the audience's cultural knowledge, these suffice to conjure the third corner of the situation of concern: vehicular traffic.

▲ = *Man* (Bicyclist as obstruction) + *Streets* + [Vehicular traffic]

That implied third element is more easily evoked by *man* than by the alternatives.[19] This conjuring ability of *man* suggests that our noun most readily tags its referent as a 'participant' in the depicted situation. Again, *man* keeps our attention on the situation itself.

3. *As applied to non-human entities.* In formulating the definition of workhorse nouns (§2.1), I noted that *man* (like אִישׁ) is occasionally applied to non-human entities. But what motivated the extension of *man* in this way (§2.5.2)? As shown in Figure 5.1 (page 86), in the board game *Sorry!*, the pieces look nothing like adult males or human beings; nor do sailing vessels; nor do the crags that obscure a mountain's summit from below.

On the discourse level, I submit that all of these usages function to manage participants (using that term loosely) within the audience's discourse model. Given its basic individuating power, the term *man* handily prompts the situating, elaborating about, and re-situating of those participants. Although the entities of interest are not human, their situatedness require the same kind of management. In real life, the game pieces, ships, and major crags are indeed entities that people need to mentally situate and keep track of.

On the informational level, I submit that these usages are metaphorical extensions of 'participant', in the following ways.[20] Game pieces are regarded as *participants in the game who are under someone's control*. Ships are regarded as *participants in waterborne commerce and military action, with each one representing the interests of a larger enterprise or country*. And crags are regarded as *participants that are situation-defining for mountain climbers*.

All of these situations (frames) are defined by their participants. And all of the participants that are labeled as *man* are doubly so. They each serve as the corners of (at least) two overlapping triangles (see §4.2.3):

▲ = *Man* (Piece) + Game board + **Opposing/competing pieces**
▲ = *Man* (Piece) + Game board + **Player being represented**

▲ = *Man* (Ship) + Contested sealane + **Opposing/competing ships**
▲ = *Man* (Ship) + Contested sealane + **Country of origin**

▲ = *Man* (Crag) + Climber + **Current location**
▲ = *Man* (Crag) + Climber + **Summit**

In the first case, *man* forms one corner of the triangles that, together with the board, situ-

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[19] This is my assertion as a native speaker. Psycholinguists should find it to be a testable claim.

[20] Metaphorical extensions are said to increase semantic specificity (Traugott 1988:408).

ate the referent of *man* both in terms of other pieces on the board ("those men") and in terms of the player ("my man"). In the second case, *man* forms one corner of the triangles that, together with the contested sealane, situate the referent of *man* both in terms of other ships ("those men") and in terms of the country whose flag it flies ("our man"). In the third case, a crag called *man* forms one prominent corner of the triangle that situates the rock climber in terms of access to the mountain summit. All of these non-human applications involve a larger, spatially organized situation (or set of situations). And in all of them, *man* describes a salient participant as such.

5.4 Discourse Level: Managing the Participants

5.4.1 Situating a Participant

For the discourse role of situating a new participant (cf. Mahlberg's "introducing function," 2005:107–108), the advantage of workhorses is straightforward. They are cognitively and communicatively ideal for flagging a new participant as such. With regard to a relational triangle in the audience's discourse model, workhorses succinctly label one (or two) of the constitutive corners of that triangle. They thus enable triangles to be erected quickly. The speaker's use of a workhorse increases the ease with which situations can be modeled.

An exemplar in English of using a workhorse noun to succinctly situate a participant is invoked in a special kind of emergency, after an unexpected wave has knocked someone off the deck of a ship:

<div align="center">

<u>Man</u> overboard!

</div>

This terse utterance instantly evokes at least two relational triangles. One consists of the (unwitting) human participant, the ship's side ("board"), and the water below. (The latter is left unmentioned, as the given element in which the other two are situated.) The other triangle consists of the victim, those still aboard the ship, and the responsibility of undertaking a rescue. Only the first of these elements needs to be articulated; the others are understood. (Classically, this expression has been applied without a specification for gender [Graham (1973) 1975:62]. In other words, it is role-oriented: it labels the referent of *man* as a 'participant'—relationally, rather than in terms of intrinsic features.)

5.4.2 Elaborating upon a discourse-active participant

When a workhorse noun is applied in a context where its informational contribution seems superfluous, this is a telltale sign that it is functioning on the discourse level (cf. Mahlberg's "characterising function," 2005:108–109). There its powers of individuation are put to work in the audience's discourse model, so as to access and modify its construal of a participant. Individuating power thus becomes the workhorse noun's low-key yet vital contribution. Paradoxically, here the noun's apparent emptiness is its strength.

Figure 5.1. *Man* is occasionally applied to non-human entities.

1. Each player's *man* as used in the game of *Sorry!* circa 1970.

2. A *man*-of-war. (Detail from *Het Kanonschot* 'Cannon Fired' by Willem van de Velde II, 1707).

3. The crags *A* and *C* are each called *man* (Jones 1897:228, 244).

PILLAR ROCK, EAST SIDE (p. 244).
About 200 feet of Rock are shown.

A. High Man.
B. Pisgah.
C. Low Man.
D. Jordan.
E. East Jordan Gully.
F. Great Chimney.
G. Savage Gully.
a. Left Pisgah Route.
b. East Pisgah Chimney.
c. Right Pisgah Route.
d. Start of Slab and Notch Route.
e. The Slab.
f. The Notch.
g. The Ledge.
h. Pendlebury Traverse.
k. The Curtain.

Morgan & Kidd, Richmond, s.w.   G. P. Abraham & Sons, Photos, Keswick.

THE EAST FACE OF THE PILLAR ROCK, VIEWED FROM THE SHAMROCK.

Workhorses seem to be better suited than either other nouns or pronouns for the task of opening the door to admit some elaboration about a depicted participant. Compare the options in the following pair of English examples:[21]

Workhorse noun:	Joe is a <u>man</u> of integrity.	Sarah, a <u>woman</u> of many talents, …
General noun:	?Joe is a <u>person</u> of integrity.	?Sarah, a <u>person</u> of many talents, …
Relational noun:	#Joe is a <u>singer</u> of integrity.	#Sarah, a <u>singer</u> of many talents, …
Pronoun:	*Joe is a <u>he</u> of integrity.	*Sarah, a <u>she</u> of many talents, …

Here the *workhorse* noun applies to the whole person—and the result is a statement of character. The *general* noun is less potent or convincing; the referent is not saturated with the attributed quality to the same degree. The *relational* noun evaluates the referent in terms of the (singing) role only. And the pronoun simply does not work.

Superfluity on the informational level paradoxically gives workhorse nouns license to work extra hard on the discourse level, where their individuating acumen is heartily welcomed. Workhorse nouns possess a skeleton key for the privileged access that allows them to alter the participant's mental representation within the model.

5.4.3 Role of the head noun in appositions

We have seen that in Hebrew, at first glance, appositional constructions seem to cast אִישׁ as superfluous and therefore meaningless (§3.1). A similar phenomenon is found in English, where *man* (or *woman*) is likewise made the head of an apposition, albeit more occasionally.[22] An example from the lyrics of a 1968 hit popular song can illustrate what *man* contributes to such an expression (Hurley and Wilkins 1967):

> The only one who could ever reach me / Was the son of a <u>preacher man</u>

The expression *preacher man*, on the informational level, describes a member of the Christian clergy whose most visible role is preaching the gospel. However, a half-century ago, when the song was composed, it was assumed that every preacher was a man—which would seem to render the term *preacher man* pleonastic. Indeed, the foregoing definition would also fit *preacher* by itself.

What distinguishes *preacher* from *preacher man* is their usage. The latter term is used to depict a *situated* figure: he heads a congregation, or visits a member of his flock, or

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[21] In my appeal to a grammaticality judgment, I use myself as the native speaker cohort. (With the example's relational noun *singer* and many others, the preposition *with* would be preferable.)

[22] Restrictive apposition (regardless of the head noun) is much more common in Hebrew than in English or French. As Waltke and O'Connor observed, "The wide use of apposition in Hebrew and the Semitic languages generally conforms with the tendency elsewhere within that family of languages to rely upon the juxtaposition of elements" (1990:227–28; similarly Van der Merwe et al. 2017:262).

intercedes in a conflict, etc.[23] That is why the term is applied readily to a specific individual ("the <u>preacher man</u> is visiting today") but not to a predicated type (*"he's a part-time <u>preacher man</u>"). These differences in meaning operate on the discourse level.

In apposition, what determines how its terms interrelate, and how discourse needs fit in to the picture? Psycholinguistic researchers have concluded that in the conceptual-combination effort that is involved in the mental processing of noun-noun phrases, the contribution of the head noun is significant: "Both semantic and relational information[24] associated with the head noun is used to evaluate the relational interpretations suggested by the modifier" (Gagné and Spalding 2013:119). In addition, extralinguistic knowledge along with semantic and pragmatic considerations are tapped to fix the contextually most plausible denotation of the noun-noun phrase (ibid., 103).

At first glance, for appositions headed by a workhorse noun, the relevant semantic relation would be one of class inclusion (TYPE OF). However, workhorse nouns apparently do not partake in such relations; rather, they indicate the ontological category of 'human being' without classifying per se (§2.5.1). Even so, this feature does not render the head term superfluous. Rather, the workhorse's role in an apposition is meaningful and even beneficial, as I shall now explain.

When a workhorse designates a referent as a 'participant' in the situation at hand, it acts like a laser pointer for situating that referent within the depicted setting. In appositions, then, it can be assumed that the head term is carrying out one of the workhorse's usual discourse functions, while doing so in a manner consistent with the information-theoretic principles of participant-reference labeling (above, §4.4.3).

In specific reference, it is to be expected that the apposition's head term (the workhorse noun) establishes the participant's address within the audience's discourse model. Then the second term modifies the audience's understanding of that participant in such a way that the combined term serves to situate (or re-situate) its referent. In terms of information structure, the use of a workhorse noun *sets up* the situation, while the appositive provides pertinent relational *detail*.[25]

Such a juxtaposition of substantives provides an efficient means of situating a participant. The workhorse noun is drafted for what appears to be a "grammatical" purpose (such that the employment of אִישׁ to head appositions receives mention in Hebrew gram-

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[23] Thus the song lyric begins by *situating* such a figure: "Billy Ray was a preacher's son / And when his daddy would visit he'd come along." See the reflections by television aficionados at TVTropes.org (2019).

[24] I.e., the semantic relations that the particular head noun is known to enter into.

[25] Workhorse-headed apposition can handily accomplish the "reference" versus "semantic role" distinction made in discourse analysis (Lambrecht 1994:184–91). It is a compact means for doing so: each of the two terms of the apposition represents a distinct stage in the mind's normal information processing. On those two distinct stages from an information-processing perspective, see also Heimerdinger 1999:141–53.

mars[26]). Actually, however, such usage is an extension of these nouns' use in managing the participants in a discourse model. It exemplifies the functional linguist T. Givón's depiction of grammar as the instantiation of discourse management (2018:25–91).

5.4.4 Re-situation of a participant

As noted above, whenever the speaker decides that a discourse-active participant's situation changes to a significant extent (such as a narrative juncture), a noun is warranted as a cue to indicate that shift (§4.4.3). Here I will add that a workhorse noun in particular possesses the ideal characteristics for such a cue—for the same reasons that make workhorse nouns cognitively ideal for introducing new participants.

From the perspective of information theory, as Runge states, when a speaker redundantly relexicalizes a discourse-active participant at a narrative juncture, the expected default expression is "the most morphologically and semantically basic referring expression available" (2006:93). The masculine singular form of a workhorse noun matches that description precisely: it is one syllable long and easy to pronounce ("morphologically basic"), while it signals the most "semantically basic" of messages: *Re-situate this participant within your discourse model!*

The "Sean Penn" minimal pair (§5.3.3) is a re-situating case. The overencoded referring expression *The man* signals a "development" (or evaluation) of the depicted situational triangle. As a workhorse noun, *man* efficiently prompts the audience to undertake that update—regardless of which of the two participants is intended. This feature explains why speakers prefer it; albeit an underspecified and ambiguous label, it suffices.

One example where *homme* prompts the audience to update an already-established situation appears in a memoir cited by Adler and Moline (2018:7):

> *Je débarquai et me dirigeai vers lui.… Le pauvre homme n'était pas rassuré…*
>> I disembarked and headed for him.… The poor man was not reassured…

A cited instance from a 1944 novel fits this category, as well (ibid., 13n8):

> *L'ennui, c'est que l'homme ne comprenait ni le latin, ni l'hébreu, ni l'espagnol, ni l'arabe.*
>> The issue is that the man understood neither Latin, nor Hebrew, nor Spanish, nor Arabic.

Furthermore, such a motivation would appear to explain the instance of unstressed definite anaphora remarked upon by Halliday and Hasan (quoted in §2.4.1 but repeated here for convenience; 1976:274–75), from a dialogue between two church parishioners:

> "Didn't everyone make it clear they expected the minister to resign?"
> "They did. But it seems to have made very little impression on the man."

Whereas the original authors explained this usage in terms of improved textual cohesion, I submit that the concept of re-situation offers a better motivation, by framing the matter

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[26] Waltke and O'Connor 1990:230; Van der Merwe et al. 2017:262.

in terms of communicative efficiency. It explains why this noun was used at all, rather than a pronoun.

Yet another context in which a speaker seeks to prompt a decisive re-situation is when *summarizing a situation*. As a matter of efficiency, workhorse nouns seem to play a role in this arena, too. For example, for more than seven decades—from 1927 until 1999—the American news weekly *Time* magazine prominently heralded what it typically headlined as *Man of the Year*; the selection was decided on the basis of that figure's out-sized "influence" on the previous year's reported events.[27] Given that the express purpose of this term was to sum up the year just passed, it is telling that—out of all possible human nouns—the magazine's preferred label was the workhorse noun *man*.

5.4.5 A consequential presence

Participants in a prototypical situation are constitutive of that situation; in other words, they are consequential. This connotation enables a workhorse noun to serve as a signal that the referent is *consequential* in the discourse (§4.4.2). This usage is found in American slang: used predicatively, *the man* (or *da man*) can express the referent's importance, as in this 1999 example from a Boston newspaper, describing a professional golf match:[28]

> Wild, wild applause. Teenagers are screaming and everyone is yelling, 'You da <u>man</u>!'

5.4.6 Reference-point usage and anaphora

In certain cases, the workhorse noun is employed in a manner that keeps its discourse-active referent fixed in place. Of more interest than the labeled party is *some other shifting aspect* of the depicted situation, while the workhorse plays a crucial orienting role. Two examples can be gleaned from Mahlberg's corpus (2005:132, 57). (The first one was adduced in §2.4.2 and is repeated here for convenience.)

```
83      ly.  ¶  As he hurled himself at the man, the Russian spun sideways then h

89       e exists between each man and the woman is not as moving or believable as
```

Grammatically speaking, when the workhorse noun is governed via a preposition in an adjunct phrase, or employed as the indirect object of a ditransitive verb, its referent is removed from the action. The workhorse thus seems to be employed so as to efficiently evoke a cognitive *reference point* (cf. Langacker 2015:133–34). The latter arises out of a basic cognitive operation.[29] In effect it holds that corner of the relational triangle fixed in

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[27] In several of those years, a *Woman of the Year* was named, or sometimes more than one person. More recently, the title has been renamed as *Person of the Year* (Rosenberg 2019).

[28] *OED*, s.v. 18e. For the text, see purl.org/stein/youdaman. For usage discussion, see purl.org/stein/daman.

[29] "The use of reference points is … fundamental to conception in general" (Langacker 2013:86). Not only workhorse nouns are used to indicate a reference point. The concept applies also to general nouns such as

place, while re-situating another corner. Presumably this approach is communicatively efficient because, as we have discussed, human beings conceive of situations as a gestalt.

A similar usage appears commonly in the form of a question. A workhorse noun can be preferred, rather than the referent's name or a pronoun, so as to signal a reference point while eliciting more information *about the situation under discussion*, such as when a prosecutor examines a witness during a criminal trial (Supreme Court 1962:32):

<div align="center">

"Mr. Shane, why did you give <u>the man</u> this money?"

</div>

In addition, while issuing a command, speakers will invoke a workhorse so as to concisely depict the *desired state of affairs*—which can involve keeping the noun's referent fixed. One example was reported when a newly arrived pro baseball player, seeking to present himself to the team manager, said to someone nearby (Atkins 1988):

<div align="center">

"Tell <u>the man</u> I'm here."

</div>

In French, one way to indicate a reference point is via the expression *en homme* 'like a man'. An example appears in a novel cited by Schnedecker (2018:17):[30]

<div align="center">

Réagir <u>en homme</u>. Te ressaisir.

React <u>like a man</u>. Get a grip on yourself.

</div>

Although the noun's deixis is indefinite, the audience can construe its referent as identifiable. That is because the reference point is culturally fixed—and hypothetical. Here the speaker (in self-address) makes recourse to it, in a rather desperate attempt to re-situate himself in his own mind.

Given the above examples, I suggest that reference-point usage be considered as yet another distinct discourse function for which a workhorse noun is preferred. It handily explains why a speaker goes to the trouble to use a noun at all—rather than a pronoun—in making the anaphoric reference.[31]

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creature, *place*, and *idea* in anaphoric use (see examples in Halliday and Hasan 1976:274–75, although they do not discuss reference points). Here I surmise that for reference-point usage regarding a *human* participant, a workhorse term is cognitively preferred.

[30] The novel's obsessed narrator is writing this in his journal. (Translation from Bénabou 2004:86.) Schnedecker cited this instance as exemplifying *la dimension interpersonnelle* 'the interpersonal dimension'. Mahlberg had also classified this type of usage as part of what she called the "characterising function" (Chapter 2, note 23). Indeed, like other usages that elaborate upon the participant (as in §5.4.2), this type does present the workhorse noun "in a structure that contributes information about the person" (2005:108). However, I prefer to classify a comparison as a *reference-point usage* because the workhorse noun here is not co-referential with the participant under discussion. Our noun invokes a new, distinct relational triangle.

[31] My explanation here meets the criteria for "a satisfactory account of . . . anaphora" advanced by the cognitive linguist Karen van Hoek (2003:172): it shows how different forms (including workhorses) correspond to different meanings; it is stated in terms of general principles of communication and cognition; and it accounts for the use of workhorses in anaphora both within sentences and across discourse. (Van Hoek's

5.4.7 Signaling a high cognitive accessibility

A label's suitability for managing discourse participants can be helpfully viewed from another angle. According to pragmatics linguist Mira Ariel (2004), a given noun's clues are provided along three dimensions: how informative it is, how referentially rigid it is, and its form.[32] This maps onto a continuum of accessibility with the following two poles:

Degree of accessibility coded	Informativity	Rigidity[33]	Attenuation
High	Uninformative	Nonrigid	Phonologically short
Low	Informative	Rigid	Phonologically long or stressed

Pronouns, as Ariel explains, code a higher accessibility than lexical noun phrases do (hence pronouns are preferred for referring to a participant who is active in the discourse, within a given situation).

Among the nouns, however, workhorses meet the criteria for signaling to an audience that their referent is *highly accessible*: their informational contribution can be the mere fact of participation ("uninformative"); they are highly semantically mutable ("nonrigid"); and their articulation is unusually attenuated ("phonologically short"). This makes workhorse nouns well suited for handling already-active participants in the discourse model. Thus we should expect to observe their use as anaphors.

5.4.8 Choice of label: Unmarked versus marked

The claim that workhorse nouns are cognitively well-suited for manipulating already identified (discourse-active) participants can be corroborated from yet another angle. Workhorses would be preferred labels under what lexical semanticist Alan Cruse called "the pragmatics of lexical specificity."[34] When designating a given referent, a speaker can

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account [1997, 2003] of the nominal reference and coreference system in English is the standard treatment in Cognitive Grammar. Although incisive, it does not examine the anaphoric use of general nouns.)

[32] Ariel's Accessibility Theory seeks to account for the selection and interpretation of *definite* referring expressions. They are analyzed as *accessibility markers*—that is, as instructions to the audience on how to access the representations in their mental discourse model. Audiences search those representations based not only on a noun's semantic "content," but also on its indicated degree of accessibility. The speaker's selection of a noun is determined in part by weighing a mix of factors (including topic, distance/recency, competition, salience, anaphoric unity), which together determine the referent's current degree of accessibility in the discourse (Ariel 2006).

[33] For Ariel, the archetypal *rigid* (fixed) label is a proper noun—it refers uniquely to its referent in most contexts. In contrast, the fixing of a *nonrigid* label's referent is more dependent upon context. The archetypal nonrigid (variable) label is a pronoun (2006:16).

[34] Cruse 1977; idem, 1986:153–55; cf. Revell 1996:187. This approach allows us to make sense of a speaker's *choice of label*. Introspectively derived, it is based upon Gricean pragmatic analysis. It assumes a taxonomy of concepts. Although workhorse nouns lie usually outside of taxonomy per se, the overall principle obtains because its basic concept ('participant in a prototypical situation'; see below) is highly general.

usually choose between a more semantically general term and one that is more specific—and thus presumably more informative.

According to Cruse, the speaker's selection will depend upon what the audience can already be counted upon to know about the situation. In contexts where the frame and its relational roles are already clear and the referent is already identifiable, or if the particular property of interest has a very high degree of *givenness*, then the preferred label is the more *general* one. It is considered to be "unmarked" and is thus expected. This has been explained as a pragmatic consideration (1977:159):

> If a term is highly redundant in a situation, or has been frequently used in a discourse, the speaker may switch to a more general term without producing the effects of markedness…. For instance, a judge at a dog show may remark:
>
> > This <u>animal</u> here is in excellent condition.
>
> Or a salesman in an establishment selling, say, motor-cycles:
>
> > I can thoroughly recommend this <u>machine</u>.
>
> …A speaker will tend to avoid saying what is absolutely obvious.

Conversely, a more specific designation is "marked" and assumed to be hinting at some kind of unstated meaning. (Indeed, any statement more informative than required is likely to be interpreted as carrying an extra implication or affective overtone.) Measured against a workhorse noun, its communicative effect is to highlight whatever features distinguish the more specific category from the generic one.[35] To use a hypothetical, contemporary example, consider the impact of two alternative ways to identify the same referent:

> Hearing a noise behind me, I turned around and found myself face-to-face with . . .
>
> > (*a*) a dog.　　　　　　(*b*) a pit bull.

Most listeners know that pit bulls are reputed to be a ferocious breed. Furthermore, they figure that if that distinctive fact weren't germane, the speaker would simply say "dog." So they infer a sense of menace from (*b*) but not from (*a*). In such a situation, the generic label is neutral ("unmarked"); the specific one is extra-meaningful ("marked").

These cognitively based conventions of interpretation provide the motivation for a speaker to prefer an austere workhorse noun to a more sumptuous alternative label. Thus in a setting where gender is not at issue and the referent's property of interest—such as being a soldier—is highly given, the most natural label is the workhorse term, as in the following account of a battle (Wheeler 1880:604):

> Then followed the most sanguinary encounter in the history of British India, which ended in a doubtful victory on the part of the English. The Sikhs were driven from their position, but they took up another three miles off. Both sides fired salutes in honour of victory, but the English had lost more than 2,400 officers and <u>men</u>.

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[35] Cf. Cruse 1977:160, 163, 1986:153–55; Revell 1996:187.

5.4.9 Discourse functions can dominate

Earlier I noted that by definition, all *referring nouns* have a discourse function. This follows from the twinned facts that such nouns constrain the audience's interpretation of the speaker's intended reference; and that an audience's fixing of that reference is a context-dependent inferential act—that is, a pragmatic one (Chapter 2, note 16; §4.4).

When a workhorse noun is deployed in anaphoric reference, it is said to behave much like an independent pronoun—and to straddle the boundary between a "content" word and a "function" word (§2.4.1). It happens that pronouns have been repeatedly discussed by adherents of relevance theory (e.g., Scott 2011, 2016; Escandell-Vidal et al. 2011: xxiv; Saussure 2011:65; Nicolle 1998:3). Building on this work, Victoria Escandell-Vidal (2017) suggests that a pronoun's *conceptual* information (such as its referent's social gender) is embedded in its *procedural* information.[36] Although a referential restriction such as 'female' for English *she* might seem to be conceptual, it is actually presented as a computational parameter: "as an attribute of an entity, not as a concept *per se*" (ibid., 87).[37] Her analysis can be productively applied to workhorse nouns, in which conceptual and procedural information likewise often co-exist. In instances where their discourse meaning is paramount, if the conceptual meaning is *subordinated* to it (as with pronouns), then it is no surprise that workhorse nouns cannot classify their referent (§5.2.1).

5.5 Informational Level

5.5.1 The crystallization of 'participant'

A workhorse noun has the potential to register meaning as a matter of participation in the *depicted situation*. The easiest type of situation in which to notice such usage at work is the *prototypical situation*—wherein two participants' involvement practically defines the situation.[38] In such situations, the participants are also parties by definition.

In this setting, the underspecified contribution of the workhorse noun is complemented by the familiar schema of prototypical situations. The semantically sparse workhorse term and the corresponding semantically rich role-governing schema seem to have been

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[36] That is, one type of information or the other is always dominant: "The coexistence of conceptual and procedural features within a linguistic category always entails an asymmetrical relation" (ibid., 80). See Traugott and Dasher's communication-oriented description of procedural meaning as "primarily indexical of [the speaker or writer's] attitudes to the discourse and the participants in it; they index metatextual relations…" (2002:10).

[37] The author later notes that in contrast to English *she*, the roughly corresponding Spanish pronoun *ella* does not encode a procedure that incorporates 'female' as a parameter. Rather, it encodes the grammatical feature 'feminine', which is not a referential property. The form *ella* selects a female "only when in competition with the null pronoun" (ibid., 92).

[38] Focusing on prototypical situations allows us to avoid vexing issues of definition and measurement regarding what it means to "participate" in a situation: how *active* or *intensive* must their participation be?

made for each other. Consequently, I submit that *'party to a prototypical situation' is the original, basic meaning of workhorse nouns on the informational level.*[39] (Nonetheless, their meaning contribution does not stop there, as we shall see.)

Yet a skeptical reader might wonder whether the posited equation of workhorse nouns with participation is simply the stuff of coincidence—without linguistic meaning. After all, the endeavors of interest to us human beings generally involve people; the latter happen to be either men or women, so *man* or *woman* would be the natural label to apply.

One reason that the correlation is more than coincidence is onomasiological: other ways of construing participants exist; other general human nouns are available as labels, as are more specific nouns, and also pronouns—yet it is the workhorse noun in particular that seems to be preferred for communicating about participants as such. The other reason is semasiological: workhorse nouns are employed when their referent's participation is salient, and meanwhile they are *not* employed when participation is *not* germane.

The present study adduces evidence to support both of those reasons.

5.5.2 Pragmatic enrichment

An underappreciated aspect of workhorse nouns is how they interact with the context of use, so as to create additional meaning.[40] I will apply as a heuristic what linguists call *pragmatic enrichment* (or *pragmatic strengthening*).[41] That term refers to a simplified procedure for meaning-making that models what an audience automatically employs when making sense of an utterance. The audience typically infers that a speaker meant more than was explicitly said, based on the premise that some things can go without saying; the speaker is presumed to rely upon the audience to fill in that unstated material. As a result, audiences customarily project additional meaning onto the speaker's referring expressions (and other aspects of the utterance), according to certain cognitively based principles of interpretation.

When a workhorse noun underspecifies its referent on the informational level, it functions much like a blank projector screen. Pragmatic enrichment of the noun's meaning is then like a projection that makes the noun appear more meaningful. However, this source of illumination is hidden. The observer's eye notices only the glowing noun; it does not register the pragmatic effects that make it seem so vibrant (cf. Fauconnier 2004:674).

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[39] My supervisor disagrees with my view that 'party to a prototypical situation' is the 'original, basic meaning of workhouse nouns'. He thinks that 'party to a prototypical situation' is merely a schematic meaning that I have abstracted away from as many of the uses of אִישׁ as possible. In his view, it is too abstract and schematic to be regarded as an original, basic meaning.

[40] Here I am invoking the area of pragmatics that deals with how words are *used to communicate* beyond their surface meaning (Yule 1996:35–46).

[41] E.g., Traugott 1988; Recanati 2012; Lewis 2013; Depraetere and Salkie 2017; cf. Fauconnier 2004:666.

5.5.3 Sortal meanings and relational meanings

Workhorse nouns (which in their basic meaning are neither sortal nor relational in themselves) can readily generate sortal or relational meanings.[42] They usually emerge out of a combination of pragmatic enrichment and semantic narrowing. New meanings and senses are thus created with more richness than the word's initial, thin meaning (§5.2.2).[43]

When people are depicted as participating in situations, their participation is normally more salient than the fact of their humanness, which is merely the "field of coherence" on which the situation is being played out (§5.2.1). The two aspects are conceptually linked via metonymy (association). This explains how a workhorse noun can generate a sortal sense (e.g., 'human being'): it manifests on the informational level when participants are situated in contexts alongside contrasting categories (e.g., beasts or children or deity).[44]

As for the workhorse noun's nuance of 'adult', it can be seen as deriving from the discourse connotation of being consequential (above, §5.4.5): an adult is someone whose presence (or contribution, opinion, or vote) *counts*—in contrast with dependents.

Among the relational senses of workhorse nouns, three in particular deserve elaboration: 'party', 'member', and 'agent'. The first of these is sparked in prototypical situations, by definition (§5.5.1). Thus it is pragmatically generated with no effort.

The second meaning of interest is 'member (of a group)'. It is likewise readily generated cognitively.[45] Recall that a workhorse noun defines a situation's participants *in relation to each other:*

    ▲ = Party #1 + Specified interaction + *Workhorse* (Party #2)

Now, when that first 'party' is a *group to which that referent belongs*, then the meaning of the workhorse noun as a label is tantamount to a 'member' of that group.

    ▲ = Group   + Specified affiliation   + *Workhorse* (Member)

The workhorse's two corresponding meanings are closely related. The same label can be used either to individuate a *participant*, or to individuate a *member*.

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[42] "Schematicity contributes to productivity in that highly schematic categories are more easily extended to new items" (Bybee and Beckner 2015:967).

[43] The cognitive linguist David Tuggy posited that a word can have a schematic meaning that exists alongside specific conventionalized "elaborations" that count as distinct senses ([1993] 2006)—a view recently endorsed by Evans (2019:433–34, 455). Such a semantic structure fits the evidence seen in the usages of workhorse nouns. On the cognitive motivations for such developments, see below, §9.3.2.

[44] In a Barsalou/de Blois analysis (below, §5.6.1), it is explained as placing focus on the Source domain. The present study does not dwell on workhorses' sortal meanings; but see below, §8.2.2, at note 32.

[45] Construal in terms of *participants* and construal in terms of *members* are cognitively linked by metonymy (Seto 2003)—i.e., by instantaneous mental association.

The third meaning of interest is 'agent'—that is, one who represents the interests of a principal, operating within the social arrangement called *agency* (Stein 2018).[46] (An agent is authorized to stand in for, or speak for, the principal.) This usage has been attested in English ("our man in Havana") and French (*homme du roi* 'king's man') (§2.5.3), and it has been posited for Biblical Hebrew אִישׁ (Crown 1974a; §3.6; Stein 2008a; 2015). However, its cognitive motivation has not been mapped out until now.[47]

Cognitively speaking, a newly appointed agent is the *participant's participant* within the given situation.[48] If a workhorse noun is pragmatically enriched from 'party to a prototypical situation' to 'agent', its meaning contribution must be highly schematic. It would evoke no more than the essential fact that *this party is acting on behalf of another party* (who may or may not be present).[49] In many contexts, however, that is the most salient fact about the referent—and an important one to establish, for it conditions how that party should be treated.

5.5.4 Pronoun-like meanings

As discussed above in §2.5.3, workhorse nouns can function like indefinite pronouns because of how the audience automatically handles them during interpretation, in order to render the text as more meaningful (Haspelmath 1997:116). Pragmatic enrichment is involved here, as well. Remarkably, the speaker mentions only a singular hypothetical individual—yet this is enough to conjure, within the discourse model, the set of all such parties who might likewise meet the implicit criteria. Consider the quasi-pronominal use of *man* in English, as in this example:

<div align="center">Misery acquaints a <u>man</u> with strange bedfellowes.</div>

This utterance (from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* II.ii.39) is more informative when construed not as referring to a single, specific man and a single event, but nonspecifically: "anyone." Thus the workhorse noun can be employed to invoke a situation that is broadly applicable, while keeping our focus on the corner of the relational triangle that is salient: the experiencer.

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[46] I am using the term *agent* in its ordinary meaning—which differs from its use both in semantic analysis ("a self-motivated force or character") and in narrative analysis ("a secondary character who functions to advance the plot").

[47] In terms of Cognitive Grammar, the principal is the *base* against which the agency label *profiles* its referent, the agent. See Van Wolde 2009:117–18. (Why employ a workhorse noun for this purpose? See below.)

[48] An agent is a participant *par excellence*. Participating in situations is exactly what agents are engaged for.

[49] I.e., a workhorse label regards its referent in terms of the only feature that every type of agent shares: the representation of another party.

Sometimes a speaker wishes to call attention to a group of distinct individuals as all having a shared relation to some other entity. (That entity may be a property, item, activity, etc.) In the linguistics literature, this is known as *distribution*. In a cross-linguistic study of how distributivity is expressed, linguistic typologist Inga Dolinina offered a precise (albeit complex) definition. She views distributivity in terms of the "individualization" of all members of a group, which is simultaneous with the "individualization of their properties/activities" (2005:133).[50] In other words, at the heart of the distributive idea is what I have been calling *individuation* (§4.4.1).[51] Since that cognitive act is a specialty of workhorse nouns (§5.3.1), it would not be a surprise to see them deployed in order to express distributive ideas.[52]

As for reciprocal constructions, we must define them carefully. According to one influential description (Haspelmath 2007:2088), they are what is conventionally used to express a *mutual situation*. And a mutual situation, in turn, is one[53]

> with two or more participants (A, B, . . .) in which for at least two of the participants A and B, the relation between A and B is the same as the relation between B and A.

The comparative linguist Nicholas Evans has incisively described what makes this idea so complex, grammatically speaking: a reciprocal construction must concisely manage to both overlay and permute two semantic (or thematic) roles, such as "agent" and "patient." As he writes regarding the classic, symmetric, two-party situation, "there is a double linking of participants to thematic roles: each participant is linked to both thematic roles … and each thematic role is linked to both participants" (2008:34).

Cognitively speaking, linguistic anthropologist Frantisek Lichtenberk explains the motivation for reciprocal constructions, as expressing a combination of two basic notions.[54] One is what he calls *plurality of relations*. It obtains when there are "two or more

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[50] Dolinina explains: "Conceptually, distributivity is not quantification over individuals only, but over both individuals and events or situations of which they are part.… [And] it refers obligatorily to the boundedness/wholeness of this group [of individuals]" (ibid., 132). In contrast, in Biblical Studies, distributivity has been described more vaguely—when it is described at all. For example, Waltke and O'Connor define distributive phrases simply as those that "associate entities pairwise" (1990:288). Strangely, the *Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics* (2013) lacks any discussion of distribution (at least by that name).

[51] I have adopted the most-used form of this term in the literature; Dolinina employs a less common variant.

[52] Like a number of languages, English and French express distributive situations by employing special pronouns (also known as dedicated quantifiers), e.g., *each, chacun*. Other languages use different means.

[53] This definition was adopted by Evans (2008:35), Jay (2009:1), matched by Bar-Asher Siegal (2012, 2014), and adopted with minor reservations by Staps (2020). It is beyond the scope of the present study to consider the *meaning* of reciprocal constructions per se, beyond a functional account of certain constructions in which our noun is featured.

[54] More recently, Bar-Asher Siegal has articulated an equivalent pair of characteristics for a more limited yet also more relevant sample: the reciprocal noun-phrase strategies in Semitic languages (2014:340–41).

instances of relations that are intimately linked: either because they are of the same kind, or because the relations are converses of each other" (2000:55; see also 33–34, 56).

The second notion behind reciprocal expressions is that for the purposes of communication, the participants can be treated as nearly *indistinguishable*. Sometimes it suffices for speakers to describe the situation succinctly, at a high level of abstraction, in a fairly vague manner—as reciprocal expressions do.[55]

Given this two-part understanding of reciprocal constructions, a potential role for workhorse nouns is evident.[56] As expert individuators that readily shape the building and shaping of situations with the audience's discourse model, they are well suited for the iterations involved in mutual situations. Furthermore, given their highly schematic semantics, workhorse nouns are designed for low-resolution depictions. Consequently, it would be no surprise to see them employed in the expression of reciprocity.

5.6 Workhorse Human Nouns: Summary and Semantic Map

To sum up the findings of this chapter, the hypothesized meaning contribution of the workhorse human noun in each of the three languages studied is that *it prototypically indicates a (human) party to a prototypical situation, while also being widely used in signaling about discourse participants. Furthermore, it has a wide range of additional contextual meanings, which includes ad-hoc meaning as well as sortal and relational senses.*

To integrate the many aspects of how workhorse nouns conventionally contribute to the meaning of a discourse, this section offers a graphic depiction—a semantic map. Such maps are the standard method of displaying knowledge (or at least a hypothesis) about how a polysemous word's senses relate to each other. Linguists have produced a large variety of map types (for reviews, see Narrog and van der Auwera 2011; Andrason 2016; Georgakopoulos and Polis 2018; Georgakopoulos 2019).

As I will now explain, my map employs Lawrence Barsalou's well-regarded model of cognitive frames, as adapted by the lexicographer Reinier de Blois for use in Biblical Studies. Unlike de Blois's model, however, this one is a dynamic semantic map (known in the linguistics trade as a "dysemap") because it incorporates a presumption of directionality from the generally observed patterns of semantic change in Traugott and Dasher 2002.

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[55] "For example," writes Lichtenberk, "with [prototypical] reciprocals the overall situation is presented as an undifferentiated whole… and the relevant participants play identical pairs of roles" (2000:34). Lichtenberk calls this second notion a *low elaboration of situations*, which subsumes a "low degree of distinguishability of participants."

[56] As with distributives, English and French speakers express reciprocal relations via pronouns (e.g., *each other*, *one another*, *se*), whereas Ancient Hebrew primarily employs its workhorse noun for these purposes.

5.6.1 A cognitive frame

When expressed in terms of what have been called Barsalou frames (see, e.g., Barsalou [1992] 2009; de Blois 2010a:4–5; 2010b; Löbner 2013:301–24), the basic conceptual frame that is evoked by a workhorse noun consists of the following four attributes.[57]

Attribute	Value
Description:	A participant in (or party to) a prototypical situation
Source:	Ontological domain of \<human being\>
Function:	To situate referents efficiently (in communication)
Connotation:	Associated with having a consequential presence[58]

Cognitive linguistic theory predicts that this basic concept can account for the other concepts that this word represents, and how they relate to each other. A word's meaning extensions can be understood as motivated by a conceptual *shift in focus*, from the overall initial frame toward one of its attributes (de Blois 2010a:6; 2004:110–11).

1. A focus on the *Source* attribute yields the sense 'human being'.

2. A focus on the *Function* attribute results in a variety of discourse functions and grammatical (pronoun-like) functions, while also licensing occasional extensions to non-human referents.

3. A focus on the *Connotation* attribute leads to conventionalized senses—both sortal and relational. The relational senses each describe a common type of human affiliation, such as 'husband/wife'.

5.6.2 The dynamic aspect

Given that most semantic maps consider only the informational level of meaning—thus ignoring the referential dimension in which אִישׁ happens to play such an outsized role with its discourse functions—the map in Figure 5.2 (page 102) intentionally differs from the norm in its arrangement. Here, I follow relevance theory in distinguishing between *conceptual* (or *contentful*) and *procedural* meaning (above, §5.4.9), while viewing the latter as comprising both referential and grammatical aspects. As Traugott and Dasher (who also adopt those categories) have explained, semantic change is pragmatically driven (2002:24), and it moves "from content meanings based in event-structure to procedural meanings based in discourse" (ibid., 26)—a process that is cognitively licensed by metonymy (ibid., 27–29). These authors thus describe a general path of directionality in

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[57] Barsalou summarizes the model as follows: "At their core, frames contain attribute-value sets. Attributes are concepts that represent aspects of a category's members, and values are subordinate concepts of attributes" ([1992] 2009:43).

[58] Another connotation is *gender*, which is discussed in Chapter 9.

semantic change, which they schematize as follows (ibid., 40; see also Traugott 2004):

contentful meaning(s) > contentful and procedural meanings > procedural meaning(s)

5.6.3 How to read this map

The following notes unpack what the map in Figure 5.2 illustrates.

1. Proceeding from left to right, the map shows a presumed diachronic evolution from the conceptual section to the procedural one (§5.4.9), and from the informational column to the grammatical one (§5.6.1). Within each column, horizontal direction has little specific import.

2. Proceeding from top to bottom, the map classifies meanings as either expressing the basic concept (§5.6.1) or as the result one of three standard cognitive processes of meaning extension: metonymy, metaphor, or semantic narrowing.

3. Each conventionalized meaning is represented by a hexagon. The largest sizes with the heaviest borders occur the most frequently in the biblical corpus.

4. Not shown on the map is the "playing field": the ontological category <human being>. (Workhorse nouns are almost always evoked on that field, in order to satisfy the abiding human concern for situating and tracking a situation's participants.)

5. In certain settings, a workhorse noun can be metaphorically extended so as to apply to non-human entities as 'participants' (§§2.2, 5.3.3) (*middle*) [unattested in French].

6. The basic concept expressed by workhorses is optimized for the depiction of prototypical situations (*upper left*), which are fundamental to human thought (§4.2.1).

7. Pragmatic strengthening (repeated enrichment leading to conventionalization) enables the schematic meaning of 'party' to be crystallized into a specific nuance of 'member' in the context of a group (*upper left*). After a presumed history of repeated use in such contexts of affiliation, workhorses have developed the lexical sense of 'member' by metonymy, wherein the prototypical situation's first party is labeled by the workhorse noun, while the second party is a group rather than an individual (§5.5.3).

8. Pragmatic strengthening likewise enables the schematic meaning of 'party' to be crystallized into additional contextually specific nuances, including 'affiliate,' 'spouse', 'agent', and 'subordinate'—all of which are variant types of prototypical situation (*left side, under conceptual/informational*). After a presumed history of repeated use in supportive contexts, workhorses have developed RELATIONAL lexical senses as a result of semantic narrowing (§5.5.3).

9. The basic discourse function performed by workhorses in prototypical situations likewise enables a speaker to efficiently manage the participants that exist in the mental representation of all situations—not only prototypical ones (*top center*).

10. Pragmatic strengthening enables the schematic meaning of 'party' to be crystallized into additional contextually specific nuances, such as 'human being' or 'adult' or 'adult male' (*gray polygons*).[59] After a presumed history of repeated use in supportive contexts, workhorses have developed SORTAL lexical senses as a result of semantic narrowing. That is, these senses are conventionally considered to express sortal concepts—although they are activated only in the context of opposition to a counterpart concept (e.g., 'human being' *as opposed to* 'deity').

11. The workhorse's connotation that its referent is consequential can be applied both as a discourse signal about a new participant, and also as an indication of (social) importance on the informational level (§4.4.2; 5.4.5) (*bottom center*).

12. A workhorse's pronoun-like functions can be seen as a more grammaticalized aspect of its general function of indicating/managing discourse participants (§5.5.4) (*right*).

13. The map's internal coherence suggests that the various meanings of a workhorse noun bear a "family resemblance" to each other, in the expected manner (§1.6.4).

Figure 5.2. Workhorse nouns appear to have an unusually complex semantic structure.

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
[59] Of course, a specific 'female' is referentially indicated via morphology (the distinctive feminine form).

5.7 Testing the Hypothesis: Predictions about the Behavior of אִישׁ

Implications of the hypothesis can be stated as a series of predictions about אִישׁ in the Hebrew Bible. (In subsequent chapters, I will test those predictions in the biblical corpus, so as to assess the theory's soundness and its ability to clarify our noun's attested usages.)

I make my predictions with an eye to what claims could be testable. A quantitative test should fall into one of three complementary types:

(1) *Tests within a paradigm of alternatives*. Does אִישׁ stand apart from the other labels in its cohort, in the predicted ways? In the terms popularized by the cognitive linguist Dirk Geeraerts, this question is *onomasiological*.[60] Such tests measure the competing words' relative frequency and dispersion.

(2) *Tests within a syntagm*. What does this noun contribute to meaning in the clause where it appears? What if it were missing? According to Geeraerts, this question is *semasiological*. Such tests examine "minimal pairs" of similar phrases, with and without אִישׁ.

(3) *Tests of textual informativeness and coherence*. Does the theoretical prediction readily yield a more meaningful text? This question is *hermeneutical*. Such tests apply the theory to interpretive cruxes.

In the following list, an initial asterisk (*) indicates that this prediction has not yet been documented explicitly in the literature for either English *man* or French *homme*.

5.7.1 Discourse level: Situating a participant

(A) As an expert individuator, אִישׁ is the default ("unmarked") label when introducing a new participant who will be named in the discourse.

(B)* The foregoing result applies also to unnamed characters.

(C)* Our noun can signal that a new participant is important to the subsequent discourse.

5.7.2 Discourse level: Elaborating upon a participant

(A) The noun אִישׁ can be employed as an attributing label when the speaker wishes to add supplemental data about a discourse participant who has been identified by name—and to depict that data as an abiding feature of the referent, rather than as a temporary quality.

(B)* The aforementioned usage can occur also with unnamed characters.

5.7.3 Discourse level: Re-situating a participant

(A)* As an expert individuator, אִישׁ can be employed as a prompt when the speaker wishes to "reset" a participant's standing in the audience's discourse model (*re-situation*).

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[60] See, e.g., Geeraerts et al. 1994; Geeraerts 2015:285; Zhang et al. 2015.

(B)* When calling attention to a situation of concern that involves a consequential, discourse-active third party, a definite noun phrase with אִישׁ will be preferred to a pronoun as the label for that party.

5.7.4 Discourse level: Reference-point usage

* The noun אִישׁ is employed as a reference point for communicating about some other aspect of the situation under discussion. For this purpose, אִישׁ is preferred over proper nouns on one hand, and pronouns on the other hand (§5.4.6).

5.7.5 Discourse level: Workhorse-headed referring expressions

* Where the presence of אִישׁ in a referring expression seems conspicuous, it correlates with one or more discourse features. Conversely, the absence of אִישׁ in a similar referring expression correlates with an absence of discourse-management needs (e.g., nonspecific reference, no development in the discourse situation, and unimportant participants).

5.7.6 Informational level: Prototypical situations: Preferred label

* In prototypical situations (§4.2.1), אִישׁ is the default label for both parties, in references made by outside observers (such as the narrator) and by the parties themselves.

5.7.7 Informational level: Membership

* In two-party situations where one party is a group of which the other party is a member, a label אִישׁ for the latter will profile its referent on the informational level as 'member'.

5.7.8 Informational level: Extended relational meanings

(A)* The usages of אִישׁ where it takes on an ad-hoc relational meaning in context, or where its contextual meaning resembles that of a relational noun (e.g., 'husband/wife'), are consistent with its normal functioning as a workhorse noun. They can be explained as a combination of individuation, thin semantics, and pragmatic enrichment.

(B)* In particular, the usages of אִישׁ where its contextual meaning is 'agent' are consistent with its normal functioning as a workhorse noun. They can be explained as a combination of individuation, thin semantics, and pragmatic enrichment.

5.7.9 Informational level: Pronoun-like usages

* The usages of אִישׁ where its functioning resembles an *indefinite, distributive, or reciprocal pronoun* can be explained by the same communicative and cognitive factors (individuating power, thin semantics, and pragmatic enrichment) that account for its behavior in general.

6 אִישׁ as a Workhorse Noun

> It is only by recognizing the crucial role of cognition—
> how *situations* are apprehended and conceptualized—
> that semantic characterizations become feasible.
>
> —Ronald Langacker (2013:98, emphasis added)

6.1 Introduction

Having compiled meaning-related behavioral predictions based upon the distinctive features of workhorse nouns, I will now test those predictions, according to the approaches outlined near the end of the previous chapter.

The most informative type of usage of אִישׁ is the kind that is prototypical for nouns in general, namely as the head of a referring expression. Therefore "אִישׁ-headed referring expressions"—bare nouns, determined nouns, and modified nouns—is my main focus. Yet I also consider some non-referential usage, namely predication.

My investigations include *validity checks* that enable me to confirm a basic assumption of my research, that the various usages discussed can indeed be considered as features of Ancient Hebrew *as a language*—and not merely as a literary device or as a lectal variant, such as the idiolect of a few biblical composers. Hence I am interested in how consistent is the use of אִישׁ between narrators (in their narration) and characters (in their reported speech).[1] Similarly, I attend to how the instances of interest are distributed across the biblical corpus. Generally it suffices to establish that a usage is widespread by reporting the number of biblical books in which a given trait appears.[2] I often supplement this rough measure by noting the variety of text types of the compositions involved. (In this chapter, I do not mention diachronic considerations—differential usage in "early" texts versus "late" texts—because none were evident from the tests conducted.)

This chapter of the present study is both the longest and the most focused on gathering and collating empirical evidence, so as to test the hypothesis.

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[1] I assume that to the extent that reported speech is not the actual quotation of a real personage, the biblical composers at least crafted it so as to seem *plausibly realistic* to the text's ancient audience. This assumption is supported by the biblical composers' evident practice of *style switching*, in which they style the reported speech of foreigners in an unusual manner, in order to make it sound appropriately foreign; see, e.g., Rendsburg 2015; Bompiani 2016. Linguists who study the development of discourse markers likewise rely upon speech as represented in written materials, including literary works ("data from trials, plays, conversation in novels, and letters"), on the grounds that such texts "tend to represent language relatively close to speech, and can be excellent resources for investigation" of language use (Traugott 2012:10).

[2] On the assumed enumeration of 24 biblical books, see Chapter 1, note 15.

6.2 Discourse Level: A Case Study of the Considerations

To account for the operation of אִישׁ (or אִשָּׁה) on the discourse level, I engage in analysis that can be illustrated by the following (rather long) example: three consecutive clauses from early in the book of Exodus (2:1–2a).

6.2.1 אִישׁ *as situating a new participant*

I will start by considering the first two clauses together (Exod 2:1):[3]

<div dir="rtl">וַיֵּלֶךְ אִישׁ מִבֵּית לֵוִי וַיִּקַּח אֶת־בַּת־לֵוִי׃</div>

An _'îš from the house of Levi_ went and took [as his wife] a _daughter of Levi_.

Because this verse depicts the interaction of specific individuals who have not been mentioned before, it apparently begins a new scene. The opening event is set against the backdrop of the previous scene, which featured Pharaoh's oppression of the Israelites and genocidal intent toward them. The initial referring expression, _'îš mibbêt lēwî_, prompts the audience to "open a file" for a new participant in the discourse; its head noun is indefinite, signaling a participant who is not yet identifiable to the audience. His existence is inferable, however, from the presupposed existence of his clan/tribe;[4] an affiliation with that group is indicated by the partitive prepositional phrase that modifies the head noun. Thus this "new" participant is not activated from scratch, but rather newly individuated. Finally, in the verse's two predications, this referent is depicted as taking initiative, and as having sufficient authority to negotiate a marriage himself.[5]

What is the contribution of the head noun אִישׁ to this verse's meaning?[6] It prompts the audience to constitute the depicted situation within its mental discourse model. Via this workhorse noun and the accompanying predications, the new participant is situated in five ways: as an initiator of action, as the member of a known group, as a party to a marriage, as an experiencer of oppressive conditions, and as an adult male. (For a noun that has little semantic substance, אִישׁ can efficiently prompt a lot of meaning.)

The situated relationships can be expressed schematically via triangles, such as:

---

[3] Cf. the briefer treatment in Heimerdinger 1999:143.

[4] The status of Levi as a tribe is still incipient at this point in the narrative.

[5] In the ancient Near East, not all men possessed marrying authority. Many of them were subordinated to their household's head. See Gen 21:21; 24:4; 34:4; 38:6; Judg 14:1–3.

[6] Tellingly, although the second party introduced turns out to be affiliated with the same body as the first party who was introduced, their affiliations are expressed differently. Why wasn't the second party's affiliation with Levi established in the same way as with the prior referent, by labeling her as _'īššâ mibbêt lēwî_ 'a womanly party from the house of Levi'? The verse's more succinct wording suffices to situate the two participants. Furthermore, the differential labeling of this verse's characters has a narrative impact. Specifically, the disparate labels serve to momentarily highlight the _more active_ participant, by depicting him as more _individuated_ from their shared group. The first participant is set off from that group (NJPS: "a certain man"), whereas the second one remains inside it, so to speak.

    ▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Wife + Marriage

    ▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Wife + Affiliation with "tribe" of Levi

    ▲ = Couple + Goals + Pharaoh's oppressive edict

These triangles set up narrative possibilities and expectations.

6.2.2 אִשָּׁה *as re-situating a participant*

Now that a new situation has been established, the first clause of the next verse (2:2) introduces dramatic tension:

<div align="center">

וַתַּהַר הָאִשָּׁה

The woman conceived. . . .   (NJPS)

</div>

The depicted action's *initiator* has now switched—from the first participant mentioned to the second one. In terms of the discourse, I observe three facts that seem to warrant explanation: (1) to represent this clause's subject, a *noun* is used; (2) it is a *changed label* for the same character who was just introduced; and (3) this new label is the *workhorse noun* אִשָּׁה (prefaced by the definite article), rather than some other more informative or elaborate term. I will account for these facts in turn.

    Significance of a subject noun.   According to de Regt, the subject's intended reference is predictable per a convention in Hebrew for construing the co-references across clause boundaries. By default, this clause's subject would be construed as coreferential with the preceding clause's object: "the anaphoric subject in the current clause … is co-referential with [the] previous object, provided it is of the same gender and number" (2019a:64).[7] Alongside that syntax-related consideration, we can add two other factors: the text provides a morphological distinction (namely, feminine grammatical gender) and the verb's semantics (pregnancy), both of which tell us that the reference must surely apply only to the second of the two discourse-active participants (cf. Runge 2007:110, 113). Consequently, despite this verse's change in initiator, the text's audience has ample reason to expect that the default encoding of this clause's subject would be *without* a noun.

    Thus we have a case of *overencoding*. This construal can be confirmed via a comparison with similar occurrences, given that notices of a woman's conception are numerous in the Hebrew Bible. Apparently a biblical narrator does not need to mention ("lexicalize") the woman herself if her conception is depicted as part of a larger event (Hos 1:3).[8]

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[7] In general, each language community develops its own conventions as to how to coordinate the referents that are referenced in adjoining clauses; such syntactically based conventions are then taken into account in formulating utterances and in interpreting them (LaPolla 2003:122–23). It is beyond the scope of the present study to assess the accuracy of De Regt's claim for this particular pattern of co-reference in Ancient Hebrew—aside from noting that exceptions can be found, e.g., Josh 2:6–7; 9:13–14.

[8] In Hosea, the chain of events is indeed framed as part of a larger event; the action is set in motion by a divine directive to the prophet to "go-marry-and-have-children" (v. 2)—treating that as a single prophetic

Likewise, no subject noun needs to appear with a conception notice if the preceding clause has mentioned one of the following situations: sexual activity[9] or divine intervention.[10] Apparently the Israelite audience, based upon their cultural knowledge, perceived both of those settings as natural contexts for situating a woman's conception.

Consequently, when a narrator nonetheless opts to depict conception as a distinct event, this is signaled via an overencoding of the participant label.[11] In the audience's discourse model, the "extra" verbiage highlights the predicated event as *a remarkable development* that cues the audience to *re-situate* this referent—to revisit her status in light of the newly available information.[12]

In the present case, which is depicted as a distinct event via the noun label, the pregnancy marks a plot shift toward the frustration of Pharaoh's prior edict (1:22).[13]

▲ = אִשָּׁה (Participant) + Pregnancy + Pharaoh's edict

It conditions the subsequent depiction of this woman's momentous actions, which becomes the new discourse topic (2:2–3).

Change in label.   Notably, this participant's label is not the same one that introduced her.[14] Because the audience would intuit that this double departure from expectation is especially meaningful, it warrants explanation. Applying to this case the three possible reasons for a changed label (§4.4.3), a shift in point of view can be readily eliminated; the narrator's omniscient viewpoint continues to prevail. Likewise the prospect of thematically important information is not salient; that is applicable only when the changed label

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act. Thus when Gomer's conception follows, it is already an integral part of the plan. On various choices in depiction, see Runge 2007:128.

[9] Gen 4:1, 17; 16:4; 38:2–3, 18; Isa 8:3; Hos 1:3; 1 Chr 7:23.

[10] Gen 30:17, 22–23; 1 Sam 2:21. Cf. Gen 25:21, where the husband remains the center of attention, which apparently warrants mentioning his wife by name.

[11] Elsewhere in the biblical text, each of two women who conceive in special circumstances are likewise labeled by our general noun, as הָאִשָּׁה (2 Sam 11:4–5 and 2 Kgs 4:16–17). Yet the noun is not needed for participant-tracking purposes.

[12] This broadly applicable, communication-oriented explanation for overencoding subsumes the "positioning by reference" explanation offered by Polak (2013, 2015, 2017) when two or more participants are interacting. In that special case, signaling a repositioning of the participants in relation to each other is part of the speaker's larger need to prompt their re-situation in the audience's discourse model. As I shall confirm below, references to participants are lexicalized (i.e., made explicit, via a referring expression) as they are making a difference in the course of the depicted situation, or in concluding an episode.

[13] To this clause's notice of conception, Rashbam (12th c.) makes the link explicit in his gloss: בעת גזירת פרעה בהשליך הזכרים ליאר 'during the time of Pharaoh's edict to cast males into the Nile.' A similar view was expressed by Keil and Delitzsch ([1866] 1996).

[14] Unlike the two cases cited in note 11. There, the label deployed in the conception notice is the default for those characters, given how each one had been introduced into the discourse (2 Sam 11:2–3; 2 Kgs 4:8).

is intensively repeated (Runge 2007:168–71). That leaves as the only viable option a *re-characterization*—also known as "iteration of the participant's role" (ibid., 167).

However, in this case the new label—a workhorse noun—is actually *less* informative than the original relational label. So whatever "characterization" it offers is opaque at first glance. Indeed, it is already obvious that the referent is a woman; when viewed on the informational level, this label is superfluous.[15]

This usage of אִשָּׁה is all the more pointed due to the lack of what Runge calls "an anchoring relation to other participants" (ibid., 168), as would be expected for (re-)situating a referent. This character is depicted as within her group—yet standing apart from it.[16]

Choice of label.   What, then, is the message behind the narrator's use of this particular noun label? Arguably, other options were available—including not only the initial referring expression *bat-lēwî* but also *hā'almâ* 'the young woman' (cf. Isa 7:14) or *hanna'ărâ* 'the maiden' (cf. Deut 22:15–21; Judg 19:3–6; Ruth 2:5)—not to mention her name (cf. 6:20). In Exod 2:2a these alternatives would be more immediately informative. Nonetheless, הָאִשָּׁה is the most salient label for relating this participant's new action (i.e., her conceiving a child) to the larger discourse—her gender aside.[17] Indeed, according to the theory compiled in Chapter 5, a workhorse noun (due to its laser-like focus on individuating its referent) is the default prompt for an audience to re-situate a participant in light of added information. Meanwhile, on the informational level, our sortal noun has relational import. The label הָאִשָּׁה relates the protagonist to the depicted narrative situation, which is a prototypical situation. It casts her as 'the participant' *par excellence*.

6.3 Discourse Level: Situating a Participant

In its situating function (§§2.4.2, 5.4.1), a workhorse noun readily prompts a relational triangle between a new referent and two other aspects of the depicted situation.

The case study just presented (Exod 2:1) is consistent with the prediction (§5.7.1) that אִישׁ is the default label when a new participant is introduced. Are there qualitative reasons to expect that this prediction holds true throughout the Bible? After all, it would require that אִישׁ be noticeably more effective at individuating its referent. In this respect, the workhorse noun אִישׁ does stand out—as has long been noted by Biblical Hebrew lexicog-

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[15] Females are thematically dominant in the salvation of Israel at this juncture. That prominence includes the midwives (1:15–21), the sister (2:4–8), and Pharaoh's daughter (2:5–10). However, none of those other participants is actually labeled as "a woman" or "a female" per se; and none of them is referenced via a suddenly changed label.

[16] Cf. above, note 6, regarding verse 1. Remarkably, the noun phrase in verse 2 is the only label for this character in the series of nine clauses in which she is active. During the recounting of her sequence of deeds, the narrator leaves her unanchored to others.

[17] See above, note 15.

raphers.[18] The earliest one to point to individuation as the special contribution of אִישׁ was Joseph Ibn Caspi (1333), expressed in philosophical terminology.[19] He begins his listing of specific senses of this noun as follows: וסוגו העליון כמו פרט 'its most general indication is akin to "an individual".' This means, as his contemporary editor explains, לציין פרט מתוך כמה פרטים או חלק מתוך השלם 'to distinguish one individual among several individuals, or a part from the whole' (Kahan 2014:100).[20]

Six centuries later, the opening statement in *TWOT* likewise calls attention to the individuating role: "The word אִישׁ connotes primarily the concept of man as an individual" (McComiskey 1980). This assessment is also found in the *Lexham Theological Word-book*, regarding the place of אִישׁ within the semantic domain of People. Its summary characterization begins: "People as individuals.…"[21] Elsewhere, the same dictionary states that "ʾîš or ʾănāšîm almost always indicate a particular individual or group (e.g., Jer 38:4)."[22] More obliquely, Schökel (1993) implies an individuating theme via his assignment of senses.[23]

Furthermore, Grant's onomasiological comparison of the masculine forms of אִישׁ with *ʾādām* 'earthling' likewise revealed a marked difference with respect to the individuation of referents. Her hypothesis consisted of two dovetailing parts (1977:3):

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[18] In use as a counting unit following a cardinal number, אִישׁ is distinctive among general human nouns in Hebrew. An Accordance search returns 187 hits for אִישׁ (all forms); 5 for *nepeš*; and none for *ʾādām*, *geber*, or *ʾĕnôš*. I therefore consider *enumeration* to be one of the individuation-based discourse functions of אִישׁ. Although it would be logical to claim the enumeration function as a characteristic of workhorse nouns, I am not doing so at this time, because the data are lacking to confirm its distinctiveness for *man* or *homme*.

[19] A similar observation was expressed already by Samuel Ibn Tibbon in his "Explanation of Strange Words," (1204) 1946:13, 31. This appendix to his Hebrew rendering of Maimonides' *Guide of the Per-plexed* (originally composed in Judeo-Arabic) focuses on his handling of the philosophical terminology. On how philosophy informed the medieval study of language, see Martínez Delgado 2004, 2008; Maman 2008.

Ibn Caspi innovatively composed his (still-unpublished) dictionary on the basis of logical principles that he assumed the first speakers of Hebrew had followed in devising the language. This led him to a monosemic view of words; he sought a common semantic denominator for all occurrences of each Hebrew verbal root. In the process, he was the first Hebrew lexicographer to recognize *distinctions in the level of generality (or granularity)* of one's analysis of a word's meaning (Kahan 2018).

On the approximated year of this dictionary's composition, see Kahan 2013:252–53; Kahan 2016.

[20] Ibn Caspi's proof texts are applications to *non-human* entities—a type of usage that is mentioned only near the end in other dictionaries. Even in such usages, he thus considers our noun to have relational func-tions. Individuation is necessarily enacted *in relationship* to some larger entity, as Kahan's note implies.

[21] Sigrist 2014, s.v. Lexical Information > אִישׁ. (That electronic dictionary is organized by the semantic do-mains that speakers of *English* would consider to be natural.)

[22] Hernandez 2014, s.v. Lexical Information > אִישׁ. But cf. Table 1.2, above, §1.6.6.

[23] Schökel assigns only four major senses to our noun—three of which are "indefinite pronoun," "indefinite article," and (definite) "pronoun." All of those grammatical classes function mainly to index their referent, or to establish its existence as an individual entity.

1. When a biblical author was thinking of mankind as a whole, human beings in general, or anyone in the sense of any human being, he would use the word *'adam*.
2. When a biblical author had in mind the particular individual or group of individuals, or any member of a particular group, he would use the word *'ish*.

Out of all the instances of those nouns (2736 by her count), she found only three that appeared to contradict her hypothesis (ibid., 7–8); and in my view, even those three fit it.[24] In short, אִישׁ is consistently a better individuator of referents than its competitor term *'ādām* 'earthling'.

To test the prediction of a preference for אִישׁ in situating participants (§5.7.1) across the biblical corpus *quantitatively*, I will proceed in two steps: first examine the Bible's *named* individual participants, and then proceed to those who are *unnamed*.

6.3.1 Named participants

In line with the approach in Mahlberg's study (2005:107), I will frame the question as follows: When an individual party who is introduced via a referring expression is then named as part of that introduction, which initial label is used most often? Therefore the three main criteria for this set of instances are: (1) The party is being introduced (activated) such that the audience would create a new mental "file" for this person. (2) A substantive label is used to introduce this person before their name is given. (3) This person's name is given as part of the introduction, perhaps after some intervening background or parenthetic narration.

In applying Mahlberg's notion, I accounted for various small ways that biblical literature differs from the mostly journalistic stories in her contemporary English corpus.[25] Then I operationalized the investigation by specifying the following four characteristics of the referring expression itself: (1) Either a masculine or a feminine form, employed in third-person reference. (2) The head term is either a common noun, or an adjective or participle that is used substantively. (3) Typically grammatically indefinite, although a

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[24] On *'ādām* in Lev 1:2, see below, §8.2.3. On אִישׁ in Job 12:10 and 37:7, the Deity is being credited with creating the multiplicity of individuals, not humankind as a whole.

[25] With regard to the first criterion listed above, I have usually excluded parties who are named within a genealogy or a formal list (e.g., 1 Sam 14:49; 1 Chr 1:51–54), which seems more a matter of historical interest than the introduction of a distinct character per se. Genealogies and lists tend to offer little opportunity for a choice of labels. However, I do include the odd entries that both meet the selection criteria and have more narrative interest (e.g., 1 Chr 2:34). With regard to the second criterion, I have excluded initial labels that are *deferential*, on the grounds that they are not truly introducing someone but rather are used for politeness (e.g., *'abdəkā kimhām* 'your servant Chimham', 2 Sam 19:38). And in accord with the third criterion, I have excluded instances in which biblical stories significantly delay giving the character's name (e.g., Amram, Jochebed, Moses, and Miriam). Additional corpus-related considerations will be treated below.

definite expression is not necessarily excluded.[26] (4) Reference is to a specific individual, whether classifying or identifying them.

Data Selection and Reporting. The corpus that I examined was the entire Hebrew Bible. I identified cases expeditiously by relying upon the biblical convention of tagging a proper noun as such via the common noun *šēm* 'name'. For example (Gen 16:1):

<div dir="rtl">

וְלָהּ שִׁפְחָה מִצְרִית וּשְׁמָהּ הָגָר׃

</div>

She had an Egyptian maidservant <u>whose name was</u> Hagar. . . . (NJPS)

A person's name rarely appears initially without such a tag. Hence as a rough diagnostic, I electronically searched the biblical corpus for *šēm* with a possessive pronoun or a preceding conjunctive particle (שְׁמוֹ or שְׁמָהּ or וְשֵׁם).[27] From the resulting set, I selected relevant instances that met the criteria.[28] I added another nine cases that surfaced in the process, where the text flagged the presentation of someone's name via the bare noun *šēm*.[29]

In reporting the results, for the sake of brevity I have set aside two types of named introductions, even though they met the above criteria. They are: birth reports,[30] and reports

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[26] I have construed a few expressions that are grammatically definite as if the referents were nonetheless *unidentifiable* to the audience as specific individuals. In particular, in eight instances the label for a man's introduced spouse appears with a suffixed possessive pronoun, which makes that label definite. Nonetheless, these associative formulations are presentational; they are equivalent to predicating the referent's presence in the discourse model separately, before giving her name. Similarly with the advent of the "Hebrew midwives," who are labeled a definite noun phrase (Exod 1:15): the role of midwife is inferable from general cultural knowledge—but not the particular identity of these two women. Finally, in 1 Sam 17:4 regarding the obscure term *ʾîš-habbēnayim* 'champion in single combat (?)', I take the construction as "*an* אִישׁ of *the* between" (rendered hyperliterally) rather than "*the* אִישׁ of *a* between," following McCarter (1980:290–91), Tsumura (2006:439), KJV, NJPS, NRSV, ESV. On the difference between definiteness and identifiability, and on the role of definite expressions in specific indefinite reference, see Bekins 2013.

[27] This approach does omit a few named introductions that meet the stated criteria yet employ an unconventional formulation that lacks the noun *šēm* as a tag. Within the scope of Genesis through Kings, for example, there are seven such instances: Gen 15:2; Judg 3:9, 15; 1 Kgs 11:14, 19, 23; 22:8. Nonetheless, the results reported below are so robust that my omitting these odd cases (and any in subsequent books that have been inadvertently missed) cannot significantly affect the findings.

On the introduction of participants by name alone, see Van Peursen 2013.

[28] Initial results included irrelevant entries (e.g., place names). Like Mahlberg, I excluded referents introduced by name *before* their role. This practice seems characteristic of the subgenre of personnel lists (e.g., 2 Chr 31:14–19); it is known in narratives (e.g., Gen 21:22; Josh 10:1; Judg 6:11; 11:1). And I excluded the occasional participant who appears in the discourse without any introduction (e.g., Exod 17:9; 1 Sam 13:2).

[29] This usage occurs for eleven introductions of two people at a time (co-wives; a pair of twins; a midwife team; etc.). Typically, the initial characterizing term is plural; then a singular term introduces each name; the first name is flagged asyndetically by *šēm*. (Only the first label is reported.)

[30] A restricted set of nouns is employed to introduce births: the default label is *bēn* or *bat*, but also *tə'ōm* "twin" is found; and occasionally, a newborn is labeled in terms of a prior sibling (especially a twin) as *'āḥ*

of the name of a king's mother.[31] These are special situations that call for fairly stereotyped expressions. Such situations discourage lexical choice. That is, presumably no alternative nouns—and in particular none of the general human nouns—would ever be used. Hence for my present purpose, those cases are uninteresting.

Results.   I compiled a data set of 69 nonstereotypical cases. (For the complete list, see Addendum A.) The qualifying introductory formulations are widely distributed across the corpus, being found in 17 out of the classic 24 biblical books.[32] All together, the Bible makes use of more than 11 different labels as heads of referring expressions as introductory labels.[33] The other designations include kinship, social status, and office/title terms. Their incidence is tallied in Table 6.1.[34] Remarkably, none of the other general human nouns is among the employed alternative terms.

   As the table shows, our noun אִישׁ (including אִשָּׁה) was used as an introductory label— preceding the character's name—far more often than any other term.[35] It thus accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total.[36] It was employed not only by narrators, but also by biblical characters (2 Sam 20:21; Zech 6:12). The conclusion is clear: both numerically and semantically speaking, the default label is אִישׁ. No other noun even comes close.

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or *'āḥôt*. Birth-reports-with-names, while most prominent in Genesis, are widespread in the Bible. They are found even in prophecy (e.g., 1 Kgs 13:2; Isa 7:14; 1 Chr 22:9).

[31] The book of Kings characteristically notes the mother's name when a new king's ascension to the throne is narrated (e.g., 1 Kgs 22:42), or when his reign is summarized (e.g., 1 Kgs 14:21).

[32] Genesis, Samuel, and Ruth have the highest incidence of the introductions of interest. Of the Bible's narrative books, Deuteronomy, Kings, and Ezra-Nehemiah stand out in not containing any introductions of this sort. (Instead, they introduce their participants either by name or via plural terms; or else their new characters remain nameless.) Other books simply contain little or no narrative to begin with—so their lack of participant introductions is no surprise.

[33] The frequency distribution of these labels is roughly Zipfian: a few of the labels in this set are used very frequently, while most of the labels are used very seldom. (On the cognitive motivation for this phenomenon, which occurs in many aspects of language, see Ramscar and Port 2016:64, 66, 70–71.) For three additional initial labels, see above, note 27.

[34] Aside from אִישׁ, all of the other labels are *relational* nouns (or relational substantives). By analogy, when אִישׁ is used, the audience may well be expected to enrich its meaning pragmatically, so as to infer salient relational information. This possibility will be discussed in Chapter 7.

[35] Aside from 'wife' meanings, our noun אִישׁ was used for this "introduction-with-name" purpose in 10 of the 17 biblical books in which such introductions appear. More than 40% of those cases come from the book of Samuel.

[36] In the next chapter, I will show that the sense 'wife' arises from the normal operation of a workhorse noun. Even if those 'wife' cases are separated out, אִשָּׁה/אִישׁ is still the highest-frequency term among the 69 cases reported here. (אִשָּׁה accounts for 5 of the 26 "Other" cases.)

Table 6.1 Situating Named Participants: אִישׁ versus Other Labels

אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	*Tally*	*Alternatives*	*Tally*
Wife	19	בַּת / בֵּן 'son/daughter'	11
Other	25	שִׁפְחָה / עֶבֶד 'slave/maidservant'	3
		אָחוֹת / אָח 'brother/sister'	2
		פִּלֶגֶשׁ 'concubine'	2
		מְיַלֶּדֶת 'midwife'	2
		מוֹדָע 'kin'	1
		בַּעַל פְּקֻדֶּת 'sentinel'	1
		נָבִיא 'prophet'	1
		שַׂר צָבָא 'general'	1
		רֵעַ 'friend'	1
SUBTOTAL אִישׁ	44	SUBTOTAL NON-אִישׁ	25

TOTAL 69

6.3.2 Resolving an interpretive crux (Gen 4:1)

The epitome of *concisely situating a participant* may be Eve's naming statement for her firstborn son. Presumably right after naming him, she explains (Gen 4:1):

קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְיָ׃

"I have gotten an *îš*, along with Yahweh."

The nuance of אִישׁ in this laconic declaration has been debated for centuries (above, Chapter 1, note 25). Yet in light of the prediction in §5.7.6, it seems most likely that Eve is employing our noun in order to succinctly present her experience in terms of *a prototypical situation*, using the language's default term for this purpose (contra Stein 2008a: 23).[37] She thus evokes a relational triangle with the following corners:

▲ = Speaker + אִישׁ (Newborn) + Yahweh

If so, then the referent of אִישׁ is profiled as *a party whose presence defines the (unprecedented) situation*. Such an interpretation readily yields a text that is both coherent and informative: Eve is piously framing his birth as the result of collaboration with her deity.

6.3.3 Unnamed, new, non-identifiable participants

Obviously, אִישׁ is employed far more often than just for introducing *named* characters. The compiled theory predicts that it likewise serves as the default label in the other cases,

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[37] Furthermore, in light of the analysis in §5.6 (cf. §1.3.2; below, §6.5.3), the well-known nuance of *adulthood* is NOT part of the basic meaning of אִישׁ (which is in play in this instance); rather, it is the result of a connotative development that can be evoked in certain settings. Therefore to insist that Eve is construing her son as an adult (even in potential), as some interpreters do, involves an unnecessary extra assumption.

as well (§5.7.1B). So I now ask: When individual characters are introduced into the discourse but *not* named in their introduction, how are they initially labeled?

Method. This question can be operationalized much as before,[38] except that the entries must be found manually, by reading through the text.[39] It sufficed to restrict the scope of investigation to the books of Genesis through Kings, plus Ruth. For by that point, the results were already so robust that the remaining biblical books could not have made a material difference.[40]

Results. These criteria yielded a data set of 115 cases. (For the complete list, see Addendum B.) They are distributed across 9 out of the 10 books examined; as before, Deuteronomy contains no instances. The book of Kings is again exceptional, but this time in the opposite extreme: it contains more cases (37) than any other book.

As shown in Table 6.2, for these introductions into discourse of an unnamed party, 15 different substantive terms were employed.[41] They include kinship, social status, social role, and group-defined terms. Again, no general human nouns are in the mix of alternatives. The most frequently employed label was אִישׁ, in 64 cases (by gender: 44 of אִישׁ, and 17 of אִשָּׁה—of which only 1 would normally be construed as 'wife'). It thus accounted for the majority of instances of this type of introduction. The next most common label was *mal'āk* 'messenger', which was used less than a quarter as often; and then *bēn/bat* 'son/daughter', one-eighth as often as אִישׁ.

A final noteworthy phenomenon: it sometimes happens that a speaker uses the label אִישׁ (with definite or unique deixis) to introduce someone into their discourse while knowing that their interlocutor can already identify the party in question. I.e., speakers

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[38] On the inclusion of certain grammatically definite referring expressions, see above, note 26. Here, too, I construe certain definite terms as referring to newly introduced specific participants who were unidentifiable to the audience, such as *'îš yiśrā'ēl* 'member of Israel' and *mal'āk 'ĕlōhîm* 'messenger of God'.

[39] This time, I included birth reports in the tabulation. However, I excluded the term *par'ōh* 'Pharaoh'. Although it is technically a noun label—being an epithet for a succession of otherwise nameless characters—the Bible treats it as a proper noun, with unique reference. I also excluded introductions that were couched in plural or collective terms. Such terms seem to regard their referent from a distinct perspective and add interpretive ambiguity, so I set them aside in this test for simplicity's sake.

[40] I.e., for the present purpose, the sample corpus is representative of the entire biblical corpus (and as far as we know, of ancient Hebrew usage as a whole). My impression is that in the remaining books, no other presentational label is so frequent and persistent that it could displace אִישׁ as dominant overall.

[41] As with the introductions for named participants, for unnamed characters all fourteen of the other labels besides אִישׁ are *relational* in their semantics. They label their referent either in terms of kinship, social status, a social role (which necessarily involves other roles), or membership in a group. Once again, this finding suggests that by analogy, the corresponding meanings of אִישׁ on the informational level are likewise relational ones.

may prefer to present a referent as *situated* (Gen 20:3; 38:25; 2 Sam 12:9; 1 Kgs 20:42; 2 Kgs 22:15; Ruth 2:1).

Table 6.2 Situating Unnamed Participants: אִישׁ versus Other Labels

Label	*Tally*
אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	64
Alternatives	
מַלְאָךְ 'messenger/angel'	14
בַּת / בֵּן 'son/daughter'	8
אֶחָד (מִן) 'one (of)'	7
נַעַר / נַעֲרָה 'youth/protégé(e)'	6
סָרִיס 'eunuch/official'	3
שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים 'captain of fifty'	3
אֱלֹהִים 'divine being/agent'	2
נָבִיא 'prophet'	2
One-time labels	6
Subtotal non-אִישׁ	51
TOTAL	115

6.3.4 A minimal pair (Lev 24:10)

The sole narrative episode in Leviticus (24:10–23) invites us to account for not only a workhorse noun's *presence*, but also its *absence*. In the first verse, which is admittedly complex, four characters are introduced and situated.

וַיֵּצֵא בֶּן־אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית וְהוּא בֶּן־אִישׁ מִצְרִי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל
וַיִּנָּצוּ בַּמַּחֲנֶה בֶּן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי׃

The son of an <u>Israelitess</u> *'iššâ*—he being [also] the son of an Egyptian *'îš* —
went out among the people of Israel; and [there] in the camp, a fight broke
out between the son of <u>the Israelitess</u> and an Israelite *'îš*.

The highlighted character is the first character's mother. She is initially labeled as *'iššâ yiśrəʾēlît*. Soon afterward, however, she is designated by only the determined (grammatically feminine) gentilic—simply as *hayyiśrəʾēlît*.[42] In the initial referring expression, the head noun אִשָּׁה signals to the audience to "open a file" in their discourse model, for this new participant. It depicts her as one corner of a situational triangle, along with the father (individuated as אִישׁ) and their son. Their familial triangle is a prototypical situation.

▲ = אִשָּׁה ([Female] party) + אִישׁ ([Male] party) + Son

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[42] This is not tagged as a changed reference in Runge and Westbury 2012a.

At the story's second reference to her, however, our noun is not needed because she is already active in the discourse model—and her situated position has not changed. Hence the gentilic suffices as a substantive for participant-tracking purposes.[43]

6.4 Discourse Level: Consequential Participants

On occasion, the biblical narrators and characters refer to *a subset of a recognized group*, while introducing it into the discourse as a distinct entity. This affords an opportunity to test the prediction in §5.7.1C, namely that our noun can signal a referent's importance.

6.4.1 Defining a subset of indeterminate size ("some" participants)

In Biblical Hebrew, the main way to introduce a subset of indeterminate size is the partitive construction.[44] It uses the preposition מִן 'of, from' to govern a label for the full set, as in this description of an attempt by some Israelites to gather manna in the wilderness (Exod 16:27):

וַיְהִי בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי יָצְאוּ מִן־הָעָם לִלְקֹט וְלֹא מָצָאוּ׃

On the seventh day <u>some of the people</u> went out to gather, and they found none.   (NRSV)

By this means, the new subgroup is not lexicalized; rather, it is invoked by implication. This means of introducing a subset is concise and thus efficient (§§5.1, 5.3.1).

6.4.2 An alternative, marked means for introduction of a subset

In Biblical Hebrew, another way to introduce such a subset is built around the plural noun אֲנָשִׁים, in absolute form, as the head term of a noun phrase that refers directly to that subset.[45] It could be inserted, as it were, alongside the above construction, as in this description of the proceedings of a Judahite colloquium (Jer 26:17):[46]

וַיָּקֻמוּ אֲנָשִׁים מִזִּקְנֵי הָאָרֶץ

And <u>some of the elders of the land</u> arose.…   (NRSV)

Alternatively, the larger initial group could be taken as a given and not explicitly mentioned, as in Moses' instruction to Joshua (Exod 17:9):

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[43] Similarly: Exod 2:11–12; with nonspecific reference, see, e.g., Gen 41:33, 39; Deut 27:15–26.

[44] Several additional (and mostly related) ways of expressing the concept of "some" are also attested, but they seem to be much more rare. See, e.g., 1 Sam 10:27; 13:7; 2 Kgs 17:25; Ezek 6:8; Neh 5:2, 5; 7:69. For אִישׁ as used to introduce a quantified subset, see, e.g., 1 Sam 30:17.

[45] As is well known among linguists, while a noun regularly *individuates* its referents, its plural form *quantifies* them. And a bare plural noun can do both, even without a quantifying modifier (a numeral; *all*; *some*; etc.). Consequently, a bare plural workhorse noun contributes both to individuating a subset from a larger group, and to the audience's construal of that subset *as a distinct participant* in the situation.

[46] Alternatively, the phrase might begin instead with the prefixed preposition בְּ 'in'. However, that is a less common way to indicate group relationships than מִן 'of, from'.

בְּחַר־לָנוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְצֵא הִלָּחֵם בַּעֲמָלֵק

"Choose some men for us and go out, fight with Amalek…."   (NRSV)

Presumably, Joshua is supposed to choose his soldiers from among the Israelites (rather than, say, Moabites or Egyptians or Arameans). Moses's utterance efficiently leaves this restriction of scope unstated—as a presupposition, inferable on the basis of salience.

Making a reference via אֲנָשִׁים (in addition to the partitive construction) is obviously more verbose. This suggests that it is a marked means of expression.

What motivates the use of our noun? According to the compiled theory, bare אֲנָשִׁים, by virtue of its nouny individuating power, highlights the new subset as a *noteworthy* participant in the situation (§4.4.2). Furthermore, a referent identified via a substantive is iconically depicted as more "substantial" than one who is merely implied. Thus our noun's use signals that its referent is more *consequential* than the norm. In short, as a marked usage it signals cataphoric importance. I will now test this prediction (§5.7.1C).

6.4.3 Testing the prediction of אֲנָשִׁים as indicating importance

Method.   I sought out a sizeable body of examples of each of the two types. I found qualifying instances mainly by searching for instances of the word *some* in the NJPS translation (because of its loyalty to English idiom, NJPS supplied that word where the concept applied, even if not explicit in the Hebrew), with regard to a human group. I found 35 instances of the first kind mentioned above (without אֲנָשִׁים), and 23 of the second kind (with אֲנָשִׁים).[47] Then I compared the two sets of instances.

Distribution.   Tellingly, both types of expression appear in the following eight books (often in close proximity): Exodus, Numbers, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Jeremiah, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles.[48] On this basis, I conclude that the two types of usage were not lectal variants (employed by distinct groups of Hebrew speakers). Rather, they were two alternatives used by the same Hebrew speakers. Consequently, it is methodologically valid to proceed to ascribe a differential meaning to these types, if one can be identified.

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[47] *First type*: Exod 16:27; 17:5; Num 21:1; Judg 20:31; 2 Sam 11:17; 2 Kgs 20:18 // Isa 39:7; 2 Kgs 25:12 // Jer 39:10; Isa 66:21; Jer 52:15–16; Dan 1:3; 11:35; Ezra 2:68, 70; 7:7; Neh 7:70, 72; 11:4, 25, 36; 12:35; 13:19; 1 Chr 6:51; 9:3, 28–30; 12:17, 20; 2 Chr 16:10; 19:8; 20:1; 21:4; 22:31; 32:21; 34:13. *Second type*: Exod 16:20; 17:9; Num 9:6; 31:3; Deut 13:14; Josh 2:2; Judg 9:4; 18:25; 1 Sam 31:3; 1 Kgs 11:17; 13:25; 20:17; Jer 26:17; 37:10; 43:9; Ezek 14:1; 20:1; Ezra 10:44; Neh 1:2; 13:25; 1 Chr 4:42; 2 Chr 28:12; 30:11. (Ezek 23:42 might also be counted among the latter type, but I am unsure of its meaning.)

[48] Meanwhile, only one type of expression or the other appears in Deuteronomy, Joshua, Isaiah, and Daniel. Due to the low incidences involved, I draw no conclusions from these findings; the absence of the other type might be just happenstance.

Results. The use of only a partitive prepositional phrase introduces the subgroup of participants into the discourse surreptitiously; and this low profile is matched by the referents' inconsequential impact in the narrative. The groups to whom this type of expression is applied are the ones who are incidental casualties in war (Judg 20:31; 2 Sam 11:17) or are otherwise hapless (Exod 16:27; Num 21:1; 2 Kgs 20:18; 25:12; 1 Chr 12:20). They also stand in the background—for example, as witnesses (Exod 17:5), as the trumpeters who accompany ritual processions (Neh 12:35), and as the monitors who watch to ensure that no commercial goods enter Jerusalem on the sabbath (Neh 13:19). In narratological terms, these are *not* the characters with the speaking parts; rather, they are the props (cf. Longacre 2003:140–41). In the argot of movie production, they would be the extras. Furthermore, this type of expression can be used in nonspecific reference to a merely hypothetical subgroup, prior to its actual existence as a distinct entity (Isa 66:21; Dan 1:3).

In contrast, the indeterminate groups who are designated as אֲנָשִׁים (or נָשִׁים) are more *individuated*—and more *consequential*. They are placed more in the narrative foreground. They are variously involved in altering their situations: they appeal to the authorities for a change in procedure (Num 9:6) or otherwise make inquiry (Ezek 14:1; 20:1); they pose a threat (Deut 13:14; Josh 2:2; Judg 18:25; Jer 37:10); they comprise a force (Exod 17:9; Num 31:3; Judg 9:4; 1 Kgs 11:17; 20:17; 1 Chr 4:42) or confront one (2 Chr 28:12); and they show up when called upon (2 Chr 30:11). Their actions matter (Exod 16:20; 1 Sam 31:3; Ezra 10:44), as do their words (Jer 26:17; Neh 1:2); and even their presence as witnesses makes a difference (1 Kgs 13:25; Jer 43:9). All instances of אֲנָשִׁים in this data set employed specific reference.

Discussion. A marked and consistent difference seems evident in terms of *consequence*. This finding can be further confirmed via a minimal pair. We can contrast the description of those Israelites who go looking for manna on the sabbath (Exod 16:27) with the prior depiction of others who attempt to save manna overnight (vv. 16–20). These two instances in close proximity share many features: their referents come from the same social group; their referents' actions both involve manna and occur just a few days apart; and both actions provoke displeasure (by Moses or by Yahweh). Why does the first passage (excerpted below) employ the term אֲנָשִׁים, whereas the subsequent one (v. 27; above, §6.4.1) does not?

זֶה הַדָּבָר֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר צִוָּ֣ה יְ֔יָ	This is what the Eternal has commanded:
... לִקְט֣וּ מִמֶּ֔נּוּ אִ֖ישׁ לְפִ֣י אָכְל֑וֹ	Each household[49] shall gather as much as it requires to eat....
וַיַּֽעֲשׂוּ־כֵ֖ן בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל...	The Israelites did so....
וַיֹּ֥אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֖ה אֲלֵהֶ֑ם	And Moses said to them,
אִ֕ישׁ אַל־יוֹתֵ֥ר מִמֶּ֖נּוּ עַד־בֹּֽקֶר:	"Let no one[50] leave any of it over until morning."

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[49] On אִישׁ in distributive constructions as applying to abstract entities, see above §1.3.4; below, §8.3.2.

וְלֹא־שָׁמְעוּ אֶל־מֹשֶׁה	But they paid no attention to Moses;
וַיּוֹתִרוּ אֲנָשִׁים מִמֶּנּוּ עַד־בֹּקֶר	<u>some of them</u> left part of it until morning,
וַיָּרֻם תּוֹלָעִים וַיִּבְאַשׁ	and it became infested with maggots and stank.
וַיִּקְצֹף עֲלֵהֶם מֹשֶׁה:	And Moses was angry with them. (TAMC)

Again, the difference in usage can be handily explained as a matter of the consequences of the respective referents' actions (reflected by the speaker's lexicalization of the referent in the more consequential case). Meanwhile, it is ironic that those אֲנָשִׁים who *took no action* (after they had been enjoined to dispose of the extra manna) prompted perceptible consequences by causing a stench and demonstrating the futility of their greed, whereas those Israelites who *took action* (after they had been enjoined not to attempt any manna gathering) came home with nothing to show for their effort. This shows that it is not the degree of action or initiative that matters but rather its impact as construed by the narrator. Restated in terms of discourse considerations, the participants who are labeled as אֲנָשִׁים—and only those participants—*materially alter the depicted situation*, and so require the audience to revise its discourse model.

Conclusions.   The prediction is confirmed: אִישׁ can indicate importance. Its bare plural (deployed with indefinite deixis, and specific reference), when used to introduce a certain subset of a discourse-active group, can not only prompt the audience to revise its discourse model, but also signal that this newly distinct subgroup materially alters the situation. It prompts the discourse model to be reconstituted around this new participant.

6.5 Discourse Level: Elaborating Upon a Participant

Now let us explore how participants are referenced after their initial presentation. The use of a workhorse noun as *a vehicle for elaborating upon* a participant is (as I will show) well attested and widely distributed in the Bible.[51] This discourse function successfully explains its presence in many cases where it otherwise seems semantically superfluous ("pleonastic").[52] In fact, that ostensible superfluity is actually a telltale sign of its special function—which, cognitively speaking, is about prompting the audience to "update" the participant's file in its discourse model (§5.4.2).

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[50] On the interpretation of אִישׁ as a fronted negative polarity item, see below, §8.2.2.

[51] Elaborating upon a participant via אִישׁ is attested in Old Aramaic; see King Zakkur's self-introduction at the start of his 8th-century-BCE stele, KAI202 A:2 (purl.org/scholar/kai202). So, too, for the opening of the (Aramaic?) Book of Balaam (Aḥituv 2008:435, 438, 440). A closer parallel to that text than the biblical passages that Aḥituv adduced is 1 Chr 27:32 (below, §6.5.1).

[52] A *pleonastic relation* exists "when one [element] seems redundant, and appears not to add any semantic information not already given by the other element" (Cruse 2011:187).

This type of usage is common in genres where characterization matters, such as narrative. For example, in Genesis, 13% of the 159 instances of masculine אִישׁ function to elaborate upon a participant of interest (see Addendum C). Although other cohort nouns are also used (occasionally) to do so, their use does more than merely serve as a vehicle for the added data; those nouns also impose their particular outlook on the referent.[53]

In reviewing this elaborating function, I will proceed as with introductions: I will examine first the named participants and then the unnamed ones. Within those categories, I will group together the utterances by narrators and then by characters—to show that both types are fully represented.

Recognizing the elaborating function of אִישׁ will enable me, at the end of this section, to offer a resolution for two longstanding controversies about our noun's import.

6.5.1 Named participants

In §5.7.2A, I predicted that the use of אִישׁ can help to elaborate upon named parties. Indeed, it carries out this function by varied syntactic means: verbless clauses, copular clauses, appositions, relative clauses, and prepositional phrases. Here are examples that represent the variety. (To emphasize the discourse function of אִישׁ in these instances, I have "unrendered" it in the accompanying translations.) From various narrators, we have:

On Noah's basic character (Gen 6:9):

נֹחַ אִישׁ צַדִּיק

Noah was a righteous *ʾîš*…   {NJPS}

On Tola's tribal affiliation (Judg 10:1):[54]

תּוֹלָע בֶּן־פּוּאָה בֶּן־דּוֹדוֹ אִישׁ יִשָּׂשכָר

Tola son of Puah son of Dodo, an *ʾîš* of Issachar,…   {NJPS}

On the post-factum explanation for Eli's sudden death (1 Sam 4:18):

וַתִּשָּׁבֵר מַפְרַקְתּוֹ וַיָּמֹת כִּי־זָקֵן הָאִישׁ וְכָבֵד

…and his neckbone was broken and he died, for the *ʾîš* was old and heavy. {Alter}

On Naaman's situation (2 Kgs 5:1; twice):[55]

וְנַעֲמָן … הָיָה אִישׁ גָּדוֹל לִפְנֵי אֲדֹנָיו … וְהָאִישׁ הָיָה גִּבּוֹר חַיִל מְצֹרָע׃

Naaman … was an important *ʾîš* to his lord.… Now the *ʾîš* was a brave warrior—and a leper.

On the qualifications of a member of King David's staff (1 Chr 27:32):

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[53] For *geber*, Num 24:3, 15; 2 Sam 23:1; Jer 22:30; 23:9; Joel 2:8; Ps 52:9; 88:5; Lam 3:1. For *ʾĕnôš*, Ps 55:14 (?). I cannot find any instances of *ʾādām* or *nepeš* used in this way.

[54] Similarly (with gentilic rather than genitive): Gen 39:1.

[55] Similarly as in v. 1a (in a copular clause, as a predicate): Josh 17:1; 2 Sam 8:10; 14:25; 1 Chr 22:9.

<div dir="rtl">

וִיהוֹנָתָן דּוֹד־דָּוִיד֩ אִישׁ־יוֹעֵ֨ץ אִישׁ־מֵבִ֧ין וְסוֹפֵ֛ר ה֖וּא
</div>

Jonathan, David's uncle, was a counselor; an *ʾîš* of understanding and a scribe was he.

Similar characterizations are articulated by various characters in the biblical narratives. The following examples are representative.

Abram says to Sarai, about her appearance (Gen 12:11):[56]

<div dir="rtl">

הִנֵּה־נָ֣א יָדַ֔עְתִּי כִּ֛י אִשָּׁ֥ה יְפַת־מַרְאֶ֖ה אָֽתְּ׃
</div>

"I know what a beautiful *ʾiššâ* you are."   {NJPS}

Dinah's brothers say to Hamor, whose son wants to marry her (Gen 34:14):[57]

<div dir="rtl">

לֹ֤א נוּכַל֙ ... לָתֵת֙ אֶת־אֲחֹתֵ֔נוּ לְאִ֖ישׁ אֲשֶׁר־ל֣וֹ עָרְלָ֑ה
</div>

"We cannot . . . give our sister to an *ʾîš* who is uncircumcised.…"   {NJPS}

David says to his watchman, about Ahimaaz (2 Sam 18:27):[58]

<div dir="rtl">

אִישׁ־ט֥וֹב זֶ֖ה
</div>

"He is a good *ʾîš* .…"   {ESV}

6.5.2 Unnamed participants

Per §5.7.2B, אִישׁ is predicted to provide entrée to elaborate about specified *unnamed* discourse-active parties. Again, I offer widely distributed and syntactically varied examples, starting with narration.[59]

On the legendary Nephilim (Gen 6:4):

<div dir="rtl">

הֵ֧מָּה הַגִּבֹּרִ֛ים אֲשֶׁ֥ר מֵעוֹלָ֖ם אַנְשֵׁ֥י הַשֵּֽׁם׃
</div>

They were the heroes of old, the *ʾănāšîm* of renown.   {NJPS}

On an elderly farmer who had moved to a different tribal district (Judg 19:16):[60]

<div dir="rtl">

וְהָאִ֗ישׁ מֵהַ֤ר אֶפְרַ֙יִם֙ וְהוּא־גָ֣ר בַּגִּבְעָ֔ה
</div>

This *ʾîš* hailed from the hill country of Ephraim and resided at Gibeah.…   {NJPS}

As characters live their lives and interact with others, they apply this usage in service of an even wider variety of communicative goals. An elaborating function is recognizable throughout by the ostensibly pleonastic presence of אִישׁ. Such instances include:

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[56] Similarly: 2 Sam 16:8; 19:33; 1 Kgs 1:42; 2:9, 26; 17:24; Isa 6:5; Ruth 3:11; 1 Chr 18:10; 28:3.

[57] (Here the indefinite אִישׁ-headed phrase serves in context as a unique referring expression.) Similarly: Gen 41:38; Exod 32:1, 23; Num 27:18.

[58] Similarly: 1 Sam 21:15.

[59] See also 2 Kgs 4:9; Zech 3:8.

[60] Similarly: 1 Sam 17:12; 25:2, 3; 2 Sam 11:2 (with Bathsheba named only later by the king's aide).

Manoah asks the angel a question of identity (Judg 13:11):

הַאַתָּה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־דִּבַּרְתָּ אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה

"Are you the *ʾîš* who spoke to this woman?"   {NRSV}

Hannah declares to Eli, about herself (1 Sam 1:26):

אֲנִי הָאִשָּׁה הַנִּצֶּבֶת עִמְּכָה בָּזֶה לְהִתְפַּלֵּל אֶל־יְיָ׃

"I am the *ʾiššâ* who was standing here with you, to pray to Yahweh.…"

Kish's protégé informs his master's son, Saul, about Samuel (1 Sam 9:6):

הִנֵּה־נָא אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים בָּעִיר הַזֹּאת וְהָאִישׁ נִכְבָּד

"There is a man of God in that town, and the *ʾîš* is highly esteemed.…"   {NJPS}

Nabal disparages David's messengers, who are standing before him (1 Sam 25:11):[61]

וְלָקַחְתִּי אֶת־לַחְמִי ... וְנָתַתִּי לַאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדַעְתִּי אֵי מִזֶּה הֵמָּה׃

"Shall I take my food . . . and give it to *ʾănāšîm* who come from I-don't-know-where?"

Poetic non-restrictive appositions describe the Suffering Servant (Isa 53:3):[62]

נִבְזֶה וַחֲדַל אִישִׁים אִישׁ מַכְאֹבוֹת וִידוּעַ חֹלִי

He was despised, shunned by men,
An *ʾîš* of suffering, familiar with disease.   {NJPS}

6.5.4 Resolving an interpretive crux (Jer 38:7)

In a narrator's statement in Jeremiah, our noun appears to be superfluous (Jer 38:7):

עֶבֶד־מֶלֶךְ הַכּוּשִׁי אִישׁ סָרִיס וְהוּא בְּבֵית הַמֶּלֶךְ

Ebed-melech the Cushite, an *ʾîš-sārîs*, who happened to be in the king's palace.…

Of the 45 instances of the noun *sārîs* 'eunuch, official', this is the only one in which it appears as an appositive of אִישׁ (see §6.8), rather than heading its noun phrase.[63] The contribution of אִישׁ here has often been questioned. Three solutions have been proposed: it clarifies that a eunuch is meant (rather than an officer); it clarifies that an officer is meant (rather than a eunuch); and it indicates referential specificity. Let us examine each one.

Keil and Delitzsch construed our noun as disambiguating between two meanings of the appositive: "אִישׁ סָרִיס signifies a eunuch: the אִישׁ shows that סָרִיס is here to be taken in

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[61] Nabal's deployment of אֲנָשִׁים for elaboration purposes is a pointed one, given that the narrator has already labeled the same referent as *naʿărîm* 'protégés' (v. 5, 9) and as *ʿăbādîm* 'servants' (v. 10); and David likewise called them *naʿărîm* in the very message to which Nabal is responding (v. 8).

[62] On structural parallelism in poetry as non-restrictive apposition, see Holmstedt 2019.

[63] Distinguishing the instances in which *sārîs* designates its referent as a eunuch versus as an official (or as both) is a longstanding scholarly puzzle (Peled 2013). The noun phrase *ʾîš sārîs* has no counterpart in the Septuagint (Elliger and Rudolph 1977; Tov and Polak 2009). Following Emanuel Tov, Everhart (2003:127) takes this phrase as a clarifying insertion into an earlier version of the text.

its proper meaning, not in the metaphorical sense of an officer of the court" ([1880] 1996, ad loc.). More recently, John Bright puts forward the same view (1965:231). However, the weakness of this interpretation is that Ebed-Melech's actions as subsequently depicted seem to befit an "officer of the court": he initiates a conversation with the king, accuses certain officers of bad behavior, and is promptly entrusted with a mission by the king.

Given the actions taken by Ebed-Melech, it is not surprising that another interpreter, George Haddad, argues the opposite—that אִישׁ shows that he is indeed an official. Haddad explains: "In the Middle East a eunuch is never referred to as a man.… The word 'man' [אִישׁ] emphasizes sexual distinction and relation" (1982:62n5).[64] Yet that interpretation does not account for the fact that in the Bible, numerous other officers of the court are labeled as *sārîs* without the benefit of אִישׁ.

A third approach is taken by Janet Everhart in her dissertation on eunuchs in the Bible (2003:128). She opts to construe the noun phrase in question as 'a certain eunuch'—that is, as if אִישׁ were playing an introducing/situating role, which is a discourse function. However, such a meaning is not plausible in this case, for the referent has already been introduced by name (in contrast to the exemplar that Everhart cites, 2 Kgs 25:19).

The solution I offer is likewise discourse oriented: אִישׁ functions to prompt the audience to admit elaboration into its discourse model. This conclusion is supported by a test that compares all 45 biblical instances of *sārîs*: Why does אִישׁ appear only with *this* instance? Because this is the only ascription of that status *as supplemental background information*.[65] Hence (to personify the noun in question) this is the only passage where the word *sārîs* presents אִישׁ as a ticket, so as to be admitted into the discourse room.

6.6 Discourse Level: Re-Situating a Participant

Our noun אִישׁ—the expert individuator that carries a skeleton key for making adjustments in the audience's discourse model (§5.4.2)—can be employed as a prompt when the speaker wishes to refresh ("re-situate") a participant's standing in the model (§5.7.3). In our case study above (§6.2.2), we saw the label הָאִשָּׁה used in this way, to reposition a participant in a prototypical situation. The fact that it was a changed label (§4.4.3) implied that it must be an expeditious noun for this task. Here I will add one more example (while

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[64] On אִישׁ and "sexual distinction and relation," see below, §6.9.1.

[65] In seven other passages, *sārîs* serves as the head of a construct phrase that is placed in non-restrictive apposition with a character's name, to situate that discourse participant at the point of his introduction or reactivation (e.g., *sərîs parʿōh* 'Pharaoh's eunuch/official' in Gen 37:36; *sərîs hammelek* 'the king's eunuch/official' in Est 2:3). Each of those terms functions to anchor its referent to his respective master. In those cases, the added data about the referent is admitted into the discourse model via the anchor, so אִישׁ is not necessary. Here, in contrast, the label appears without the benefit of anchoring as an admission ticket. (His relation to the king is inferable from his unusual name and from the notice of location that follows.) On anchoring to existing elements in the discourse model, see Runge 2006.

footnoting others)[66] that likewise highlights the re-situation process for a prototypical situation. Consider how Jacob objects to his mother's urging that he impersonate his twin. To depict the problem that he sees, he juxtaposes two verbless clauses (Gen 27:11):

הֵן עֵשָׂו אָחִי אִישׁ שָׂעִר וְאָנֹכִי אִישׁ חָלָק:

"Behold, my brother Esau is a hairy *ʾîš*, and I am a smooth *ʾîš*." {ESV}

Kühlewein's dictionary lists these instances of אִישׁ under the rubric of "a circumlocution for an adjective" (1997a:101). Yet this explanation makes little sense, given that both of these modifiers are themselves adjectives already. More to the point, our noun is carrying out a re-situating move on the discourse level. Jacob's deployment of the twinned-yet-counterposed instances of אִישׁ evokes a situational frame of *contrast*. That is, he urges Rebekah to construe his brother and himself as opposed parties in a relational triangle, with respect to the "skin texture" dimension—as implied by the contrasting adjectives.

▲ = אִישׁ (Participant 1) + אִישׁ (Participant 2) + Skin texture

Through this discourse-structuring device, Jacob is representing the existing situation as more reified and intractable than could be achieved merely with adjectives alone.

6.6.1 Resolving an interpretive crux (Gen 30:43)

One case of signaling a need for re-situating appears near the end of Jacob's sojourn in Aram, describing the resolution of a situation that had long been tenuous (Gen 30:42–43):

וְהָיָה הָעֲטֻפִים לְלָבָן וְהַקְּשֻׁרִים לְיַעֲקֹב:
וַיִּפְרֹץ הָאִישׁ מְאֹד מְאֹד

And so the feeble ones went to Laban and the sturdy ones to Jacob.
Thus the *ʾîš* grew exceedingly prosperous…   {Speiser 1981}

In this story, Jacob keeps the best sheep in compensation for husbandry on behalf of his father-in-law (Laban). Suddenly the narration pointedly refers to one of those two characters via a definite noun phrase: הָאִישׁ. In the flow of the story, that designation must refer to the protagonist, Jacob. But how does it set him apart from Laban? And since it does not seem particularly informative, why was it chosen as a label? Why not simply use Jacob's name?[67] Presumably it was questions like this that prompted Westermann (1981: 484) to opine that "there is no reason for the designation" here as הָאִישׁ.

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[66] Aside from Exod 2:2a, instances of the label הָאִשָּׁה as overencoding so as to flag a narrative development (and re-situating of the referent) include: Gen 3:6; 12:14–15; Exod 2:9; Lev 20:16; Num 5:18; Josh 2:4; Jud 13:6, 10, 24; 19:26 (changed label?); 1 Sam 1:18 (changed label), 23; 28:11, 21; 2 Sam 20:22; 2 Kgs 8:2, 3. For additional re-situating usages of determined forms of masculine אִישׁ, see, e.g., Gen 18:16; 24:21, 26.

[67] Indeed, the use of a clearer designation would be expected, according to Frank Polak's conclusion regarding the rhetoric of biblical narrative: "The participant who is successful in his undertaking or prevails in the spoken interaction is marked *by name and/or title*, whereas reference to the character who complies

An additional puzzle comes courtesy of Schökel (1993:58), who states that whenever our noun is used with the article to refer to an aforementioned party, it is equivalent to a pronoun. If so, then why does the text not simply use a pronoun—or rely upon the verbal inflection alone?

Discourse Level.   This case is similar to הָאִשָּׁה in Exod 2:2a (§6.2.2), although there the reference was unambiguous on gender grounds. The same participant-tracking "rule" that I adduced there (based on de Regt's research) applies here: the subject's referent is presumed by a convention of Hebrew to be coreferential with the closing object complement in the previous clause, namely *ya'ăqōb* 'Jacob'.[68] Thus the expected referent of הָאִישׁ is Jacob (not Laban).[69]

Alternatively, consideration of salience leads to the same result. The linguist and cognitive scientist Deirdre Wilson addressed from the perspective of relevance theory a similar use of the noun phrase *the man* (1992) in English parlance (above, §5.3.3). She considered a case involving two men, in which this semantically underspecified label creates referential ambiguity. She explained how an interpreter could reliably resolve that ambiguity via considerations of *relevance*. The audience's mental parser automatically selects for the most *salient* referent who fits that description.[70]

Given the audience's inferential ability, a speaker actually has little motive to be more specific in labeling the referent of interest. Indeed, from the audience's perspective, by what is known in pragmatics as the Gricean Maxim of Quantity, speakers are not expected to do so. Thus although the wording employed is semantically underspecified, it is considered normative communication under certain circumstances.[71]

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or remains submissive or passive is limited to the verbal form only" (2017:168–69; emphasis added).

[68] Lénart de Regt confirms that the "rule" applies in this case. He observes that Jacob meanwhile remains the "discourse active subject" from the start of the previous verse (personal communication, 18 Nov 2018).

[69] Our noun is similarly employed as the head of a semantically underspecified (and therefore potentially ambiguous) referring expression in a number of passages, including Gen 26:13; Exod 2:9, 21; Judg 17:11; and 2 Sam 12:5. As Nathan tells David his parable (2 Sam 12:1–4), he labels all three participants as הָאִישׁ at one point or another.

[70] The linguist Shevaun Lewis (2013) would likewise say that our noun succeeds as a referring expression due to a "relevance implicature." Supporting evidence for the claim that an audience will reliably resolve such a reference comes from dialogue-based psycholinguistic studies, which suggest—as summed up by Van Deemter—that "a distractor [i.e., potential alternative referent] may be disregarded when the meaning of the sentence makes it an unlikely referent" (2016:67).

[71] In order for a speaker's underspecification strategy to work, the audience must share enough background knowledge to be able to supply the necessary inferences that will link what is *said* to what is *meant* (see Wilson 1992:168–69 on Herb Clark's felicitous use of the "bridge" metaphor for this inferential activity).

Informational Level.   Here, too, this case is similar to הָאִשָּׁה in Exod 2:2a (§6.2.2). In the present clause, הָאִישׁ designates the grammatical subject, which is not only overencoded but also features a changed label (a substitute for Jacob's name).

Overencoding is typical of concluding statements that mark the resolution of a narrative episode. (Elsewhere, it may indicate a story's opening, or a turn in the narrative; here it marks the arrival at a new state of affairs.) Cognitively speaking, overencoding via a noun signals a suggestion to the audience to conclusively update the discourse model according to the outcome. This is simply taking advantage of what nouns do best.

As for the changed label,[72] it too is typical of concluding statements—at least those that reflect some development in a particular character's situation or status. For as we have seen, אִישׁ offers an ideal way to flag such a change. It is the cognitively preferred way to signal such developments—to enter them into the record, as it were. This instance can thus be explained as summarizing, which is a form of re-situating a participant.

In addition, as a workhorse noun, אִישׁ has the ability to direct our attention not only to its referent (whichever party that happens to be), but also to the *situation* in which he played a part. Or more precisely, this usage leads the audience to regard its referent *as a participant* in the previously fraught rivalry between Laban and Jacob; the new state is now portrayed as the direct outcome of that situation. (Recall the "Sean Penn" minimal pair in §5.3.3 using *the man* versus *the paparazzo*—and how each label guided our attention differently: the label *the man* kept our attention on the just-depicted altercation.)

Jacob had entered into an animal-husbandry business contract with his father-in-law—a calculated gamble that (with divine help) he has turned to his advantage. Via the label הָאִישׁ, Jacob's newfound wealth is depicted as the resolution of this situation. It evokes the relevant situational triangle and prompts Jacob's final re-situation within it. Thus the proposition that this clause advances—that its referent has grown wealthy—not only readily makes sense when applied to Jacob (rather than to Laban), but also it yields a dividend in informativeness and textual coherence.

As for our noun's semantics, its contextual meaning is 'the prevailing participant *in the salient aforementioned situation*'. (Clearly the point of using this label is *not* the referent's gender, since that is not a differentiating factor between the two parties.) In short, a label that had seemed uninformative and baffling in its vagueness is actually meaningful enough, due to its relational implications, to bring the story to a satisfying close.

6.7 Discourse Level: Reference-Point Usage

Deployment of a workhorse in anaphoric reference that holds its referent as a fixed point in a shifting relational triangle was discussed in §5.4.6, with a prediction in §5.7.4. It is indeed a regular practice with אִישׁ, as employed by both narrators and characters.

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[72] See Runge (2007:28–29, 108–13; 132–33); Runge and Westbury (2012, s.v. *Changed Reference*).

Usage by *narrators* includes situations with physical movement, such as the depiction of the end of a protagonist's period of wandering. (For an example, see below, §6.9.8.)

Among the usages of אִישׁ by biblical *characters*, one conspicuous deployment appears in a *question* that Jacob poses to his sons, regarding a given participant (Gen 43:6):

לָמֶה הֲרֵעֹתֶם לִי לְהַגִּיד לָאִישׁ הַעוֹד לָכֶם אָח:

"Why have you done me this harm to tell the *ʾîš* you had another brother?"   {Alter}

A similar use of אִישׁ while *issuing a directive* can be seen soon afterward, when Jacob adopts a plan of action. His depiction of the desired situation revolves around the given participant, whom he efficiently labels with our noun אִישׁ (v. 11):

קְחוּ מִזִּמְרַת הָאָרֶץ בִּכְלֵיכֶם וְהוֹרִידוּ לָאִישׁ מִנְחָה

"take some of the choice products of the land in your baggage,
and carry them down as a gift for the *ʾîš*"   {NJPS}

Moreover, that figure remains a fixed point as Jacob expresses a pious hope (v. 14):

וְאֵל שַׁדַּי יִתֵּן לָכֶם רַחֲמִים לִפְנֵי הָאִישׁ

"And may El Shaddai grant you mercy before the *ʾîš*…"   {Alter}

All three of Jacob's usages are conspicuous, for a simple pronominal suffix would have sufficed for his audience's reference-tracking purposes. The concept of a reference point accounts for his deployment of the workhorse noun. Table 6.3 shows nine additional cases of reference-point use, in reported speech, of a determined noun phrase that is headed by masculine אִישׁ.[73] Such instances are fairly widely dispersed—a distribution that warrants our treating reference-point usage as a feature of Ancient Hebrew.

Table 6.3   Additional Reference-Point Usages of אִישׁ for a Discourse-Active Third Party

Location	Speaker	Addressee	Referent	Alternative to אִישׁ
Gen 20:7	God	Abimelech	Abraham	Pronominal suffix
Gen 43:13	Jacob	his sons	Egyptian vizier	Noun (*haššallîṭ*)[74]
Gen 44:4	Joseph	steward	visitors (brothers)	Noun (*hammal'ākîm*)
Exod 2:20	Reuel	his daughters	rescuing stranger	Pronominal suffix
Exod 10:7	courtiers	Pharaoh	(certain) Israelites?[75]	Pronominal suffix
Num 22:35	angel	Balaam	Balak's envoys	Noun (*hammal'ākîm*)
1 Sam 14:8	Jonathan	attendant	Philistine garrison	Noun (*hammaṣṣab*)[76]
1 Sam 29:4	Philistine officers	Achish	David	Pronominal suffix
Ruth 3:3	Naomi	Ruth	Boaz	Pronominal suffix

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[73] For instances of a feminine form used in this manner, see below, §6.8.4.

[74] See below, note 110.

[75] See below, §7.5.5.

[76] Compare vv. 1, 6.

In the tabulated cases, as with Jacob's cited utterances, the presence of אִישׁ in the character's speech is otherwise difficult to explain. Either a noun label is not needed to enable the audience to fix the intended reference, or another (more specific) noun would have been more informative, or the referent's name would have been a clearer designation. What readily renders these texts both informative and coherent is the idea that our noun can efficiently prompt the audience to revise the situation in its mental model.

6.7.2 Reference-point comparisons

As noted in §5.4.6, a governing preposition seems to be a key part of reference-point constructions. Arguably the preposition type that most lends itself to such constructions is *comparatives*. Three biblical examples follow.[77]

A prophet describes his experiences (Zech 4:1):

וַיְעִירֵ֙נִי֙ כְּאִ֔ישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יֵע֖וֹר מִשְּׁנָתֽוֹ׃

[The angel] woke me, <u>like an *ʾîš* who is awakened out of his sleep.</u> {ESV}

Joab instructs the female agent whom he is sending to King David (2 Sam 14:2):

וְהָיִית֙ כְּאִשָּׁ֔ה זֶ֛ה יָמִ֥ים רַבִּ֖ים מִתְאַבֶּ֥לֶת עַל־מֵֽת׃

"…and act <u>like an *ʾiššâ* who has grieved a long time over a departed one.</u>" {NJPS}

A poetic simile describes an approaching enemy (Jer 6:23; 50:42):

וְעַל־סוּסִים֙ יִרְכָּ֔בוּ עָרוּךְ֙ כְּאִ֣ישׁ לַמִּלְחָמָ֔ה

They ride upon horses, / Accoutered <u>like an *ʾîš* for battle,</u>… {NJPS}

6.7.3 Resolving an interpretive crux (Isa 66:13)

Recognizing the reference-point function of אִישׁ resolves an interpretive crux for a passage in Isaiah's lyrical poetry. In the preceding verses, which are addressed to Israel in exile, the topic is the people's forthcoming good fortune, as promised by Yahweh. Israel is portrayed as a suckling child. Such imagery then continues (Isa 66:12b–13):

. . . עַל־צַד֙ תִּנָּשֵׂ֔אוּ וְעַל־בִּרְכַּ֖יִם תְּשָׁעֳשָֽׁעוּ׃

…You shall be carried on shoulders / And dandled upon knees. (NJPS)

כְּאִ֕ישׁ אֲשֶׁ֥ר אִמּ֖וֹ תְּנַחֲמֶ֑נּוּ כֵּ֤ן אָנֹכִי֙ אֲנַֽחֶמְכֶ֔ם וּבִירֽוּשָׁלַ֖͏ִם תְּנֻחָֽמוּ׃

<u>As a mother comforts her son</u> / So I will comfort you; / You shall find comfort in Jerusalem. (NJPS)

<u>As one whom his mother comforts,</u> / so I will comfort you; / you shall be comforted in Jerusalem. (ESV)

These two renderings of verse 13 show that numerous scholars construe it as beginning a new sentence that summarizes the preceding few verses.[78] The problem with this con-

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[77] Likewise making a comparison: Gen 44:15; Isa 42:13; Jer 14:9; 23:9; Joel 2:7; Ps 38:15; Neh 6:11; 7:2.

[78] So Luzzatto (mid-19th century) wrote explicitly, ad loc.; so the renderings in KJV, NRSV, ESV; McKenzie 1968:206; Blenkinsopp 2003:302; Watts 2005:934.

strual is at least twofold: (1) The Hebrew syntax is inverted between the verse's first two clauses, which makes them clash with each other in terms of semantic roles.[79] (2) It makes the verse's third clause seem tacked on.[80]

Meanwhile, commentators and translators are divided over the meaning of אִישׁ here, regarding its referent's implied age. Given the imagery, it is not surprising that some scholars perceive the sense of אִישׁ contextually as 'child' or 'son'.[81] Others render אִישׁ in more conventional terms: 'a man' (McKenzie 1968:206), 'a person' (Watts 2005:934), or 'someone' or 'one' (LXX, KJV, ESV).[82]

However, we have just seen that a simile with אִישׁ can serve a reference-point function, in which it juxtaposes a new situation to an existing one for the sake of comparison. If we applied that approach straightforwardly in the present passage, it would require linking the simile to the *preceding* description—as in the following construal.[83]

$$\ldots\text{עַל־צַד֙ תִּנָּשֵׂ֔אוּ וְעַל־בִּרְכַּ֖יִם תְּשָׁעֳשָׁ֑עוּ: כְּאִ֕ישׁ אֲשֶׁ֥ר אִמּ֖וֹ תְּנַחֲמֶ֑נּוּ}$$
$$\text{כֵּ֣ן אָנֹכִי֙ אֲנַחֶמְכֶ֔ם וּבִירוּשָׁלַ֖͏ִם תְּנֻחָֽמוּ:}$$

You shall be carried on shoulders / and dandled upon knees / <u>like one whom a mother comforts</u>.[84]

So I Myself will comfort you; / through Jerusalem you shall be comforted.   (Based on NJPS+ESV)

As we saw in §5.4.6, when a workhorse noun is engaged in the reference-point function on the discourse level, it contributes minimal meaning on the informational level. That is, אִישׁ simply describes 'a participant (in the depicted situation)'. And as such, there is nothing to prevent it from being employed in *nonspecific* anaphoric reference to an infant.

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[79] In the Bible, a protasis introduced by the comparative preposition *kə-* and an apodosis introduced by the discourse deictic *kēn* 'so' are combined 60 times within a comparative construction (Koehler and Baumgartner [1967] 2001e:483; cf. Joüon 2006:604–5)—as ostensibly here in verse 13. Yet whereas in the other cases, *syntactic* and *semantic* parallels in the two halves align, here they do not: the syntactic mate for אִישׁ is customarily construed as *'ānōkî* 'I', but that noun's semantic role (as patient) is matched instead by the second-person plural object suffix; meanwhile, the semantic role of *'ēm* 'mother' (as agent) is matched by the deity's first-person pronoun, while that noun lacks a syntactic mate in the apodosis.

As shown, translators have handled the mismatch in two ways. NJPS (whose Isaiah appeared in 1973), McKenzie (1968:206), NRSV (1989), Childs (2001:530), Blenkinsopp (2003:302), and Watts (2005:934) rework the syntax of the first clause so as to match the second clause—all without noting that transformation. Alternatively, KJV and ESV faithfully preserve the dissonance—thus resulting in an incoherent rendering.

[80] Indeed, Elliger and Rudolph (1977:778) notate the third clause as being "perhaps added."

[81] Ibn Ezra glosses אִישׁ as *bēn* 'son'; NJPS and Blenkinsopp ("her son"), NRSV and Childs ("her child").

[82] For LXX, see Tov and Polak 2009, ad loc.; Silva 2009:875. So also Malbim, ad loc.

[83] In the Hebrew Bible, what we moderns would call a sentence (a logically complete thought) occasionally transcends the boundary of a Masoretic verse—ending in the middle of a verse. See, e.g., Isa 10:1–2; 25:4–5; 29:5–6; 30:4–5; 43:20–21; 58:13–14; 65:6–7. See also Ginsburg 1897:68–108 and the NJPS translators' cognizance of this biblical practice (Orlinsky 1970:21, citing the 10th-century exegesis of Saadia Gaon).

[84] Because the reference is nonspecific, neither אִישׁ nor the possessive pronoun that it governs can ascribe gender to their hypothetical referent, beyond the mild constraint of "not exclusively female" (Stein 2013).

Thus here in Isa 66:13, even though אִישׁ clearly *refers* to a suckling child, that is not its contribution to meaning. Rather, its principal meaning is its discourse function: *to rapidly introduce a familiar relational triangle in such a way that illuminates a given situation.*

According to my proposal, then, the comparative preposition *kə-* modifies the immediately preceding depiction; then the discourse deictic *kēn* 'so' takes the whole preceding promise as its anaphor, starting with הִנְנִי נֹטֶה 'Behold, I will send…' (v. 12).[85] This construal readily yields a coherent and informative Hebrew text.

6.8 Discourse Level: Superfluity in אִישׁ-Headed Referring Expressions

In some of the verses discussed (e.g., Gen 27:11; Jer 38:7; Isa 66:13), אִישׁ pointedly headed a referring expression, yet it itself seemed to say little about its referents. Let us now examine our noun's role in the many additional instances where its meaning contribution appears superfluous on the informational level.[86] Grammatically speaking, there are many types of such expressions—the most prominent being appositions.

6.8.1 *The need for a reappraisal of* אִישׁ *in appositions*

Prototypically, *apposition* is the juxtaposition of two nouns (or noun phrases) that are used together to point toward someone, or to make a point about someone.[87] Some English examples: *my colleague Sara*; *Geeraerts, a prolific scholar*. In each case, one term is considered the *head* while the other is the *appositive*.[88] A speaker can deploy an apposition either in reference, in predication, or as a vocative; if in reference, then the reference is common to both of its terms.

In appositional constructions, our noun is occasionally employed as the head term. Yet whereas for most head nouns the interpretive question is classically framed as "how the appositive modifies its head," we will see that the challenge is almost the reverse with

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[85] The particle *kēn* does not necessarily require a *kə*-headed protasis (see above, note 79); indeed, standing on its own, it roughly corresponds to 'thus, as had just been told' 120 times (Koehler and Baumgartner [1967] 2001e:482), e.g., Exod 10:29; Job 8:13. In this respect, my proposal resembles the NJPS construal of Isa 63:13–14, which renders a *kə*-headed phrase and a *kēn* phrase in separate sentences: [13] *"…So that they did not stumble—* / [14] *…Like a beast descending to the plain?" / 'Twas the spirit of the LORD gave them rest; / Thus did You shepherd Your people / To win for Yourself a glorious name*. See also Ezek 23:44 (NJPS, NRSV, ESV). On *kēn* as a discourse deictic term, see Forbes 2014; Van der Merwe et al. 2017:437.

[86] For the variety of אִישׁ-headed expressions, see, e.g.: Gen 25:27; Exod 1:19; Num 32:14 (where an appended apposition enables Moses to further disparage his interlocutors' forebears); Judg 18:2; 1 Sam 14:52; 2 Sam 14:5; 20:1 (second instance); Jer 23:9; Ps 38:15; Ruth 2:1.

[87] Attested appositions with אִשָּׁה and אִישׁ apply only to human beings. An apposition can include more than two terms, but for simplicity's sake I treat two substantives as the norm.

[88] In English appositions, the head is the *last* term; in Hebrew, it is the *first* term. As for labeling, I follow Holmstedt and Jones 2017:25 in referring to the modifying term as the *appositive*; I reserve the term *apposition* for the whole construction.

a workhorse noun. Namely, how do we explain the presence of אִישׁ at all? For the instance in Jer 38:7, I was able to generate a reason (§6.5.4), but how widely does it hold?[89]

Harkavy's dictionary states that אִישׁ is "used in apposition with other nouns to indicate the gender" (1918:21), before glossing *'îš-sārîs* as 'eunuch' (much like Keil and Delitzsch, above, §6.5.4). However, such an explanation is competely unconvincing, for it overlooks the facts that the referent's gender is obvious from the appositive alone, and that *sārîs* is almost always employed without any such indicator, as noted above.

Other scholars likewise frame the problem on the informational level, yet with no more success. Regarding (restrictive) appositions, both grammarians and linguists assert that the apposed term specifies, particularizes, or modifies the head term.[90] Yet recall Joshua's label for Rahab of Jericho as *'iššâ zônâ* 'harlot woman' (Josh 6:22; above, §1.3.3). Construing the text conventionally there yields a noun phrase that, if recast as a proposition, informs us that "a harlot is a type of woman." Obviously this is not an informative construal.[91] Nor is it consistent with a fundamental principle in pragmatics: people do not waste words.[92] The text's composers would have known that when their audience encountered our noun as the first term in an apposition, they would *by default* assume a communicative intent; hence they surely had the motivation to make it meaningful. So why did they bother to include the noun אִשָּׁה?

A further question is why the composers deployed a workhorse noun with an appositive, as in *'iššâ zônâ*, only occasionally. After all, the term *zônâ* (זוֹנָה) alone functions as a substantive in other cases, as in Gen 38:15:

$$\text{וַיִּרְאֶהָ יְהוּדָה וַיַּחְשְׁבֶהָ לְזוֹנָה}$$

When Judah saw her, he took her for a <u>harlot</u>.…   (NJPS)

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[89] Unless otherwise noted, I am *not* treating the related question of *nested* apposition, namely how to interpret an אִישׁ-headed apposition when it is itself apposed with other referring expressions.

[90] Arnold and Choi 2018:31; Van der Merwe et al. (2017:262); Williams 2007:28; Joüon 2006:450; Waltke and O'Connor 1990:232. As Yoder observes (2015:101n2), Gesenius cites some apparent exceptions to this rule (Gesenius and Kautzsch 1910:425), alluding to 10 instances of the phrase *dāwīd hammelek* 'King David'. Of those, 9 are found in Chronicles, where that exceptional word order probably expresses David's being the illustrious founder of a long-lived dynasty, as promised by the deity. As for the remaining instance, 2 Sam 13:39, Revell explains it as an exploitation of normal usage: "The unusual word order, placing the name before the title, can be read as reflecting the fact that David's desire for reconciliation with Absalom was atypical for a king" (1996:104n23). In short, the usage of the exceptional phrase *dāwīd hammelek* is distinct enough from other apposition cases that it does not affect the construal of the workhorse noun אִישׁ.

[91] Yoder critiqued the grammarians' *genus-species* classification as being an "equivocal fit" with respect to certain other cases where there is *no* overt semantic relationship between אִישׁ and the appositive that follows it (2015:102–3). My initial objection complements his, by finding the conventional analysis to be unacceptably uninformative even when an overt semantic relationship *is* available—as here in Josh 6:22.

[92] See Runge 2006:95; Stein 2018; Stein forthcoming.

Biblical scholarship has not satisfactorily explained how אִישׁ (or אִשָּׁה) functions when it heads an apposition. The opaque or cursory treatment by lexicographers and grammarians was discussed in §3.2; some other scholars simply ignore the problem.[93] In their recently revised reference grammar, Van der Merwe and colleagues (2017:263) go farther than most by listing the semantic functions of nouns in apposition.[94] They state that the appositive term elucidates the head term. One of the appositional types that seem applicable to persons is where "the second member specifies the *status* of the first member" (example given: אִשָּׁה אַלְמָנָה, 'a woman, a widow'; 1 Kgs 7:14). Again, however, this is not an informative construal.

Taking up the longstanding challenge, two scholars have each used a similar approach to account for אִישׁ-headed appositions; however, their arguments have been unconvincing. W. E. Staples (1941) and Tyler Yoder (2015) have explained אִישׁ-headed appositions as a vestigial scribal practice, transferred from the cognate language of Akkadian (long a lingua franca in the ancient Near East). They point out that in Akkadian, a particular *determinative marker* was occasionally written before human occupational and gentilic terms as a classifier—to mark the following word as a human noun.[95]

The two authors observed a surface resemblance between the respective practices in the two languages, in two respects. First, the Akkadian determinative in question (the marker LÚ) can also be read as a word: *awîlu*, 'human; free man'—equivalent to *amīlu* in Standard Babylonian—which is the cognate term to אִישׁ in Hebrew. Second, both the determinative marker (in Akkadian) and the head noun (in Hebrew) typically appear before *occupational* and *gentilic* terms; that is, they show up in similar situations.[96]

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[93] Heddie Marsman, in her comprehensive review of women in Israelite society, says only that "the participle זֹנָה [*zônâ*] and the phrase אִשָּׁה זֹנָה [*'iššâ zônâ*] both refer to the professional prostitute" (2009:432).

[94] In a restrictive usage, the denotations of the two terms function in *series* (which is like viewing the referent through a telescope), rather than in *parallel* (which is like viewing it through binoculars). See further Holmstedt and Jones 2017.

[95] Staples explains the motivation for this supposed development: "Mesopotamian pictographs … took on a multiple of syllabic values. When this happened, certain aids became necessary for the reader to give the correct value to the sign or signs" (1941:139).

[96] Yoder points to evidence that in the peripheral Akkadian usage in Canaanite diplomatic correspondence during the Amarna period, some determinatives were treated as words in their own right. (He adduces the evidence presented in Rainey [1996:28–31], showing the syllabic recording of a usually logographic determinative. Yet neither Yoder nor Rainey account for why such markers were construed as words only *occasionally*.) If so, then the result would be similar to noun-noun apposition (and also to genitive constructs, in some cases). Yoder sees in this a possible precedent for the Hebrew appositions with our nouns. However, in at least some instances, the scribes were arguably replacing an existing apposition in their own language with a determinative-noun pair in Akkadian—e.g., "land of Egypt." (See Rainey 1996.) Apparently it was the determinative that those scribes had found superfluous, not the noun that it became. Further-

However, these correlations between the two languages do not imply causation. A crucial weakness of the determinative hypotheses is that a *motivation* is missing: there is no reason *why* the unspoken Akkadian practice would have been adopted into biblical Hebrew texts, to be spoken aloud without any useful function.[97]

In short, biblical scholarship regarding the dozens of אִישׁ-headed appositions in the Bible is not only at odds with linguistic and grammatical theory but also cannot account for the usages in a manner that renders the text as informative. Perhaps we can do better.

6.8.2 The same puzzle with other אִישׁ-headed referring expressions

At the same time, the issue is larger than appositions per se. Aside from noun appositives, אִישׁ is often modified by a term that is not necessarily a noun itself, yet elsewhere it serves as a substantive on its own. Dozens of adjectives and participles fit this description—for example, *ʾîš nokrî* 'foreigner' (Deut 17:15; cf. 14:21; 15:3; 23:21; 29:21), and *ʾănāšîm mᵊraggᵊlîm* 'spies' (Josh 2:1; cf. Gen 42:9; 1 Sam 26:4; 2 Sam 15:10). All such cases share in common the feature that our noun appears, at first glance, to be semantically superfluous. That is, if אִישׁ were deleted from the referring expression, the utterance would (it seems) remain grammatical; the audience could still fix the intended referent; and the label's implicit predication about its referent would ostensibly remain unaltered.

All of these cases pose the same puzzle: Why does אִישׁ appear in this expression? How is this construction not a pleonasm? And why doesn't our noun also appear in similar passages where its modifier is used as a substantive label by itself?

For the present purposes of determining the extent of relational usage of אִישׁ, I am interested in its juxtaposition with *any* substantive (not only a noun) such that the two terms are used together to point to someone, or to make a point about someone. That would include, as the modifying term, even a relative clause that is being used substantively.[98]

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more, if Eva von Dassow (2004) is correct, Canaanite scribes were already speaking with *ʾîš*-headed appositions in their native tongue, even before they altered standard Akkadian scribal practice.

[97] The lexicographer Sukenik (1950) is one of the few scholars who has cited Staples, yet he then remarked tersely: אין השערה זו מתקבלת על הדעת 'This hypothesis is implausible'. Meanwhile, as Yoder himself notes, similar appositions are also found in the (depicted) speech and literature of nearby nations. Hence if his hypothesis were correct, then a meaningless idiosyncrasy of a few scattered Canaanite scribes must have been adopted—for no apparent reason—internationally. This "bigger picture" implication argues against a Canaanite scribal origin.

[98] E.g., *hā'îš ʾăšer ʿal-bêt yôsēp* 'Joseph's steward' in Gen 43:19 (cf. the relative clause *ʾăšer ʿal-bêtô* as a standalone substantive in v. 16 and 44:1, 4).

Treating such cases together has the advantage of avoiding definitional problems at the boundaries of the syntactic classes: a noun versus an adjective,[99] and a noun versus a participle.[100] For my purposes, the modifier's word class makes no difference. Even so, I will treat apposition as the typical case, because it is the most obviously problematic.

6.8.3 Is its function semantic—or pragmatic?

A given apposition is ambiguous with respect to how its two terms interact. Two concepts are profiled, yet the intended *relation* between those two concepts is left unexpressed (Gagné and Spalding 2013:99). It is instructive that Holmstedt and Jones (2017) favorably cite discussions of apposition in English that refer to the construction's first term as its "anchor."[101] This terminological metaphor underscores the relative importance of an apposition's first term in actual communicative use.

In the linguistics literature, appositions are analyzed in terms of general semantic relations.[102] This approach reflects the cognitive processes that are used in human communication (see Chaffin and Herrmann 1984; Goldwater et al. 2011). Nonetheless, these approaches are restricted to the *informational* level; they do not account for *discourse* functions—which are a crucial part of actual language use, especially for workhorses. Per the prediction of §5.7.5, the presence of אִישׁ as a head term is a matter of discourse needs. I will now test this idea.

6.8.4 Learning from prostitutes

A promising set of cases for understanding אִישׁ-appositions that introduce a participant happens to center on prostitutes, simply as a matter of the frequency of attested use. The Bible includes ten instances of the phrase *'iššâ zônâ*; two more instances of *zônâ* as an epithet in apposition with a name (which are uninformative); and the term *zônâ* appears by itself in another 20 instances.[103] This gives us a sizeable initial data set for testing hypotheses as to why אִשָּׁה appears where it does—and why only in those passages.

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[99] See Miller-Naudé and Naudé 2016. Van der Merwe and colleagues exemplify the challenge by classifying gentilics both as nouns (2017:211) and as adjectives (ibid. 261). Cf. the Groves-Wheeler Westminster Hebrew word-class tagging in Accordance Bible Software, versus Waltke and O'Connor (1990:92–93).

[100] The authoritative treatment of the boundary between those two word classes in Biblical Hebrew is by Benjamin Kedar-Kopfstein (1977), who posits a cline with many gradations. The distinction turns upon whether a given instance denotes a *role* or an *event*.

[101] I have not adopted this terminology for two reasons: (1) it would downplay the cognitively salient status of the head term in *restrictive* appositions—which is the type that I am concerned with (see next note); and (2) it would invite confusion, given that "anchor" has a different application in discourse analysis.

[102] *Semantic relations* between concepts are understood to be the basic components of thought. They organize how concepts fit together. E.g., PART-WHOLE and TYPE-OF (class-inclusion) relations. See Storey 1993.

[103] For *zônâ* appearing alone, I exclude two vocative instances (Isa 23:16; Ezek 16:35) as uninformative.

The prediction is borne out. Of the instances of *zônâ* in referring expressions, all 20 standalone cases make a nonspecific, discourse-inconsequential reference, as predicted.[104] Meanwhile, our noun אִשָּׁה in all ten instances of *'īššâ zônâ* executes a discourse function; see Table 6.4. Two distinct functions can be identified, namely situating and re-situating. Of the first kind, four instances involve situating a specific participant, while one situates a non-specific participant—that is, a type (Lev 21:7)[105]—via the usual communicative efficiency of a workhorse noun.

Table 6.4   Discourse Functions of אִשָּׁה in the Apposition *'īššâ zônâ*

Locale	Passage	Rendering
Situating a specific participant		
Josh 2:1	וַיָּבֹאוּ בֵּית־אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה וּשְׁמָהּ רָחָב	They came the house of an *'īššâ zônâ* by the name of Rahab
Judg 11:1	וְיִפְתָּח הַגִּלְעָדִי הָיָה גִּבּוֹר חַיִל וְהוּא בֶּן־אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה	Jephthah the Gileadite was a stalwart warrior; he was the son of a certain *'īššâ zônâ*
Judg 16:1	וַיַּרְא־שָׁם אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה	There he saw an *'īššâ zônâ*
1 Kgs 3:16	אָז תָּבֹאנָה שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים זֹנוֹת אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ	Thus two *'īššâ zônâ* [plural] came to the king
Situating a nonspecific participant		
Lev 21:7	אִשָּׁה זֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה לֹא יִקָּחוּ	An *'īššâ zônâ* or someone "pierced"— they shall not marry her
Re-situating a participant (point of reference)		
Josh 6:22	בֹּאוּ בֵּית־הָאִשָּׁה הַזּוֹנָה וְהוֹצִיאוּ מִשָּׁם אֶת־הָאִשָּׁה	Go to the house of the *'īššâ zônâ*; bring out the *'īššâ* from there
Jer 3:3	וּמֵצַח אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה הָיָה לָךְ	You had the forehead of an *'īššâ zônâ*
Ezek 16:30	בַּעֲשׂוֹתֵךְ אֶת־כָּל־אֵלֶּה מַעֲשֵׂה אִשָּׁה־זוֹנָה שַׁלָּטֶת׃	Your doing all of these things [was like] what an autonomous *'īššâ zônâ* does
Ezek 23:44	וַיָּבוֹא אֵלֶיהָ כְּבוֹא אֶל־אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה	He went to her as one goes to an *'īššâ zônâ*
Prov 6:26	כִּי בְעַד־אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה עַד־כִּכַּר לָחֶם וְאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ נֶפֶשׁ יְקָרָה תָצוּד׃	For an *'īššâ zônâ* costs but a loaf of bread, but a married woman hunts for a precious life. {Fox}

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[104] Gen 34:31; 38:15; Lev 21:14; Deut 23:19; 1 Kgs 22:38 (identifiable type); Isa 1:21; 23:15, 16; Jer 2:20; 5:7; Ezek 16:31, 33, 41; Hos 4:14; Joel 4:3; Mic 1:7 [twice]; Nah 3:4; Prov 7:10; 23:7; 29:3.

[105] Milgrom renders Lev 21:7 with more idiomatic English: 'They shall not marry a promiscuous woman or one who was raped…' (2000:1805). As priests face their choice of mate, אִשָּׁה focuses attention on the type of marriage candidate. It is used to distinguish between viable candidates; it admits for consideration two disallowed types, starting with a *zônâ*. Alternatively, some interpreters construe the pair of modifiers *zōnâ waḥălālâ* as evoking a single concept ("hendiadys")—yielding 'degraded by harlotry'—rather than listing two types (NJPS, cf. Levine 1989:143; Lipka 2008:727).

Within chapter 21 of Leviticus, vv. 7 and 14 form a minimal pair to confirm that אִשָּׁה has a discourse function when collocated as the object of the verb *l-q-ḥ* (see below, §7.4.3, Table 7.1). Both verses specify and draw distinctions between candidate types (disallowed or allowed). In v. 14a, that task is accomplished via deixis ('*ēlleh* 'these'), whereas in vv. 7 and 14b it is done via the workhorse noun אִשָּׁה. The vaunted ability of this noun to individuate-and-situate its referent is thus active in Lev 21:7.

The other discourse function for אִשָּׁה in *'iššâ zônâ* similarly evokes a situation efficiently, by employing the workhorse noun to indicate a point of reference in the existing situation, or by invoking a new relational triangle for the sake of an instructive comparison (§5.4.6). These five cases are detailed below.

- In Josh 6:22, Joshua as commander is issuing a directive to his subordinates. He treats the referent of אִשָּׁה as a fixed point for their orientation—a target location.[106]
- In Jer 3:3 and Ezek 16:30 (both couched in the second person), Yahweh as remonstrator is advancing a claim about the addressee, seeking to alter the latter's self-perception. In both cases, the workhorse indicates a point of comparison.
- In Ezek 23:44, the speaker contrasts the manner in which men seeking extramarital sex approach a *prostitute* with how they more surreptitiously approach a *married woman* (who is accountable to her husband—with adultery as a capital offense); unlike a wife, a prostitute is *autonomous*.[107] Our noun indicates a point of comparison, in order re-situate the male referent's behavior in the audience's mind.
- In Prov 6:26, the discourse topic is the ultimately high cost of adultery. The teacher employs אִשָּׁה as a point of reference, to contrast the way of adultery with a lower-cost (less risky) option of visiting a prostitute.

Conclusion. All told, the appositions that involve *zônâ* bear out the prediction that אִשָּׁה is not meaningless (superfluous) as the head term. Rather, it is carrying out the discourse functions that workhorse nouns do, and in a manner consistent with the principles of participant-reference labeling. Meanwhile, the appositive term adds information so that the combined term can properly situate (or re-situate) that participant. The next three sections will confirm this finding with a variety of modifiers and discourse functions.

6.8.5 When "redundant" usage is actually about something else

When Jacob's sons first return to Canaan from Egypt, they report to their father. They begin by introducing a new participant into their intrafamilial discourse (Gen 42:30):[108]

<div dir="rtl">

דִּבֶּר הָאִישׁ אֲדֹנֵי הָאָרֶץ אִתָּנוּ קָשׁוֹת

</div>

The *'îš* who is lord of the land spoke harshly to us… {NJPS}[109]

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[106] Joshua uses a co-reference that evinces a changed label in his speech, relative to his earlier reference to Rahab by name in v. 17 (a change not indicated in Runge and Westbury 2012a). Here the focus is on the *situation* that Joshua wants his subordinates to attend to, whereas in v. 17 it was on Rahab herself. On changed labels, see above, §§4.4.3, 6.2.2; on this verse, see above, §1.3.3.

[107] See the comments ad loc. by Eliezer of Beaugency (12th century) and Moshe Greenberg (1997:486–87).

[108] Given this introduction, when Judah reactivates this participant in a later dialogue (43:3), he can do so by referring to him simply as הָאִישׁ 'the [salient aforementioned] party.'

[109] For another instance of the plural construct אֲדֹנֵי for describing an individual, see 1 Kgs 16:24.

As this clause's verb-first word order suggests, the sons are eager to recount the big problem that they encountered; they need to account for the absence of their oldest brother. The speech event that they depict is their main topic of concern. Their referring expression is definite because it is a given (from cultural knowledge) that *somebody* must be in charge of the distribution of foodstuffs. Yet their father would not yet know about the ad-hoc post occupied by the official whose words they are reporting. In their eagerness to get to the point, the speakers naturally label him only as needed to establish his authority. In so doing, Jacob learns something from each element in the apposition: first, that there is a salient participant in the situation who must be reckoned with; and second, that he possesses final authority in this matter. Both parts of this apposition are informative.

In terms of information structure, the sons could have hypothetically referred to this referent with a more specific label.[110] Why say it with אִישׁ? As with the prostitute cases, a workhorse noun *sets up* the situation, while the appositive provides pertinent *detail*.

Even so, this explanation is provisional until I can also account for a clearly non-introductory use of this same apposition, later in the same report by Jacob's sons (v. 33).

וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֵינוּ הָאִישׁ אֲדֹנֵי הָאָרֶץ בְּזֹאת אֵדַע כִּי כֵנִים אַתֶּם

But the _ʾîš who is lord of the land_ said to us, 'By this I shall know that you are honest.… {NJPS}

This reference is otherwise unambiguous, so (determined) אִישׁ alone is the default label.[111] The full referring expression overencodes the referent for the sake of thematic highlighting.[112] It appears to signal that the following pronouncement is unusually demanding—and eventually fateful ("…bring your youngest brother to me.…"; vv. 33b–34).

In short, when אִישׁ heads a referring expression and seems pleonastic, the term that is conspicuous (extraneous) may not be אִישׁ—instead, it may actually be the modifier. Nonetheless, as predicted (§5.7.5), the presence of אִישׁ correlates with discourse function.

6.8.6 *When a self-reference uses—or avoids—אִישׁ*

A total of nine biblical characters employ an אִישׁ-headed referring expression in order to elaborate about themselves to someone else. One example is how a young David describes himself (1 Sam 18:23):

וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד הַנְקַלָּה בְעֵינֵיכֶם הִתְחַתֵּן בַּמֶּלֶךְ וְאָנֹכִי אִישׁ־רָשׁ וְנִקְלֶה׃

David replied, "Do you think that becoming the son-in-law of a king is a small matter, when I am but a poor man of no consequence?" (NJPS)

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[110] E.g., *haššallîṭ* 'the ruler' (Gen 42:6), or *hammašbîr* 'the provisioner' (ibid.), or *haśśar* 'the official' (2 Kgs 9:5; Mic 7:3; 1 Chr 15:5–10), or even the appositive term alone.

[111] As expected, אִישׁ alone prompts a re-situating of the same participant in 43:3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14.

[112] Similarly for אִישׁ-headed appositions in Judg 19:22, 23; 1 Kgs 17:17; Est 7:6; and elsewhere. Runge and Westbury (2012a) do not tag this term in Gen 42:33 as being overencoded.

The other eight passages (and the particular speaker) include: Gen 13:8 (Abraham); Gen 27:11 (Jacob; above, §6.6); Exod 4:10 (Moses); Judg 12:2 (Jephthah); 1 Sam 1:15 (Hannah); 2 Sam 14:5 (Joab's agent); Isa 6:5 (Isaiah); Zech 13:5 (hypothetical person). Clearly such widespread usage is normal—which is telling. It implies that the head term אִישׁ must be both meaningful and efficient; otherwise people would not be depicted as employing it so regularly when they speak. Evidently the speakers are *not* using אִישׁ to call attention to their own gender or their status as adults, for both of those intrinsic facts must already be obvious to their interlocutors just by looking at them.

What does our noun accomplish here? These are predications in which characters either introduce themselves to someone, or they seek to revise another party's impression of them—by offering information that is germane to their present situation. In discourse terms, the speakers are trying to advantageously situate or re-situate themselves in their interlocutor's eyes. Their use of אִישׁ (or אִשָּׁה) deals with how they are situated—which includes the following triangle of interest.[113] These, too, are prototypical situations.

▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + My attribute/status (as construed by addressee) + Addressee

We can create something of a minimal pair by juxtaposing David's statement adduced above with his similarly self-disparaging remark years later, as monarch (2 Sam 3:39):

וְאָנֹכִי הַיּוֹם רַךְ וּמָשׁוּחַ מֶלֶךְ וְהָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּנֵי צְרוּיָה קָשִׁים מִמֶּנִּי

> Whereas I, today, am tender, having been anointed king,
> these *'ănāšîm*—the sons of Zeruiah—are more tough than I am…

Here David does *not* invoke a workhorse to describe himself as *rak* 'tender' (אִישׁ רַךְ*).[114]

David's focus in these two passages is quite different. In the earlier statement, he characterizes himself in terms of his situation, as a matter of social station. He uses אִישׁ to constitute a representation in his interlocutors' discourse models, so that they will situate him in their minds as he wishes to be seen. In contrast, in the later statement, David is emphasizing a quality that he has adopted since becoming king—as signaled by the time stamp *hayyôm* 'today'. The use of אִישׁ as a head noun would unduly reify this adjectival attribution of a temporary quality (cf. above, §6.6). Meanwhile, David also avoids casting himself as a knowing אִישׁ 'party' to the misdeeds that he is condemning.

As predicted (§5.7.5), אִישׁ carries out a discourse function in self-reference.

6.8.7 A conspicuous presence with nonspecific reference

It appears that the discourse role of signaling the consequential (situation-altering) nature

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[113] Additional situational triangles may be relevant in these self-references, too. In the case at hand, David also references his standing vis-à-vis the king's daughter. And in Gen 13:8, to give another example, Abraham also references a triangle of *conflict/controversy* over grazing land between his shepherds and those of Lot (on the key role of אִישׁ in such situations, see below, §6.9.2).

[114] In the next breath, David pointedly uses the workhorse to label his sister's offspring (see below, §6.9.7).

of a participant (§§4.4.2, 6.4) can apply for making reference even to a type. For example, in Ezek 45:20, while instructing priests on removing certain types of ritual impurity from a future temple, Yahweh mentions the potential for contamination from two sources:[115]

מֵאִישׁ שֹׁגֶה וּמִפֶּ֑תִי וְכִפַּרְתֶּם אֶת־הַבָּיִת:

…from an *'îš* erring-one, or from an ignoramus; so you shall purge the temple.

What is the contribution of אִישׁ here? Note that the syntax (two phrases governed by the prefixed preposition *mīn* 'from') places the expression *'îš šōgeh* in parallel with the noun *petî*, thus treating the first two words as *a single term*. The biblical scholar Benjamin Kedar-Kopfstein considers this expression with אִישׁ to be unusual in two respects. First, he classifies it as a construction that he calls a *junction* ("combination of a qualified noun and a qualifying *qôṭēl* that constitutes one conceptual and syntactic unit"; 1977:170).[116] Second, he classifies it as *epitheton ornans* 'a fancy moniker' because it parallels the simple term *petî*, which he treats as a substitutable synonym (ibid., 171). Kedar-Kopfstein goes on to say that the second term, being a participle, expresses the subject's "action, potential or real"—that is, how the party that is labeled as אִישׁ is related to the world.

On the discourse level, I would add that in order for our noun to become part of "one conceptual and syntactic unit," it would have to relate its referent to the situation, or to some entity within it. Given the speaker's problem-solving frame, the point of using אִישׁ here is presumably forensic: 'participant (in the situation of concern)'. In this case, the participant in question is an undesired, *situation-altering* one: an introducer of impurity into the temple precincts. The situation can be represented as:

▲ = אִישׁ (Consequential participant) + Temple + Contaminating impurity

Once again, as predicted (§5.7.5), a discourse function accounts for the use of אִישׁ.

6.8.8 Resolving an interpretive crux (Exod 2:14)

During the sojourn of Jacob's descendants in Egypt, an anonymous Israelite, in his retort to a naïve Moses, articulates what has become a controversial apposition (Exod 2:14):[117]

מִי שָׂמְךָ֙ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט עָלֵ֔ינוּ

"Who made you an *'îš*—official and judge—over us?"

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[115] This case involves a grammatical borderline construction: an אִישׁ-headed expression with a participle that is unattested in independent use as a substantive. For אִישׁ with other such participles, see, e.g.,: Gen 39:2; 1 Sam 18:23; 1 Sam 21:15; 1 Sam 22:18; Ezek 45:20; 1 Chr 5:18; 1 Chr 27:32; Jer 48:41; 49:42; Ezek 16:32; Prov 30:20; Judg 18:11, 16.

[116] The term *junction* seems to have been coined by the linguist Otto Jespersen ([1924] 2007:87, 108, 114).

[117] According to Tov and Polak (2009), the Septuagint has no direct equivalent for אִישׁ in this passage. Meanwhile, the Samaritan version and 4QExod[b] read slightly differently: מי שמך לאיש שר ולש(ו)פט עלינו 'Who made you into an *'îš śar* and into a judge over us?' (Elliger and Rudolph 1977; cf. Propp 1999:161).

This passage has prompted many interpretations. Some scholars have viewed אִישׁ in this verse as a grammatical word. Ben Yehuda (1908:98) classifies it under the rubric מִי שִׁיש לוֹ אִיכוּת הַשֵּׁם הָאַחֵר 'someone who has the quality expressed by the other [apposed] noun'. Yet this does not explain *why* one would choose to employ a pleonastic locution—rather than using only the appositive. Similarly, Koehler and Baumgartner ([1967] 2001a:43) adduce this verse as an exemplar of how אִישׁ "indicates a position, occupation, public office." However, in context אִישׁ still seems superfluous. Bratsiotis (1974:223) likewise cites this instance as evidence that אִישׁ can "designate an office, profession, and a rank held by men." Meanwhile, he views the apposition *'îš śar* as denoting a 'prince'—which is the same meaning as *śar* would contribute by itself. The contradiction is not explained.

Other scholars see אִישׁ as a role term. In §3.5, I noted that Alan Crown posited a leadership sense for אִישׁ; he then interpreted the above question as: "Who made you a <u>ruler</u>, a prince and a judge over us?" (1974a:111). However, this reading inserts a disjunction after אִישׁ where none appears in the Masoretic text.

And still other scholars prefer a sortal sense, such as Durham: "Who made you, *only a man*, into a prince and a judge over us?" (1987:19; emphasis added). However, this reading seems to ignore the preposition that governs אִישׁ and links it to the verb.

All told, a new analysis of this passage is warranted. A cogent interpretation must explain three aspects: (1) how אִישׁ connects with the verb, (2) why the appositive alone would not suffice, and (3) why אִישׁ needs to be modified by the appositive. Let us review each of these three issues, in turn.

(1) The verb that the speaker employs is a "verb of appointment." Normally it is used to indicate that the referent of its direct object has attained an office or status that is labeled by a prepositional phrase (whose complement is the *effected object*—denoting what has been brought about by the verbal action).[118] In this case, Moses as addressee is the direct object's referent, while our noun is the head term for the effected object. It designates what Moses's changed status would be after the ostensible act of appointment. (The preposition casts אִישׁ as a reference point for the depicted situation; §5.4.6.) However, because this is the only attested case in which our noun is the effected object of this particular verb, the speaker's use of אִישׁ appears to be an exploitation, not a norm.

(2) If the speaker were simply questioning Moses' authority to *adjudicate* the dispute,[119] that could have been stated more succinctly: we know from elsewhere that the noun *śar* by itself readily serves to label the object of a verb of appointment.[120]

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[118] Levinson 2011; Joüon 2006:410. As Waltke and O'Connor state, "verbs of appointment govern as accusatives *person appointed + rank*" (1990:175). Cf. Van der Merwe et al. 2017:353. For the use of *śîm lə-* to indicate appointing someone to an important post, see Gen 45:8; Judg 8:33; Ezek 44:8.

[119] Normally in Israelite culture (the presumed backdrop for the audience), the two disputants themselves decide whether to seek arbitration (Bovati 1994). A determination is not imposed from the outside.

(3) If the speaker were questioning whether the intervener is a legitimate participant at all, then אִישׁ alone ought to suffice—without an appositive. Hence he is not conceiving of the matter as a PART-WHOLE relationship (meronymy). Rather, his utterance takes Moses' involvement as a given—and questions only what *type* of participant Moses is.

Of the discourse functions that have been observed for workhorse nouns, what seems to fit best here is the *cataphoric signal of a consequential (situation-altering) participant in the discourse model* (§§4.4.2, 6.4). If so, then the apposition's two terms could be linked by readily grasped semantic relations—a TYPE-OF relationship (taxonomy).[121] Of the kinds of consequential participants in a conflict situation, one of them is the arbitrator—which is what the appositive *śar wə·šōpēṭ* specifies. The speaker's rhetorical question therefore has two parts, each springing from one of the elements in the apposition. It can be paraphrased as follows.

"Who made you a consequential party (to this conflict) with the authority to settle it for us?"

To sum up: The speaker's collocates a verb of appointment with אִישׁ so as to insist that any *consequential* new participant requires the authorization of those involved. He includes אִישׁ to signal that the power to *alter* the situation is at issue. And the appositive then specifies what kind of role was presupposed by Moses's intervention. Thus we have arrived at a coherent and informative text.

6.9 Informational Level: Prototypical Situations

The compiled theory predicts that אִישׁ is the default label for the parties in prototypical situations, as articulated both by outside observers (e.g., the narrator) and by the parties themselves (§5.7.6). In addition to testing that surmise, this section will also show that it resolves several longstanding interpretive cruxes.

6.9.1 A party to heterosexual activity

In the Bible, one important prototypical situation (or set of situations) is *heterosexual activity*.[122] Onomasiological investigation can test the prediction that masculine אִישׁ is the default label for the male participant. In this domain, in addition to the cohort of human nouns listed in §1.1, I consider also *zākār* 'male' as a synonym.

Descriptions of sexual activity were identified by looking for characteristic verbs. Interpreting inclusively, I found seven verbs that are used to refer to heterosexual activity. They are (listed in alphabetical order): *b-w-'* 'enter', *b-'-l* 'possess', *d-b-q* 'cleave', *y-d-'*

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[120] Compare, with this same verb, 1 Sam 8:12; 18:13; 22:7; 2 Sam 18:1; 2 Chr 33:14.

[121] On the cognitively distinct concepts of meronymy and taxonomy, see Seto 2003.

[122] On construing an activity as *a set of situations*, see §4.2.1. For brevity, I use the singular term *situation*. As the adjective on "activity" acknowledges, the biblical text treats only heterosexuality as normative.

'know', *q-r-b* 'approach', *š-g-l* 'violate', and *š-k-b* 'lie (with)'. Our noun collocates with all seven of these verbs as either its subject (or anaphor thereof) or object,[123] for a total of 26 instances.[124] An instance with each verb follows.[125]

• Deut 22:13 reads:[126]

<div dir="rtl">

כִּי־יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבָא אֵלֶיהָ

</div>

An *'îš* marries a woman and co<u>hab</u>its with her.   {NJPS}

• Deut 24:1 reads (cf. 21:13):

<div dir="rtl">

כִּי־יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ

</div>

An *'îš* takes a wife and <u>possesses</u> her.   {NJPS}

• Gen 2:24 reads:

<div dir="rtl">

עַל־כֵּן יַעֲזָב־אִישׁ אֶת־אָבִיו וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ וְדָבַק בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד:

</div>

Hence an *'îš* leaves his father and mother and <u>clings</u> to his wife,
so that they become one flesh.   {NJPS}

• Num 31:17 reads:[127]

<div dir="rtl">

וְכָל־אִשָּׁה יֹדַעַת אִישׁ לְמִשְׁכַּב זָכָר הֲרֹגוּ:

</div>

and kill off, as well, every woman who has <u>known</u> an *'îš*
through lying down with a male (*zākār*).   (Levine 2000:448)

• Lev 18:6 reads:

<div dir="rtl">

אִישׁ אִישׁ אֶל־כָּל־שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ לֹא תִקְרְבוּ לְגַלּוֹת עֶרְוָה

</div>

Every *'îš* [among you] shall not <u>approach</u> any of his close relatives to uncover nakedness.

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[123] The verb in question often does not actually appear within the same clause as אִישׁ. I have followed the practice of the *Dictionary of Classical Hebrew*: I count it as a collocated subject if our noun is the *anaphor* of the verb's true subject as indicated by verbal inflection (sometimes loosely called "zero anaphora")—either by its having appeared in a prior clause, or by its being preposed to the verb's clause via fronted dislocation (on this term, see below, Chapter 8, note 25), or by the verb's appearance in a relative clause that modifies אִישׁ. In a similarly inclusive spirit, "verb" here includes verbal participles.

[124] One or more of these instances of אִישׁ appears in each of the first six books of the Bible.

[125] The usage of אִישׁ with multiple verbs argues against the possibility that its collocation is merely a matter of the selectional preferences (restrictions) of any one verb.

[126] According to BHQ, this verb in MT is reflected also in the Samaritan and Syriac versions, as well as Targums Onqelos and Pseudo-Jonathan; cf. 11QT[a], Old Greek, Targum Neofiti, and Vulgate, all of which may reflect a conflation with 24:1 (see below).

[127] With this verb, also Gen 19:8; 24:16; Judg 11:39; 19:25; 21:12. In Num 31:17, our noun has no counterpart in the Septuagint (Tov and Polak 2009, ad loc.): "kill every woman, whoever has known a man's bed" (Flint 2014:136). Although the Greek version does make sense, the use of אִישׁ is nonetheless not superfluous, as discussed in this section.

• Deut 28:30 (*kətîb*)[128] reads:

<div dir="rtl">

אִשָּׁה תְאָרֵשׂ וְאִישׁ אַחֵר ישגלנה

</div>

You shall betroth a wife, but another *'îš* shall r<u>avish</u> her.   {ESV}

• Lev 15:33 reads:[129]

<div dir="rtl">

וּלְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב עִם־טְמֵאָה׃

</div>

…concerning an *'îš* who l<u>ies with</u> an impure woman.   {CJPS}

In contrast, in a heterosexual context, not a single one of the synonyms of אִישׁ, when used as a personal noun, is ever the subject of any of the seven verbs adduced above (nor, in the case of *y-d-ʿ*, the direct object).

What accounts for the presence and total dominance of אִישׁ in this arena? One could posit that the reason is phonological: perhaps the text is simply pairing up our noun with its similar-sounding feminine counterpart, אִשָּׁה. However, that match-up is made in only 11 (42%) out of the 25 instances of אִישׁ cited above; in the other 58% of instances, the female party is actually labeled with another term (as in Lev 18:6 and 15:33, above).

Alternatively, one could posit that אִישׁ prevails because the competing terms are unknown to the texts' composers.[130] Yet for every book in which אִישׁ is used in this domain, at least one of the competing terms appears (in other domains); conversely, in every book in which a competing term is used in this domain, אִישׁ appears (in other domains). These overlaps suggest that a competing term is always available—but not deemed suitable.

Whereas two synonyms of אִישׁ are never deployed to depict a man's direct engagement in a heterosexual relationship, they are occasionally used to describe men's behavior with respect to women. It is a significant datum that none of these usages involve *participation* per se.

1. For the label *zākār* 'male', the depicted situations involve the following topics: maintaining a distinction in sexual partners (Lev 18:22; 20:13), exclusion of women (Lev 6:11, 22; 7:6), or a distinction in economic value according to sex (Lev 27:3, 5, 6).[131] The case of Num 31:17, adduced above, is instructive: for a specific set of women,

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[128] The Masoretic text of this verse incorporates a *qərê* (vocalized) and a *kətîb* (unvocalized) textual variant. Each of those readings pairs אִישׁ with a distinct verb. (Both readings are grammatical, and the *qərê* is a euphemistic substitution; Tigay 1996:265.)

[129] With this verb, also Exod 22:15; Lev 15:18, 24; 19:20; 20:11, 12; Deut 22:22 (*bis*), 23, 25 (*bis*), 28, 29; 28:30 (*qərê*).

[130] As noted in §1.3.1, the incidence and dispersion of the synonyms are much more restricted than those of אִישׁ. Here I am, in part, exploring why that is the case.

[131] Similarly, in the summary statement of Lev 15:33a, where participation is *not* at stake (the focus being placed on the given fact of a genital discharge), the gender distinction is drawn in terms of *zākār* 'male' and *nəqēbâ* 'female', rather than in terms of אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה—as in vv. 2, 16, 19, 25, which situate participants.

their having had "experience" with a man (i.e., participation in some activity) is depicted via אִישׁ; and then the sexual nature of that encounter is described separately, via *zākār*.[132]

2. For the label *geber* 'he-man', the depicted situations treat the following topics: a gender distinction (Deut 22:5), exclusion of women (Exod 10:11; 12:37), a perverse and alienated arrangement with them (Jer 31:22), and their objectification (Judg 5:30). Such a stance of detachment toward women is palpable even in the one passage that does seem to allude to a sexual encounter (Prov 30:19):

$$\text{וְדֶרֶךְ גֶּבֶר בְּעַלְמָה:}$$

How a <u>man</u> has his way with a maiden.   (NJPS)

This laconic phrase appears within a passage (vv. 18–20) that expresses a stance of paradox or puzzlement; it is not a neutral picture. The absence of a verb (contra the NJPS rendering) is telling. Michael Fox (2009:870–73) adduces various convincing arguments in favor of interpreting this verse as pointing to the depicted act's "tracelessness." That is to say, this proverb is observing with some amazement that "a man can have sex with an unmarried girl and leave no one the wiser" (ibid., 871). Consequently, *geber* is used here to label the type of man who participates in a sexual encounter yet pointedly *hides or denies* his involvement.

Conclusion.   When the biblical composers wish to express a man's participation in heterosexual activity (26 cases), the sole attested human noun that is deployed as a label is אִישׁ. Conversely, when the topic is a man's behavior with respect to women but participation in some activity with them is *not* involved (14 cases), a synonym is used instead of אִישׁ. Consequently, it appears that our noun's basic semantic contribution is to designate a *participant* in the depicted situation, as predicted.[133]

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[132] I qualify the indicated set of women as "specific" because, in the next verse in that passage, the same idea seems to be applied to a nonspecific group of women—this time without אִישׁ. That synonymous expression in verse 18 reads: אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָדְעוּ מִשְׁכַּב זָכָר 'who have not known lying with a male'.

On the basis of that subsequent verse, it might be supposed that the presence of אִישׁ is not original in verse 17, especially given that the longer expression there is rendered in the Septuagint without an equivalent for the noun אִישׁ (Tov and Polak 2009). Even so, the scribe who then inserted our noun must have had reason to think that it would make a meaningful contribution. In any case, essentially the same pair of expressions is found in Judg 21:11–12, albeit in the opposite order. There, the second reference to a set of women is the more specific one. (And there, the Septuagint rendering does include the word ἄνδρα 'man' as well as ἄρσενος 'male'.)

[133] Likewise on the womanly side, our noun appears to be the default term for a participant in gender (not only sexual) relations. In 4 out of the 5 instances where *zākār* and *geber* are counterposed with a "female" term of some kind, the latter word is not the directly corresponding *nəqēbâ* or *gəberet*—but rather אִשָּׁה. See Lev 18:22; 20:13; Deut 22:5; Prov 30:19. Cf. 1 Sam 21:5 for *naʿar* 'youth, protégé' counterposed with אִשָּׁה.

6.9.2 Conflicts denoted by the verbal root r-y-b

Another prototypical situation is an outright conflict between two parties. Of course the Bible mentions many different kinds of conflict, and a variety of Hebrew terms is used to describe them (e.g., *milḥāmâ* 'war', *'êbâ* 'enmity'). Proceeding methodically, I will begin with conflicts that are designated by a prototypical verb of conflict: either the verb *r-y-b* 'contend, dispute, quarrel' or its derived-noun form *rîb* 'two-party controversy, altercation, uproar.' Because most usages of this verb and noun were featured in Pietro Bovati's well-regarded monograph on juridical conflict (1994),[134] his work will serve as the starting point of my analysis.[135] Like Bovati, I will then proceed to look for more situations whose characteristics match those that are designated with *r-y-b* or *rîb*. However, unlike him I will not restrict the investigation only to juridical situations.

Which noun labels are used to indicate the parties to the various kinds of conflict that this initial verb denotes—and how prevalent is אִישׁ among them? Of particular interest are terms that are directly related to the verb of interest: the derived noun *yārîb* 'adversary', and two participles that are used substantively, *rāb* 'contender' and *mērîb* 'foe.'

Data Selection and Reporting. For this investigation, the corpus was the entire Hebrew Bible. Because I am interested in identifying the default substantive for the labeling of the parties, I include terms that are not governed by the verb under study, in the same clause; they can appear in a restatement of the situation. A good example of restatement is a parallel poetic line (Ps 43:1):

שָׁפְטֵנִי אֱלֹהִים ׀ וְרִיבָה רִיבִי מִגּוֹי לֹא־חָסִיד מֵאִישׁ־מִרְמָה וְעַוְלָה תְפַלְּטֵנִי׃

Vindicate me, God; / <u>defend</u> (*rîbâ*) <u>my case</u> (*rîb*) against a faithless [group of] people; / rescue me from the <u>treacherous, dishonest *'îš*</u>.

In this verse, אִישׁ appears in a clause governed by the verb *pallēṭ* 'cause to escape'; that clause alludes to the same situation that in the previous clause is designated by the noun *rîb*. Hence I (like Bovati 1994:279) construe אִישׁ as a label for a party to the depicted con-

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[134] Bovati defines the *rîb* as "a controversy that takes place between two parties on questions of law" (1994:30). He explains that "the individuals in question must have had a previous juridical bond between them … [namely] a body of norms that regulates the rights and duties of each" (ibid.). A *rîb* would commence with one party's accusation against the other, with a claim of injury; ideally it would conclude with reconciliation: "if the *rîb* achieves its effect the two parties can, in truth and justice, renew their relationship" (ibid., 31). Finally, it was an enduring social institution: "The two-party controversy retained its validity throughout the history of Israel" (ibid., 33).

[135] Bovati likewise describes his analysis of this root as "a convenient point of departure for a study of juridical conflict" (1994:37, n1). His overall methodology was a masterful application of structuralist linguistics. Ellen van Wolde has meanwhile used his work as the starting point of her cognitive-linguistics-informed study of juridical considerations, noting that "because of its great detail and its explicative power, Bovati's study became standard" (2014:199).

flict. In this way, I avoid being constrained by the selectional preferences of the particular verb *r-y-b*, which might otherwise skew the results.

I exclude as uninformative two types of conflictual instances: parties who are both identified via proper nouns; and poetic exploitations of normal usage.[136] Likewise, because my interest is in the labeling of individual parties, I do not tally the occasional collective term such as *'am* 'people, collectivity'.

Results.   Applying the above criteria, I compiled a data set of 44 cases (for a complete list, see Addendum D).[137] They are widely distributed across the corpus, being found in 14 out of the classic 24 biblical books.[138] Altogether, this verbal root is collocated with 25 different labels as heads of referring expressions for the parties to a conflict.[139] They include juridical, adversarial, kinship, social status, and office/title/vocation terms, as well as others. One other general human noun, *'ādām*, is attested (Prov 3:30; Lam 3:36). Because many of those labels are used coreferentially, or for different parties within the same conflict, the total number of labels exceeds the number of cases. Not counting proper nouns (as occasionally used for one of the parties) or negative epithets (which expressively replace the default labels), their incidence is as shown in Table 6.5.

As that table shows, out of the 64 instances in which a party to conflict (that is expressed using the root *r-y-b* or the noun *rîb*) is labeled, אִישׁ was used as a label 23 times, or in more than 1 out of 3 instances. The next most common label, *'ōyēb/'ōyavt*, occurs about one-fifth as often. The distribution of אִישׁ is widespread: out of the 44 qualifying cases of conflict, it was used to label a party in 21 of them, or nearly half of the cases.[140]

No other label—whether general or domain-specific—comes close to matching the dominance of אִישׁ. Noteworthy is the rarity of terms that would have seemed like good candidates for the default label. These are the juridical or adversarial terms—particularly the ones that derive from the root *r-y-b* itself.

In striking contrast, אִישׁ appears in collocations that pointedly relate it to conflict situations. Note well the construct term *'îš rîb* 'participant in a two-party controversy'.[141]

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[136] Exploitations include: an imagined lawsuit between Northern Israelites as individual citizens and their (personified) nation as a whole (Hos 2:4); and those in which one of the parties to the conflict is a *deity*. (When *both* parties are deities, then we are dealing with an extended metaphor that presumably is modeled after the equivalent conflict between human beings.)

[137] A similar yet more pronoun-like usage in Hos 4:4 is cited in §8.2.

[138] Among the narrative books, Joshua and Kings stand out as having no instances of this type.

[139] The frequency distribution of these labels is roughly Zipfian; see above, note 33.

[140] Similarly, our noun אִישׁ is used in this manner in 12 of the 15 classical biblical books in which qualifying instances appear.

[141] Or: 'legal adversary' (Limburg 1969:298). Bovati rightly calls this expression "the terminology of the controversy" (1994:278).

Table 6.5   Labels for a Party to a Conflict Designated in Terms of *r-y-b* or *rîb*

אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	*Tally*	*Alternatives*	*Tally*
’îš/’ănāšîm*	7	GENERIC HUMAN	
’ănāšîm = both parties	6	*’ādām* 'earthling'	2
’îš rîb	4	DERIVED FROM VERB	
’îš ’ăšer-yihyeh-lô-rîb	2	*yārîb* 'opponent'	3
’îš mādôn/midyānîm	2	*mērîb* 'adversary'	1
Labels occurring once	2	OTHER LABELS	
		’ōyēb/’ōyavt 'enemy'	5
		rō‘eh 'shepherd'	4
		rē‘a 'friend'	3
		’āḥ 'brother'	2
		’almānâ 'widow'	2
		ḥōr 'noble'	2
		segen 'official'	2
		Labels occurring once	15
SUBTOTAL אִישׁ	23	SUBTOTAL NON-אִישׁ	41

TOTAL 64

* One party is designated as אִישׁ or אֲנָשִׁים; the other party is labeled by name, unspecified, or as an 'enemy'.

Hence I endorse Bovati's conclusion that the expression in Deut 19:17—*šənê hā’ănāšîm ’ăšer-lāhem hārîb* 'the two <u>parties</u> to the dispute' (NJPS)—is "typical and almost definitive" (1994:37). We have reason to replace his "almost" with "even."

Another finding is that aside from אִישׁ, all of the other terms are relational nouns (or relational substantives), except for *’ādām*.

These findings provide a consistent initial validation for the prediction in §5.7.6.

6.9.3 Additional juridical usages

Going beyond the aforementioned verb and its derived noun, I expanded further within the semantic domain of conflict.[142] One simple extention of the previous section's topic occurs when the parties behave as in a *rîb* (closely paralleling one) but the altercation is not explicitly designated as such. Our noun likewise plays a role in those cases.[143]

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[142] The invocation of elements sometimes overlaps; thus some of the citations are repeated.

[143] Judg 12:1 and 1 Sam 26:23 (Bovati 1994:36). Bovati notes that "an analysis of juridical controversies cannot be limited to cases in which the 'technical terminology' appears" (1994:36). From the perspective of frame semantics, the mention of one or two distinctive frame elements suffices to evoke in the audience's mind an entire frame (sometimes called a Gestalt), together with all of its other elements. I applied that cognitive principle to conflict-based frames, which are built upon the participant triangle.

Significantly, an official who is pronouncing judgment will use אִישׁ conspicuously to label the parties involved, while proceeding to re-situate them in the audience's discourse model (see above, §6.6; below, §§6.9.7 [discussion]; 7.3).[144] For example, just prior to a summary execution, King David frames the situation for those present (2 Sam 4:11):[145]

אֲנָשִׁים רְשָׁעִים הָרְגוּ אֶת־אִישׁ־צַדִּיק בְּבֵיתוֹ

[Two] guilty parties have killed an innocent party in his own home.…

Here the king has no need to use אִישׁ as a label, apart from its situation-defining function.

In similar onomasiological investigations in the juridical realm, I looked for the labels used in four prototypical situations: (*A*) when Yahweh is depicted as passing judgment in a forensic manner; (*B*) disputes between citizens are appealed to an authority (e.g., king) for resolution; (*C*) court proceedings are described;[146] and (*D*) one's allies (in facing conflict) are mentioned.[147] In all of these juridical categories, אִישׁ appears to be the default label for the parties involved (see Addendum E; see also below, §6.9.7).

I also conducted collocation-oriented searches for the labels used with (*E*) the juridical verb Hiphil *y-k-ḥ* 'arbitrate';[148] and (*F*) the juridical verb Qal *š-p-ṭ* 'pass judgment; provide justice', along with the derived noun *mišpaṭ* 'judgment'.[149] Here, too, אִישׁ predominates among potentially general individual terms (see Addendum E).

Juridical usage also links אִישׁ with witness-related concerns or terms. Bovati makes a convincing case that our noun can refer to a plaintiff ("prosecution witness")—otherwise known by the more specific term *ʿēd* 'witness' (e.g., Deut 19:16–17). [150] As he observes, "the term *ʾîš* … is to the point juridically … when it is construed with terms characteristic

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[144] 1 Sam 14:28; 21:15; 2 Sam 3:39; 4:11; 12:5; 21:4–5; 23:16–17; 1 Kgs 2:32; 2 Kgs 10:24.

[145] The referring expressions are undetermined because in this context, the deixis is unique.

[146] According to John Barton (1992:2:840), "the OT provides only one clear account of proceedings in court, in 1 Kgs 21 (the trial of Naboth)." There, in the complex apposition שְׁנַיִם אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל 'two parties [who are] scoundrels', the head term (אֲנָשִׁים) prompts the situating of its referents as defining parties to the controversy, while the third term (בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל) characterizes them as qualified for that despicable job.

[147] See below, §6.9.4. Addendum E shows only a sample of the assorted other labels associated with this role, none of which rise to the level of a default.

[148] I did not count instances of the verb's alternative sense as 'rebuke'. See also below, Table 6.6; cf. Hos 4:4. In 1 Chr 16:21, the governing preposition argues against the standard construal of אִישׁ as an indefinite pronoun (e.g., NJPS, NRSV, ESV; Braun 1986:183; Japhet 1993:309; Knoppers 2004:634). Rather, the KJV rendering as "no man" (so also Keil and Delitzsch, ad loc.) actually comes closer to the mark. Although some late-medieval manuscripts lack the preposition (Elliger and Rudolph 1977:1490), those manuscripts are unreliable (Breuer 1976), and the text-critical guideline of *lectio difficilior praeferenda* applies.

[149] Addendum E shows only a sample of the assorted other labels associated with this verb or noun, none of which rise to the level of a default. I did not count instances of this noun with other senses.

[150] This usage is evinced in three ways: by co-references (Deut 19:16–18); by actions attributed to parties with that designation (as in 1 Kgs 21:10–13); and by antithetical parallelism (Prov 21:28).

of the value of legal testimony (*šeqer*, *kāzāb*, *ḥāmās*, etc.)" (1994:278; cf. 322).[151]

Taken together, these findings strongly reinforce the initial impression (from *r-y-b/rîb* collocations) that throughout the Bible, אִישׁ is overwhelmingly preferred as the label for *participants in juridical situations*. This conclusion is further supported by a large set of juridical expressions, as described in the next section.

6.9.4 Juridical expressions that feature our noun

The biblical text repeatedly opts to refer to the parties in conflict situations *in terms of* אִישׁ. As already shown (Table 6.5), אִישׁ appears in numerous collocations that pointedly link it to such situations; see also Table 6.6. Two exemplars follow (Prov 29:9; Ps 41:10).

Table 6.6   Selected Juridical-Frame Expressions with אִישׁ

Expression	Gloss	Locale
'îš 'awen	'villainous party'	Prov 6:12–14
'îš bəliya'al	'worthless party'	Prov 16:27
'îš damîm	'bloodthirsty party'	2 Sam 16:8; Pss 5:7 (cf. Prov 12:17; 14:25); 55:24; 59:3; 139:19
'îš ḥamas/ḥamasîm	'violent party'	2 Sam 22:49 // Ps 18:49;[152] Ps 140:2, 5, 12; Prov 16:29
'îš ḥermî	'party judged as subject to destruction'	1 Kgs 20:42
'îš lašôn	'slandering party'	Ps 140:12
'îš madôn/midyanîm	'antagonistic party'	2 Sam 21:20 (see also Add. D)
'îš môkîaḥ	'plaintiff'[153]	Ezek 3:26
'îš tahpukôt	'perverse party'	Prov 16:27–29
'îš tōkaḥôt	'chastised party'	Prov 29:1
'ănāšîm ṣaddîkim	'innocent [previously uninvolved[154]] parties'	Ezek 23:45
'anšê bərîtekā	'your treaty partners'	Obad 1:7[155]
'anšê šəlōmekā	'your allies'	Jer 38:22; Obad 1:7
mišpaṭ 'îš	'the case brought by the party mentioned'[156]	Prov 29:26

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[151] Tellingly, in Gen 31:50, Laban uses שָׂא with this nuance, according to Menaḥem ben Solomon (author of *Sekhel Tov* in 1139) and David Kimḥi (circa 1200), ad loc.: "another party as an abiding witness who would be present to attest to this agreement and intervene so as to hold Jacob accountable" (which indeed yields a more informative and coherent reading of Laban's utterance than construing אִישׁ vaguely as 'anyone'). For additional examples of witness-related usage, see, e.g., Ps 140:2, 5, 12; see below, Table 6.6.

[152] On *'îš ḥamas* in this psalm, see Gray 2014:183–85; on this psalm's juridical motif, see ibid., 199–201.

[153] Per Bovati 1994:48. Alternatively, this term refers to a defined social role, which apparently involves publicly accusing another party of wrongdoing (cf. Amos 5:10). That is, the term אִישׁ points to a prototypical situation: a confrontation between two parties over alleged misbehavior. Either construal explains our noun's otherwise superfluous presence in this verse.

[154] The expression is dislocated so as to set up contrastive focus with the אֲנָשִׁים 'participants' in Ezek 23:40, 42; it refers to those who will soon be punishing the guilty parties; cf. 2 Kgs 10:9).

[155] See also Ben Sira 6:6. Cf. Jer 20:10 with *'ĕnôš* 'human being' rather than אִישׁ.

$$\text{אִישׁ־חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת־אִישׁ אֱוִיל}$$

When a <u>wise</u> *'îš* enters into litigation with a <u>foolish</u> *'îš* … {NJPS}

$$\text{אִישׁ שְׁלוֹמִי | אֲשֶׁר־בָּטַחְתִּי בוֹ}$$

My <u>ally</u> [*'îš šālôm*] in whom I trusted… (NJPS)

6.9.5 Violent conflict

Further expanding the scope of what is meant by "conflict," I investigated collocations with verbs that denote violence. The subjects or objects of such verbs necessarily refer to the parties to the conflict. Again, compared with other general human nouns, אִישׁ has no peer as the preferred label for such parties. The usages of אִישׁ with the following two verbs include not only narratives about warfare but also the genre of casuistic law.

(1) The verb *h-r-g* denotes killing. Based on the entry for this verb in *DCH* (Clines 1995b:589–90), אִישׁ is the predominant collocated object; and it is tied with *'āḥ* 'brother' for the title of most common subject.[157] The instances include 2 Sam 4:11 (quoted above, §6.9.3).

(2) The verb *n-k-h* denotes hitting or striking (and by metonymy, also killing). Based on the entry for this verb in *DCH* (Clines 2001a:686–87), אִישׁ is the dominant subject; and it is tied with *melek* 'king' as the predominant object.[158] Diagnostic instances include 1 Sam 17:27 and 1 Kgs 20:20:

$$\text{כֹּה יֵעָשֶׂה לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַכֶּנּוּ:}$$

Such-and-such will be done [as a reward] for the <u>party</u> who strikes him down.

$$\text{וַיַּכּוּ אִישׁ אִישׁוֹ}$$

Each <u>party</u> struck down his <u>opponent</u>.…

6.9.6 War and other military situations

Among the many biblical designations for participants within the context of warfare, אִישׁ figures prominently. So I tallied its prominence in that semantic domain in the Bible.[159] After searching systematically for various synonyms (in Hebrew and in translation), and after recording 290 instances of a labeled referent within the domain of war, I found that

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[156] Bovati 1994:208–9.

[157] With respect to object labels, I have subtracted out the instances of *bēn* that are used to identify a named party via his patronymic.

[158] I have not tallied the dozens of battle situations that are depicted with both אִישׁ and this verb. For other cases, see Gen 19:11; Exod 2:11, 12, 13; 21:12; 21:18 (also *rîb*); Exod 21:20, 26; Lev 24:17; Num 25:14; Deut 19:11; 25:11; Judg 6:16; 15:15, 16; 1 Sam 17:25b, 26 (2nd); 2 Sam 8:10 // 1 Chr 18:10; 23:21; 1 Kgs 20:35, 37; 22:34 // 2 Chr 18:33; 2 Kgs 3:23; Isa 66:3; Jer 41:9; Neh 13:25 (also *rîb*); 1 Chr 11:23.

[159] This section revises what I reported in an unpublished paper (Stein 2015).

אִישׁ is the most frequent label (94 instances), followed by *gibbôr* 'mighty one' (92 instances), and *'ebed* 'servant' (45 instances).[160] As predicted, אִישׁ appears to be the default label for a participant in warfare.

Supporting this conclusion are associated construct expressions such as *'îš milḥāmâ* 'warrior',[161] and especially its variants with plurals or possessive pronouns or prepositions, e.g., *'anšê milḥamtekā* 'your war-adversaries' (Isa 41:12).[162] Whereas these expressions are not easily derived from the meaning 'human being' or 'adult male' for אִישׁ, they readily flow from the meaning 'party to a prototypical situation'. Thus *'îš milḥāmâ* is most readily construed as 'a (regular) party to warfare'.[163] Because war is a prototypical situation, its participants are most naturally designated in terms of their participation.

6.9.7 אִישׁ *in reported speech in juridical situations*

In *deictic* settings, a speaker points via speech to one of the parties; the referent's presence in the situation is a given. Through such utterances, speakers seek the *re-situating* of the referent in their audience's discourse model. Juridical situations are a type of prototypical situation: a problem involving two opposing parties needs a resolution. Hence in the juridical cases among the deictic usages, it is predicted that biblical characters would be depicted as using אִישׁ as the default head of their referring expression.[164]

My reason for focusing on a deictic frame is threefold: (1) *Identifiability*. Even if the labeled party is new to the discourse, that referent is already readily identifiable to the addressee because that party is present on the scene.[165] Intrinsic attributes such as gender are self-evident. (2) *Implied contrast*. As the relevance theorist Kate Scott has noted, the use of a complex demonstrative form (deictic plus noun label) signals an intended contrast with "another entity of the same type" (2011:200). Thus it serves to instantiate the

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[160] The latter term profiles its referent in terms of subordination to a commander. I tallied ten other labels with much lower frequency counts. I did not tally three terms with relatively low incidence: *śar* 'captain, chief', *nōśē' kēlîm* 'armsbearer', and *nōśē' māgēn* 'shieldbearer'. Nor did I count collective terms.

[161] Exod 15:3; Josh 17:1; Judg 20:17; 1 Sam 16:18; 17:33; 2 Sam 17:8; Isa 3:2; Ezek 39:20.

[162] Also Josh 5:4, 6; 2 Sam 8:10; Isa 42:13; 1 Chr 18:10, 28:3; Jer 6:23 // 50:42; 48:14; 50:30; Ezek 27:10.

[163] Some lexicographers construe the nuance of אִישׁ here to be one of expertise. Among the earliest such entries, al-Fāsī (Skoss 1945) includes this expression under the (Judeo-Arabic) rubric ופי אלבלק 'with regard to attributes'; Ibn Janaḥ (transl. Ibn Tibbon 1893) and Kimḥi (1847) gloss it as בעל מלחמה 'master of war'. However, it seems to me that the most basic sense of the head noun as *participant* suits the contexts adequately, without prompting an extended meaning. Furthermore, the Bible has other terms that seem to denote expertise in warfare, such as *gibbôr ḥayil*, which makes it less likely that *'îš milḥāmâ* would also fill this slot in the semantic domain.

[164] This section elaborates upon a test that I first reported in an unpublished paper (Stein 2015).

[165] In some cases, a speaker employs proximal deixis even when the referent is not visibly present, but rather is conceived of as present in the situation—and thus still readily identifiable to the audience (e.g., Gen 19:8; 34:21; 1 Sam 25:25; 2 Kgs 9:11; Jer 38:9).

audience's perception of a prototypical situation—which suggests a discourse function for our noun. (3) *Conventionality*. Such situations are fairly easy to picture, so that I can ascertain with confidence the speaker's communicative goal. That, in turn, enables me to judge whether or not the label's usage is expressive (i.e., evaluative—pointedly expressing an emotional stance toward the referent). An example of normal usage appears in the context of a judicial hearing (Deut 22:16):

$$\text{אֶת־בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה}$$
"My daughter I gave to <u>this *'îš*</u> as wife...."   {Alter}

A contrasting example of expressive usage appears in the question posed to Jehu by his fellow military officers (2 Kgs 9:11):

$$\text{מַדּוּעַ בָּא־הַמְשֻׁגָּע הַזֶּה אֵלֶיךָ}$$
"Why did <u>this mad fellow</u> come to you?"   (ESV)

As these examples show, on occasion, speakers verbally point to another party to a situation—and they do so by using a singular or plural substantive, together with one of the proximal demonstrative pronouns. My interest is in the speaker's choice of substantive.

Method.   I searched for substantives (nouns, as well as adjectives and participles that are used substantively) that are followed by one of the proximal deictic terms.

To assess the usage of אִישׁ in as wide a context as possible (looking for possible limits to its application, such as a verb's selectional preferences), I defined the term *juridical* broadly—for want of a more precise English term. I wanted to find all cases in which *the speaker mentions another party while trying to influence the addressee's decision or action*. Therefore in this category I included not only strictly judicial cases but also instances of petitionary prayer or blessing, on the grounds that the worshippers understand themselves to be appealing to the Supreme Judge for a particular outcome.[166] I also included proceedings without a formal judge, as long as they required explicit agreement (ratification) either by a particular individual[167] or a certain group[168]—e.g., legal-status or treaty arrangements.

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[166] 1 Sam 2:20; 1 Kgs 17:21; Neh 1:11 (on which see below, §6.9.9). The assumption that the prayer context would evoke a juridical frame would explain the townspeople's labeling Ruth as אִשָּׁה in Ruth 4:11, versus a different label for her in the next verse. Cf. below, note 169.

[167] Gen 24:58, 65. I am construing Rebekah's question in v. 65 within a legal context, as an expression of concern to complete the marriage's contractual arrangements. She seems to be asking not out of idle curiosity but rather in order to be able to present herself properly to her groom. The narrator evinces that interest on her part nonverbally, by describing her dismount (v. 64) and her veiling herself (v. 65). Nahum Sarna's conclusion regarding the latter act is salient: "The veiling of the bride was part of the marriage ceremony.... Rebekah's veiling herself has both symbolic and socio-legal significance. It is an unspoken signal to Isaac that she is his bride" (1989:162).

Results. In the Hebrew Bible, I identified 68 instances of proximal deixis following a substantive. They appear in 14 out of the 24 biblical books. Constructions with אִישׁ appear in 12 of those books (Genesis, Numbers, Deuteronomy; every book in the Prophets section; and Ezra-Nehemiah and Chronicles). These results show a remarkable uniformity of usage across the speech of characters as depicted by a wide range of authors and genres. All told, 16 different substantives were employed. (See Addendum F for the full tally.) Table 6.7 summarizes the relative incidences.

As the table shows, the usage of the term אִישׁ (and אִשָּׁה) accounted for 38 instances—more than half of the total. The next-most-common label is "Philistine," with only 7 instances; it is obviously not a generalizable designation. Notably, none of the labels aside from אִישׁ is a general human noun.

The latter finding underscores that אִישׁ is indeed the default label overall.

Table 6.7   Substantives Used in Proximal Deixis in Reported Speech

Label	Tally	
אִישׁ		
Masculine	32	
Feminine	6	
SUBTOTAL אִישׁ		38
pəlištî 'Philistine'	7	
na'ar/na'ărâ 'protégé(e)'	4	
šûnammît 'Shunammite'	3	
yeled/yaldâ 'child'	3	
'ārēl 'uncircumcised'	2	
Labels occurring once	11	
SUBTOTAL NON-אִישׁ		30
TOTAL		68

Of the total number of instances of spoken proximal deixis following a substantive, I judged that 12 (less than 20%) employed expressive labels; the other 56 (more than 80%) did not. The label אִישׁ thus comprised 2/3 of the non-expressive instances.

Furthermore, Rebekah's use of אִישׁ was arguably a meaningful choice, since other Hebrew speakers use merely a demonstrative pronoun in order to point out a visible, approaching referent (Isa 63:1; Song 3:6). However, in those cases perhaps the noun was considered normal and thus could go without saying, being elided within the poetic genre.

[168] In Gen 34:21, the leader of the citizens of Shechem presents them with a treaty that he has negotiated on their purported behalf. In Gen 19:8; Judg 19:23, 24, the respective speakers are attempting to avoid an unruly mob's proposed assault via a counterproposal.

Given my definition of the juridical frame, all 38 occurrences of אִישׁ occurred within one. Conversely, in all but one of the 39 total juridical situations in which proximal deixis was used, the label employed was אִישׁ.[169]

Discussion. Bovati, in his more restricted investigation, had found the dominant presence of אִישׁ to be impossible to ignore, even though he had expected specific technical terms to suit the juridical setting. Even without an awareness of a workhorse noun and its powers, he had to conclude that the use of אִישׁ as a label for the various parties was quite intentional and effective in the juridical domain (1994:389):

> The function of expressing juridical concepts is not limited to one vocabulary,
> considered technical, but is also filled out by a 'generic' terminology,[170] which
> in certain contexts and particular syntagms has a meaning quite like the former.

In other words, אִישׁ functions as if it were technical—as the default term for making certain kinds of references. My hypothesis explains Bovati's conclusion, as follows: because אִישׁ in use prompts the mind to think in terms of *participants*, it is ideally suited for labeling the *parties* in a juridical (i.e., prototypical) situation.

Furthermore, my own findings confirm Bovati's conclusion. For example, the most typical and telling context for employing the label אִישׁ is the lawsuit: when biblical disputants state their claim before the judges, they consistently refer to each other not by name—nor by whatever term comes to mind, nor by a pronoun—but rather as "this אִישׁ (or אִשָּׁה)." In particular, אִישׁ is the preferred term even when its referent is an individual *whose name is known to the speaker*.[171] It is also the preferred term even when the referent is not new to the discourse.[172]

It might be posited that the biblical text presupposes a sociolinguistic norm: אִישׁ was understood to be a neutral and appropriate label for deliberative situations. Two considerations argue against that view. First, this label is used even when the referents are being denounced for misbehavior (e.g., Jer 26:11, 16; 22:28, 30) or have been famously dis-

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[169] Ruth 4:12 is the exception, but just barely. The speakers are the townspeople, who, in attesting to Boaz's declaration of engagement to Ruth, proceed to bless the couple. In the previous verse, they refer to her with the default head noun (above, note 166) as *hā'iššâ habbā'â 'el-bêtekā* 'the (womanly) participant who is entering your household'; now in this verse they refer to her again, but this time as *hanna'ărâ hazzō't* 'this young woman; protégée'. According to the cognitive linguist and discourse analyst Pamela Downing (1980), such a shift to a more specific label implies a contrast of some kind. In this case, it seems to express a renewed promise of progeny, given that Boaz himself is not so young (cf. his own remark in 3:10).

[170] Here Bovati has mind not only אִישׁ but also *'ādām* 'earthling' (cf. ibid., 278), although the latter is used perhaps only a tenth as often as אִישׁ in the juridical contexts that he considered.

[171] Gen 24:58; Deut 22:14, 16; 1 Sam 25:25; 29:4; 2 Sam 21:5; 2 Kgs 22:15 // 2 Chr 34:23; Jer 26:11, 16; 38:4 (twice); Est 7:6; Neh 1:11; cf. 2 Kgs 6:19, where Elisha exploits this convention. Cf. royal pronouncements, above, §6.9.3 at note 144.

[172] Num 16:30; Jer 22:28, 30; Ezek 14:16, 18.

loyal (Deut 1:35). And second, the idea of a special register for speech presumes a marked usage; but the workhorse noun's usage is actually unmarked. As posited in Chapter 5 and confirmed in this chapter, אִישׁ is constitutive of the juridical situation in its audience's discourse model; its most basic task is to individuate a participant. In those cases, its contextual sense instantiates participation: 'a party (to the proceedings)'. Speakers use this term because it is efficient.

A telling phenomenon is where even the *judging* figure pointedly employs the locution under study. Again, he knows the parties' names—yet does not use them. The workhorse noun shows that the speaker is attempting a re-situation of the referent in his audience's discourse model. Three examples follow.

(1) When King Abimelech publicly refers to Isaac as "this *ʾîš*" (Gen 26:11), his label fits his utterance's purpose: depicting a prototypical situation with a juridical frame.

הַנֹּגֵעַ בָּאִישׁ הַזֶּה וּבְאִשְׁתּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת׃

"Anyone who molests <u>this *ʾîš*</u> or his wife shall be put to death."   {NJPS}

The king is announcing a capital penalty. He invokes this label for one of the parties—in the potential victim—as a point of reference. This explains why the king does not refer to his referent either by name or by some other noun label.

(2) When King David publicly and disapprovingly refers to the brothers Joab and Abishai initially as "these *ʾănāšîm*" (2 Sam 3:39; discussed above, §6.8.6), it is at first glance a superfluous designation. For it is followed by a non-restrictive appositive that clearly identifies them by their family affiliation:

וְהָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּנֵי צְרוּיָה קָשִׁים מִמֶּנִּי

…<u>these *ʾănāšîm*</u>—the sons of Zeruiah—are more tough than I am…

Again, the frame is juridical; the king is passing judgment upon his stated referents (although he defers punishment, for the time being). That frame is what evokes this label—in this case, for the perpetrators of a blood feud. This explains why the king uses this expression even while he also refers to his referents by family name.

(3) In Jer 38:16, the king, while swearing an oath to Jeremiah, refers to a group of his courtiers (named by the narrator in v. 1) as follows:

אִם־אֲמִיתֶ֔ךָ וְאִם־אֶתֶּנְךָ֗ בְּיַד֙ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר מְבַקְשִׁים אֶת־נַפְשֶֽׁךָ׃

"I will not put you to death or hand you over to <u>these parties</u> who seek your life."

Why doesn't he label them by name (cf. 38:1–5)? Or with the head noun *śārîm* 'officials,' as the narrator did in verse 4? Or replace the whole expression with the synonym *ʾōyəbêkā* 'your enemies'?[173] The answer seems to be that the king is focusing on the *situ-*

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[173] The term *ʾōyēb* 'enemy' appears frequently in Jeremiah as an apposed synonym of "one who seeks another's life" (e.g., Jer 19:9; 21:7; 34:20–21; 44:30; cf. 2 Sam 4:8). Alternatively, these verses in Jeremiah

ation—which is conflictual and potentially deadly.[174] He references it in the usual way, by specifying the other two corners of the relational triangle. No standard juridical terminology exists apart from the language's normal use of אִישׁ to manage discourse.

As for the numerous other labels besides אִישׁ, they are employed in nonjuridical situations that are likewise procedurally oriented. Such labels express the salience of a *specific property* of the referent with respect to the procedure in question—as in the next two examples, Gen 21:10 (spoken by Sarah) and 1 Sam 29:3 (spoken by Philistine officers):[175]

$$\text{גָּרֵשׁ הָאָמָה הַזֹּאת וְאֶת־בְּנָהּ}$$
"Cast out <u>this slave woman</u> with her son.…"   (ESV)

$$\text{מָה הָעִבְרִים הָאֵלֶּה}$$
"Who are <u>these Hebrews</u>?"   (Alter 1999:180)

Often such labels seem to have been selected in order to influence the audience to take a desired course of action. Indeed, all 11 instances of expressive labels occur in procedural negotiations, outside of juridical settings.

6.9.8 Discussion and summary of אִישׁ in prototypical situations

As predicted, our noun אִישׁ is the default designation for referencing the various parties to *any social situation that involves at least two people with distinct (and potentially conflicting) interests*. Of all the general human nouns, this is the only term that is employed consistently in such situations—not only by the narrators but also by the characters. It is preferred over pronouns. It is also preferred over more domain-specific terms. It is even preferred over names—and regardless of attitude toward the referent.

The thoroughgoing extent of such usage can be illustrated by two examples from Exodus: one in its narrative, and one in the Covenant Code. The first case appears at the climax of a clause that implies that Moses (a fugitive from Egypt, newly arrived in Midian) has been invited to dwell in the household of Reuel, priest of Midian (2:21):

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meanwhile employ the participle of *b-q-š* as a substantive; one might therefore think that the participle alone would suffice for the king's utterance in 38:16. However, those references are different in that they are *nonspecific*. Once again, it appears that in order to signal a *specific* reference (as the king is doing), an individuating noun like אִישׁ is the norm.

[174] Cf. similar formulations in Exod 4:19; Jer 11:21.

[175] Perhaps when the labels *yeled* 'child' (Exod 2:9; 1 Kgs 17:21) and *na'ar* 'youth, protégé' (1 Sam 1:27) are used instead of אִישׁ in the deictic situations under study, it is because the latter term is restricted to adulthood. However, that explanation works less well for Boaz's use of the feminine form, *na'ărâ*, to refer to Ruth, who is a grown woman by the time that he spots her (Ruth 2:5); and it cannot explain the usages in Zech 2:8 (given the co-reference with אִישׁ in v. 5) or in Ruth 4:12 (given the co-reference with אִשָּׁה in v. 11). As for Shechem calling Dinah *yaldâ* 'girl' (Gen 34:4), that appears to be expressive usage or code-switching, since *na'ărâ* would have been a more obvious choice of label.

<div dir="rtl">

וַיּ֣וֹאֶל מֹשֶׁ֔ה לָשֶׁ֖בֶת אֶת־הָאִ֑ישׁ
</div>

Moses consented to stay with the *'îš*… (NJPS)

What warrant exists for the changed label—from "Reuel" to "the *'îš*"? According to the prevailing discourse analysis, it should indicate a recharacterization—a shift in the labeled participant's role (§4.4.3; 6.2.2). However, it might be better understood as a prompt to the audience's discourse model to re-situate *Moses*. For why not simply use a pronominal suffix instead of "the *'îš*"? This seems to be a *reference-point usage* of אִישׁ that enables the narrator to develop the situation under discussion (§§5.4.6, 6.7). That is, as the head of the household, Reuel is iconically depicted as a stable point in the relational triangle between himself, Moses, and the latter's surprising new domicile. The label אִישׁ evokes that whole triangle—which is a prototypical situation.

Meanwhile, labeling Reuel as "the אִישׁ" is meaningful also on the informational level: he is profiled as a key *participant* in the newly arranged situation. (The fact that both parties are adult males is not at issue.) He is nonetheless efficiently and unambiguously identified in the simplest of terms, as 'the [salient] [other] party (to the arrangement)'.[176]

The second case comes at the end of the protasis of a casuistic law (Exod 22:7):

<div dir="rtl">

כִּֽי־יִתֵּן֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ כֶּ֤סֶף אֽוֹ־כֵלִים֙ לִשְׁמֹ֔ר וְגֻנַּ֖ב מִבֵּ֣ית הָאִ֑ישׁ
</div>

When someone delivers to a neighbor money or goods for safekeeping,
and they are stolen from the neighbor's house… (NRSV)

In this verse, our noun appears twice. In the second clause, it occurs as a changed label—from *rēʿa* 'a neighbor' to 'the אִישׁ'. (The NRSV's rendering obscures that shift in Hebrew label.) What warrant exists for the changed label—especially given that the same label has already been used to designate the first party? Again, it can be explained as a prompt to the audience's discourse model to treat that second party as a point of reference for construing the altered situation. Thus that party is efficiently profiled *in terms of the situation*, as 'the (salient) party to the situation'.[177]

In conclusion, on the informational level of meaning in conflictual, juridical (defined extremely broadly), and presumably all other prototypical settings, אִישׁ designates its referent as a consequential participant: *a party whose presence defines the situation*.[178]

6.9.9 Resolving an interpretive crux (Neh 1:11)

Many scholars have found it odd that Nehemiah, in praying for a desired outcome, refers to his master (the emperor!) as *hā'îš hazzeh*—construed as 'this man' (Neh 1:11).[179]

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[176] Similarly, Judg 17:11; so too in Josh 2, which depicts a prototypical situation; and not only are Israel's spies labeled "the *'ănāšîm*" (vv. 2–5, 9, 14, 17, 23) but also the agents sent by the king of Jericho to apprehend them—at a dramatic juncture in the storyline (v. 7).

[177] Similarly Num 5:8.

[178] See further below, §§7.2–3.

וְהַצְלִיחָה־נָּא לְעַבְדְּךָ֙ הַיּ֔וֹם וּתְנֵ֥הוּ לְרַחֲמִ֖ים לִפְנֵ֣י הָאִ֣ישׁ הַזֶּ֑ה

"Give success to your servant today, and grant him mercy in the sight of <u>this man</u>!"   (NRSV)

As the commentator H. G. M. Williamson notes, "Much has been made of the expression 'this man' as a way of referring to the king" (1985:174). Believing this locution to be pointed, interpreters have offered a wide range of explanations—such as the pious view that construes אִישׁ in traditional sortal terms: "in the eyes of Nehemiah, with his religious approach, Artaxerxes was just a man like any other man" (Fensham 1982:157). However, all such views ignore Ancient Hebrew's normal use of the phrase *hā'îš hazzeh*.

As we have seen (§6.9.7), *whenever biblical speakers are trying to influence their addressee's decision or action and mention another party, the default way to refer to that other party is as* אִישׁ *'party'*. Such usage is evident not only in forensic cases (e.g., Deut 22:16, quoted above, §6.9.7), procedural negotiations (Gen 34:21), and simply situating the party in question (Ezek 14:14), but also specifically in prayer/blessing situations like Nehemiah's, namely 1 Sam 2:20 and Gen 43:14 (quoted and discussed above, §6.7)—which are both reference-point usages (§5.4.6).

Explanatory parsimony suggests that Nehemiah is likewise using the most effective linguistic means to depict both a prototypical situation and a desired outcome.[180] (His preposition casts the אִישׁ as a reference point [§5.4.6], so as to prompt a prospective re-situating of himself in his deity's eyes.) His use of אִישׁ is thus expected—that is, normal and customary (§6.9.8), reflecting our noun's postulated basic meaning.

I submit that this would have been the default construal of Nehemiah's phrasing. It requires no special assumptions in order to yield a coherent and informative text.

6.9.10 Resolving an interpretive crux (1 Sam 26:15)

While still a fugitive, David pointedly addresses Saul's general Abner (1 Sam 26:15):

הֲלוֹא־אִישׁ אַתָּה

"Are you not <u>a man</u>?"   (NRSV)

As noted in §§3.3–4, the meaning of David's striking usage of אִישׁ here has long been disputed in dictionaries and biblical commentaries. The debate has been over two competing senses of אִישׁ, amounting to *leadership* versus *manliness*.[181] Most lexicographers

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[179] Nehemiah employs polite speech in referring to himself in the third person as 'your servant' and 'him'.

[180] As Nehemiah prays, the emperor is in the forefront of his mind, for he is about to approach his master with a proposal. Thus the proximal demonstrative pronoun is appropriate. See above, notes 165 and 166.

[181] The construal of אִישׁ as 'man' (befitting a manly ideal) does not lead to a coherent result, for that meaning is not germane to David's subsequent criticism of Abner's inattentiveness. What evidence is there that in ancient Israel, manliness was equated with attentiveness? On the contrary, only men in certain positions of responsibility were required to be attentive. Apparently this consideration is what led various interpreters (such as Naḥmanides) to posit that אִישׁ refers here to a leadership role or position of prominence.

from Ibn Janaḥ (11th century) through Forster (1557) have supported the former construal, whereas most lexicographers after Simonis (1756) have supported the latter one (so also NRSV, as shown). However, both of those purported contextual senses are uncommon. Furthermore, both are inconsistent with the principles of information structure;[182] and they do not account for the distinctive pattern of Masoretic accents, as compared with similar instances that clearly classify their referent.[183] Perhaps we can do better.

Based upon what has been discussed in §§6.9.2–4, I propose that we recognize the presence of a *juridical* situation—specifically a two-party controversy. This conceptual frame was highly available to the ancient audience (much more so than to later interpreters), for the two-party controversy was a widespread and enduring social institution in ancient Israel (see above, note 134). On this view, the previous verse recounts that David has just initiated a *rîb* with Abner, such that the latter's response should be forthcoming (v. 14a):

וַיִּקְרָ֨א דָוִ֜ד אֶל־הָעָ֗ם וְאֶל־אַבְנֵ֤ר בֶּן־נֵר֙ לֵאמֹ֔ר הֲל֥וֹא תַעֲנֶ֖ה אַבְנֵ֑ר

> And David called out to the troops and to Abner son of Ner, saying,
> "Will you not answer, Abner?"   (Alter)

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[182] Prior scholarship has been unable to situate David's question within the discourse context (i.e., the preceding dialogue), even though that is supposed to condition the information structure. According to that context, a topic is already established. As Ellen van Wolde has noted: "In verbless clauses with a relatively less-definite element in first position and the relatively more-definite element in second position [*as in this clause* —DESS], the starting point is the 'given' … element.… This verbless clause does not interrupt the topic chain but situates the previously mentioned referent in the speech situation.…" (1999:331). Indeed, particles such as הֲל֥וֹא indicate that the first element in this clause depends upon the preceding clauses (cf. ibid., 332). That is, this utterance of David's is backward-looking ("anaphoric"), presupposing what came before (1997:41–42).

Yet interpreters reverse the assignment of the clause's elements. Its usual construal in translations and commentaries is: "You are a *man*, aren't you?" Likewise, both the Holmstedt syntax module in Accordance Bible Software (v3.0) and the ETCBC syntax database (v1.0) tag the *pronoun* here as the clause's subject—as if the addressee's identity were the given element. (Although Runge and Westbury 2012a usually tag the topic of a verbless clause, they do not parse this particular one.) Meanwhile, Adina Moshavi (2007:178n25; 2011:100n36) construes this clause not as a rhetorical question at all, but rather as a justification for the rhetorical question that follows—as if David's statement were only forward-looking.

On word order and its pragmatic function in verbless clauses, see also Van der Merwe et al. 2017:497, 509–10; cf. Holmstedt 2009a:126–129; Revell 1999:316; Heimerdinger 1999:131; Lambrecht 1994:248–82, 286–322.

[183] In this verse, the pronoun takes prosodic stress—as reflected here by two aspects of the Masoretic accent system: the accent on the prior word is conjunctive, and the pronoun's own syllabic stress does not recede (to "pausal form"). Yet for *classifying* an addressee, the prosodic stress is normally on the predicate, which in this case is conventionally taken to be אִישׁ. Hence according to the conventional construal, the accent prior to the pronoun should be disjunctive, and the pronoun's syllabic stress should recede (see Gen 12:11; 2 Sam 16:8; 1 Kgs 1:42; 2:9, 26; Ruth 3:11; 1 Chr 28:3)—yet that is not the case. On these aspects of Masoretic accents, see Jacobson 2017:294, 345–47.

David is now prompted to follow up on his having indicted Abner, because the rudely awakened general has parried by (mis)construing David as having called out *to the king* (v. 14b). Yet it is Abner whom David is targeting—and whom he will proceed to accuse and rebuke. (Doing so enables David to demonstrate loyalty to their king and concern for the latter's welfare.)[184]

But first, David needs to *clarify* that Abner is indeed his intended addressee. That is what David now signals by his three-word question. The prosodic stress is thus on the last word in the Hebrew, namely the pronoun:

$$\text{הֲלוֹא־אִישׁ אַתָּה}$$

"Aren't *you* the[185] (other)[186] party (to my controversy) (and not the king)?"

On the informational level, David is *reiterating* (not classifying) his assertion as to his addressee's role.[187]

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[184] Much of the utterance's meaning plays out on a third level of meaning: the *subjective* perspectives of the parties to the communication, as characterized by Traugott (e.g., Traugott and Dasher 2002:19–24). David thoroughly engages this level by encoding his own point of view as he explicitly attends to the circumstances of communication with his interlocutor. His terse utterance, which is pregnant with meaning, requires inferencing in order to situate the two parties to the dialogue. Furthermore, David's *hălō'* marker expresses an epistemic attitude toward the proposition, as well as an attitude toward what just transpired and toward the discourse structure (as to who is being addressed); it does not express all participants in the event structure (omitting David himself); and as a rhetorical question it is implicitly concerned with the interlocutor's (Abner's) perspective. All of these features are characteristic of subjective utterances, according to Traugott. Constraints of space and time do not permit our noun's role on the subjective level to be discussed in the main text of the present study; but see further below, Chapter 7, note 33.

[185] I render אִישׁ in English with the definite article because the Hebrew noun's referent in this context is unique. David's polemical point is that he is initiating a standard "two-party controversy" so as to accuse Abner of incompetence. Hence aside from David himself, there can be only one other possible party (אִישׁ). In Hebrew, a unique reference needs no determiner (although in English the definite article is standard).

[186] On the frequent use of אִישׁ to mean 'other party' or 'another party', see below, §7.2.

[187] In terms of *information structure*, I construe this verbless clause as follows: This is a *topic-comment* sentence. David presupposes his having just initiated communication with Abner (v. 14), and so the existence of an interlocutor (אִישׁ) in that situation is a given. It is also his *topic* (setting it apart from other possible themes), while his assertion of that other party's identity (*'attâ* 'you') is his *comment* on that topic (to correct Abner's evident misunderstanding about David's intended addressee).

Consequently, this clause's information structure is unlike the more usual fronted-predicate-focus structure for newly *classifying* an already-given addressee (see the examples cited in note 183). Only after having reasserted the identity of his intended addressee does David proceed to chide him as follows (vv. 15–16): Abner, who is both outstanding in competence and responsible for protecting the king, has been unforgivably derelict in his duty.

For other examples of verbless clauses with an indefinite topic expression and with the prosodic stress on the comment, see Mal 2:10; Job 7:1; 22:12. (Another verbless topic-comment clause that similarly begins with אִישׁ is Est 7:6a.)

And on the discourse level, our workhorse noun functions (as usual) to prompt the assembly (in the audience's mind) of a prototypical situation. In the situation at issue, the speaker is one party, while the addressee is the other:

▲ = Speaker (plaintiff) + Controversy (initiated) + אִישׁ (Other Party [to controversy])

In sum, my construal has six advantages over conventional readings:

(1) It is highly meaningful on all levels.[188]

(2) It is consistent with the principles of information structure, in terms of how it explains the word order.

(3) It accounts for the distinctive pattern of Masoretic accents.[189]

(4) It requires only that the audience assume one (highly accessible) frame in order to render the utterance as informative.

(5) It understands David as employing אִישׁ in its most common and conventional sense ('party to a prototypical situation'), rather than a rare sense ('adult male').

(6) By connecting David's utterance not only to what follows but also to what precedes it, this reading yields a more coherent construal of the dialogue than the competing prior interpretations.

6.10 Participation and Group Membership

The meanings of a workhorse noun as 'participant' (in a situation) and as 'member' (of a group) are closely related (§5.5.3). I had predicted (§5.7.7) that אִישׁ registers meaning on the informational level as 'member' when the other party to the depicted situation is a group of which the referent is a member. In practice, the concepts of <participant> and <member> often overlap: a participant in a situation of interest is introduced into the discourse as the individuated member of a group whose existence is presupposed (e.g., Exod 2:1; §6.2.1). In the following example, the verb's implicit subject refers to a young Moses who has emerged from the Egyptian palace (Exod 2:11):

וַיַּרְא אִישׁ מִצְרִי מַכֶּה אִישׁ־עִבְרִי מֵאֶחָיו:

He saw an Egyptian [party] beating a <u>Hebrew</u> [party], <u>one of his kinsfolk</u>.   {NRSV}

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[188] My interpretation accounts for both what David meant and why he said it that way. "The requirement that both the content and the fact of the utterance must be explained … [sometimes] forces us into an interpretation of the content that would not be favored in an informational account alone" (Hobbs 2004:739).

[189] Both the information structure and the Masoretic accents in this case match those in another instance—Joab's statement to Ahimaaz, following the death of Absalom (2 Sam 18:20): לֹא אִישׁ בְּשֹׂרָה אַתָּה הַיֹּום הַזֶּה. There, the first referring expression is the *topic*—because right after a battle, it is a given that *one party will be delegated* to report the outcome to headquarters as swiftly as possible (thus the reference is unique, and so the referring expression is not marked as definite); the *comment* is about that informant's identity—which in this case is negated: "Today, <u>the party to bring tidings</u> is not <u>you</u>" (or in more idiomatic English: "You shall not be the one to bring tidings today"; NJPS).

In the highlighted instance, אִישׁ denotes its referent not only as a *party* to the conflict (being counterposed with the other party who is labeled as אִישׁ), but also as a *member* of the presupposed body of "Hebrews" (via the gentilic appositive or modifier).[190] A gentilic is one of at least four ways that the sense of אִישׁ as 'member' is expressed. Those ways vary by how the relevant group is mentioned, and how the member's affiliation is signaled.[191] All of the membership usages rely upon the individuating power of אִישׁ.

6.11 Summary

Through a variety of tests, predictions in §§5.7.1–7 were validated. This chapter has thus plumbed certain behaviors of our noun and ascertained its more fundamental relational meanings. The notion that אִישׁ can be classed as a *workhorse noun*, and that the distinctive characteristics of such nouns reflect communicative needs, has been shown to explain dozens of instances of our noun's otherwise puzzling or ostensibly gratuitous usage. Conversely, the behavior of אִישׁ validates many of the theory's predictions.

Our noun works on two levels at the same time. No wonder that so many instances that at first glance appeared to be redundant turn out to be quite meaningful.

The functions and behaviors of אִישׁ are remarkably widespread across the Hebrew Bible—with no discernible lectal variation at the fairly schematic level of my survey. Furthermore, a remarkable internal consistency applies across various syntactic arrangements (bare nouns, genitive constructs, appositions) and regardless of grammatical number (singular or plural). The characteristics and norms of use that have been identified appear to be true features of the Ancient Hebrew language.

It remains my task to investigate those usage patterns of this noun that are less prototypical yet still extensive. I will test the predictions about the usages that seem semantically supercharged (§5.7.8), as well as those that seem semantically empty or "grammatical" (§5.7.9). Such investigations are the respective subjects of the next two chapters.

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[190] Given that the referent's affiliation with Moses's people is evident from the gentilic alone, the referring expression seems to be overencoded by the added partitive prepositional phrase. This thematically underscores the sense of *membership* identification that the observer (Moses) is feeling with the victim.

[191] Expression of group membership includes the following ways:

(1) *A head with gentilic*, e.g., also Lev 24:10 (§6.3.3); Exod 2:11 (§6.10).

(2) *A genitive construction* ("member-of-group"), e.g., Judg 10:1 (§6.5.1); Gen 17:23; Deut 27:14; 2 Kgs 10:6.

(3) *A partitive construction* that features the preposition מִן, e.g., Exod 2:1 (§6.2.1); Gen 39:11; Lev 17:3; Num 11:16; 26:62; 2 Sam 20:11; 21:6; 2 Kgs 25:19; Ezek 33:2; Ruth 2:1; Est 6:9 (see also Stein 2008a:12).

(4) *Separate mention of the group in question*, in the co-text nearby. That group thus becomes part of the frame within which our noun is construed. Examples (with their referential scope) include the following: Exod 11:6 (member of the Israelite people); 12:43–44 (member of the Israelite people); Num 11:26 (members of the ad hoc delegation); 15:31–32 (member of the Israelite people; see Stein 2008a:12); 1 Sam 20:15 (David's enemies); 2 Sam 18:9–10 (David's servants); Isa 40:26 (the heavenly host).

7 Pragmatic Enrichment:
A Pathway to Relational Senses

> "Pragmatics [belongs] to the realm of what is obvious and pervasive
> and yet invisible to its expert users and participants.… This invisibility
> is a general feature of meaning construction."
>
> —Gilles Fauconnier (2004:674)

7.1 Introduction

A defining feature of the workhorse human nouns is that in actual use, they are highly semantically mutable. Their significance derives from the context of deployment. In other words, their meaning must be explicable as a matter of pragmatics as well as semantics.

This chapter builds upon the previous one by examining selected cases to show how pragmatic enrichment (relevance) can compound our noun's contribution to its biblical passage's meaning, as a matter of normal functioning—as predicted in §5.7.8. It thus dwells on the informational level of meaning. According to the theory (§5.5.2 and §5.6), pragmatic enrichment sometimes enhances our noun's lexical side; at other times, enrichment brings out its grammatical side. The present chapter will treat the first type of outcome. On the lexical side, two kinds of results are of interest: relational ad-hoc contextual meanings, and relational lexical senses. I will treat these two kinds, in turn.

7.2 Selected Ad-Hoc Contextual Meanings

7.2.1 Contrast as a limitation of referential scope

Workhorse human nouns sometimes prompt a kind of special situating of their referent. One set of examples consists of eleven passages in the Torah's Priestly material on ritual and legal procedures (detailed below). These usages are a special case of the standard practice of preferring אִישׁ for introducing a character into the discourse (§§5.4.1, 6.3). The difference here is twofold: a contrast is implied with the participant(s) already present; and the consideration of salience excludes the existing participant(s) from the referential scope. As we shall see, the result is an enriched construal: 'someone *else*' (equivalent to a positive-alternative pronoun in some other languages). The indicated participant is someone who plays a new, distinct, and significant *role* in the depicted procedure.

Let me illustrate the above dynamic with the first of these examples. In Leviticus, Yahweh's extended treatment of certain types of sacrificial offering includes the proper disposition of the various parts of the slaughtered animals. Regarding the creature's hide, Yahweh approves of only one destination (7:8):

וְהַכֹּהֵן הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת־עֹלַת אִישׁ עוֹר הָעֹלָה אֲשֶׁר הִקְרִיב לַכֹּהֵן לוֹ יִהְיֶה׃

> And the priest who brings-near the offering-up of an *'îš*,
>
> the skin of the offering-up that he brings-near is for the priest—
>
> his shall it be. {Fox}

This is the first instance of אִישׁ in the book of Leviticus. That fact alone makes its usage here somewhat conspicuous—for up until this point, other nouns have been employed to refer to worshippers (namely, *'ādām* 'earthling' and *nepeš* 'person').[1] Why is it suddenly being used here? According to the prediction of §5.7.1B, אִישׁ is playing its normal role: it readily introduces a new (nonspecific) participant into the audience's discourse model, enabling that referent to be situated there.

▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Skin from the offering + Officiating priest

At the same time, additional meaning is reliably induced, for two factors that promote a certain kind of pragmatic enrichment are present. (1) Contrast is drawn. Here, the contrast is with the recipient priest, as explained by Arnold Ehrlich (1899:218): "This specification is needed to exclude the priest's own offering, in which case the entire animal would be burned, including the hide…, just as in the case of the priest's cereal offering (6:15)."[2] That is, when the priest has offered his own sacrifice, keeping the creature's hide would be an obvious form of self-dealing.[3] Hence the label אִישׁ 'party to a prototypical situation' clarifies that this rule applies only to "someone else's" offering—not that of this priest. (2) The salience of the "someone else" arises simply from the inability of אִישׁ in this context to refer to the priest himself.[4] Such a construal—a pragmatic limitation of referential scope—yields a coherent and informative text.

7.2.2 Consequential participation

A workhorse noun can signal that a new participant's presence is consequential (§§4.4.2, 6.4). That nuance seems to be part of our noun's meaning in cases where it *excludes the existing participants* from its referential scope. The ten additional instances in which Priestly texts use אִישׁ with indefinite deixis to invoke a discourse-significant new participant in the depicted proceedings include: Lev 15:5 (initially discussed in the previous chapter); 16:21; 19:20 (second instance); 20:10; Num 5:13; 19:9; 19:18, 20. These in-

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[1] On the apparent reasons for the text's choice of those labels rather than אִישׁ, see below, §8.2.3.

[2] This is Milgrom's paraphrase (1991:411) of Ehrlich's German commentary; it matches the earlier work by Ehrlich in Hebrew that I have cited.

[3] *Contra* Ewald ([1891] 2004:37), who perceives a different kind of pragmatic enrichment.

[4] Actually, the referential scope of אִישׁ is more contextually nuanced. On the one hand, a priest should be entitled to keep the hide from a guilt offering brought by *another priest*—not only by the laity. On the other hand, a priest is presumably *not* entitled to keep the hide if the offering is brought by *a member of his immediate family*—not only by him.

stances of אִישׁ are *conspicuous*, in that substantival participles were hypothetically available instead to refer to the party that it designates (compare Lev 16:21 with v. 26, for example); and in one case, the phrase in which it appears seems pleonastic (Lev 20:10). The conspicuous presence of אִישׁ gives the audience an additional incentive to enrich its meaning: it is understood that marked usages have marked meanings (Huang 2004:298). Meanwhile, contrasts are implied;[5] and a natural attraction to salience prevails. The referent's participation is understood to be consequential because this party's presence is a required element in the depicted procedure. Hence the audience could be counted upon to grasp that in these contexts, the semantic contribution of אִישׁ to the utterance's meaning is akin to 'someone else' or 'another party'.

7.2.3 Result: "Another" participant

Our noun is regularly used in procedural texts to invoke the presence of *a new and significant participant* when that party's role becomes germane. (The label employed is simply the noun אִישׁ in *s*ingular, *a*bsolute, *i*ndefinite, *n*onspecific usages, which I will abbreviate henceforth as "SAIN" usages.) The invited inference: this party is decidedly *not* someone who is already involved in the depicted situation. Rather, the referent is a distinct party whose presence alters the situation. As predicted, the usages of our noun discussed in this section accord with its standard function throughout the Bible (and in extrabiblical texts and cognate languages, as well), subject to the normal process of pragmatic enrichment.[6]

7.3 The '(Offending) Party'

In §6.9, I discussed how אִישׁ prompts the relational lexical sense of 'party to a prototypical situation'. Here I will consider an example situation that is *not* prototypical, to show that pragmatic enrichment can yield the same result—and even be more specific.

The book of Exodus relates that Pharaoh has reacted harshly to Moses' initial demand for a religious holiday. He pronounces a punishment, based on his finding of fact (5:7–8):

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. . . לֹא תֹאסִפוּן לָתֵת תֶּבֶן לָעָם לִלְבֹּן הַלְּבֵנִים . . . כִּי־נִרְפִּים הֵם

</div>

"You shall no longer give the people straw to make bricks … for they are lazy.…   (NRSV)

Then Pharaoh restates the penalty and his reasoning for it (Exod 5:9):[7]

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[5] For instance, in the atonement proceedings of Leviticus 16, a designated agent must escort the scapegoat (v. 21) because the high priest—to maintain his purity—cannot himself leave the sanctuary.

[6] Sarah Shectman has examined the personal nouns that are employed in Leviticus 1–16 from a gender-analysis perspective. After agreeing with Milgrom that the label אִישׁ is used "to avoid confusion over whose עלה [ascent offering] is being discussed," she concludes that "אִישׁ in these verses *is* a technical term—but it means *layperson*, in contrast to *priest*, as opposed to meaning *man* in contrast to *woman*" (2019:424). However, according to the findings herein, there is no need to assume an unannounced "technical" usage.

[7] See above, §3.1. Cf. LXX: ἀνθρώπων 'human beings'; Luther ([1534] 1912): *die Leute* 'the people'.

<div dir="rtl">

תִּכְבַּ֧ד הָעֲבֹדָ֛ה עַל־הָאֲנָשִׁ֖ים וְיַעֲשׂוּ־בָ֑הּ

</div>

"Let heavier work be laid upon <u>the men</u>; let them keep at it.…"   (NJPS)

"Let heavier work be laid on <u>them</u>; then they will labor at it.…"   (NRSV)

The question is: Why does Pharaoh use the label הָאֲנָשִׁים in his restated pronouncement? It seems conspicuous. The reference to the Israelites involved would have been at least as clear if he had simply employed a possessive direct-object suffixed pronoun: *ʿălêhem 'on them'. Alternatively, given that in this passage Pharaoh otherwise calls the oppressed workers hāʿām 'the collectivity' (vv. 4, 5, 7)—as does the narrator (vv. 6, 10, 12)—he might be expected to do so here as well: *ʿal-hāʿām 'on the people (involved)'.

However, on the discourse level, the overencoding signals a distinct development (prompting the audience to update its construal of the situation).[8]

▲ = אֲנָשִׁים (Participants) + Offense committed + Workload as penalty

Furthermore, the label, which is not this participant's "primary referring expression," signals thematic highlighting. What is that theme? Which aspect of participation is being profiled via this choice of vague (underspecified) label? I will now argue that as framed by Pharaoh's utterance, they are contextually identified as *offenders facing punishment*.[9]

▲ = אֲנָשִׁים (**Offenders**) + Offense committed + Workload as penalty

A juridical frame is clearly salient. For it is a commonplace that as the head of state, Pharaoh is expected to dispense justice and maintain order (e.g., 2 Sam 15:2–6; 1 Kgs 7:7). Here, he has already passed judgment and handed down a sentence—punishing הָאֲנָשִׁים 'those involved' for the "crime" of being *nirpîm* (NRSV: 'lazy'; NJPS: 'shirkers'). Indeed, the term הָאֲנָשִׁים is repeatedly used to refer to a plural party upon pronouncing their guilt (see Num 14:22; 16:26; Judg 20:13; 1 Sam 11:12; 2 Sam 3:39; Jer 34:18; cf. above, §§6.8.6; 6.9.3; 6.9.7). In such a context, it appears to be conventionalized and to carry a negative connotation.[10] Since it was the standard term for referring to a party who has been found guilty, the audience must have been expected to enrich the underspecified label's meaning to that specific extent.[11] Thus as Pharaoh speaks, the kind of participation that he brings into view is that of *involvement in an offense against the state*.

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[8] A summary statement (conclusion) is a typical occasion for the overencoding of participants (§§5.4.4, 6.6.1).

[9] Note the information structure: Pharaoh has not placed our noun label in focus. Hence no contrast is implied with another group (e.g., women, children, or animals) that would prompt a sortal sense via contrast. Alternatively, Pharaoh might be profiling these workers as participants in the labor performed on his behalf—i.e., as 'the subordinates' (a not-infrequent usage of אֲנָשִׁים; e.g., Gen 12:20; 24:32, 54); however, he seems more concerned that they be kept busy (and in line) than that they accomplish something.

[10] As Lewis notes, "conventionality can be straightforwardly operationalized as frequency" (2013:20).

[11] Distinguishing between guilt and innocence was the very goal of a juridical proceeding.

This construal readily yields a coherent and informative text. Consequently, it would be the audience's predictable and automatic choice. And this is how, on the level of information, pragmatic enrichment can start with הָאֲנָשִׁים 'the (relevant) participants' and conclude with a juridical meaning—yielding a more specific notion: 'the offenders'.

7.4 'Husband' and 'Wife'

This section confirms the prediction in §5.7.8A (based upon the cognitive motivation spelled out in §5.5.3), that those usages of אִישׁ where its contextual meaning is 'husband/wife' are consistent with its normal functioning as a workhorse noun.

7.4.1 Cognitive relationship between 'participant' and 'spouse'

Nearly all biblical scholars who have examined (masculine) אִישׁ explicitly agree that in a setting related to marriage, it usually describes its referent in a manner that corresponds to the English relational noun *husband*.[12] Dictionaries most often mention only a few such instances of אִישׁ—namely, those in construct with a suffixed personal possessive pronoun, for they are both the most typical and the most obvious cases. Even-Shoshan lists 82 instances of אִישׁ with the sense of 'husband' (1982a:49).[13] As for the feminine form אִשָּׁה, the majority of its 781 instances are said to denote 'wife' ("legitimate sexual partner of a man, and mother of his children"; Clines 2018c:594).

In many cultures, the two conceptual domains of <PERSON> and <SPOUSE> are closely related, as noted by the cognitive linguist Marcin Grygiel (2012:236): "Being a husband presupposes being a man and every unmarried man can be perceived as a potential husband." If so, then the integration of the two domains would be, as he writes, "a natural consequence of overlapping semantic structures."[14] So indeed, in *TLOT*, Kühlewein (1997a:100) asserted that in Biblical Hebrew, אִישׁ as 'husband' developed from 'man' (the mature male) as a limitation: "a more specialized sense." The denotation of one term is treated as a *subset* of the other.[15]

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[12] Almost all of the 40 consulted dictionaries recognize 'husband' as a sense. The absence of mention by Al-Fāsī (Skoss, 1945) and by Münster (1524) can be attributed to those lexicographers' distinctive goals.

[13] His tally stands in need of slight correction, because 8 of the listed instances cannot be construed as 'husband' (Lev 27:20; Josh 10:2; 1 Kgs 20:20; 2 Kgs 25:23, 24; Jer 40:7, 8, 9), while presumably the reference to Judg 12:2 intended its adjacent entry, 20:4. Out of the remaining 74 instances, 56 are singular with a possessive suffix (per Accordance), or more than 3/4 of the total.

Kaddari asserts, in an insertion into the article on אִישׁ by Loewenstamm and Blau (1957) that was incorporated into his larger work, that the 'husband' sense of masculine אִישׁ occurs "always in construct with a name or joined with an expression of attachment" (2006:35). But see Judg 20:4; 2 Sam 3:15; Prov 7:19.

[14] Nonetheless, it appears that in Akkadian, there were distinct terms for <woman> and <wife>— *aššatum* and *sinništum*, respectively (Levinson 2011:105n33).

[15] A TYPE-OF (taxonomic) metonymy is the cognitive operation that licenses lexical specialization.

Alternatively, I would suggest, the mind can go directly from 'party to the *situation*' to '**party** to the *marriage*'—which, it should be noted, is a type of prototypical situation:

▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Wife + Marriage

▲ = אִישׁ (**Husband**) + Wife + Marriage

Such relational triangle builds a direct and highly accessible conceptual-metonymic bridge between the concepts of <party> and <husband>. Given the default informational-level meaning of אִישׁ, then when a speaker employs that noun, the audience must simply ascertain which kind of participation is the most *salient*. Construing a referent as 'husband' or 'wife' means regarding them in terms of *their relationship to their spouse*, beyond being mere *participants in the overall situation* that is being depicted. It is a conventionalized semantic narrowing.

7.4.2 'Woman' versus 'wife'

Construing a workhorse noun as the salient 'participant' readily explains a distinctive aspect of how the feminine form אִשָּׁה is deployed. It is repeatedly used in a construction that marks a formal change of status,[16] indicating the status of 'wife', as in Gen 20:12:[17]

<div align="center">

וַתְּהִי־לִי לְאִשָּׁה׃

"…she became my <u>wife</u>."   (NJPS)

</div>

Literally: "…she became an אִשָּׁה to me." But wasn't she a woman prior to her marriage? The answer is that indicating the 'participant' in a *marriage* employs the same label as for the 'participant' in a *prototypical situation* (namely אִישׁ, §6.9.8)—for that is precisely what a marriage is.

7.4.3 Marriage as a prototypical situation, with participants

In Ancient Hebrew, many ways exist for a speaker to evoke the situation of marriage. First of all, our noun can play its usual situation-constituting role.

▲ = אִשָּׁה (Participant) + Husband + Legal relationship

By convention, *grammatical possession* serves as a succinct way to express a marriage relationship. That is, mentioning either singular אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה together with merely a

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[16] This construction (with a copular verb, a dative of benefit, and a preposition that marks the new status) is used to mark the engagement of representatives—such as a forced-labor detail, military commander, priest, vassal, or king. See, respectively, Jud 1:30; 11:6; 17:5; 1 Sam 27:12; Neh 6:6.

[17] See Even-Shoshan (1982b:123) s.v. לְאִשָּׁה. The use of אִשָּׁה within a construction that describes a status change (as in the lower six rows of Table 7.1, below) shows that a distinct lexical sense of 'wife' exists.

In a corresponding usage, Naomi employs the *masculine* plural to pose a rhetorical question to her daughters-in-law, after the death of her sons, to describe the dim prospect of new 'husbands' (Ruth 1:11). As the only instance of this kind where (masc.) אִישׁ labels the effected object, it may be an exploitation.

possessive pronoun (inflected by the other gender) suffices to constitute the triangle—namely, two counterposed individual parties who are associated in an enduring relationship (e.g., Gen 26:7; Exod 21:5).

In addition, a wide range of constructions is used. Some of them are characteristic labels that identify the referent as a marriage partner; in such labels, the two parties' affiliation is indicated by a genitive construction. For the husband, such labels include: *ba'al 'iššâ* 'woman's husband' (Exod 21:3); *'îš 'iššâ* 'woman's husband' (Judg 20:4); and *'îš ḥēqâ*, 'husband of her bosom' (Deut 28:56).[18] Another option is the formula *'ēšet N*, that is, '*N*'s wife', where *N* stands for either a man's name, a "male" noun, or a salient body-part label that, in turn, stands for the man (as in Exod 18:2; 20:17; Lev 20:10; Deut 13:7).

As for verbal (clausal) constructions that identify a spouse, more than a dozen of them employ our noun; see Table 7.1.[19] What all these identifiers have in common is that—as predicted—the construction relies upon the distinctive ability of a workhorse noun to readily evoke the whole relational triangle within the audience's discourse model. They employ our noun to label one of its corners. (The non-copular verbal constructions are not idioms; rather, they are metonyms—by articulating one salient aspect, they express the whole process of getting married.)

The fact that so many and varied expressions are employed is a sign that the language's indication of a marriage partner is constructed *pragmatically* in Ancient Hebrew, rather than lexically. (Likewise, the Bible does not contain a one-word equivalent for 'marriage' or 'married' per se, although there are terms for several kinds of in-laws.) The pragmatic strategy is reliably successful because the institution in question is ubiquitous and societally fundamental.[20] (The Bible's reiterated existence of a death penalty for adultery is one relatively strong piece of evidence for this claim.) Thus for the text's audience, the concepts of <husband> and <wife> are cognitively highly accessible.

7.4.4 Pragmatic enrichment in the marriage domain

That being said, at least a few instances of our noun are enriched in a more oblique manner, in order to yield a coherent and informative text. I will now discuss one such case.

Proverbs often make their point via indirection. Thus it may not be surprising that in

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[18] In this case, the wife is indicated via synecdoche (BODY PART FOR WHOLE PERSON); her 'bosom' stands for her, while it also implies an intimate relationship.

[19] For various, less common ways of referring to marriage without using אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה, see, e.g.: Gen 19:14; Exod 2:1; Gen 20:3; Jud 12:9; 2 Sam 17:25; Prov 30:23; Neh 13:23; 1 Chr 23:22.

[20] On the pragmatic practice of preferring more general terminology in contexts where the quality that is under consideration has a high degree of givenness, see above, §5.4.8.

Table 7.1 Verbal (Clausal) Constructions for Identifying a Spouse

Construction	Rough Gloss	Example	*ʾiššâ* as Object*	Semantic Role of Husband	Semantic Role of Wife	Comment
hāyətâ lə·ʾîš	'become a man's'	Lev 22:12	—	Beneficiary	Agent	Standard idiom expresses belonging
nātan ʾōtāh lə·ʾîš	'give her to a man'	Gen 34:14	—	Beneficiary	Patient	Transfer implies a new status for both parties
ʾēraś ʾiššâ	'betroth a woman'	Deut 28:30	Affected	Agent	Patient	Formal designation points to marriage
hošîb ʾiššâ	'settle a woman'	Ezra 10:14	Affected	Agent	Patient	Used only for "foreign" wives (Japhet 2013:72)
lāqaḥ (lô) ʾiššâ	'take (himself) a woman'	Gen 24:3–4	Affected	Agent (and Beneficiary)	Patient	Individuation/selection of affected object from an (often implicit) larger pool; change of status is implied by process metonymy
nāśāʾ lô ʾiššâ	'raise himself a woman'	Ruth 1:4	Affected	Beneficiary	Patient	Presumably the groom "lifts" his bride to the higher status of wife
nātan lô ʾiššâ	'give him a woman'	Exod 21:4	Affected	Beneficiary	Patient	Transfer with focus on the *affected* object
hirbâ lô nāšîm	'multiply wives for himself'	Deut 17:17	Effected	Beneficiary	Patient**	Verb implies acquisition, with a focus on the result; see also 1 Chr 7:4
hāyətâ lô ʾiššâ	'become his wife'	2 Chr 21:6	Effected	Beneficiary	Agent	Indicates a change of status, with a focus on the result
hāyətâ lə·ʾiššâ	'become a wife'	Num 36:6	Effected	Beneficiary**	Agent	Indicates a change of status, with a focus on the transition
lāqaḥ (lô) lə·ʾiššâ	'take for himself as a wife'	Gen 12:19	Effected	Agent (and Beneficiary)	Patient**	Expresses change of status as selection for a purpose: status as effected object
māhar lô lə·ʾiššâ	'make her his bride'	Exod 22:15	Effected	Beneficiary	Patient**	Effected via payment of a bride-price
nātan lô lə·ʾiššâ	'give him a wife'	Deut 22:16	Effected	Beneficiary	Patient**	Transfer with focus on the *effected* object

* See above, §6.8.8.   ** Implicitly so.

the following adage, the distinction between 'female participant' ('woman') and 'wife' is left more vague than usual (Prov 19:14):[21]

בַּיִת וָהוֹן נַחֲלַת אָבוֹת וּמֵיְיָ אִשָּׁה מַשְׂכָּלֶת׃

Property and riches are bequeathed by fathers,
But an efficient <u>wife</u> comes from the LORD.   (NJPS)

This utterance would arguably be grammatical even if our noun were deleted; that would leave the participle *maśkelet* (rendered by NJPS as 'efficient') to function alone as a substantive, instead of modifying אִשָּׁה much like an appositive.[22] This suggests that אִשָּׁה is conspicuous by its presence—and thus the audience would presumably construe it (if possible) as more meaningful than simply 'woman'. Otherwise it is not very informative.

Let us recall that the way referents are introduced depends upon how much they matter *subsequently* (§4.4.2). In the proverb above, our workhorse noun may be carrying out a discourse function by highlighting its referenced participant's *consequential* impact, which a participle alone would not do (§§6.8.7, 7.2.2). Such usage is also consistent with the preference for אִישׁ (and אִשָּׁה) as the label for situating a discourse participant. At the same time, on the informational level, אִשָּׁה is ripe for pragmatic enrichment.

The first part of the adage sets up a frame by naming patrimonial assets that evoke the domain of a corporate household (which, as the basic socioeconomic unit of Israelite society, is cognitively highly accessible). Within that domain, the אִשָּׁה who is most *salient* is the householder's principal wife.[23] Consequently, even though this proverb mentions neither of the usual contextual clues for differentiating 'woman' from 'wife'—namely, a householder/husband or their marriage—the audience reliably selects the sense of אִשָּׁה here as 'wife'. That construal readily yields a coherent and informative text.[24]

7.5 'Agent'

This section explores the prediction in §5.7.8B (based upon the cognitive motivation spelled out in §5.5.3), that the usages of אִישׁ where its contextual meaning is 'agent' are consistent with its normal functioning as a workhorse noun.

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[21] I consulted several rabbinic and scholarly commentaries on the Masoretic Text, all of which took a construal as 'wife' for granted. Likewise some ancient witnesses understand the last clause to be about a wife—while construing the final word differently. Thus the Septuagint reads: δὲ θεοῦ ἁρμόζεται γυνὴ ἀνδρί 'a woman is joined to a man by God' (Tov and Polak 2009; Cook 2014:638 = NETS). So too the Targum: וּמִן אֱלָהָא מִתְמַסְרָא אִתְּתָא לְגַבְרָא 'a woman [or: wife] is transmitted to a man from God'.

[22] The participle *maśkîl*—the masculine counterpart of *maśkelet*—functions independently as a referring expression in Prov 15:24 (NJPS 'an intelligent man') and 16:20 (NJPS 'he who is adept').

[23] In ancient Israelite households, the principal wife (if more than one) had considerable responsibility and authority, not unlike the chief operating officer of a contemporary small corporation (see Meyers 1998).

[24] Similarly: Isa 54:6, where the context of אִשָּׁה implies 'wife' even without a grammatical affiliation marker or explicit mention of husband or marriage.

7.5.1 Pragmatic enrichment in agency situations

Situations involving agency provide ample opportunity for אִישׁ 'party [etc.]' to be re-analyzed as 'agent'. For example, as part of a procedural text, Num 34:18–19 reads:

וְנָשִׂיא אֶחָד נָשִׂיא אֶחָד מִמַּטֶּה תִּקְחוּ לִנְחֹל אֶת־הָאָרֶץ׃
וְאֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת הָאֲנָשִׁים

> And you shall also take a chieftain from each tribe through whom the
> land shall be apportioned. These are the names of the *'ănāšîm*.… {NJPS}

In the first verse, the referents' initial label is *nāśî'* 'chieftain'. In the second verse, אֲנָשִׁים is a changed label (§4.4.3). It differs conspicuously from the primary referring expression (repeated again seven times in verses 22–28). The workhorse here is explained by its discourse function: it serves as the entrée to admit additional background data about the referents (specifically, their names).

Meanwhile, as its plural referent is situated, אֲנָשִׁים is construed in terms of its referent's social *role* in this situation. Those אֲנָשִׁים are serving as delegates to perform a task on behalf of their respective tribes; and each tribe participates via the assignment of its participant-members (who is a recognized leader, according to the norms of delegation in that society). In other words, a double participation obtains: the delegates are the *participants' participants*.

By association, this situated meaning on the discourse level is available to be attributed to the workhorse noun ("pragmatic enrichment"). In that light, the noun's nuance in context is like the English term 'representatives' or 'commissioners'. By such means, אִישׁ could eventually have gained an "agency" sense, after repeated use.

7.5.2 When agency is a given

According to §5.4.8, אִישׁ is the preferred label for an agent when the agency role is already clearly given. Here I will offer an example of supporting evidence drawn from a co-reference. In a vision Ezekiel hears the Deity issue a command to some supernatural agents (Ezek 9:1) who are not yet present on the scene:

קִרְבוּ פְּקֻדּוֹת הָעִיר וְאִישׁ כְּלִי מַשְׁחֵתוֹ בְּיָדוֹ׃

> "Draw near, you executioners of the city, each with his destroying weapon in his hand." (NRSV)

In the label used for these referents, the passive participle indicates that they have been appointed to their role. Evidently they are about to be sent on a grim mission. In the following verse, the prophet reports what happened next:

וְהִנֵּה שִׁשָּׁה אֲנָשִׁים בָּאִים | … וְאִישׁ כְּלִי מַפָּצוֹ בְּיָדוֹ

> And six *'ănāšîm* came … each with his weapon for slaughter in his hand. {NRSV}

Co-reference is established via salience. The situation would be enriched like this:

▲ = פְּקֻדּוֹת הָעִיר (Executioners) + Weapons + Mission (implied)

▲ = אֲנָשִׁים (Participants) + Weapons + Mission (implied)

▲ = אֲנָשִׁים (**Agents**) + Weapons + Mission (implied)

The pragmatics of lexical specificity predict that any more-specific label (even the prima-ry referring expression) would be used only if its additional semantic information is sali-ent enough to warrant the higher cognitive processing costs, or to induce a marked effect.

7.5.3 When agency is only implied

Furthermore, the construal of אִישׁ as 'agent' is readily available not only when a party is explicitly delegated as such. Such a construal obtains also when a participant (labeled as אִישׁ) is simply acting on someone else's (or a group's) behalf—that is, as an agent would be expected to act. For example, someone visits the prophet Elisha (2 Kgs 4:42).[25]

וְאִישׁ בָּא מִבַּעַל שָׁלִשָׁה וַיָּבֵא לְאִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים לֶחֶם

An *'îš* came from Baal-shalishah; he brought the *'îš*-of-God some bread.…

The label אִישׁ for this mobile referent prompts the assembly of a new situation within the audience's discourse model:

▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Recipient + Bread

Meanwhile, his actions presuppose a role of some kind that has motivated him. At the very least, an opportunity exists for the reanalysis of אִישׁ as 'agent':

▲ = אִישׁ (**Agent**) + Recipient + Delivery mission

7.5.4 Does אִישׁ have an agency sense?

Is the construal as 'agent' a distinct lexical sense—or a matter of ad hoc pragmatic en-richment only? Conclusive evidence for a distinct lexical sense of 'agent' in Ancient He-brew would be a set of passages that already evoke an *agency frame*, and which are ren-dered *more coherent and informative* if such a sense is assumed.

Among such passages would be those in which our noun's presence seems grammati-cally conspicuous yet its semantic contribution is otherwise trivial. One example is the label that Psalms uses to refer to Joseph (105:17):[26]

שָׁלַח לִפְנֵיהֶם אִישׁ לְעֶבֶד נִמְכַּר יוֹסֵף׃

He sent ahead of them an *'îš*, / Joseph, sold into slavery. {NJPS}

Our noun introduces into the poetic discourse a participant who is quickly situated:

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[25] Similarly, with the same verb: Jud 13:6; 1 Sam 4:13–14; 2 Sam 1:2; 1 Kgs 13:1; 2 Kgs 4:42; 23:17; 2 Chr 25:7; and see Ezek 9:2, immediately above.

[26] Cf. certain cases of apposition or of a changed label (especially at the moment where agency is most sali-ent), e.g., Gen 24:21; 43:15; Exod 2:7, 9; 11:3; 1 Kgs 21:10; 2 Kgs 5:23–24; 12:16.

▲ = Principal + Mission + אִישׁ (Agent)

An agency frame is indicated by the verb *š-l-ḥ* 'to send', which is the agency verb *par excellence*.[27] As Joseph himself came to understand (Gen 45:5), he had been sent unwittingly on a mission to ensure his family's long-term survival. Thus construing אִישׁ as 'agent' readily yields a more coherent and informative text.[28]

The surmise that 'agent' is a distinct sense of אִישׁ likewise accounts for usages where our noun's presence otherwise seems puzzling. This includes the repeated deployment of אִישׁ to label the various *divine* agents whom Ezekiel, Zechariah, and Daniel encounter in their visions (Ezek 9:2–3; 10:2, 6–7; 40:3–6; Zech 1:8–10; 2:5–6; 5:9; Dan 9:21; 10:5–6, 18–20; 12:6–7).[29] Again, construing אִישׁ as 'agent' readily yields a more coherent and informative text.[30]

7.5.5 Resolving an interpretive crux (Exod 10:7–8)

During the ongoing negotiations between Pharaoh and Moses regarding a proposed Israelite venture to serve Yahweh, the king's courtiers urge him to reconsider (Exod 10:7):[31]

שַׁלַּח אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים וְיַעַבְדוּ אֶת־יְיָ אֱלֹהֵיהֶם

"Let <u>the men</u> go to worship the LORD their God!" (NJPS)

"Let <u>the people</u> go, so that they may worship the LORD their God…." (NRSV)

As shown, English translators differ on the import of our noun here. Some versions (e.g., NJPS) read it as 'men', as if Pharaoh's advisors intend that the women and children remain behind.[32] Others (e.g., NRSV; cf. LXX ἀνθρώπους) construe אֲנָשִׁים more broadly, as

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[27] This Qal verb appears similarly with אִישׁ in Num 13:2, 16; 14:36; Deut 1:22; Josh 2:1; 7:2; 8:3; 18:4; Judg 18:2; 20:12; 21:10; 1 Sam 9:16; 2 Kgs 2:16–17; Jer 26:22; 2 Chr 2:6, 12.

[28] It appears to me that the first clause places our noun in a marked (out-of-the-ordinary) position, giving it the tonic stress. If אִישׁ is indeed so marked, that would further induce its pragmatic enrichment as 'agent'.

[29] Contra Sukenik 1950:273, Bratsiotis 1974:233, Hamori 2008, and others, it is unlikely that the appearance of 'adult male humans' is meant, given that when the Bible *explicitly* describes non-human figures as (potentially) having a human appearance, the human nouns used are *'ādām* (Isa 44:13; Ezek 1:5, 10, 26; 10:21; Dan 10:16, 18), *zākār/nəqēbâ* (Deut 4:16), and *geber* (Dan 8:15)—not אִישׁ. (Regarding apparent exceptions: In Isa 44:13, אִישׁ individuates the fashioned figure, whose human appearance is then specified via *'ādām*. On the pronoun-like usage of אִישׁ in Isa 52:14, see Chapter 8, note 22. As for Ezek 8:2 in LXX, which some say presupposes אִישׁ in the Greek text's *Vorlage* [e.g., Tov and Polak 2009, ad loc.], another explanation is that the unvocalized source text was not construed correctly.)

[30] This view is also consistent with the notion that the divine figures are being introduced as *consequential participants*; their presence indeed materially alters the situation (§§4.4.2, 5.4.5). See below, note 57.

[31] I assume for the sake of a coherent story (as all interpreters must) that the courtiers' Hebrew wording is equivalent to their presumed Egyptian speech.

[32] In the 12th century, Bekhor Shor adds (ad loc.): ולא נשים וטף 'and not women and children', citing Pharaoh's male-only counteroffer in v. 11: *gəbārîm* 'men; adult males; prominent men'; so Durham 1987:136.

'people' (Keil and Delitzsch [1866] 1996, ad loc.). In addition, Cornelis Houtman (1993: 7, 105–6) senses a third possibility—a "denigrating connotation"; thus he renders the determined noun phrase הָאֲנָשִׁים as 'those good-for-nothings'.

Taking a fresh look at this passage in light of the present study's findings, I will show that this usage illustrates a *pragmatic bridge* for the agency sense of אִישׁ to develop.

Note first that the courtiers are discussing a *prototypical situation*. Therefore, in order to efficiently convey their proposal, by default they are expected to employ a workhorse-noun phrase, which is vague (*underspecified*); and as usual, this would yield: 'the (salient) participants'.[33] More precisely, the speakers are urgently articulating their desired scenario, which means that they are inclined to seek the most efficient way to depict that situation. In the service of that goal, our noun indicates a reference point (§§5.4.6, 6.7).

Further, because the courtiers view the situation as dire (as evinced by their question: "Are you not yet aware that Egypt is lost?" [NJPS]), their utterance makes the most sense if one assumes that they are advancing a compromise proposal, and that their intended referent is specific and readily recoverable from the context.[34]

If so, then we can learn from what Pharaoh makes of their idea. He promptly summons Moses, and after claiming to have assented to Yahweh's demand, he asks (v. 8):

<div align="center">

מִי וָמִי הַהֹלְכִים

"Who are the ones to go?"   (NJPS)

</div>

This question would be bizarre if the advisors' proposal were about sending off 'the adult males' (as some interpreters have believed). The king could hardly expect Moses to produce, on the spot, a census list of 600,000 adult males by name (cf. 12:37). Moreover, at this point no contrast with women is evident in the situational context, so no warrant exists to perceive the issue as a matter of the referents' gender. In other words, the construal as 'men' does not hold water. Rather, in order for the story to be coherent, Pharaoh must intend an Israelite subset that is readily countable and identifiable.[35]

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[33] Linguistically speaking, some meaning in the courtiers' utterance resides outside of the informational and discourse levels, namely on the *subjective* level (see above, Chapter 6, note 184): the encoding of their own point of view in describing Moses as a *môqēš* 'snare'; the vagueness of the key term (our noun), which requires inferencing to identify its referent; and their rhetorical question about the interlocutor's (Pharaoh's) level of awareness and his perspective.

[34] It remains possible that some other presupposed semantic frame for the situation sufficed to disambiguate exactly which participants were intended. If so, we can no longer recover it reliably. As Peter MacDonald has observed, "Biblical discourses that to us appear vague, elliptical, or even defective may be ones in which the speaker was simply assuming a high degree of overlap between his or her own scripts and those of the hearers" (1992:165). On the term *scripts*, see below, note 44.

[35] Cassuto (1967; at 10:11) interprets the passage as if Pharaoh purposely twisted his advisors' recommendation: the king realized that in saying הָאֲנָשִׁים they meant 'the entire people', but he chose to ignore that aspect: "he pretends that he understood it in its restricted sense," namely the men only (based on v. 11).

Meanwhile, Bill Propp points out that previously in the story, the collective noun עַם 'people' was repeatedly the term used in the discourse for referring to Israel. Clearly the advisors are going out of their way to suddenly employ a plural noun, which—as Propp notes—describes its referent as "a collection of individuals."

If, as Propp suggests, the courtiers are still referring to the populace as a whole, then in the terms employed in the present study, their choice of wording is marked; it is a changed label (§§4.4.3; 6.2.2; 6.6; 7.3). They are then prompting Pharaoh to re-situate an active participant in his discourse model, or to shift his point of view.

Propp indeed claims that the courtiers' shift in grammatical number prompts a shift in Pharaoh's perspective, enabling him to countenance releasing only a subset of the populace (1999:337). However, an even more coherent reading of the passage—and one that relies upon a conventional usage of our noun—would construe that the courtiers themselves already intended a subset of the populace. Recall that *introducing and situating a subset of an active referent* is an amply attested marked usage of אֲנָשִׁים (§6.4.2). This applies also to definite noun phrases.[36] Allowing for this fact would answer a question that Propp's interpretation leaves open: Why did the advisors opt to use this *particular* plural noun? Standard subsetting usage argues against construing הָאֲנָשִׁים here as 'the people' and as co-referential with Moses's עַמִּי 'my people' (as Propp and others have believed).

As for Houtman's claim that the courtiers employ אִישׁ with a *denigrating* nuance, it likewise does not withstand scrutiny. He cites no other instances to support it; and I am not aware of any that would not be better explained in other ways. One could perhaps argue that the courtiers intend this word's semantic emptiness to signal that the referent is likewise insubstantial. Yet such usage is unattested. Whereas the courtiers' verb is literally dismissive, their noun is not.

On the contrary, as we have repeatedly seen, אִישׁ is regularly employed with a presumption of *importance*—rather than the lack thereof (§§6.4; 7.2.2). Even on the informational level, interpreters of a few other passages construe אֲנָשִׁים as '(male) persons of

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However, this view is unconvincing; Pharaoh had nothing to gain by deceiving his own advisors, who had offered their proposal *in camera*. Cassuto's construal is less likely for two further reasons: it requires an additional assumption (about Pharaoh's calculations), and it yields a less coherent text.

[36] A definite plural noun's referential scope is inclusive, which on the surface argues for a maximal reading; however, it is also situationally constrained—a matter of salience. As Radden notes, "The definite article refers to all objects in a *pragmatically delimited* set" (2009:219; emphasis added; also 221). In the Bible, a banner example of denoting a subset via the noun phrase הָאֲנָשִׁים is Jon 1:10 (*bis*), 13, 16, where the passenger Jonah is situationally excluded from its scope (even though it would normally include him); there it refers to the ship's crew—i.e., to everyone on board *except* Jonah. For other subset-defining cases with הָאֲנָשִׁים see, e.g., Gen 14:24 (= the allies, not the subordinates); 18:22 (= the visitors who were leaving, not Abraham and his third visitor); 20:8 (= the courtiers, not Abimelech); Exod 5:9 (= excluding Moses, Aaron, the disabled, etc.; cf. above, §7.3); Num 13:31 (= excluding Joshua); Deut 31:12 (= excluding strangers).

consequence or importance'. Indeed, a nuance of importance *follows by analogy* from the constitutive power of אִישׁ to efficiently define a prototypical situation in the audience's discourse model. Perhaps the clearest case of such usage is the non-restrictive apposition that characterizes twelve scouts dispatched by Moses (Num 13:3):

כֻּלָּם אֲנָשִׁים רָאשֵׁי בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל הֵמָּה׃

…all of them <u>men [of standing]</u>— / heads of the Children of Israel were they.   (Fox)

As discussed above (§3.4), there the commentator Rashi categorically remarks: כל אנשים לשון חשיבות הוא 'Every [instance of] אֲנָשִׁים [in the Bible] is the language of consequence [or: importance]'.[37] Ibn Ezra, Kimḥi, and Rashbam construe this instance similarly; so also Levine (1993:351) and Milgrom (1990:101).[38] Another such case is 1 Chr 9:9.

So in Exod 10:7, which particular Israelite subset would the courtiers' words have reliably evoked? In earlier work, I suggested that in the minds of the text's ancient Israelite audience, with regard to a deity's communal worship, a *duly authorized delegation* was standard practice (e.g., Exod 19:7–8; 24:1–11). And furthermore, that it was a given that such a delegation would consist of leading citizens, named in advance (e.g., Num 1:4–17; 13:1–16). So the audience would understand that Pharaoh's courtiers are presupposing this frame—and that he would grasp their presupposition.[39] Thus the courtiers would be understood to have meant 'a delegation of their notables' (Stein 2008a:23; 2014, ad loc.). Such a construal now receives added support from the present study's identification of the use of אֲנָשִׁים to indicate participants who are consequential, as well as those who are representing the interests of their group (i.e., another party).

Pharaoh's question to Moses presupposes the dispatch of a *delegation*—one whose composition remains to be specified; he thus solicits a list for preapproval. As the 13th-century commentator Naḥmanides notes (v. 8), "Pharaoh initially wanted [only] leaders and elders to go—אֲנָשִׁים who would be 'designated by name'."[40] In other words, the king construes הָאֲנָשִׁים as 'the salient participants *who customarily represent the people*'.

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[37] The supercommentary called *Sifte Ḥakhamim* by Shabbetai the Bass-Singer (1680) 1995:244 explains that Rashi is referring only to instances of אֲנָשִׁים that are *not otherwise modified* and are employed *predicatively*, as in Num 13:3. This construal seems insightful but perhaps too restrictive; cf. below, note 40.

[38] This apposed notice underscores that we should expect the opinion of these scouts to be influential.

[39] Our noun collocates comfortably with the Piel verb *šillaḥ* 'send off' (Gen 19:12–13; Lev 16:21; cf. above, note 27) to denote the 'participant' who is selected for a task or mission. The text's audience would construe the speaker as employing the definite article for a delegation that is "definite in the imagination" (Waltke and O'Connor 1990:243–44)—or more precisely, it is cognitively accessible via its association with a known frame (Bekins 2013:229–30). The cited translations construe the article differently. However, as Bekins notes, "the associative use of the article is often misdiagnosed when cultural distance makes it difficult to determine the exact nature of the semantic frame" (ibid., 230).

[40] Ad loc. Naḥmanides' phrase אֲשֶׁר נִקְּבוּ בְּשֵׁמוֹת 'designated by name' quotes an adjectival clause that is applied to our noun elsewhere (Num 1:17; 2 Chr 28:15; 31:19), where it clearly refers to designated agents.

To summarize, Pharaoh's courtiers (v. 7) employ אֲנָשִׁים in a conventional, underspecified manner, so as to efficiently depict their desired situation, which includes introducing a new referent (a subset of the populace) as they propose a compromise. In context, their usage evokes meanings of אֲנָשִׁים as describing *salient and consequential participants*—which cultural knowledge would then identify as a delegation of notables. Under the cultural premise that such a party can legitimately represent the populace as a whole, Pharaoh and his advisors implicitly rely upon one or more relational meanings of אִישׁ, indicating importance and representation.

7.5.6 Resolving an interpretive crux (Gen 18:2)

Shortly after Abraham has arranged for his circumcision and that of the male members of his household, three visitors present themselves, before proclaiming a message of divine blessing upon him and his wife Sarah: she will bear a son (Gen 18:1–15).[41] The narrator introduces these characters into the discourse (§6.3) via the default term (v. 2):

וַיִּשָּׂא עֵינָיו וַיַּרְא וְהִנֵּה שְׁלֹשָׁה אֲנָשִׁים נִצָּבִים עָלָיו

He lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold,

three *ʾănāšîm* were standing in front of him.   {ESV}

In the history of the plain-sense interpretation of this verse, אֲנָשִׁים has usually been construed as 'men'—that is, as 'adult males'. That reading recognizes one possible connection (understood as straightforwardly literal) between this verse and the start of the previous one (v. 1). That verse, which evidently began the present episode, relates that Yahweh undertook to interact with Abraham in a particular way; for the moment, I will leave open the specific nature of the interaction (shown by a blank):

וַיֵּרָא אֵלָיו יְיָ בְּאֵלֹנֵי מַמְרֵא

Yahweh _____ (to) him at the Oaks of Mamre. . . .

The Conventional Construal and Its Shortcomings.   Most of the recent treatments of this passage by biblical scholars construe the verb in question as indicating visual perception, which is then fulfilled by the sighting of the 'men' in verse 2. According to this view, the use of אֲנָשִׁים indicates that at first, Abraham understandably—yet mistakenly—believes

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Accordingly, Pharaoh's use of the more specific label *gəbārîm* 'he-men' (v. 11) underscores his point that a delegation of authorized leaders (cf. Jer 22:30; Zech 13:7; Job 22:2) should suffice. On the irony in his use of that term, see Stein 2014, ad loc.

[41] This section is a greatly condensed version of Stein 2018. (Admittedly it is unusual for material that is assembled during doctoral research to not appear in the dissertation itself. However, the present project is unusually comprehensive in scope, requiring argumentation far in excess of what the space constraints here allow.) Please see that open-access article for full documentation and references.

that he is facing ordinary human being(s).[42] That is, Gen 18:1–15 depicts an angelophany (or theophany) in which divine messengers (or deity) are not recognized as such until after they have delivered their message.[43] Although interpreters' explanations differ in their details, I will refer to this position schematically as the "obscured-origin" (OO) construal.

Despite its wide and longstanding popularity, an OO construal has serious shortcomings. In three respects, it is at odds with how human minds naturally construe any text:

1. *It flies in the face of convention.* Ostensibly, the visitors deliver divine blessing without first making the bestower's identity known to the recipient. However, in making sense of a text, the audience always defaults to conventions. In this case, two conventions apply: a *messaging* convention, namely that a principal's identity will be made known to the recipient before any message is delivered;[44] and a consequent *narrative* convention, namely that a recipient is presumed to know the principal's identity—whether such recognition is stated explicitly or not.[45] Hence the text's audience will not infer a lack of awareness on the part of the recipient unless that fact is stated *explicitly*.[46]

2. *It yields a sensible narrative only at the cost of one or more special assumptions,* such as assuming that the visitors have disguised their true nature. However, whenever an audience is forced to revise its discourse model, it expends extra processing effort. Audiences will undertake that effort only if no easier way of making sense of the text comes to mind.

3. *It paints the narrative itself as either inarticulate or artfully laconic.* Significant supposed developments—such as the visitors' having adopted disguises—are oddly left unstated. In other words, the audience is left in nearly as much of a "fog" as Abraham himself.[47] Yet an audience's normal text processing mechanisms will not be content with a story until it can be construed as cohesive and informative; and composers of a text normally take that fact into account as a matter of course.

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[42] E.g., Wenham 1994:45; De Regt 1999:76–77; Greenstein 1999:57*; Savran 2005:47, 79; Hamori 2008; Sommer 2009:40; Gossai 2010:31; Smith 2015; Potter 2017:31; Kugel 2017. See further Stein 2018.

[43] A few modern scholars claim instead that Abraham realizes right away that his deity has appeared: Keil and Delitzsch ([1866]:1996) at 18:1–15), Sailhamer (1992:161–64), and Lyons (2002:159–61, 265).

[44] The existence of this messaging convention is fully argued and exhaustively documented in Stein 2018.

[45] In the Bible, this narrative convention is used by default (unless the specific trigger for the recipient's awareness is of particular concern). Because the recipient's identification of a messenger as the sender's agent was a *normal* part of messaging protocol, it usually did not need be mentioned in a depiction of messaging. Rather, the text's composers could presuppose that the audience was familiar with it. The existence of this narrative convention is fully argued and exhaustively documented in Stein 2018.

[46] The biblical composers were demonstrably capable of telling their audience when a character did *not* recognize someone (e.g., Gen 19:33, 35; 27:23; 38:16; 42:8).

[47] The OO construal yields a picture that is "strange and singular in the Old Testament," says Von Rad—who adopted it anyway (1973:204). The term "fog" has been applied to this story by Kugel (2003, 2017).

In short, a strong cognitive headwind would have discouraged the ancient audience from construing these texts as posited by the OO interpretation. Cognitively speaking, the OO view is highly implausible as a plain-sense interpretation.[48] Therefore I will now proceed to assess an alternative plain-sense reading of this scene that dates back some nine centuries: Yahweh is being represented by agents whom Abraham recognizes immediately as such..[49] The question now is whether the present study's view of אִישׁ supports that alternative construal as readily yielding a coherent and informative text.

Audience Expectations and the Agency Sense of Our Noun. The first step in my analysis is to account for the expectations that the audience reliably brings to its encounter with verse 2. This warrants our revisiting verse 1. By all accounts, its initial clause sets up an expectation for the audience—a promise to be fulfilled as the story progresses. That promise is a function of the opening verb, the Niphal stem of *r-'-h*. As noted, it is conventionally rendered in this passage as 'appeared'. However, in the Bible that is actually a highly unusual meaning of this Niphal verb when it is applied to persons (whether human or divine).[50] Its most common semantic contribution is more abstract: to indicate *the advent of a communication event*.[51] Hence that is at least one of the meanings that the audience would reliably apply, upon encountering the verb.

Furthermore, due to our opening verb's semantics, the completion of its denoted action in the story is a matter of *the recipient's apperception*.[52] No appearance or contact can occur until Abraham actually notices it as such. Thus as long as the verb's action remains in the story as unfinished business, the audience's text processing will seek a construal that enables this condition to be met at the first possible opportunity. It will look for a reason to understand that Abraham somehow has had that realization—which is the narrator's promise.[53]

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[48] Nonetheless, the biblical scholars cited above (note 42) have made a virtue out of the apparent incoherence—perceiving it as intentional and instructive.

[49] Rashbam (12th c.) at Gen 18:2; Ḥizz'kuni (13th c.) at v. 2; Naḥmanides (13th c.) at v. 3; Baḥya ben Asher (13th c.) at v. 2; Benno Jacob (1934) at vv. 1–2.

[50] As Fuhs states in *TDOT*, our verb always "remains epistemological" (1977:229). See Stein 2018:585–87 for a semantic analysis of the 63 relevant biblical instances of Niphal *r-'-h*.

[51] Before two parties can communicate, the first party must *signal an intent* to communicate, and the second party must *notice* that the other party indeed intends to communicate. I.e., both parties are necessarily involved from the beginning. Communication commences only after both parties agree to communicate.

Niphal *r-'-h* indicates this *advent stage* of communication in more than two-thirds of its attested biblical instances—in other words, by default. See previous note.

[52] Given that the *advent stage* of communication includes the recipient's recognition of the sender's identity, and that our verb indicates that stage by default (see previous note for both points), then its use implies that the receiving party recognizes the sender's identity. One could call this a lexical presupposition.

[53] Stein 2018:554–55 shows how Abraham's recognition is expected imminently by verse 2.

Meanwhile, the verb's activation of a communication frame would have entrained various associated commonplaces about how communication is carried out. In particular, the ancient Israelites were well aware that it could be enacted via an agent, especially someone who serves as a messenger.[54] Indeed, Genesis has already depicted Israel's deity as messaging with another member of Abraham's household (namely Hagar, 16:7–14).[55]

In other words, the possibility of Yahweh's recourse to messaging in the present instance would have been a highly available concept.[56] And consequently, if a party were to show up who—it could be safely assumed—was representing the deity's interests, then this would qualify as having fulfilled the promise of the opening clause in verse 1.

Now we can assess the contribution of אֲנָשִׁים in verse 2 on the informational level. Because verse 1 has set up an agency frame (in potential), the label would be both germane and informative if taken in the sense of 'the (salient) participants' = 'agents'.

> Verse 1:   ▲ = Abraham + Yahweh + **Incipient communication**
> Verses 1–2a: ▲ = Abraham + Yahweh + אֲנָשִׁים (**Agents**)

That is, the audience would assume their role as messengers from the stated situation—namely, that a communication event is underway.[57]

Accounting for the Choice of a General-Noun Label.   Thus far I have addressed what an audience's automatic processing of the prior text would predict. However, generally speaking, audiences base their construal of a noun's referential use not only upon that prediction, but also upon considering what alternative terms are known to be available (§1.6.4). In effect, the audience's text processing now asks of verse 2: *What communicative goal is being satisfied by the use of this particular label, as opposed to another label within the same semantic field?*

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[54] Agency was an entrenched cognitive domain in ancient Israel. It was often legally and morally binding. Moreover, it was integral to society; the dispatching of agents was an everyday occurrence—for commerce, diplomacy, family relations, and military need. It was a highly *available* frame of reference (Stein 2018).

[55] For a plain-sense analysis that rules out Yahweh's presence on the scene of the angel's encounter with Hagar, see Stein forthcoming.

[56] Granted that this possibility is less obvious to contemporary readers. See above, note 34.

[57] My reconstruction of the audience's construal of אֲנָשִׁים in Gen 18:2 is supported by six similar cases. In these other biblical passages, agents who facilitate communication are introduced into the narrative via similar wording (including *wǝ·hinnēh*): Josh 5:13; 2 Sam 18:24; Ezek 40:3; Zech 1:8; 2:5; Dan 10:5. All of those agents are initially labeled as אִישׁ. As discussed, §5.4.8 predicts that this would be the optimal label (compared to *malʾāk* 'messenger') when the referent's having a mission (of some kind) is *clear from the context*. That prediction appears to be borne out: in Joshua, a mission is evident from the opening depiction of that figure as wielding a sword; in Samuel, from the depiction of his running alone; in Ezekiel, from the depiction of him as holding implements; in Zechariah 1, from the depiction of him as being mounted on a horse; in Zechariah 2, from the depiction of him as holding a measuring line; and in Daniel, from the notice in 10:1 that an oracle is anticipated. Indeed, a disclosure of information is expected in all cases.

To address that question in the case of אֲנָשִׁים in Gen 18:2, let us consider a likely alternative label, the very one that is later applied (19:1, 15) to two of these same visitors: *malʾākîm* ('messengers, angels').[58] What if it had been used already here, in 18:2?

<div align="center">

וְהִנֵּה שְׁלֹשָׁה מַלְאָכִים נִצָּבִים עָלָיו

</div>

<div align="center">

*and behold, three <u>messengers</u> were standing in front of him.

</div>

Whose messengers would they be? The audience would conclude that they were Yahweh's agents, because communication with Abraham is already anticipated. However, this usage of the noun would be construed as conspicuous: it is more specific than necessary.[59] Overspecification in this context would call attention to what distinguishes a *messenger* from an *agent* in general: the dynamic state of being currently tasked with a mission. (Mere agents seem to represent their principal in a more vague, ongoing, or stationary manner.) Nonetheless, the fact that these visitors are on a mission can already be inferred from the situation. So the text's composer(s) employed the unmarked—and therefore expected—label, for it is *optimally* informative.[60] It is enough to call these referents אֲנָשִׁים, because in context that label will anyway be construed as 'agents'—that is, as facilitators of communication between Yahweh and Abraham.

Connecting the Dots.   To review, the audience has gained enough data to form an associative cluster that "connects the dots" into a recognizable narrative picture. The introduction of אֲנָשִׁים coincides with Yahweh's having undertaken a communications initiative. What links those two parties is the familiar messaging script.[61] Yahweh and the new party each correspond to a respective main role in that script. So as usual, the whole script is mentally activated. The audience confirms agency (specifically, messaging) as the frame of reference for this story's opening. It also tags Yahweh and the visitors with their roles as "principal" and as "agents," respectively.

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[58] Another candidate noun is *gəbārîm* ("men, gentlemen, nobles"). If this had been the chosen label, the audience would entertain the suspicion that the visitors might be Yahweh's agents (based on prediction). However, their advent on the scene would remain just one more circumstantial piece of evidence; all of the open questions would remain open until later in the story.

[59] See above, §5.4.8. This consideration thus nuances the blanket statement in *NIDOTTE*: "The lexemes אֲנָשִׁים/אִישׁ are used interchangeably with מַלְאָכִים/מַלְאָךְ, angel(s)/messenger(s)" (Hamilton 1997:390).

[60] To introduce a referent following the discourse marker *wə·hinnēh* 'and behold', the Bible uses not only the default noun אֲנָשִׁים (as here in 18:2), but also the term *malʾāk*: Gen 28:12 (Jacob's dream); 1 Kgs 19:5 (feeding Elijah); and Zech 2:7 (prophetic vision). However, in contrast with the present case, the messenger's advent is *not* predictable in those situations. Predictability (also called givenness; see above, §5.4.8) alters the calculus of the pragmatic import of a noun's usage.

[61] In cognitive linguistics, computer science, and social psychology, a *script* is the culturally shared outline of what participants normally do and say at each stage in a certain frequently recurring sequence of events. It applies to routine procedures. See MacDonald 1992:160; Ungerer and Schmid 2006:207–17.

This construal of אֲנָשִׁים, which arises from the pragmatic enrichment of our noun's semantic potential as '(salient) participants', enables the audience to conclude that the narrator has employed the opening verb to depict the advent of communication—just as predicted, given the verb's conventional usage. And because one essential element in establishing communication is that Abraham *recognize these visitors as Yahweh's messengers*, the audience infers that this must be the case. Thus the narrator's opening promise has been fulfilled.

The messaging script, combined with the selected construal of אֲנָשִׁים, now enables answers to the pressing questions that the narrative has raised: *How will the deity communicate with Abraham?* Ah, via these three agents. *When will Yahweh establish communication?* Right now.

In short, construing אֲנָשִׁים as 'agents' readily yields a coherent and informative text. (This coherence is then reinforced as the story proceeds.[62]) This finding vindicates the centuries-old minority interpretation of this passage.[63] Furthermore, it has leveraged a workhorse noun, in order to resolve a major interpretive crux in the book of Genesis.[64]

7.6 Summary

Given that workhorse human nouns are highly mutable (context-dependent), their meaning contribution is more a matter of pragmatics than semantics. In order to grasp how context impacts the meaning of אִישׁ, I have employed the model known as pragmatic enrichment (or pragmatic strengthening).

As predicted by the theory (§5.6), I found that such enrichment sometimes enhanced our noun's lexical side; at other times, enrichment brought out its grammatical side. On the lexical side, two kinds of results were evident. One kind consists of relational *ad-hoc* contextual meanings, such as regularly appear in procedural texts to invoke the presence

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[62] Commentators who advance the minority interpretation (above, note 43, second paragraph) have observed that the subsequent details in verses 2b–5 readily align with the conclusion that Abraham has already recognized his visitors. Abraham behaves just as would be expected of a devotee who knowingly encounters his deity's representatives. Furthermore, when the latter do convey a message (starting in v. 10), the situation is consistent with existing conventions (above, note 45); the audience has no cause to doubt that Abraham is aware that those words are spoken in his deity's name. On an additional narrative convention that meanwhile reliably prompted the audience to construe the name *Yhwh* in v. 13 as referring most directly to Yahweh's *agent*, see Stein forthcoming.

[63] See above, note 43, second paragraph. Stein 2018 provides further validation by confirming also that construing אִישׁ as 'agent' in another famous crux, Gen 32:25, likewise promptly yields a coherent and informative text—and not only in that passage itself, but also in Gen 32:2–3 (a third crux, albeit one that does not directly involve אִישׁ).

[64] When we conclude that Abraham did recognize whom he was dealing with, it also alters the narrative's theological import. A deity that had seemed enigmatic according to the OO construal can instead be seen as supportive—showing loyalty to Abraham and Sarah.

of a new and necessary participant. Another example is the juridical settings in which the determined noun phrase הָאֲנָשִׁים, as applied to the guilty party, is enriched from 'those involved' to 'the perpetrators'. The other kind consists of *conventionalized* relational usages that have become lexical senses, such as 'husband/wife' and 'agent'.

Situations involving agency provide ample opportunity for אִישׁ as label for the 'salient party to a prototypical situation' to be reanalyzed as 'agent'. That construal is readily available even when the referent (labeled as אִישׁ) is simply acting as an agent would be expected to act. Cognitively speaking, a newly appointed agent is the *participant's participant* within the given situation. When a workhorse noun is pragmatically enriched to 'agent', its meaning contribution is highly schematic.

I offered supporting evidence to show that אִישׁ is the preferred label for an agent when the agency role is already clearly given. I also adduced a set of passages that evoke an agency frame, and which are rendered *more coherent and informative* if an agency sense is assumed. (These cases include the resolution of significant interpretive cruxes.) Therefore I conclude that 'agent' was a recognized lexical sense in Ancient Hebrew—albeit still underrecognized in modern scholarship.

8 A Pathway to Pronoun-Like Function

Die Worte zunächst nicht als Lautgefässe mit bestimmtem Inhalte
erlernt werden, sondern also Miteel zu bestimmten Zwecken.[1]

—Philipp Wegener (1885:72)

This chapter responds to the prediction (§5.7.9) that the communicative and cognitive factors behind workhorse human nouns can account even for their more evidently "grammatical" behaviors. It will show that the pronoun-like usages simply reflect the way that workhorses operate across the board.

I will first treat usage that resembles indefinite pronouns in other languages, in *nonspecific* reference.[2] Then I will discuss our noun's distributive usages, and lastly reciprocal usages. In other words, I will focus on our noun's SAIN usages (see above, §7.2.3).[3]

8.1 Introduction to Indefinite Pronoun–Like Usage

As noted in Chapter 3, some scholars have labeled אִישׁ in many cases as either "a pronoun" or tantamount to one. I will examine these cases, beginning with the resemblance to *indefinite* pronouns, as a baseline. The words in that grammatical category that are applied to persons may be typified by English *anyone/anybody* (or by *someone/somebody*, in its nonspecific reading). Their main function is to express the making of reference via *indefinite deixis*;[4] generally speaking, this signals that the referent is identifiable to the speaker

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[1] "Words are not primarily learnt as phonetic vessels with a clearly delineated content, but as instruments with a specific goal" (transl. Geeraerts 2010:21).

[2] Haspelmath has advanced a carefully developed and precise distinction between specific and nonspecific reference (1997:109). It draws upon the cognitive linguist Gilles Fauconnier's model of "mental spaces." According to Haspelmath, a *nonspecific* phrase has a referent only in a dependent space that is either of the irrealis or distributive type, whereas a *specific* phrase has a referent also in some other space (typically, the main one, which represents the real world of the speaker).

[3] According to Hopper and Thompson 1984, the degree of typically noun-like behavior is a matter of pragmatic (communicative) need. A noun that is used to make nonspecific reference—that is, to a *class* of entities that is abstracted from experience ("whoever fits the description")—can be expected to have fewer of the classic noun trappings than usual. We should expect such nouns to appear in the *singular* rather than in the plural, and to be bare (absolute) rather than combined with genitives, possessives, or appositives.

[4] Indefinite deixis is relational: it creates a mental space in which other similar referents can co-exist. As the cognitive linguist Günter Radden has explained: "In [indefinite] individuative reference, … the speaker refers to a single nonspecific instance and at the same time presupposes that there is at least one more element within a pragmatically defined set that is excluded [from the immediate reference]" (1999:202). Cognitively speaking, such deixis sets up an implicit metonymic *association* with other potential referents that

but is not believed to be identifiable to the hearer (Haspelmath 1997).[5] In the biblical text, the principal way of referring to an unspecified, representative person is to use the noun אִישׁ.[6]

Everyone.   The expression כָּל־אִישׁ is the typical biblical equivalent to *everyone*, although it can also have the nuance of *everyone else*, *no one*, or *anyone*, depending upon the context.[7] Semantically speaking, it transparently combines the range-setting term *kōl* 'all' (akin to a "universal quantifier" in logical [or: formal] semantics), with the individuating function of אִישׁ. With this expression, the applied individuation thus ranges without prejudice across the set of relevant entities, each of which is seen as related to the others, and to the depicted situation. One example is when Joseph the vizier moves to reveal his identity to his brothers (Gen 45:1):

הוֹצִיאוּ כָל־אִישׁ מֵעָלָי

"Clear out every<u>one</u> around me!"   (Alter)

In construing such usages, the audience can simply rely upon the underspecified lexical concept of 'party [etc.]'. The cognitive motivation is then direct and straightforward. In short, this compound evokes an utterly normal and relational usage of our noun.

Anyone and no one.   I treat these two meanings together because my impression is that the audience must process them both in the same manner.[8] I focus on the *anyone* usages because they are the least apparent from word forms alone. I will ask: how did אִישׁ come to be used this way? What was the cognitive motivation and the pragmatic derivation?[9]

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are presupposed to exist (the same "reference class")—which in turn makes them readily accessible in the audience's discourse model.

[5] I.e., indefiniteness is not a property of words but rather of how they are deployed to point to their referent. Others (Van der Merwe et al. 2017:309; Moshavi 2018:43n5) have pointed out that indefinite pronouns might be more accurately termed *quantifiers* (in analogy with what that term indicates in logical semantics), for they do not signal that the referent is as highly accessible within the discourse model as true pronouns do. Quantifier terminology would better reflect the primal individuating function of אִישׁ (§§5.3.1, start of §6.3). Nonetheless, I call them *pronouns*, both because that is standard in biblical scholarship, which is based on grammatical tradition, and in analogy to how they are usually rendered into English.

[6] Alternatively, as noted in grammars (e.g., Van der Merwe et al. 2017:312), the text occasionally indicates a nonspecific referent via a third-person verb that lacks a specified subject (e.g., Gen 48:1). On the exceptional use of the personal nouns *ādām* and *nepeš* (rather than אִישׁ) with indefinite pronoun–like function in Leviticus, see below at note 35.

[7] This expression occurs 15 times with (masc. singular) אִישׁ (Even-Shoshan 1982a:51). See also Job 12:10.

[8] By Alison Grant's count (1977; see above, Table 1.2), there are 574 occurrences in which אִישׁ describes 'anyone' (or 'no one'), or more than a third of the 1,660 biblical instances of masculine אִישׁ. Even-Shoshan's concordance lists 101 instances that correspond to 'no one', per the count by Eng (2011:98).

[9] I rely mainly on Martin Haspelmath's magisterial study of indefinite pronouns (1997) and Adina Moshavi's investigation of the general noun *dābār* 'thing' in Biblical Hebrew (2018).

8.2 'Anyone'

8.2.1 Unmarked and marked usages

While invitations for pragmatic enrichment remain common, אִישׁ has also developed a distinct meaning during its SAIN usage. Our noun is regularly deployed in lieu of an indefinite pronoun, while acting quite normally as a workhorse noun.

Indefinite pronoun–like usage takes advantage of a workhorse noun's prowess as an individuator, in order to prompt the inference that an entire class is in view. True, a full-class denotation can be implied also with other nouns. Take, for example, a well-known American English clause: "not <u>a creature</u> was stirring."[10] It mentions merely *one* creature as not moving, yet the inference drawn is that *none* of them were.[11] What a workhorse human noun offers is high efficiency within the human domain.

To accomplish this, the workhorse noun must be used in its singular form, with indefinite deixis, in nonspecific reference, and without a modifier (cf. Haspelmath 1997:182). For example, in Gen 13:16, Yahweh's promise to Abram of descendants too numerous to count mentions literally only one nonspecific party:

אֲשֶׁר | אִם־יוּכַל אִישׁ לִמְנוֹת אֶת־עֲפַר הָאָרֶץ

…so that if <u>one</u> can count the dust of the earth…   (ESV)

The audience then conventionally construes such usage via enrichment, based on the contextual cue: the lone referent who is indicated must represent the whole class of "potential counters of dust particles." After all, *any one of them* might satisfy the stated condition.

Conversely—yet reached via similar inferencing—a similar construction with our noun can implicate "any and every" member of the applicable class. This is exemplified by a rousing prediction that Jonathan made about his compatriot David (1 Sam 20:15).[12]

וְלֹא בְהַכְרֵת יְיָ אֶת־אֹיְבֵי דָוִד אִישׁ מֵעַל פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה:

…even if the LORD were to cut off <u>every one</u> of the enemies of David
from the face of the earth.   (NRSV)

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[10] From "A Visit from St. Nicholas," a poem about Christmas Eve, first published anonymously in 1823.

[11] Moshavi persuasively argues that "a negative clause with *any singular indefinite noun* in Biblical Hebrew can produce a minimizing implication, given an appropriate context" (2018:55–56; emphasis added).

[12] Here the enrichment is prompted by the verb *k-r-t* (in the Hiphil stem) 'cut off'. (Similarly: 1 Sam 2:33; Jer 44:7; in the Niphal stem, 1 Kgs 2:4; 8:25; 9:5; Jer 33:17, 18; 35:19; Obad 1:9; 2 Chr 6:16; 7:18.) This verb's semantics involve a type of individuation from a group—in this case, via removal. That is, what this verb puts into play is *the individual's participation in that group*—the very issue that אִישׁ highlights so well (see Chapter 4). Another "individuating" verb is *š-'-r* (in the Niphal or Hiphil stems) 'remain [behind]; remain [alive]'; see Josh 8:17; 1 Sam 14:36; 2 Kgs 10:14, 21. For additional such verbs whose semantics likewise prompt the pragmatic enrichment of אִישׁ, see Deut 23:11; Judg 2:21; 1 Sam 27:9, 11; 2 Kgs 10:5; Jer 22:30; 2 Chr 6:5.

According to standard linguistic models, such a construal occurs automatically in the audience's mind via pragmatic enrichment (or per relevance theory: during the automatic search for optimal relevance). This particular type of enrichment has been called a *scalar implicature*.[13] The enrichment is undertaken because the utterances that employ generic nouns under such conditions are "simply uninformative unless they are given a scalar-endpoint interpretation" (Haspelmath 1997:227).

Such usages arise in what grammarians and linguists call *non-affirmative* (or *non-assertive*) contexts—which includes all utterances aside from claims that something is the case or actually existed or happened (Haspelmath 1997:33–37; Pullum and Huddleston 2002:834–38; Giacolone Ramat and Sansò 2007:101, 106–8; cf. Moshavi 2018:44).[14] Consequently, any discussion of what *could* or *should* exist (or happen), or what *might have* existed (or happened), or what did *not* exist (or happen)—as in the aforementioned depiction of Moses' apparent concern to ensure the absence of witnesses to his version of justice—is a ripe context for using generic nouns such as אִישׁ in a pronoun-like manner.

For any referring expression, its SAIN usages will always be in *non-affirmative* contexts.[15] The type of word or phrase that regularly gets enriched in that kind of communication environment has been called a *negative polarity item* (NPI; as in English *anyone*).[16] Although not all nonspecific usages prompt enrichment (i.e., generate a scalar-endpoint interpretation), these do.[17] Our noun is often used in this fashion.

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[13] That is, the whole scale of conceivable quantities is implicated by mentioning only the lowest point on that scale (Lewis 2013:26–112; Potts 2015:179–80).

[14] The archetype of a non-affirmative context is negation. The category also includes questions, conditional clauses, commands, predictions, proposals, preferences (as with jussive verb forms), modal evaluations, generalizations (such as proverbs), and more. Pullum and Huddleston (2002) and Hoeksema (2012:15–24, 29) discuss many further nuances, such as expressions of counter-expectation. In any case, the basic principle is that the speaker's audience automatically seeks to construe the utterance *so as to yield coherent and informative communication*.

[15] This linguistic generalization applies to normal usage. (Exploitation of lexical norms for expressive effect remains a possibility.) Conversely, if a speaker utters an affirmation that something is (or was) *real*, then a *specific* reference must be intended. As the linguist William Croft put it, "a nonspecific reading requires a domain of possibilities for it to range over. [In contrast,] a specific reading … requires a real … object as a referent" (1983:28–29).

[16] Pullum and Huddleston (2002) prefer to use the term *negatively-oriented polarity-sensitive items*, which is less elliptical—but also ponderous. For his part, Haspelmath commends the term *scale reversal items* (1997:34n8). Since the standard abbreviation *NPI* is already part of biblical scholarship (Moshavi 2018), I will use it as the most expedient notation.

[17] Enrichment is not prompted in SAIN usages where the stated goal is to identify or to characterize someone in terms of desired qualities, a role, or a task (e.g., Gen 41:33, 38; 1 Sam 16:16–17; 17:8–10; 28:7). In such usages, אִישׁ is fulfilling a local discourse function: introducing the (nonspecific) participant, while attaching situating or elaborating information (§§5.4.1–2).

So that the text's prompting for enrichment is evident, let me offer at least one example of אִישׁ in four different environments in which NPIs are known to thrive: negation, questions, initial conditions (protases), and comparatives.[18] The previous two examples (Exod 2:12; 1 Sam 20:15) were cases of *negation*.[19] An example of a *question* is articulated by King David when he expresses concern about his ability to abide by an agreement that he had made with Jonathan (2 Sam 9:3):[20]

וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ הַאֶפֶס עוֹד אִישׁ לְבֵית שָׁאוּל וְאֶעֱשֶׂה עִמּוֹ חֶסֶד אֱלֹהִים

The king continued, "Is there <u>anyone</u> left of the house of Saul with whom I can keep faith as pledged before God?"   (NJPS)

As for *conditional clauses*, Elijah articulates a pair of them in two juxtaposed directives to his assistant—using our noun as grammatical object and subject, respectively (2 Kgs 4:29):[21]

כִּי־תִמְצָא אִישׁ לֹא תְבָרְכֶנּוּ וְכִי־יְבָרֶכְךָ אִישׁ לֹא תַעֲנֶנּוּ

"If you meet <u>anyone</u>, do not greet him;
and if <u>anyone</u> greets you, do not reply."   (ESV)

Again, in each case the utterance mentions only *one* party—which the audience's mind automatically enriches to include *all* salient parties of the depicted type.

My final NPI-usage example employs אִישׁ as a *standard of comparison* (Prov 30:2):[22]

כִּי בַעַר אָנֹכִי מֵאִישׁ וְלֹא־בִינַת אָדָם לִי׃

Surely I am more stupid than <u>anyone else</u>; I lack common sense.

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[18] For אִישׁ as an NPI in a generalization, see, e.g., Gen 2:24; Exod 18:16; 33:11; Deut 1:31; 8:5; Amos 5:19; Mal 3:17; in a command, Num 31:17; in a prediction, Obad 1:9; in a proposal, Gen 41:33; in a procedural instruction, Num 19:9, 18.

[19] Likewise with the negator לֹא: Gen 41:44; Deut 34:6; 1 Sam 12:4; and many others.

[20] Compare the rendering by Van der Merwe and colleagues via a noun: *Then the king asked, "Is there not another <u>person</u> of the house of Saul left…?"* (2017:460). The NJPS choice of a pronoun seems to better reflect what seems to be the standard pragmatic enrichment ("scalar implicature") of a workhorse noun in a question context. That recognition then leads NJPS to construe the ambiguous word *ʿôd* in terms of the passage of time (as in Jer 31:34) rather than as a predication about the referent ('another'; as in 1 Kgs 22:8).

[21] The construction *kî YIQṬÔL ʾîš* 'when anyone [has undertaken something]' occurs 23 times, of which all but 2 appear in the Torah. In regulatory contexts, it serves as a casuistic-law formula. It is prominent in the Covenant Code within the book of Exodus. Other frequently used conditional constructions are governed by the most common conditional particle, *ʾim* 'if' (e.g., Gen 13:16); alternatively, a relative clause sets a qualifying condition on the utterance (e.g., Lev 15:18; 27:28; Num 5:30; Isa 36:6). Still other conditional clauses are more subtle, as in Exod 21:16 and Deut 29:17.

[22] In terms of information structure, the first clause is arranged with predicate focus, which has the effect of confirming the nature of the discourse-active subject—namely the speaker (cf. Van der Merwe et al. 2017: 509–10). The rendering of the second clause is taken from NJPS. Another "standard of comparison" construction appears in Isa 52:14.

Emphatic Usage.   Occasionally, the text treats our noun's automatic enrichment as somehow noteworthy in itself—not to be taken lightly. Haspelmath calls this *emphatic NPI* usage, without defining it more precisely. (To give an example in terms of the previously quoted snippet "not a creature was stirring," emphatic usage would be like stressing one's articulation of the noun phrase "a creature" so as to convey that—contrary to expectation—"not even a single creature" moved a muscle.) He observes that the comparative type of utterance is always emphatic (as in the example just above); emphatic expression is optional in negations, questions, and conditional utterances (1997:125).

In the Bible, this kind of emphasis is widely evident. It is expressed mainly in three similar and evidently conventionalized ways, as follows.[23]

- Marking אִישׁ for *constituent focus* via fronting (Jer 38:24):[24]

וַיֹּאמֶר צִדְקִיָּהוּ אֶל־יִרְמְיָהוּ אִישׁ אַל־יֵדַע בַּדְּבָרִים־הָאֵלֶּה וְלֹא תָמוּת׃

[King] Zedekiah said to Jeremiah, "Don't let <u>anyone [at all]</u> know about this conversation, or you will die." {NJPS}

- Marking אִישׁ for *announcing a topic* via fronted dislocation (Lev 13:29):[25]

וְאִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה כִּי־יִהְיֶה בוֹ נָגַע

When <u>any man or woman at all</u> [among the Israelites] has a disease.…

- *Repeating* אִישׁ in a phrase that is (like the preceding) marked for announcing a topic via fronted dislocation (Lev 18:6):[26]

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[23] These three approaches to emphatic expression will be discussed further in the next section. In addition, a fourth and more rare approach employs אִישׁ (in SAIN usage) as pointedly indicating any member of a specified group (via the preposition בְּ 'in, among'), rather than simply mentioning the group in question. The pragmatically enriched result of this "extra" workhorse noun is akin to "(not) a single one." This usage is attested only four times, all in Deuteronomistic works: Deut 1:35; 2 Sam 19:23; 21:4; 1 Kgs 3:13.

[24] Here, the king is underscoring that his plan requires total confidentiality. (On constituent focus, see Van der Merwe et al. 2017:502.) This emphatic construction conventionally combines אִישׁ with a jussive verb conjugation. See similarly with this same verb: 1 Sam 21:3; Jer 36:19; and with other verbs: Exod 16:19; Exod 34:3; 1 Kgs 18:40; 2 Kgs 10:19, 25; 23:18; Hos 4:4. (Contrast these jussive constructions with ordinary sortal nouns in post-verbal position—which generate no scalar implicatures: 2 Kgs 9:15; Isa 56:3; Jer 9:22; 46:6; Ps 9:20; 2 Chr 14:10.) For the emphatic fronting of אִישׁ with the negator לֹא: Gen 23:6; 24:16; Exod 34:3; 1 Sam 2:33; Isa 40:26; Jer 40:15; 41:4; Ezek 18:7, 16; 44:2; Hos 2:12; Zech 2:4; Est 9:2. With the negator אֵין, see below.

[25] This formula is characteristic of Priestly regulations—it appears in Leviticus, Numbers, and Ezekiel. Including אִשָּׁה, there are 27 such instances. (I follow Tania Notarius [2013] in preferring the term *fronted dislocation* to the more typologically normative term *left dislocation*, given that in written Hebrew the dislocation actually appears toward the right.)

[26] Occurring 13 times (thus accounting for 26 instances of אִישׁ), this appears to be a Priestly locution; it appears in the tabernacle portion of Exodus, as well as in Leviticus, Numbers, and Ezekiel.

אִישׁ אִישׁ אֶל־כָּל־שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ לֹא תִקְרְבוּ לְגַלּוֹת עֶרְוָה אֲנִי יְיָ׃

"Not a single, solitary one of you [men] shall come near anyone
of his own flesh to uncover nakedness: I am Yahweh."

8.2.2 The puzzle of fronted repetition on the informational level

Fronted repetition, as in the immediately preceding example, is difficult to comprehend
on the informational level. If our noun instead appeared only once, its meaning would
nonetheless be distributed across the set of potential referents and construed as 'anyone'
(or, under negation, as '[not] one'). So, what does the added אִישׁ contribute? Compare
this doubling of אִישׁ with that of other doubled nouns. For sortal nouns such as *zāhāb*
'gold', the force of doubling is transparent; it iconically evokes that metal's need for pro-
gressive refinement—and so indicates a more intense version of the usually denoted enti-
ty. Hence: *zāhāb zāhāb* = 'pure gold' (2 Kgs 25:15). As for *gēbîm* 'pools of water',
doubling clearly operates along another cognitive line of association: it evokes an iconic
multiplication of quantity. Hence: *gēbîm gēbîm* = 'full of pools' (2 Kgs 3:16; NJPS; NRSV;
ESV).[27] But what is אִישׁ אִישׁ supposed to indicate?[28]

The fronting of אִישׁ directs the audience to pay special attention to *how* they are filling
the slot in their minds for the key participant that this noun refers to. Such emphasis can
further communicative goals.[29] For example—taking the many Priestly locutions as ex-
emplars—let us suppose that the Priestly composers wish to highlight the significance of
certain (mis)deeds, while placing responsibility squarely upon each member of the cove-
nant community. That goal can be accomplished by prompting the text's audience to con-
struct its model of the depicted situations *around the hypothetical participant* (and by do-
ing so repeatedly). Hence it is efficient to articulate אִישׁ up front.[30]

In other words, the emphatic-NPI usages can be seen as a predictable outcome of
communicative need. It reflects the normal usage of אִישׁ to perform discourse functions,
while allowing pragmatic enrichment on the informational level. And this strategy—the
efficient framing of a situation by highlighting its key participant—is useful not only for
priests. Indeed, Lot's eldest daughter fronts our noun אִישׁ so as to emphasize the *lack* of a

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[27] Cf. on word repetition in Waltke and O'Connor 1990:116, 119, citing these two examples, among others.

[28] The traditional answers are unsatisfying. Gesenius and Kautzsch offer no more than the general observa-
tion that the point of repetition is "to express a plurality of living beings … especially to express entirety, or
in a distributive sense" (1910:394–95). So also Joüon 2006:468. Similarly, Milgrom (at Lev 17:3) com-
ments: "This idiom is distributive in meaning" (2000:1453). That is, he treats the doubling as semantically
opaque, leaving unclear how he understands it to "distribute" differently from the singleton.

[29] Fronting allows a speaker to address the audience's epistemic perspective (Givón 2018:36).

[30] A speaker's attending to an additional discourse function via fronting does not compromise the audi-
ence's construal of the (Priestly) text's instructional information, nor does it hinder their process of prag-
matic enrichment. For as noted in §2.3, all levels of meaning are activated together in the audience's mind.

key participant, as she infamously prepares to propose to her sister that they take extreme measures (Gen 19:31):[31]

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אָבִינוּ זָקֵן וְאִישׁ אֵין בָּאָרֶץ לָבוֹא עָלֵינוּ כְּדֶרֶךְ כָּל־הָאָרֶץ:

</div>

"Our father is old, and there is no <u>other (potential) participant</u> on earth
to consort with us in the way of all the world."   {NJPS}

My adaptation of NJPS rendering is hyperliteral for clarity. This is a SAIN usage in a non-affirmative context, so our noun must be construed as an NPI. In order to be consistent with our treatment of other NPI usages, interpretation must begin with the "thin semantics" of 'party [etc.]'. That is, the speaker is expressly concerned with finding someone to *participate* with her as needed for her to meet her goal, which is producing offspring.

Of course, the audience consciously reads אִישׁ simply as 'man'. But even here, in the context of sexual reproduction (cf. §6.9.1), pragmatic enrichment of our noun can account for the sortal meaning 'adult male'.[32] (As with construal in general, the contextually based interpretive process is automatic and unconscious.)

In sum, as predicted, the "anyone" usage of אִישׁ can be explained on the basis of the same discourse functions that it is drafted to serve everywhere: as a cognitive "(re)start" button, and as a mooring for one corner of the basic relational triangle in situations.

As for the Priestly use of repetition (אִישׁ אִישׁ), it is best understood as urging the audience to compound the individuation-oriented enrichment.[33] That is, it makes an issue of

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[31] I use the term "fronting" loosely in applying it to a clause without a finite verb. The case that our noun is marked for constituent focus here is that it precedes the negator אֵין in only one other passage (1 Sam 21:2), whereas it follows that negator in thirteen passages (e.g., Exod 2:12, above). The former two cases seem distinctive in expressing that the situation at hand is extraordinary as a matter of degree: 'not a single one'.

[32] As a matter of semantic extension, this case exemplifies how the meaning 'adult male' could have become conventionalized over time as a distinct contextual sense. See above, §5.5.3.

[33] The license for such emphasis is evident due to where it appears: in each case in which the doubled-noun phrase begins a dictum, the consequences of disregarding that dictum are serious—even deadly. Yet there are other Priestly regulations—some of which are textually proximate—whose violation likewise has severe consequences, yet they are not so marked. I.e., the topic's "seriousness" appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the doubling of אִישׁ.

The already well-documented use of singleton אִישׁ to perform both discourse and information functions at the same time leads me to predict that paired אִישׁ would also function on both levels of meaning. In addition to giving emphasis, it would have a structural role—it would organize the text into a pattern of sections. As a matter of fact, the distribution of this attention-getting device correlates highly with the findings of Moshe Kline's research on the tabular nature of the Torah's literary structure (2019). Of the 13 אִישׁ pairs, 12 arguably serve to structure certain textual sections, which Kline has labeled IX, XI, XII, XIV, and XVI in Leviticus, as well as section II in Numbers. The fact that Kline has marked אִישׁ pairs as a structuring device only in XVI ("parallel between cells in the same column") is telling. It means that the surmised structuring role of our noun's usage is *mutually reinforcing* with those of the various other devices that Kline treated as diagnostic. According to his schema, the sole Pentateuchal instance of (non-distributional) paired

the *need* on the discourse level to range across the full scale of individuated members of the set of potential participants. On the informational level, this yields a meaning that is matched by a similarly redundant English expression: '[not] a single solitary one'.[34]

8.2.3 Making sense of the apparent exceptions in Priestly texts

In order to verify our hypothesis, we need to address some apparent exceptions. Among the conditional protases of the Priestly regulations (i.e., a non-affirmational context), alongside the predominance of אִישׁ—in its SAIN usage—as the normal label for the main participant, three other personal-noun labels are employed instead in 13 cases. They are: *'ādām* 'human' (Lev 1:2; 13:2; Num 19:14), *nepeš* 'person' (Lev 2:1; 4:2; 5:1, 4, 15, 17, 21; 7:21), and *kol-nepeš* (Lev 7:27; 17:12). Can these anomalous usages with sortal nouns be convincingly explained?[35]

The answer is yes, due to the nature of these depicted situations. Nearly all of them lack the need for a formal determination—a forensic procedure of some kind—that warrants the proceedings then described in the text. That is, the conditions that initiate the matter either are clearly evident to everyone, or are evident possibly only to the referent himself or herself.[36]

אִישׁ that lacks an obvious structuring role is in Num 9:10. Cf. the more restricted structural role for אִישׁ אִישׁ in Leviticus 17–18 as asserted by Cassuto ([1947] 1973:3).

[34] In that respect, this device is like the English phrase *any and every*. On the informational level, either element of this phrase would suffice on its own. In my experience, the combined term provides reassurance with regard to anxiety-producing topics. A banner example appears in the title of a recent online magazine article: "How to find the perfect dress for any and every type of wedding" (*Good Morning America* 2018).

[35] Of these 13 cases, all but two (Lev 17:12; Num 19:14) appear in Leviticus 1–16 and are therefore discussed in Shectman 2019. Her approach to accounting for the Priestly composer's choice of noun labels differs from mine. I identify norms of language-wide usage and then explain the apparent exceptions, whereas she treats Lev 1–16 in isolation (except in light of certain other Priestly materials). She assumes that given the availability of the *gender-inclusive* terms *'ādām* and *nepeš*, the noun אִישׁ implies a *male* referent by default. (So already Seebass 1998:503, 515; Westermann 1997:755.) Shectman's article concludes that the composer of P made labeling choices that occasionally deployed אִישׁ in an idiosyncratic way (as "technical terminology").

My findings in this study suggest that Shectman's basic assumptions (like the reasoning of Seebass and Westermann) would not have been shared by the text's ancient audience. Rather, speakers of Ancient Hebrew regularly applied אִישׁ in other ways and for other reasons than to indicate referential gender. A workhorse is not used like ordinary sortal nouns. Thus gender is sometimes too narrow an analytical lens for viewing the choice among alternative personal nouns. And so I find reason to doubt that Shectman's analysis explains the labeling choices in Leviticus 1–16.

[36] E.g., in the case treated in Lev 5:1, no forensic procedure can possibly identify someone who has withheld testimony. The case presupposes an absence of corroborating evidence for the witnessing that is at issue. A noncompliant witness must therefore decide his or her own guilt.

In contrast, whenever a casuistic formulation in Leviticus offers instruction about a situation whose resolution requires a formal determination, it is introduced with אִישׁ.[37] This is to be expected, given the preferred use of אִישׁ in forensic situations throughout the Bible (see §§6.9.2–4).

The only case without אִישׁ in which a formal determination is nonetheless required is Lev 13:2. However, there the label *'ādām* is necessary for structural reasons: it sets up an implicit topical contrast between the passage that it inaugurates and the following passage: eruptions on *human skin* (vv. 2–46) versus those on *fabric or leather* (vv. 47–59).

Further considerations account for the particular choice of the remaining labels other than אִישׁ. The noun *'ādām* is a standard label for counterposing human beings with the Deity.[38] In Lev 1:2, where *'ādām* is the label, the protasis as usual evokes a situational triangle; but here the third corner of that triangle is Yahweh.

$$\text{אָדָ֗ם כִּֽי־יַקְרִ֥יב מִכֶּ֛ם קָרְבָּ֖ן לַֽיהֹוָ֑ה}$$

When <u>any</u> of you presents an offering of cattle to <u>the LORD</u>.… (NJPS)

▲ = אָדָם (Non-deity) + Offering + Yahweh

In other words, the text is concerned with maintaining an individual referent's proper relationship with the national deity. In light of both the implied contrast with divinity and the animal slaughter involved, the referring expression seems to have been chosen to evoke a sense of *mortality*. Indeed, that consideration is explicit in the case of Num 19:14 (where *'ādām* refers merely to the instigation for the subsequent proceedings, whereas the only specific *participant* in those proceedings is referred to as אִישׁ, as usual, in v. 18).

Where the label used is *nepeš*, the third corner of the relational triangle is again Yahweh. Here, too, a concern for the referent's relationship with the national deity seems to warrant labeling the referent as a 'person' (with respect to the deity) rather than as a participant in a more generic manner.

As for the remaining two cases where the label is *kol-nepeš*, both of those verses proscribe eating an animal's blood. The label *nepeš* seems designed to evoke and reinforce the symbolic identification of animal blood with human life—a point that is made explicit in verses that surround the latter instance (17:11, 14).

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[37] In these cases, a forensic procedure is needed for a variety of reasons: the resulting penalty is execution (20:27; 21:9; 24:15; 24:17); a transfer of real estate title is involved (25:26, 29); the situation must be settled via an assessment either of value (22:14; 24:19; 27:2, 14) or of damage (19:20); or it must be settled via the certification of one's having met the criteria for fulfillment (22:21).

[38] E.g., Gen 1:26; Deut 5:20; Isa 17:7; Ezek 34:31; Ps 124:2. Although אִישׁ is also occasionally counterposed with the Deity, its generic-species use profiles the referent in terms of *participation* in the human species (see next section). In contrast, the use of *'ādām* downplays human social relations (Grant 1977).

In conclusion, the occurrence of אִישׁ within Priestly texts is consistent with its behavior in the Bible generally.

8.2.4 Species-generic usage as a special case

In the SAIN usage of אִישׁ, the same process of pragmatic enrichment that produces meanings like *anyone* can lead effortlessly to a *species-wide* (generic) construal. This result can be illustrated by Ps 39:7, for which I present two renderings into English:

$$\text{אַךְ־בְּצֶ֤לֶם ׀ יִתְהַלֶּךְ־אִישׁ אַךְ־הֶ֥בֶל יֶהֱמָי֑וּן}$$

> Surely <u>everyone</u> goes about like a shadow. / Surely for nothing they are in turmoil.…   (NRSV)

> <u>Man</u> walks about as a mere shadow; / mere futility is his hustle and bustle.…   (NJPS)

Two aspects of this verse—broadly applicable observations and imperfect verb forms—together trigger an atemporal interpretation. That is, the categorical (non-assertive) observation creates the context for אִישׁ to be construed as an NPI, which is then subject to pragmatic enrichment. The referential scope keeps expanding until it reaches the level of the species.

This application of אִישׁ to humankind is a natural result of the highly general inferential process that Neo-Griceans have called the Principle of Informativeness ('I-Principle'); it "allows the hearer to enrich the interpretation of an utterance if no further specification is given by the speaker" (Haspelmath 2006:50; similarly Huang 2004:298; Horn 1984:18). It is what the devotees of relevance theory describe as the audience's innate search for optimal relevance. That search is what can turn our noun's semantic dial from 'participant' to 'humankind'.

As a result, the noun's *nonspecific-indefinite* construal and its *species-generic* construal are roughly interchangeable.[39] Their similarity is shown by juxtaposing the two quoted translations: one uses an indefinite pronoun, while the other uses a species label.

Cognitively speaking, however, a generic-species use involves *an additional abstraction from experience*. Given that extra step, we should perhaps infer that the generic-species usage derived from the variable-scope kind of nonspecific usage.[40] It would be a derivation because it seems to be a special case.

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[39] Similarly, in discussing the nonspecific-indefinite versus species-generic usages of English *man* (or its equivalent in various European languages), Giacolone Ramat and Sansò observe: "in many cases it is difficult to make a distinction between the two senses in written texts" (2007:108). And as they point out, both kinds of predication are non-affirmative. Radden explains that the conceptual relationship between these two construals is metonymic; human beings necessarily "comprehend and process generalizations about a type by way of its instances, i.e. by means of the metonymy INSTANCE FOR TYPE" (1999:201). Furthermore, the referential categories *type* and *instance* are interdependent (ibid., 200–201).

[40] Here I mean "derived" both developmentally and diachronically: in each individual language learner, and in the public language as an added, conventionalized sense of the noun. This is *contra* Giacolone Ramat

8.2.5 Conclusions

As predicted in §5.7.9, the indefinite pronoun–like usages of אִישׁ can be explained in the same way as its more prototypical usages (in specific reference and/or with definite deixis). The same communicative and cognitive factors apply to both. The former type occurs in contexts that rely upon the workhorse noun's individuating expertise and encourage its modest semantic contribution to be enriched by the audience's world knowledge.

In order to make the cognitive journey to the meaning 'anyone', the audience's mind must start with (or pass through) the meaning of 'participant'. That is, the audience must construe the label אִישׁ as an instruction to regard its referent(s) relationally.

8.3 Distributive Function

8.3.1 Distributivity in Ancient Hebrew in typological perspective

Like many languages (Dolinina 2005:128), Hebrew expresses the distributive idea in a wholly different way from English or French (Williams 2007:55). In the main Hebrew method, the workhorse noun אִישׁ plays a leading role (§1.3.4)—taking advantage of its individuating power (§5.3.1). For example, as the narrator describes the impact of the long famine that had been foretold in Pharaoh's dreams, we read (Gen 47:20):

$$\text{כִּי־מָכְרוּ מִצְרַיִם֙ אִישׁ שָׂדֵ֔הוּ כִּי־חָזַק עֲלֵהֶם הָרָעָב}$$

…for each Egyptian sold his field, as the famine was harsh upon them.…   (Alter)

The first clause combines a plural verb with a SAIN usage of אִישׁ and with a referring expression for some entity (here: farmland) that is linked with אִישׁ via a possessive suffix.[41] Such constructions—including all variants—occur nearly three hundred times in the Bible (Even-Shoshan 1982a:51–52); they appear in 19 out of the 24 classic books.[42] These locutions are used both by narrators and by various characters.[43]

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and Sansò 2007. My surmise accords, however, with what Traugott and Dasher observe to be "speakers' tendency to recruit referential meanings to less referential functions of language" (2002:86), and for words to shift in meaning from concrete concepts toward abstract ones (ibid., 94–95).

[41] Analyzing this verse grammatically, we see that *miṣrayim* 'Egypt' is the collective subject that corresponds to the plural verb, while אִישׁ is part of an adjunct—an adverb of manner (Joüon 2006:513n2).

[42] As Even-Shoshan indicates (1982a:51–52), the typical form of distributive entries does not occur in Psalms, Proverbs, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, or Daniel. However, an atypical distributive usage can be found in Ps 62:13. Instances with אִשָּׁה are rare but include Exod 3:22; 11:2. According to Grant (1977:4–5), there are 389 occurrences in which אִישׁ refers to "each or every member of a particular group," a category that seems to combine the distributive and the reciprocal usages. Meanwhile, the above construction with אִישׁ was also part of the cognate Moabite language, as attested on the Mesha‘ inscription, lines 24–25 (Aḥituv 2008:392–93, 414).

[43] Another, less common distributive construction is used for describing when one party dispenses something (concrete or abstract) to a set of other parties. This linguistic approach, too, features the use of אִישׁ

How does a Hebrew distributive construction work? According to typologist Inga Do-linina (2005:130), one of the ways that languages realize the distributive meaning is

> by a specific contrast in marking the co-existence of singularity and plurality. Singularity represents the idea of individualization and plurality represents the idea of a group involved in action.

Although she does not mention Hebrew among the sampling of languages that she ad-duces in this category, I propose that her extract describes precisely how the typical dis-tributive construction with אִישׁ works in Hebrew. The verb's plural form points to the group—whose label often serves as the verb's subject; meanwhile, אִישׁ points to the indi-vidual members who are each re-situated by the verb's indicated action. Such a construc-tion thus marks the intended distribution by counterposing the plural number on the verb with the singular grammatical number on our noun.

8.3.2 Cognitive motivation, pragmatic enrichment, and meaning contribution

Some scholars call the prototypical Biblical Hebrew distributive construction "idiomatic" (e.g., Joüon 2006:434). Such an assessment implies that the overall constructional mean-ing cannot be divined by knowing the meanings of its elements. Under the conventional assumption that אִישׁ is a sortal noun that means 'adult male' or 'human being', the dis-tributive construction is indeed semantically opaque. For what is it that connects the pro-filed אִישׁ with the larger group? A cognitive link is missing.

That missing link is supplied by the hypothesis that אִישׁ simply regards its referent as a participant in the depicted situation (§5.3), while allowing also for metonymic construal as a 'member' of a group (§5.5.3). The relations in question are located within the dis-course level of meaning. The referential set of אִישׁ exists within the audience's discourse model. Its members are handled by the speaker in the same way that speakers shape the instantiation of all situations and their participants (§4.4).

In our above example (Gen 47:20), the situation could be modeled as two triangles that share two of their corners, labeled שָׂדֶה 'field' and אִישׁ (with its two meanings):

▲ = <u>Field</u> + אִישׁ (Member)   + Field-owners (a set)

▲ = <u>Field</u> + אִישׁ (Participant) + Sale of his field

When the two triangles' shared corners are superimposed,[44] a coherent and informative text results: *each member of the set of field-owners participates in the sale of his field.*

To generalize from this example, the typical distributive construction appears to be semantically transparent, as follows.[45]

(e.g., 2 Sam 6:19; Jer 17:10; Zech 10:1). It appears in the Nôqdîm ostracon.obverse.7 (Aḥituv 2008:194–96). Constraints of time and space do not allow me to discuss this second construction in this study.

[44] This cognitive operation seems to involve metonymic association.

- The construction is highly compact. It presupposes the existence of basic facts (cf. Dolinina 2005:131) regarding our noun's set of referents and the situation that applies to them. The speaker does not need to articulate those facts because the audience's mind obliges by filling them in (via pragmatic enrichment), so as to complete the picture. Hence they can go without saying.[46]

- In order to reconcile the "mismatched" plural marking on the verb with our singular noun, the latter is pragmatically enriched so that its referent is not a single individual, but rather all members of the applicable group. The enrichment deploys the noun's individuation power to iterate across the scope of the group.

In the process, the semantic contribution of אִישׁ shifts by metonymy to indicate how the referents in its scope relate both to the depicted situation ('participant') and to each other ('member'). This integration of meanings from two overlapping triangles cannot be discerned just by looking at the distributing noun by itself. As Dolinina notes, "The salient feature of Distributivity … is that its meaning is available only on the level of a proposition/predication, not on the level of an argument (noun phrase) alone" (2005:132).

Given the surmise that distributive relations are carried out on the discourse level and involve manipulations within the audience's discourse model (rather than in the "real world"), Biblical Hebrew is readily able to deploy its workhorse noun אִישׁ within a distributive construction to apply even to abstract entities and non-human creatures (§§1.3.4, 2.5.2, 5.3.3). The latter are treated simply as "participants" within the discourse model.

In conclusion, as predicted (§5.7.9), the leading role that אִישׁ plays in expressing distribution can be readily explained in terms of the same communicative and cognitive factors that explain the functioning of workhorse nouns in general.

8.4 Reciprocal Function

I predicted in §5.7.9 that the same communicative and cognitive factors that account for אִישׁ as a workhorse noun in general can account for how the Bible deploys it to express reciprocity. However, making the case will not be as straightforward as it was for distributivity, for two reasons. One is the difficulty of the subject itself. As the comparative linguist Nicholas Evans wrote at the start of his typological study, "Reciprocal constructions arguably denote the most complex event type to be expressed in most languages by regular grammatical means" (2008:33).

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[45] In other words, the distributive construction that centers on אִישׁ is *not* an idiom.

[46] An audience often supplies presuppositions that are otherwise missing from the discourse. In logically oriented linguistics literature, this has been called *accommodation* (Lewis 1979; Heim 1982). However, a proper understanding of how an audience normally handles the cognitive status of discourse participants (Gundel et al. 2001) and assigns referents via abductive reasoning (Hobbs 2004:730) has shown that a special concept is unnecessary.

The second reason for a roundabout approach is that, among the many functions of אִישׁ in Biblical Hebrew, its role in expressing reciprocation is the one that has been the most intensively studied in recent scholarship.[47] Those efforts have shed much light on the subject and need to be taken into consideration. At the same time, they have viewed our noun only through syntactic or diachronic lenses. The reciprocal usage of אִישׁ has not yet been defined in communication- and cognitive-oriented terms.

To develop such a definition for this study has been a particular challenge. In order to both reckon with the subject and engage the ongoing scholarly conversation, I have taken pains to identify the boundaries of reciprocal usage, to identify a prototype, and to characterize deviations from it—in particular, the application to non-human entities.

That work is reflected in the long discussion that follows, which is in service of being able to answer the question: Does the prediction hold in all of these disparate cases? The answer is affirmative: when אִישׁ marks reciprocation, it can be explained by the same communicative and cognitive mechanisms that account for workhorses in general.[48]

8.4.1 Terminology: Pronoun, pro-Noun, or noun?

Adina Moshavi has noticed a vagueness in biblical dictionaries and grammars as to whether אִישׁ should be classified as a noun or as a pronoun when it is used in a manner resembling indefinite pronouns. In her view, this question of characterization has yet to be faced directly in Biblical Studies literature (2018:42). This need becomes particularly acute with respect to our noun's reciprocal usages.

The issue is vexed by the occasional ambiguity that results from the polysemy of the scholarly term *pronoun*. It is used in different senses within the field of linguistics. In his diachronic study of the English reciprocal expression *each other*, the linguist Florian Haas (2007:31n2) expressly reserves the term *pronoun* for its nontechnical meaning and instead calls the two terms *markers*. In contrast, in his diachronic studies of Semitic reciprocal constructions, Elitzur Bar-Asher Siegal prefers the broader, typological definition of *pronoun*, namely "free forms whose interpretation depends on another referential element, namely, the antecedent" (2014:348). The linguist Rivka Halevy prefers to call this a "pro-Noun," as distinct from a regular pronoun (2011:13; 2013:325–26).

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[47] Citations will be made in the course of discussion. The attention in recent articles (not to mention a monograph in press) seems to be in contrast to the cursory treatment in biblical grammars. Ewald has the most to say ([1891] 2004:144); see also Gesenius and Kautzsch (1910:448); Joüon (2006:512). I find no mention by Van der Merwe and colleagues (2017), Williams (2007), or Waltke and O'Connor (1990).

[48] A case could be made that the reciprocal usages are a specialization of the distributive ones—conceptually, syntactically, and diachronically. However, that topic is beyond the scope of this study.

8.4.2 Description of the אִישׁ-headed construction

Reciprocal constructions denote a mutual situation (or event). In Biblical Hebrew, they are of several types. This study will discuss only the type that features אִישׁ, in order to eventually tally and display all of its instances (below, §8.4.9 and Addendum G). An exemplar is this depiction of the reunion of Moses and his father-in-law (Exod 18:7):

וַיִּשְׁאֲלוּ אִישׁ־לְרֵעֵהוּ לְשָׁלוֹם

…and <u>each</u> asked after <u>the other's</u> welfare…

Here אִישׁ appears in its classic SAIN usage, inside a complex single-clause construction, where it heads a noun phrase that includes a second noun. The construction includes a transitive predicate that is marked as plural.[49]

Within the two-part ("bipartite") noun phrase, אִישׁ (either masculine or feminine, as needed for syntactic gender agreement) always fills the first slot.[50] It is sometimes known as the *anaphor*, because it shares its reference with a previously specified set (namely, the participants in the situation/event described by the predicate; Halevy 2013:325; cf. Bar-Asher Siegal 2014:348). At other times, it is known as the *antecedent*, acknowledging its governing role with respect to the second noun (Halevy 2013:323, 325, 326). It represents the predication's reference point (cf. Kemmer 1993:256:65), as is often the case (§6.7).

The second slot is occupied by a relational noun that is known as the *alterity term* or the *reciprocant*.[51] Usually that noun is *rēʻa* 'neighbor', but often it is *ʼāḥ* 'brother' (or the feminine equivalent of one of those two terms).[52] Occasionally also *ʻāmît* 'fellow' and אִישׁ itself are attested.[53]

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[49] As we shall see, all three of the features mentioned in this sentence are typical but not required. To show which instances of אִישׁ are truly reciprocal usages, we will need to pay sustained attention to the predicate.

[50] Halevy describes the construction as "periphrastic" (2013:325), apparently meaning that the expression is formed by the use of uninflected function words. More precisely, as noted by Jay (2009:10n19), אִישׁ is inflected for gender, but not for number or for person—just as in the "anyone" and distributive usages discussed in the preceding sections. Gender inflection matches that of the noun's coreferential group members, as usual. Not inflecting for number enables our noun to generate iterated individuation within the reference class; not inflecting for person enables it to point to that class within the audience's discourse model, rather than to a specific referent.

[51] The fact that the second term is a *relational* noun is not otherwise mentioned in the literature on Hebrew reciprocals. For example, Bar-Asher Siegal (2014:350, 352) discusses the second term only with regard to its semantic need to point to someone other than the first participant ("distinctness requirement"). In addition, however, the relational label not only directs attention to how the parties involved are related, but also makes the second party's identity dependent upon that of the first party. On relational nouns in reciprocal constructions, see Evans 2006; Matushinsky and Ionin 2011.

[52] The difference between these two alternatives appears to be *semantic*. The noun *rēʻa* regards its referents as being *proximate* (related spatially like neighbors), while *ʼāḥ* regards them as being of *the same kind* (related like kin). The speaker's *communicative need* then governs which of these nouns is selected to express

Typically, our noun אִישׁ and its companion (the "reciprocal markers") are separated by an intervening direct-object marker or preposition that governs the second term while characterizing the verb's action (especially with transitive verbs), or by a conjunctive *wāw* (with certain Niphal verbs).[54] The two nouns refer to participants in the situation who are standing in a mutual relation to each other.[55] Such participants have been called *mutuants* (Haspelmath 2007:2088). Both nouns co-refer to the entire set of mutuants, yet their co-reference obtains between the *individual members* of that set (ibid., 2094).

8.4.3 Processing mutual relations on the discourse level

As with distributive relations (§8.3), mutual relations are located within the discourse level of meaning; the referential set in question exists within the audience's discourse model. The speaker manages this set's members as with all participants in situations. This is evident in the way that reciprocating two-noun phrases refer to their set's members in the *third* person, even while—on the *informational* level—the verb addresses those same members in the *second* person. A good example is the apodictic statement in Lev 25:14:

אַל־תּוֹנוּ אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו:

…y<u>o</u>u shall not wrong <u>one another</u>.   (NJPS)

Reciprocation's being located on the discourse level also explains why the construction can be readily applied to *non-human* referents (§5.3.3; below, §8.4.10).

As noted in §5.5.4, two conditions—the desire to express a plurality of relations and a willingness to treat the participants as indistinguishable—provide the soil in which reciprocal constructions flourish. I will treat these two conditions as necessary and sufficient

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a given case of reciprocal usage. Even if we view such usages as grammaticalized, we should recall that grammaticalization theory predicts that a noun's concrete meaning conditions its use—which ought to extend to a paradigmatic choice among alternatives (cf. Hopper and Traugott 2003:94, 98).

[53] The noun *ʿāmît* occurs only three times as an alterity term, all in Leviticus. (Indeed, it appears only 12 times in the entire Bible—11 of which are in Leviticus.) Whereas *ʾāḥ* also appears in Leviticus, *rēʿa* does not. Hence I will treat *ʿāmît* as a local equivalent for *rēʿa*—a lectal variant. As for אִישׁ as the second term, it appears both times (Isa 3:5; Ezek 18:8) without a genitive suffix—which is actually necessary in order for it to refer to the same set as the first אִישׁ, as any reciprocating term must do. (Cf. 1 Kgs 20:20, where the suffix indicates that the second אִישׁ refers to a *different* set, namely the adversaries.) These two cases should perhaps be considered to indicate reciprocation via noun repetition, which is technically another formula; cf. Bar-Asher Siegal 2014:350–51, who cites examples in Akkadian and Amharic but not Hebrew.

[54] On the various connecting terms—or lack thereof—see Staps (2020), who refers to them as *case markers*. (Halevy calls the genitive suffix, too, a case marker.) As he points out (*contra* Halevy 2011:17), an intervening element is absent in 8 cases (see below, regarding Table 8.1).

[55] According to Haspelmath's terminological distinctions, *mutual* refers to the semantic relations, while *reciprocal* refers to the morphosyntactic patterns that express them (2007:2087).

for deciding whether to count a given instance of אִישׁ as a reciprocal usage.[56] Both are matters of construal, and thus subject to pragmatic considerations.

8.4.4 Pragmatic enrichment in reciprocal constructions

The audience, in its automatic search for a construal that readily yields a coherent and informative text, has ample reason to enrich reciprocal constructions in a manner similar to distributive ones (§8.3). Loosely speaking, the result is a compounding of the meanings evoked from each of the partner nouns. Consider, for example, when Joseph's older brothers are pasturing their flocks and notice him coming toward them (Gen 37:19):[57]

$$\text{וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו}$$

They said to <u>one</u> <u>another</u>…. (ESV)

Our noun in SAIN usage is first enriched by extending its denotation from a single individual, iterating across the set that is established by the reference class of the plural verb's implicit subject, as in its distributive usage.[58] Meanwhile, the second noun is enriched through that first operation, by extending its denotation from just one individual's "brothers" to the (permuted remaining) "brothers" of each of the iterated referents of אִישׁ. Thus in each case, one individual is mentioned—yet within the audience's discourse model, they point to sets of interrelated individuals. Cognitively speaking, the role of אִישׁ is to provide the mooring that anchors the automatically simulated permutations.

As with distribution, an אִישׁ-headed reciprocal construction appears elliptical because it relies upon presuppositions (or metonymies). The speaker can rely upon the audience to fill in the missing information and iterate the mutual or converse relationship, for the sake of a coherent and informative construal.

8.4.5 The limits of the pragmatic enrichment of referential scope

Not every אִישׁ-headed noun phrase with a bound relational noun is subject to enrichment in the manner just described. For example, in the following apodictic law, the ostensible reciprocant term, *’āḥôt*, must be construed literally as 'sister' (Lev 18:18):[59]

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[56] I.e., I am taking a functionalist approach. As the linguist T. Givón has written, "Clause-types (constructions) cannot be defined structurally, but rather functionally" (2018:35).

[57] In this case, the denoted set happens to consist literally of brothers. Cf. the sisters in the next example.

[58] Alternatively, we can say that by naming an *instance*, this construction evokes the *type* (that is, the specified set) via metonymy. See Radden's remark above, note 39.

George Savran has observed that in the dozen or so occurrences of this construction with this particular verb in the Bible, it is always used "to describe a process of discussion, often focused around a question," and it appears together with "evidence of actual deliberation or argumentation" (2009:9).

[59] Here the noun phrase is fronted for the sake of topic activation within a list of prohibitions (cf. Van der Merwe et al. 2017:500–502).

וְאִשָּׁה אֶל־אֲחֹתָהּ לֹא תִקָּח לִצְרֹר לְגַלּוֹת עֶרְוָתָהּ עָלֶיהָ בְּחַיֶּיהָ׃

And a <u>woman</u> along with <u>her sister</u>, you are not to take-in-marriage,

producing-rivalry, exposing her nakedness in addition to her, during her lifetime!   (Fox)

What has prompted this translator (like all the rest) to render the second noun literally as 'sister' rather than as, say, 'another (woman)'? A reciprocal construal is blocked because this utterance evokes only one of the two basic notions of reciprocity. Although a *plurality of relations* does obtain between the female parties who are referenced by the construction's two nouns (as sisters and as co-wives), the crucial fact is that the participants are *distinguishable*: only one of them is already your (the addressee's) wife. Hence the situation—as framed by the speaker—is not actually mutual.

In other words, the second noun's literal construal follows from the audience's expectation of coherence between the two halves of the verse, in light of cultural knowledge (i.e., pragmatic considerations). Without enrichment, the construction is not reciprocal.

8.4.6 Symmetric and asymmetric relations

One factor that has concerned many observers is the degree of *symmetry* of the depicted interaction. Some scholars, such as Lichtenberk (2000), distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric relations, reserving the term *reciprocal* and *mutual* for the former, while classifying the latter according to subtypes such as *converse relations*, *chain relations*, and the like. Yet in natural language, situations that are encoded as reciprocal are rarely fully symmetric (Haspelmath 2007:2088; Kemmer 1993:256n65). For example, it is difficult to imagine (without recourse to the American pop-culture trope of zombies) how the following prophecy about a horrific siege could be fulfilled in a symmetric manner (Jer 19:9):

וְאִישׁ בְּשַׂר־רֵעֵהוּ יֹאכֵלוּ

…and <u>everyone</u> shall eat the flesh of <u>his neighbor</u> …   (ESV)

The key is to understand that such constructions offer their depictions at a fairly abstract level; they are thus agnostic as to which party initiates the action in question.[60] As Bar-Asher Siegal points out, "It is crucially important for the interpretation of the sentences that it is immaterial which member of the set takes which role in the relation" (2014:341; cf. 2012:231). For his purposes, he considers the asymmetric cases to be no different than the truly symmetric cases.[61] The same approach has been taken by a number of scholars (Halevy 2013:323, Haspelmath 2007:2088, Kemmer 1993:256n65, and others): they use

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[60] This is a restatement of the "indistinguishability of participants" that Lichtenberk (2000) described, as discussed above.

[61] Bar-Asher Siegal (2014; in press) prefers the term "unspecified constructions" to "reciprocal constructions" in order to make clear that they are also used to express relations that are not symmetrical. The basic requirement is that "all members of the set should participate" (2014:340).

the terms *reciprocal* and/or *mutual* to refer to both types of participation.[62] I, too, follow this practice, because for my purposes the distinction does not matter: אִישׁ functions the same way regardless of whether the depicted activity is symmetric.

8.4.7 The impact of various verb characteristics

When a finite verb governs an אִישׁ-headed reciprocal construction, it is usually plural.[63] However, as discussed further below, it may instead be singular.[64] In this respect, a recip-rocal usage of אִישׁ can resemble the "anyone" usages (where singular verbs are the norm, §8.2), while differing from a distributive one (where the plural marker is crucial, §8.3).

Plural marking plays a role in prompting the reciprocal construal similar to that for a distributive one. As Bar-Asher Siegal explains it, the agreement is semantic rather than syntactic: "the target of the agreement is controlled by the actual number of members within each set participating in the reciprocal relation" (2012:220; 2014:350). A plural marker thus helps to condition the scope of the reciprocation. Furthermore, a plural verb generally depicts the mutual relations as symmetric.

That being said, the Bible includes some clauses with a plural verb (and in Halevy's terms, a plural co-subject; 2013:325) and an אִישׁ-headed noun phrase, and yet the con-struction is *not* reciprocal.[65] These utterances are cognitively one-sided. They include: instructions on engaging with the members of another group (Exod 11:2; 32:27, 29), a general's observation about how doggedly his troops pursue their adversaries (2 Sam 2:27), a directive on how to treat indentured servants (Jer 34:14), and an accusation about the mistreatment of impoverished debtors (Neh 5:7).[66] In all of these cases, the speakers' deictic viewpoint places the "others" outside the scope of their own immediate audience. In other words, the participants are distinguishable—and the speakers are making that distinction. While on the surface these constructions look reciprocal, they are actually *distributing* the "others" among the members of the group of concern.[67]

As for a singular verb, it indicates a situation that may or may not be symmetric; the construal of symmetry depends upon the predicate's semantics, as informed by cultural

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[62] In ordinary English, the terms *reciprocal* and *mutual* are polysemous; they can mean either "exerted by each with respect to the other" (that is, as the result of symmetric, two-way interaction), or more broadly "shared in common" or "experienced jointly" (which can be the result also of asymmetric, one-way action).

[63] According to Halevy (2013:325; 2011:12), the verb in such constructions is always plural. But see below.

[64] My tally (see Table 8.1, below) includes 16 singular cases (expanding the list in Jay 2009:10n20), and a collective singular in another 3 cases.

[65] Halevy, who considers only plural-verb instances, does not mention these exceptions to her definition of the "specialized syntactic construction [featuring a pair of noun markers] for encoding mutual events" (2013:325). Consequently, that definition leads to the inclusion of these cases as "false positives."

[66] This last instance cited employs a participle rather than a finite verb.

[67] For a formal explication of this idea, see Bar-Asher Siegal in press, §7.7.1.

knowledge.[68] Nonetheless, even in an asymmetric case, a singular verb can indicate reciprocal situations, given a metonymy or presupposition that evokes mutuality.[69] One example is when Gideon is spying on a Midianite encampment and overhears something (Judg 7:13):

<div align="center">וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ מְסַפֵּר לְרֵעֵהוּ חֲלוֹם</div>

<div align="center">… behold, a <u>man</u> was telling a dream to <u>his comrade</u>…   (ESV)</div>

Here the two basic cognitive characteristics behind reciprocal constructions are present. This schematic depiction does not distinguish one participant from the other. And plurality of relations is exemplified by conversation. Although only a one-way activity is depicted in this clause, the recounting of a dream is a metonym for two-way conversation, which is inherently a mutual activity.[70] Alternatively, we can say that a conversation is presupposed.[71] Regardless, the audience will reliably construe this clause as describing a *mutual situation*. It can be depicted schematically as follows.

<div align="center">▲ = אִישׁ (Participant) + Interlocutor + Dream under discussion</div>

With an אִישׁ-headed reciprocal construction, the verb need not be transitive, as long as pragmatic enrichment enables it to be construed as indicating an experience in which the participants share.[72] One example occurs when Joseph's brothers are overwhelmed by their strange experience in Egypt (Gen 42:28):

<div align="center">וַיֶּחֶרְדוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו לֵאמֹר</div>

<div align="center">…and they turned trembling <u>to one another</u>, saying,…   (ESV)</div>

As Moshe Greenberg observed (1965:186), the Qal intransitive verb *ḥ-r-d* 'tremble'— which does not indicate directional motion—normally cannot govern the preposition *'el*

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[68] *Symmetric*: 1 Sam 14:20; Isa 41:6b; Ezek 38:21; Ruth 3:14.   *Asymmetric*: Lev 24:19; Deut 22:26; 1 Kgs 8:31; Isa 3:6; Jer 46:16; Ezek 22:11; 33:30; Zech 14:13b; 2 Chr 6:22.   *Ambiguous*: Exod 33:11.

[69] Cf. the minimal pair of otherwise identical constructions, using a term that conveys reciprocity via an alternative means (namely, repetition of the noun), with a singular verb (Isa 2:4) and a plural one (Mic 4:3). Both versions of the utterance *mean the same thing* because "raising a sword" is processed as a metonym for warfare—a mutual activity.

[70] Presumably the reason that people recount a dream is in order to discuss its meaning with their interlocutor. If so, then the depiction of its telling—as the most salient part of the conversation—can represent the entire conversation via a PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymy. In this case, such a construal is confirmed by the next verse, which relates the comrade's spoken response seamlessly. If that second conversational turn were intended as a distinct event, the narrator would have introduced it with its own discourse marker.

[71] Corresponding metonymies/presuppositions are available in each of the cases with a singular verb that I have categorized as reciprocal.

[72] Bar-Asher Siegal (2014:338) considers only cases with a transitive verb, and for which the אִישׁ-headed noun phrase fills the positions of that verb's arguments. However, like Camil Staps (2020), I see no reason to restrict the construction's definition in that way, given my goal of surveying how אִישׁ functions.

'toward'. Hence because this verb and preposition are collocated, the audience must infer some bodily movement that makes the utterance coherent—as is reflected by the quoted translation ('turned … to'). Greenberg referred to this as a *pregnant* construction, citing also 43:33. (For other intransitive verbs, see Jer 36:16; Ezek 4:17; 24:23.)[73]

The predicate does not always feature a finite verb—or indeed a verb at all. Additional variations are known, as well.[74]

8.4.8 Casuistic laws and proverbs

Nine cases of casuistic law employ a two-part אִישׁ-headed formula. All of them meet both of the conditions for a mutual construal: the indistinguishability of participants,[75] and a plurality of relations (which includes converse relations). Regarding the latter, the key is to understand that the audience construes all such utterances in light of contextual considerations—as part of its automatic search for an interpretation that readily yields a coherent and informative text. That is, these laws are pragmatically enriched. And thus the same condition of metonymy or presupposition applies as for the cases of singular verbs just discussed. Consider one of the entries in the Covenant Code (Exod 21:14):

וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה

But if <u>someone</u> willfully attacks and kills <u>another</u> by treachery…   (NRSV)[76]

It has been asserted that such parties are not in a mutual relationship.[77] Such a view overlooks the fact that the speaker, in using the adverb *bǝ·'ormâ* 'by treachery', presupposes that the perpetrator had earned the victim's trust in some innocuous interaction that *preceded* the deadly betrayal (cf. Josh 9:4, in light of the account in vv. 3–21). In order to render a coherent text, the audience must supply that prior, *mutual* interaction in its discourse model. And when it does so, the mutual (albeit asymmetric) context is established.

To generalize, if the audience would reliably construe the construction as describing a situation of mutual relations (without regard to which party is which), then it is effective-

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[73] Bar-Asher Siegal (in press, §§5.4.1–2) proposes that in these cases, the construction is used to express *sociativity*—that is, a shared experience. Such a meaning shift is available via conceptual metonymy.

[74] According to Halevy (2013:325), the אִישׁ-headed noun phrase can be "applied" not only to verbs, but also to nouns and adjectives that denote a mutual relation—but I do not grasp what she is alluding to.

[75] Indistinguishability of participants is a consequence of the SAIN usage of אִישׁ in negative-polarity contexts (§8.2). But when the two parties have a different social status, the alterity term must be more specific.

[76] The NRSV renders אִישׁ in terms of the indefinite pronoun *someone* (presumably in order to be gender-inclusive), which places the utterance's focus on the situation. The implicit question is: *what is to be done in such a situation?* However, the Hebrew wording arguably places its focus instead on *the central participant*, whose involvement defines the situation. So more precisely, the implicit question of the protasis is: now that the depicted event has occurred, *what is to be done with the party in question?*

[77] Bar-Asher Siegal (in press, §§0.6, 4.3.4; 2014:340; 2012:232–35).

ly a reciprocal construction—and can be analyzed accordingly. This applies not only to all of the casuistic laws in question,[78] but also to three proverbs that employ a two-part אִישׁ-headed formula.[79]

8.4.9 A count of אִישׁ-headed constructions, and their variability and distribution

I have tallied the אִישׁ-headed reciprocal constructions in light of the foregoing considerations (see Addendum G).[80] They occur 125 times in the Bible (113 in the masculine form, and 12 in the feminine form). They appear in 20 out of the 24 classical biblical books.[81] A closer examination of the table's entries will reveal that they are articulated by various narrators and characters, including Yahweh. Hence such usages can be safely considered a normal part of the language spoken in ancient Israel.[82]

I identify a prototype that is exemplified by the opening example: *a plural, finite, transitive verb is followed by two nouns* ("bipartite mutuants") *that are joined via a case marker* (such as the preposition in the example), *and that co-refer with the clause's sub-*

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[78] In Exod 21:18 and Deut 25:11, a (symmetric) fight situation is expressly stated; Exod 21:35 implies that the oxen (who metonymically represent their owners) were fighting *before* one gored the other; Exod 22:6, 9, and 13 imply that the two parties *previously* contracted an agreement; Lev 24:19 implies that the two parties were fighting (*before* one of them went too far); and Deut 19:11 mentions a prior mutual hatred.

[79] Prov 25:18 implies that the two parties had *previously* interacted; 26:19 implies the existence of an interaction *during* which the deception occurred; and 27:17 describes an *ongoing* blade-to-blade engagement.

[80] To generate the list, I first searched using Accordance for instances of אִישׁ (tagged as a common, singular, absolute noun) followed within 7 "words" (including particles) by either *'āḥ*, *rē'a*, or *'āmît* (all tagged as singular), with the alterity term taking a suffix (tagged as pronominal third-person singular). Increasing the allowable distance between the two terms adds only to the false-positive hits. I similarly searched for instances where the first noun is אִשָּׁה and the second noun is either *'āḥôt* or *rə'ūtâh*. From the resulting list of hits, I eliminated the following: eight instances lacking mutual relations (see §5.5.4), one instance lacking a plurality of relations (1 Kgs 20:20; see above, note 53), and four instances in which the two nouns appeared in different clauses. Finally, Isa 3:5a (which showed up only because of 3:5b) prompted me to search separately for אִישׁ as an unpossessed alterity term, which turned up one more such instance.

[81] The exceptions are: Joshua, Song of Songs, Lamentations, and Daniel.

[82] Our אִישׁ-headed reciprocal constructions are attested (with defective spelling) three times in Jerusalem's Siloam Tunnel inscription, lines 2–4 (Aḥituv 2008:22). In the first instance, the corresponding verb is no longer extant; the second instance appears with a Niphal singular verb (cf. Gen 31:49); and the third instance appears in the prototypical format (described next).

Gary Rendsburg has offered some evidence that in Israelian Hebrew (the reconstructed dialect of the Northern Tribes), אִישׁ-headed reciprocal expressions may have been less favored than the "one … one" reciprocal construction that was used nearby among Aramaic speakers (2015:79, citing especially 2 Sam 14:6 and Job 41:8). I can add the negative evidence that אִישׁ-headed constructions appear in neither of the works attributed to northern prophets (Hosea and Amos), nor in stories about Elijah. They do appear four times in the stories about Elisha, albeit not in northern Israelite speech (2 Kgs 3:23, in Moabite speech; 7:3, 6, 9, in narration).

ject.[83] I count 30 such instances, which appear in 12 of the 24 classic biblical books (articulated by various narrators, prophets, and Yahweh).[84] That being said, the total number of אִישׁ-headed reciprocal constructions is more than 4 times larger than those prototypical instances alone. That is, more than 3/4 of the Bible's אִישׁ-headed reciprocal constructions deviate from the prototype case. Meanwhile, the Bible employs many *types* of variation; the אִישׁ-headed reciprocal construction is highly productive.[85]

Table 8.1 tallies the instances of the major types of deviation from the prototype.

Table 8.1 Significant Variations from the Prototypical Reciprocal Formula

• Singular transitive verb is used.	16
• Intransitive verb is used.	6
• Niphal verb stem marks the reciprocal function.	8
• Collective singular subject is co-referential with the two-part noun phrase.	3
• Reciprocal clause is verbless.	7
• Predicate is a participle rather than a finite verb.	8
• Predicate is an infinitive rather than a finite verb.	3
• Clause inherits its (gapped) verb from a prior clause.	8
• Clause inherits the (gapped) first term of its two-part noun phrase from the previous clause.	2
• The paired reciprocating nouns are directly juxtaposed, without an intervening preposition or the like (case marker).	8
• Verb's subject is not co-referential with the two-part noun phrase, which thus functions syntactically as an adjunct of manner.	13
• Clause forms part or all of the protasis in a casuistic law.	9
• Clause appears in a proverb within the book of Proverbs.	3
• The two-part noun phrase is fronted (articulated prior to verb/comment).	16
• Mutual relationship is with an entity that is possessed by one of the parties.	19

The last variant listed there warrants some explanation. In some instances, the mutual relationship is between one party and an entity that is possessed by another party.[86] We saw

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[83] In the prototypical cases, the subject is usually not lexicalized but rather carried over from a prior clause, due to information-structure considerations (i.e., nouns signal the need for recalibration; see above, §4.4.3).

[84] Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Twelve, Psalms, and Chronicles. Meanwhile, only non-prototypical usages are attested in the books of Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Job, Proverbs, Ruth, Ecclesiastes, Esther, and Ezra-Nehemiah.

Nearly half of the prototypical instances (14/30) involve the verb *'-m-r* 'said'.

[85] Furthermore, it is not an idiom, as noted by Jay (2009:7).

[86] Here "possession" includes inalienable possession, as for a body part. Or as Jay put it, the relationship holds "between a member and a part or tool of another member" (2009:12). He cited four biblical examples and offered an English analogy: *They kissed one another's <u>cheek</u>.*

one of these instances above, in the discussion of mutuality (Jer 19:9). These are variants of the reciprocal construction that conceptually *distribute* the possessed entity (in the above case, one's flesh) in order to describe how its possessor interacts with the other mutuant(s). The distributed entities include languages, carcass sections, oxen, swords, wives, injury, assault, control, and jealousy.

8.4.10 Cognitive motivation: Why does our noun head the construction?

Remarkably, אִישׁ is the only noun—general or otherwise—that is used as the first term of a reciprocal construction that employs a pair of distinct nouns.[87] Moreover, our work-horse appears even where we least expect it. As the prophet Isaiah depicts a desolate scene, he twice attributes reciprocal action to vultures (34:15–16, labeled by a grammatically feminine noun). Yet the noun that he uses as the head of both reciprocating phrases is אִשָּׁה.[88] Even when the antecedent is non-human, it is denoted by our noun אִישׁ.

Conceiving of אִישׁ as a "human-denoting noun" alongside other nouns such as *'ādām* 'earthling', Halevy addresses why none of those other nouns ever appears in the first slot of the two-part noun phrase. She views the uniform preference for אִישׁ as a kind of rigidity—a sign of the grammaticalization of the reciprocating construction. Specifically, it is "evidence of loss in paradigmatic variability" (2013:326). According to that view, long ago in the proto-Semitic era, other human nouns must have been allowed a turn in that slot.

The picture looks rather different when we view אִישׁ as a workhorse noun—given its expertise as a situator and re-situator of participants within an audience's discourse model. According to this view, the fact that אִישׁ always fills the first slot is simply a reflection of its unmatched abilities with regard to modulating discourse.

When reciprocal constructions are viewed in that light, it is no surprise that the first of the two nouns is always אִישׁ. Because of its special communicative advantages, our noun retains its preferred status as the initial label for the constituent member of any set.[89] As such, operating on the discourse level, our noun individuates its referent and introduces

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[87] True, in one biblical instance (Isa 34:14), a two-noun construction is applied to non-human inhabitants of the wilderness, where the head noun is not אִישׁ but rather designates the kind (*śā'îr* 'wild goat; satyr'). On that basis, Halevy asserted that "when the antecedent is inanimate or non-human, it may be denoted … by a lexical (non-grammaticalized) noun," i.e., not by אִישׁ (2013:326; 2011:13). However, that instance is not reciprocal; the relations are not mutual. Rather, *some* (not *each*) of the creatures participate in the action described. (So Halevy has acknowledged; personal communication, 30 Jan 2012.)

[88] Likewise for another prophet who depicts sheep (Zech 11:9). In Zechariah's metaphoric depiction, the grammatically feminine noun pair is referring within the source domain (sheep). That is, given the feminine markers, the intended antecedent must be *ṣo'n* 'small cattle'. (Female human beings are not in view.)

[89] Also germane here are the pragmatics of lexical specificity: a more general label will be preferred in situations where the intended referent's kind is already obvious (see above, §5.4.8).

that participant into the discourse model as being schematically distinct from the rest of the set's members. Once that task has been accomplished, that participant serves as the cognitive mooring for the mutual relationship, on the discourse level of meaning. The second mutuant can then define the relationship of another member of the set to that given individual referent of אִישׁ.[90]

In short, the role of אִישׁ in its reciprocal constructions is vital for their instantaneous processing by the audience—whereas no other general human noun is equal to the task.

8.4.11 Fronting as emphatic usage

As shown in Table 8.1, in 16 instances, the אִישׁ-headed noun phrase is fronted (articulated prior to the verb). Bar-Asher Siegal considers such fronting to be a distinct "type" of reciprocal construction (2012:209–10). Alternatively, as we saw with "anyone" usages (§8.2), fronting can be productively understood as the speaker's varying of word order according to information-structure concerns. Indeed, all of the reciprocal instances of fronting can be construed as expressing a *constituent focus*.[91]

The resulting pragmatic enrichment (in order to readily yield a coherent and informative text) is scalar in nature. That is, the fronting appears to direct the audience's attention to the extreme end of the scale in question—yielding a meaning like "every one *without exception*," "not *a single* one," "not anyone *at all*."

One example comes during Yahweh's reply to Job from out of the whirlwind, describing Leviathan's armored scales (Job 41:9 [Hebrew]):

אִישׁ־בְּאָחִיהוּ יְדֻבָּקוּ יִתְלַכְּדוּ וְלֹא יִתְפָּרָדוּ׃

They are joined <u>one</u> to <u>another</u>;
they clasp each other and cannot be separated.   (NRSV)

Given the contextual emphasis upon the impenetrable nature of these scales (see vv. 7, 9), it would seem that the fronting of our אִישׁ-headed phrase underscores that they are joined

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[90] Bar-Asher Siegal construes both אִישׁ and its correlative term in reciprocal constructions as assuming "the role of indefinite pronouns" and also "the function of existential quantifiers" (in press, §1.3.2.2.2). This explanation does not seem to fully account for the distinctive need for the first term (אִישׁ) both to individuate/situate its referents, and to serve as the reference point for distributing the reciprocated relations.

[91] In two unusual cases—Gen 9:5 and Zech 7:10—our fronted two-noun phrase is itself governed by other elements. (The syntactically remarkable word order in the latter case was noted by Ewald [1891] 2004:144, and by Joüon 2006:512; here I can add that the governing term *rāʿa* 'evil' is fronted for the sake of a topic contrast.) Syntactically speaking, in these situations, the speaker evidently construes our two-noun phrase as a unit that is *separable* from the usual reciprocal construction. Meanwhile, these cases share several unusual features: the context of use is highly charged, poetic diction is concatenated, and the case marker between the two nouns is elided. (On the significance of the omission of the intervening case marker, see Staps 2020.) That pragmatic correlation, along with the second-person address in each case (oriented toward persuasion), makes it likely that these instances are *exploitations* for expressive effect.

together *without exception*. (That construal is not reflected in the quoted NRSV rendering.)

In conclusion, fronting in reciprocal constructions is interpretable in terms of salience and contrast. As such, the applicable construal-and-enrichment approach is the same for all SAIN usages of אִישׁ, regardless of the construction (distributive, reciprocal, etc.). The principle of explanatory parsimony thus favors this interpretation.

8.4.12 Reciprocal constructions: Conclusion

In reciprocal constructions, our noun is deployed in unadorned SAIN mode, and this is for pragmatic reasons. The speaker can thus readily prompt the necessary pragmatic enrichment that powers a mutual construal. Reciprocal usage derives naturally from the basic schematic meaning of אִישׁ; it relies upon our noun's most characteristic function: to indicate participants in a situation. That function enables it to prompt the cognitive simulations that re-situate participants in the audience's discourse model, and to reiterate those simulations as needed.[92]

The wide range of syntactic variants (Table 8.1) argues for a consistent functioning of our noun throughout its reciprocal constructions. Its use prompts pragmatic enrichment in most cases—while in the prototypical cases, a distinct contextual sense of "each" (a distributing force) seems to have emerged, as in our noun's distributive usages.

As a workhorse noun, when אִישׁ is inserted into reciprocal constructions, it seems to operate like the no-nonsense dealer in a card game. Its role is to distribute the cards to each player, for every new round. And simply by being present on the scene, it is able to induce new rounds of play. Thus in practice, once again, אִישׁ is even more relational than a relational noun—in this case, the relational noun that it is expressly paired with.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has validated the prediction that the communicative and cognitive factors behind the functioning of workhorse human nouns (Chapter 5) can account also for their many and varied pronoun-like usages. This includes behavior that resembles that of true indefinite pronouns, distributive pronouns, and reciprocal pronouns in other languages—including English and French.

Given a posited schematic sense of אִישׁ as indicating participation, allowing for its pragmatic enrichment has consistently and effectively explained both the frequently occurring and more atypical grammatical constructions.

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[92] Bar-Asher Siegal likewise concludes that in both reciprocal constructions and casuistic laws (for he distinguishes the two; see above, n. 77), אִישׁ functions to individuate and distribute across its denoted set of referents. As he writes: "The across-the-board use of the same construction in Biblical Hebrew is possible because its constituent pronouns compositionally designate existential quantification [i.e., behaving like indefinite pronouns], effectively stipulating what happens '(if) someone did something to someone (else)'" (in press, §4.3.4).

9 Summary, Findings, Discussion, and Conclusion

> [For each article in the erstwhile Oxford Hebrew Lexicon project,] the problem with the semantic analysis and description was that it proved to take a long time.… Each word required something like a dissertation.
>
> —James Barr (1992:144)

> [In linguistics literature on the world's languages,] there are very few studies of the actual meanings and internal semantic structure of nouns.
>
> —Zhengdao Ye (2017:2n2)

9.1 Summary of Prior Chapters

Chapter 1.   This study began by viewing אִישׁ as a *human noun*, alongside the other general nouns within that semantic domain in Biblical Hebrew: *nepeš* 'person', *'ādām* 'earthling', *geber* 'he-man', *'ĕnôš* 'human being'. It is distinctive within that cohort. Comparatively speaking, the masculine singular form אִישׁ is: phonologically shorter; easier to pronounce; far more frequent; more broadly dispersed in the biblical corpus; more semantically mutable; used in situations where its presence seems superfluous; matched with a commonly used feminine counterpart form; regularly employed in pronoun-like ways; applied most widely beyond human beings; and more often used in a relational sense. This list of distinguishing features warranted placing אִישׁ in a league of its own.

I then set out to account for the presence of *communicative and cognitive factors* that might explain our noun's special behavior—and in particular the licensing of its relational meanings (which directly impact the meaning contribution of our noun). I drew upon the linguistic classes of nouns known as *general nouns* (semantically underspecified), *generic nouns* or *ground nouns* (pointing to ontological categories), and—as a distinct set that overlaps with those two classes—*human nouns* (customarily referring to humans).

Chapter 2.   In two other languages, a particular human noun likewise possesses a similar set of distinctive characteristics (compared to its cohort of human nouns) as אִישׁ does: the English noun *man* and the French noun *homme*. I therefore classed those words together as "workhorse human nouns"—a name that honors their being so markedly useful in their respective languages. The point of creating this category was to learn lessons from what has been observed about *man* and *homme* that can be applied to אִישׁ. Both *man* and *homme* have been categorized by linguists as among the *general human nouns*.

(As a caution to the reader, I paused to note that given the highly mutable nature of workhorse nouns, their residual or "dictionary" meaning is largely irrelevant.)

In order to keep track of how workhorse nouns function in communication and cognition, I laid out the concept of two levels of meaning. Meaning is generated both on the

informational level (regarding the referent within the world depicted by the text), and on the *discourse level* (managing the communication between speaker and audience). Communication in general, and all referring expressions, operate on both levels at once.

I then reviewed what is known about both *man* and *homme* that ought to apply to אִישׁ, as well. On the discourse level of meaning, both *man* and *homme* can be deployed to reduce the processing load for the audience, such as in anaphoric usages—wherein the workhorse (rather than a pronoun) substitutes for a more specific label. Workhorse nouns have been shown to carry out significant discourse-enhancing functions: to introduce a specific party into the discourse, to admit into the discourse some additional information about a participant (sometimes by providing a point of reference), and to enable the audience to track the participants.[1] Furthermore, workhorses—or their alter ego, namely a distinct indefinite pronoun—can refer singly to a set of otherwise unspecified individuals, in the same way that several kinds of pronouns do. (The occasional pronoun-like function of workhorses is best viewed as taking place on the discourse level.)

On the informational level of meaning, although at times *man* and *homme* represent the concept of 'human being' as part of a taxonomy, in many cases they say little about their referents. In some ways, they seem too semantically general (or underspecified) to participate in ordinary taxonomy. They directly prompt little more information than pronouns do. Their extension beyond human referents is not automatic (in French), but it is not surprising either (in English). And they often characterize their referent as situated with respect to some other entity. In so doing, they manage—via indirection—to evoke more information about their referent than their cohort labels (such as *individual*) can do.

Chapter 3. Hebraists have addressed few of the distinctive characteristics of אִישׁ in a sustained way. Typically, students of the Bible treat it like an ordinary human noun, applying its residual ("dictionary") meaning as a default. As for the two levels of meaning:

- *Discourse* meaning has not been recognized as such. In appositions, אִישׁ has been described as a "generic noun of class." Its construct chains are treated as conventional idioms or pseudo-adjectives. Pronoun-like usages have not been explained or related to the word's other functions. The question of how the various so-called grammatical usages of אִישׁ function to facilitate discourse—that is, how they serve as a strategy for efficient communication—has not yet been addressed.

- On the *informational* level, the contribution of אִישׁ in certain grammatical constructions, such as apposition, is considered to be negligible. Its occasional extension to non-human entities is attributed (without elaboration) to grammaticalization with semantic bleaching. Meanwhile, multiple relational nuances of our noun have been

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[1] Technically speaking, discourse functions are carried out by the entire referring expression—not only the head noun. Yet for convenience, I speak about the referring expression in terms of its most salient element.

asserted—and contested—among scholars for more than a millennium. The debate has centered around certain particular instances.

Comparing what I had collated about *man* and *homme* with what biblical scholars have been saying about אִישׁ, I saw that the findings of those two fields of scholarship hardly align, especially with respect to the *discourse* level of meaning. This suggested an opportunity for Biblical Studies to learn from linguistics in this respect, by looking again, with new eyes, at how the usages of אִישׁ may be operating.

Chapter 4. Why are the workhorse nouns deployed the way that they are? I put forward an overall approach that would enable us to view their distinctive features in an integrated fashion. At its core is a recognition of the fundamental cognitive importance of *situations*—especially those that involve a human participant—and the role of nouns when we communicate about them. I defined a *prototypical situation* as composed of two human participants whose interests either align or differ. Because the audience's mind treats such situations as a cognitive gestalt or schema, speakers can resort to an *under-specified* (relatively ambiguous) description. They can mention only *some* of a situation's facets—and even do so rather vaguely—in order to evoke the *whole* picture schematically in the audience's mind. (Situations in general can be schematically modeled in terms of triangles. The corners represent the participants or other constitutive elements, while the sides represent the relationships.)

During communication, an audience's discourse model keeps track of the depicted situations and their participants—who may be conceived of in either specific or nonspecific terms. The speaker must manage that model's cast of characters. This task involves cueing the audience to do three things within its model: (1) represent the depicted participants—some of whom may be new; (2) absorb supplemental data about those participants; and (3) revise the situation around the participants as needed. To provide the proper signals for these mental operations, the speaker employs noun labels. (Nouns may also play a role in a presentative device that signals a referent's importance.)

Nouns' signaling functions accord with their most basic role as the head of a referring expression, which *individuates* its referent within our mental universe. A typical noun also describes its referent in terms of a particular intrinsic property or cluster of properties. Even so, a given noun can usually be used to highlight either those features or one of the referent's extrinsic relationships.

All nouns in referring expressions have a relational function on the discourse level. Even on the informational level, they can be—and often are—used to evoke relational information. They can do so because a noun's most basic function (individuation) is implicitly a relational operation.

Deploying a noun that evokes an entity concept (e.g., <human being>) also activates the referent's situated relationships—making the latter cognitively available. Consequent-

ly, if a speaker wishes to regard a referent *in terms of its relationship to another entity*, it can suffice to articulate the label for the entity itself. The audience will adopt a relational reading when it yields a more meaningful text.

Chapter 5. I posited that workhorse human nouns are optimized for the speaker's management of the participants in the audience's discourse model. On the informational level, they prototypically feature a *thin* or *low-dimensional semantics*. In their ontological persona (establishing the possible relationships between phenomena), they accomplish only one simple task: they manifest a field of coherence. Such an *underspecified* semantics not only enables rapid cognitive processing by the audience, but also allows a speaker to dramatically alter the word's meaning contribution from one context to another. Furthermore, a workhorse appears to be the speaker's least-cost way to accomplish a variety of discourse functions. In other words, workhorses are both efficient and versatile.

All nouns indicate their referent's *participation* in the situation under discussion. However, when a workhorse noun is employed as the label, the referent is defined *primarily* in terms of its participation in the depicted situation. Consequently, we should expect workhorses to serve as the default label for the participants in prototypical situations (which are defined in terms of their participants).

Because participants in a prototypical situation are constitutive of that situation, a workhorse noun can serve as a signal that the referent is *consequential* in the discourse.

Workhorse nouns can efficiently evoke a cognitive *reference point* when construing a situation. The referent is in effect held fixed while the speaker describes a shift in some other aspect of the situation. Such usage is common in questions and in commands.

When a workhorse noun is applied in a context where its informational contribution seems superfluous, this is a sign that it is functioning on the discourse level. For example, as the head term in an apposition, the workhorse accesses the participant's address within the audience's discourse model. Then the appositive modifies the audience's understanding of that participant in such a way that the combined term serves to situate (or re-situate) its referent. (For example, the term *preacher man* depicts its referent as a figure who is *situated* in his community.)

Similarly, in contexts where the referent's property of interest has a high degree of *givenness*, a workhorse label is expected. (For example, from the summary description of a late 19th–century battle: "the English had lost more than 2,400 officers and <u>men</u>.")

Workhorse nouns can function as indefinite pronouns because of how the audience automatically enriches them during interpretation, in order to render the text as more meaningful. Similarly, since the basis of the distributive concept is individuation, which is a specialty of workhorse nouns, they are well suited to express distributive ideas. Furthermore, since reciprocal constructions are licensed by notions that workhorse nouns express efficiently, they are thus well suited to express reciprocity.

When expressed in terms of a Barsalou frame, the basic conceptual frame that is evoked by a workhorse noun consists of the following four attributes.

Attribute	Value
Description:	A participant in (or party to) a prototypical situation
Source:	Ontological domain of <human being>
Function:	To situate referents efficiently (in communication)
Connotation:	Associated with having a consequential presence

A workhorse's meaning extensions can be understood as motivated by a conceptual *shift in focus*, from the overall initial frame toward one of its attributes.

1. A focus on the *Source* attribute yields the sense 'human being'.

2. A focus on the *Function* attribute results in a variety of discourse functions and grammatical (pronoun-like) functions, while also licensing occasional extensions to non-human referents.

3. A focus on the *Connotation* attribute leads to conventionalized senses—both sortal and relational. The relational senses each describe a common type of human affiliation, such as 'husband/wife'.

The following semantic map is explained on pages 101–102.

In short, the hypothesized meaning contribution of a workhorse noun is that *it proto-typically indicates a (human) party to a prototypical situation, while also being widely used in signaling about discourse participants*. Furthermore, it has a wide range of additional contextual meanings, which includes ad-hoc meaning as well as sortal and relational senses.

One implication of this hypothesis is *onomasiological*: a workhorse noun will be preferred for communicating about participants as such—versus other general human nouns, more specific nouns, and also pronouns. Another implication is *semasiological*: workhorse nouns will be employed when their referent's participation is salient, and meanwhile will *not* be employed when participation is *not* germane. I expressed these implications as a set of nine predictions, to be addressed in the next three chapters, in turn.

Chapter 6. This chapter tested the first seven predictions on the biblical corpus. Most of the results are listed below under Findings. One major result was confirmation of the surmise that אִישׁ is the default label for the parties in prototypical situations. It obtained whether the reference in question was articulated by outside observers (e.g., the narrator) or by the parties themselves. It was observed in three types of prototypical situations: (hetero)sexual activity, all kinds of conflictual (e.g., juridical) settings, and marriage. Of all the general human nouns, אִישׁ is the only one employed consistently in prototypical situations. It is also preferred over more domain-specific terms, and even over the participants' names—and regardless of the speaker's attitude toward the referent. I concluded that on the informational level in such settings, אִישׁ designates its referent relationally, as a 'party' (to the activity, conflict, proceeding, or marital relationship—as the case may be). I then showed that this surmise resolves several longstanding interpretive cruxes.

Chapter 7. This chapter explored the role of contextual modulation of a workhorse's meaning, as reflected by the heuristic known as pragmatic enrichment. As predicted, such enrichment sometimes enhances our noun's *lexical* side; at other times, enrichment brings out its grammatical side. On the lexical side, two kinds of results were evident. One kind consists of relational *ad-hoc* contextual meanings, such as regularly appear in procedural texts to invoke the presence of a new and necessary participant. Another example is the juridical settings in which the determined noun phrase הָאֲנָשִׁים, as applied to a guilty party, is enriched from 'those involved' to 'the perpetrators'. The other kind consists of *conventionalized* relational usages that have become lexical senses, such as 'spouse' or 'agent'. (I offered supporting evidence for the notion that אִישׁ was a recognized lexical sense in Ancient Hebrew.)

Chapter 8. I tested the prediction that the communicative and cognitive factors behind workhorse human nouns can account even for their more evidently "grammatical" behaviors. After examining hundreds of instances in which אִישׁ corresponds to pronouns such

as English *everyone*, *anyone*, *each one*, *one another*, and species-generic usage, I showed that these pronoun-like usages of אִישׁ indeed reflect the way that workhorses operate across the board (i.e., in specific reference and/or with definite deixis), on the discourse level of meaning, with the help of pragmatic enrichment from the audience.

Indefinite pronoun–like usages occur in contexts that rely upon the workhorse noun's individuating expertise, and that encourage its modest semantic contribution to be enriched by the audience's world knowledge.

For *distributive* operations, locating the referential set within the audience's discourse model explains how distributive constructions have been readily applied to non-human entities: they are cast as participants and then manipulated by the speaker in the same way that speakers shape the instantiation of all situations and their participants.

Remarkably, אִישׁ is the only noun (general or otherwise) that is used as the first term of the most common *reciprocal* construction—which employs a pair of distinct nouns. Even when the antecedent is an animal, it is denoted by the workhorse noun. This fact can be explained as the straightforward result of the unmatched abilities of אִישׁ with regard to modulating discourse.

Fronted usages (whether of the indefinite pronoun–like or reciprocal variety) were readily explained as a predictable outcome of communicative need and in terms of normal information-theoretic word-order arrangements.

9.2 Findings

9.2.1 Tabulation of 349 instances in a corpus sample

To put the noted findings into perspective, I have tabulated in Addendum H all instances of masculine אִישׁ in the first three books of the Bible: 349 tokens. (This sample encompasses narrative, legal, priestly, and poetic genres; it includes roughly 1 out of 6 instances in the Bible.) They are classified according to the various informational-level and discourse-level functions that have been presented in this study. As that table shows—and as is well known—many instances of אִישׁ effectively have no informational-level meaning (outside of the ontological-domain information, and except perhaps for social-gender ascription in specific references, neither of which is tallied here). Nonetheless, as would be expected of a noun, all instances have at least one identifiable discourse function that is related to *participation in the depicted situation*. The results are summarized in Table 9.1.

Four main, relatively robust findings from this tabulation are: (1) On the informational level, what I have identified as our noun's *basic meaning*, namely 'party to a prototypical situation', seems to be functioning in the Bible as the *conceptual prototype*, given that meaning's relative frequency in actual use—for it is the most common by far.[2]

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[2] Significantly, nearly all of the instances that are tallied as having more specific informational-level meanings ('member', 'affiliate', 'spouse', etc.) also meet the definition of 'party to a prototypical situation'.

(2) Roughly 60% of instances perform the prototypical discourse function of nouns—that is, managing discourse participants—while remaining meaningful on the informational level. (3) On the discourse level, the situating (introducing) function seems to be the most typical usage for אִישׁ. (4) About 1 out of 4 instances perform discourse functions that are handled by pronouns in many other languages.

Table 9.1 Distribution of the Meanings of Masculine אִישׁ in the Bible's First Three Books

Category	Tally	% of total
Informational-Level Meaning		
Party to a prototypical situation	136	39%
Member	14	4%
Affiliate[a]	15	4%
Spouse (specifically: husband)	10	3%
Agent	14	4%
Subordinate[b]	5	1%
Human being	2	<1%
Man (adult male)[c]	17	5%
None (Discourse meaning only)	137	39%
Discourse-Level Meaning[d]		
Situate (Introduce) a participant	114	33%
Re-situate a participant	60	17%
Reference point for another participant	33	9%
Elaborate upon a participant	32	9%
Indefinite pronoun–like	18	6%
Distribute (including non-human)	43	12%
Reciprocal	31	9%
Consequential participant[e]	85	24%
Emphasis (repeated)	12	3%
Enumerate[f]	3	<1%

[a] Indicates affiliation with a place or household.

[b] Indicates subordination to another person.

[c] In these instances, male sexuality is contrasted with female sexuality, or אִישׁ is contrasted with a feminine term. (Referential gender is not considered.)

[d] The item tallies add up to more than 100% (of the 349 total instances of masculine אִישׁ) because some entries are classed in more than one discourse-functional category. In particular, the "consequential" signaling function is often combined with the "situate" discourse function.

[e] Indicates that the speaker considers the referent to be consequential (important) to the discourse. (Assignment to this category is much more tentative than to the other categories.)

[f] I.e., used as a counting unit following a cardinal number (Chapter 6, note 18).

As shown in Addendum H, every instance of our noun has at least one identifiable discourse meaning, regardless of the presence or absence of informational "content."

9.2.2 Findings that confirm previous findings in English and French

- In dialogues, a speaker will sometimes use אִישׁ to comment upon the emotional relationship between its referent and the addressee (rather than a relationship to other participants within the world of the discourse).

- The default ("unmarked") label is אִישׁ when introducing a new participant who will be named in the discourse.

- The noun אִישׁ can be employed as an attributing label to add supplemental data about a named discourse participant—and to depict that data as an abiding feature of that referent, rather than as a temporary quality.

9.2.3 Findings that do not apply to English or French

- The usages of אִישׁ where its functioning resembles a *distributive or reciprocal pronoun* can be explained by the same communicative and cognitive factors (individuating power, thin semantics, and pragmatic enrichment) that account for its behavior in general.

9.2.4 Findings that may apply also to English and French

Although the present study began with the premise that modern languages could be used to shed light on ancient ones, it has turned out that the reverse is also true. For English and French, certain aspects of the semantics of their respective workhorse noun—and not only the category itself—have been brought into focus by a consideration of Ancient Hebrew. Chief among these is the realization that the basic (original) concept behind the masculine forms *man* and *homme* may not be 'human being' (and certainly not 'adult male') but rather 'party to a prototypical situation'. (I.e., the early attested usages that have been construed as 'human being' were actually profiling their referent in terms of participation.) This surmise has been validated by its explanatory power with respect to numerous and varied usages of אִישׁ. Meanwhile, the Hebrew frequency data (Table 9.1) suggests that likewise for *man* and *homme*, the proposed meaning may have been dominant in actual use.

In addition are the following findings for אִישׁ beyond those stated so far in §9.2. These were not previously claimed in the literature for either English *man* or French *homme*, but they may well apply—given that they have now been documented for the corresponding workhorse noun in Ancient Hebrew. This possibility warrants investigation especially by scholars of general human nouns.

- The workhorse noun is the default label when introducing a new participant who remains *unnamed* in the discourse.

- A workhorse can signal that a new/active participant is *important* to the discourse.

- A workhorse can signal the need to re-situate (reset) a participant's standing in the discourse model. Via reference-point usage, this signal can apply not only to the workhorse's own referent, but also to another participant in the situation.

- A workhorse can be employed as an attributing label when the speaker wishes to *elaborate upon* a discourse participant who remains unnamed—and to depict that added data as *an abiding feature* of the referent, rather than as a temporary quality.

- Where the presence of a workhorse in a referring expression seems conspicuous, it correlates with one or more discourse-level operations. Conversely, the absence of a workhorse in a similar referring expression correlates with an absence of discourse-management needs.

- In prototypical situations, the workhorse noun is the default label for both parties.

- Where a workhorse's contextual meaning resembles a relational noun (e.g., 'husband/wife', 'agent'), its usage is consistent with its normal functioning as a workhorse noun. It can be explained as a combination of individuation, thin semantics, and pragmatic enrichment.

- Where a workhorse's functioning resembles an *indefinite pronoun*, this can be explained by the same communicative and cognitive factors that account for its behavior in general.

9.3 General Discussion

This research has relied upon a number of methodological innovations in the study of אִישׁ in Hebrew. They include: (1) Attempting to explain *en masse* the cluster of behavioral features that sets a noun apart from its cohort of apparent synonyms. (2) Asking what a general human noun's special role (including its observed discourse functions) might be in communication—and considering communicative efficiency. (3) Not dismissing a word's apparently superfluous or semantically vacuous usages by invoking "grammaticalization," but rather looking for the underlying motivation. (4) Applying the human affinity for thinking-about-participants-within-situations as an explanation for an under-specified noun's unusually frequent usage. (5) Defining a "prototypical" situation as a diagnostic venue for assessing a given language's cognitive preference for labeling its participants. (6) Applying to a general human noun the concept of a linguistic marker that cataphorically signals importance/topicality (from Givón's function-oriented pragmatics). (7) Applying to a general human noun the concept of a reference point (from Langacker's Cognitive Grammar). The combination of these approaches seems to have borne fruit.

Because workhorse nouns, when viewed in isolation, are so semantically schematic, we might expect them to be nearly useless. Yet this is not the case. On the contrary, they are especially useful; they work on multiple levels at the same time. They can associate their referent with other aspects of the discourse situation. They can be used to manage

that situation's participants in the audience's discourse model. And on the informational level, when their low-dimensional semantics is augmented by situated relationships, they can lend their nouny solidity to expressing those relationships. The speaker is therefore free to employ this underspecified (vague) term, while counting on the audience to infer the rest—given the human affinity for thinking about participants within situations. Speakers can prudently employ workhorse nouns on many and varied occasions. Upon reflection, it is little wonder that workhorse nouns have been so popular.

I hypothesized a semantic structure and evolution for workhorse human nouns that promised to account for their distinctive behavior. When applied to אִישׁ, this hypothesis successfully explained the word's unusual "grammatical" usages (such as being the head term of appositions, and the head term in reciprocal constructions) and additional other-wise-puzzling behaviors. It also enabled nine longstanding interpretive cruxes to be resolved. Thus the hypothesis evinced greater explanatory power and economy than the existing notions of אִישׁ in Biblical Studies. And those results, in turn, suggest that the hypothesis can likewise explain some of the unusual behaviors of *man* and *homme* in their respective languages.

9.3.1 Validation of assumptions

As noted in Chapter 1, I made four initial working assumptions regarding the biblical text, to suit the global scope of the analysis: (1) the composers chose their words carefully—for they were seeking to communicate; (2) the text is *isotropic*—that is, prevailing patterns of the usage of our noun apply uniformly over time, and across books, genres, dialects, and other causes of variation in language use; (3) gender-related meanings can be set aside, to see what additional meanings emerge from our noun's uses; and (4) standing behind a given word is one basic concept that, when extended in various directions according to recognized cognitive principles, can explain that word's usages.

These assumptions can now be validated. Regarding the first two assumptions, I found the functions and behaviors of אִישׁ to be remarkably widespread across the Hebrew Bible—with no discernible lectal or meaningless variation at the fairly schematic (highly abstract) level of my survey. Furthermore, a remarkable internal consistency applies across a variety of syntactic arrangements (bare nouns, genitive constructs, appositions) and regardless of grammatical number (singular or plural).

Furthermore, the characteristics and norms of use that I identified appear to be true features of the Ancient Hebrew language. I found the usage of אִישׁ to be consistent between and among narrators and characters, and well dispersed across the biblical corpus, including by genre. (No diachronic considerations—differential usage in "early" texts versus "late" texts—were evident from the particular tests conducted.)

This is not to claim that no lectal or meaningless variation exists—only that the degree of such variation was negligible for the purposes of this study.[3] Local variations in style or expression prompted meaning contributions that all remained within the "standard" range of meanings found elsewhere in the Bible.

Regarding the third main assumption—the bracketing of gender considerations—it is validated simply by virtue of my having found a wealth of internally consistent and cognitively motivated meanings that are unrelated to gender. (This finding should not be surprising, given that the topic of the referent's gender is germane in so few instances of the masculine form—only 5% in the Genesis–Leviticus sample corpus. Something else must have been going on, aside from gender ascription, when this word was being used.)

Finally, the assumption of a single basic concept has proven to be surprisingly potent. It crystallizes into a formulation via the Barsalou/de Blois approach to analysis introduced in §5.6.1 and displayed in Figure 5.2 (reproduced above). The resulting posited basic concept ('party to a prototypical situation') turns out to be expressed by אִישׁ in the Bible more than any other on the informational level. Furthermore, the number of instances that cannot be accounted for by that underlying concept is negligible. In short, it appears that essentially all of the attested usages of אִישׁ can be accounted for by either the posited basic meaning or one of its predictable extensions.

9.3.2 How can an abstract noun's meaning become concrete?

Historical semantics posits a rule of thumb that as word meanings shift over time, they typically move toward more *abstract* concepts, as opposed to becoming more *concrete* (e.g., van der Merwe 2018:322). If so, this would seem to argue against my suggestion that the meaning of workhorses began with relational—that is, abstract—meaning on the informational level ('party to a prototypical situation'), evolving from there toward more concrete and informationally "contentful" senses (e.g., 'adult male', 'spouse', etc.).

Note, however, that the observed diachronic trend is said to apply only to meaning shifts that are prompted by metaphor;[4] the other known motivations for sense extension are not bound by it.[5] Metonymy in particular offers a pathway to sense extensions that

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[3] For example, I noticed that Lamentations employs synonyms of אִישׁ in syntagms where I would have expected to find אִישׁ itself, and vice versa. However, those few instances do not affect the answers to the particular questions that I posed in this study.

[4] Conceptual-metaphor theory emphasizes primal metaphors that handily express abstract concepts in concrete (embodied) terms. Metaphoric extensions of individual word meanings generally seem to follow suit.

[5] In his synopsis of three theories of lexical semantics, Geeraerts does not mention a movement toward abstraction as a significant consideration in semantic change (2010:25–41; 63–64; 230–239). Abstraction does not seem to affect the type of semantic shift that is known as *narrowing* (or *specialization* or *differentiation*). For example, the English noun *meat*, which used to mean 'food' (as in "to every beast of the earth … I have given every green herb for *meat*"; Gen 1:30, KJV), is nowadays most often used to specifically

become more concrete.[6] And as we have seen, with regard to participants and situations, what is abstract and what is concrete are inexorably intertwined (Barsalou et al. 2018), creating ample opportunity for metonymic associations.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that even metaphoric extension can lead to more concrete senses, at least under certain conditions (Chapter 5, note 20). Overall, the semantic development is, as the linguist Randy LaPolla has observed, "in the direction of greater specificity and a more constrained set of possible interpretations" (2003:138).

9.3.3 Gender, semantic shifts, and the life cycle of workhorse nouns

Here, near the end of my study, is the place to tentatively re-integrate the workhorse noun's gendered (male/manly/masculine) semantic contributions with its other accomplishments. Where does the sortal feature of *social gender* properly enter the picture regarding how the masculine form אִישׁ is used?

As observed at the start of this study, אִישׁ, *man*, and *homme* are the only members of their respective cohorts that have a regularly occurring feminine counterpart form. This property does not seem accidental. From an information-theoretic perspective, a grammatical gender cue is more informative and thus more useful for discriminating referents. Thus it is fitting that a gender distinction be made only for the most frequently occurring word in the cohort.

Yet in all other respects, the workhorse is semantically the least informative in its cohort. This feature, too, can be explained from an information-theoretic perspective. Linguists have proposed that communicators aim to keep relatively constant their audience's uncertainty about the intended message (Dye et al. 2017). Under that assumption, and also assuming that a noun's gender marking offers an effective means of selectively modulating audience uncertainty, then speakers should mean less (on the informational level) by their use of a gender-marked label—that is, a workhorse noun—than they do by their use of a non-marked label from the same class. To keep the uncertainty constant, the added information about the referent's gender offsets the paucity of other information that is evoked about the referent.

Given that languages are emergent phenomena—not fixed entities—it is worth asking how workhorses have fared diachronically. Based on the experience of English, French, and Hebrew, a workhorse human noun appears to have a limited shelf life in its language. This is to be expected, given that workhorses exemplify an indirect means of expression:

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denote edible animal flesh (as in "vegetarians don't eat meat"). The word's newer, specific sense is no more abstract than its older meaning. (Cognitively speaking, a specialized meaning can be explained as a conventionalized WHOLE-FOR-PART metonymy—perhaps influenced by prototype effects.)

[6] As the cognitive linguist Martin Hilpert states, "metonymic associations can go freely back and forth between objects, their parts and wholes, and related activities and persons" (2015:352).

using an entity noun to indicate situated relationships in a shorthand manner (§4.4.6). Indirect approaches are inherently unstable, because eventually the language's users lose sight of the ploy and re-analyze it (Frajzyngier and Jirsa 2006). In particular, the referential gender aspect of the masculine form of a workhorse noun—which it uniquely (among general human nouns) incorporates and makes efficient use of—is in certain settings reanalyzed by language users as lexical gender.[7] As I shall now explain, when such reanalysis takes place, it meanwhile impairs some of the most distinctive workhorse functions.

One factor in semantic shifts is a broad phenomenon that the linguist Elizabeth Closs Traugott calls *subjectification* (e.g., Traugott and Dasher 2002). She describes it as "the metonymically based process by which speakers/writers recruit meanings that [otherwise] function to convey *information* to do the work of *communication*" (ibid., 31; emphasis added). If so, we might expect that one of the informational-level meanings of a workhorse noun was original—as the word in question was coined—from which the procedural/discourse meanings derived. (The fact that a workhorse's discourse meanings can all be explained as related to *participation in situations* is a strong argument in favor of my proposal that 'party to a prototypical situation' was the original informational-level meaning. According to Hopper and Traugott, even as a word's usage becomes more grammatical over time, its originally salient meaning continues to constrain its usage [2003:94–96, 98]. So by extrapolation backward from the attested discourse meanings, a similar initial meaning on the informational level is thereby implicated.) Furthermore, we would expect an increase over time in the noun's discourse-functional usages. However, that is not what has occurred.

The three nouns classed in this study as "workhorse human nouns" have undergone significant semantic changes, some of which were noted in §2.2. Post-biblically, in the Rabbinic Hebrew of late Antiquity, the masculine singular form אִישׁ was used much more often in gendered contexts to make sharp gender distinctions; and some of its functions as a workhorse noun were meanwhile picked up by *'ādām* 'earthling'—for example, the induction of "anyone" and of distributive readings (Sarfatti 1965; Chernick 1983; Stein 2019). This transformation from a largely gender-neutral term to a reflexively gendered one is paralleled in English with *man* and in French with *homme* (using Latin *homo* as the starting point), where a similarly slow lexical gendering is well documented over the centuries (e.g., Curzan 2003). And as in Hebrew, a concomitant decrease in the pronoun-like usage is evident over time (Giacolone Ramat and Sansò 2007; Laitinen 2012:637).

The theory proferred in this study predicts that to the extent that gendered information is evoked in its use, a workhorse noun is correspondingly less semantically nimble; thus when being used to make references to a type (nonspecific usage), it is a less effective prompt for discourse functions. A weightier word is a more ponderous one. The effect of

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[7] On lexical gender as a *gradient* category—a matter of degree that can shift over time—see Stein 2019.

increased lexical gender can be likened to creating a heavier isotope of a chemical element. Although its chemical properties do not change, its physical properties are altered.[8] In some respects, then, a noun's functioning changes as it becomes more gendered.

Consequently, as a workhorse noun is slowly construed as more lexically gendered, the informational balance is altered, affecting the degree of uncertainty maintained during communication, as noted above. To compensate, the word's other informational contribution (i.e., aside from gender) would normally tend to decrease accordingly. Yet for a workhorse, that contribution is already minimal. Thus the only compensation available is to cease using the word in its distinctively workhorse-like ways.

This is precisely what has been happening to English *man* and French *homme* in my lifetime. In recent decades, the Modern Hebrew אִישׁ and the contemporary versions of *man* and *homme* have all come to be generally perceived as terms that *presuppose a male exemplar* and that often exclude women from their denotations—and therefore (so the argument goes) they should be used only when a male referent is intended.[9] In other words, the use of the masculine forms of workhorses in a gender-nonspecific manner is increasingly unthinkable.

This view, it must be noted, significantly obscures the historically distinctive and versatile roles of a workhorse noun within its language. (If the present reader remembers only one thing from this study, let it be that at least in past centuries, such nouns have regularly evoked far more meaning than merely profiling their referent as an adult male.)

9.3.4 The default label in anaphoric usage

When a workhorse noun is employed (together with a determiner) in anaphoric reference, its meaning on the informational level is: 'the aforementioned participant'—or, if more than one discourse-active participant would qualify on the basis of grammatical agreement, 'the most salient of the aforementioned participants'. As phrased, this meaning would apply also to pronouns. However, the workhorse contributes more to meaning than a pronoun does, because of the discourse functions that meanwhile attend the workhorse noun. And the fact that a workhorse is often a changed label (and sometimes substitutes even for the person's name) confirms that it is the most expeditious noun for this task.

9.3.5 Elaborating upon a participant

A workhorse noun's ostensible superfluity is a telltale sign that a discourse-modulating operation is underway (to prompt the audience to "update" the file for its referent).

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[8] For example, at normal atmospheric pressure, the boiling point of *heavy water*—which contains a heavy hydrogen isotope—is 101.4°C rather than the usual 100°C (Engineering Toolbox 2003).

[9] On that basis, I myself have played a leading role in three "gender-sensitive" editions of biblical translation into English. (And that is what made me so interested in אִישׁ in the first place.)

This type of usage is common in the genres where characterization matters. Although other general human nouns are also used occasionally to characterize a participant (e.g., "a person of means" or "the guy over there with the funny hat"), their use accomplishes more than merely serving as a vehicle for the added data; those nouns impose their particular outlook on the referent—which predictably adds to the audience's processing cost.

9.4 Discussion for Biblical Scholars

9.4.1 Going beyond the disagreements among scholars

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the meaning *man* (in that English noun's contemporary residual meaning as 'adult male') plays a fairly trivial role in the usage our noun's masculine form: a mere 5% of the 349 instances in the Bible's first three books (Table 9.1). The attraction that this meaning has long held for post-biblical interpreters may be in part due to the fact that it is so prominently displayed by the first two instances of אִישׁ in the Bible (Gen 2:23–24). Yet those happen to be rather unusual contexts of use. Given that אִישׁ is such a commonly occurring term in Hebrew, the Bible's composers could hardly have intended to condition their future usages of our noun on those two initial cases.

The widely variant construals by biblical scholars regarding the role of אִישׁ in particular passages (Chapter 3) is partly a consequence of its extremely mutable, context-dependent nature—that is, its thin (underspecified) semantics. More than most nouns, it lacks a stable semantic core that can be reliably distinguished from the context of use.

With a high-frequency term like a workhorse noun, the prudent course in interpreting a given instance is to begin with that noun's normal and expected contribution to meaning. If the result readily yields an informative and coherent text, then there is no need to look further. For אִישׁ, the first meaning to try is 'party to a prototypical situation'.

9.4.2 Neither a sortal noun nor a relational noun

The compiled theory about workhorse nouns, when applied to אִישׁ as an exemplar, is somewhat at odds with two prior competing beliefs among biblical scholars. It appears that scholars have long understood אִישׁ as a prototypical noun, describing its referent *sortally*—as a member of a "sort" or class (as in the question "What *sort* of thing is this?"). Such a noun instructs the audience to regard the referent *in terms of its intrinsic features*. At the same time, scholars also agree that אִישׁ occasionally describes its referent *in terms of a role*: husband, warrior, subordinate, etc. In these ways, אִישׁ behaves like a *relational* noun—and some scholars have characterized it as such.[10]

However, the notion of a workhorse noun suggests that our noun behaves neither like a prototypical sortal noun, nor like a relational noun. Compared on the one hand to sortal

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[10] The first to do so was Van Wolde (2009:117–18). I had assumed this categorization when I began to formulate my research proposal for the present study, so I spent two years reading about relational nouns.

nouns, אִישׁ is drafted for relational use far more regularly (§1.3.5). Yet compared on the other hand to relational nouns, its ability to relate its referent to another entity on the informational level does not arise from its own semantics, which are underspecified (§5.3).

9.4.3 On the "literal" meaning of אִישׁ

Readers who like to think in terms of a "literal" meaning of אִישׁ (i.e., 'adult male' or 'human being') are cautioned again to notice that in actual use, workhorse nouns seldom behave like sortal nouns (§2.2). The closest thing to our noun's literal meaning may be its most frequent one—to express the basic concept 'party to a prototypical situation'.

9.4.4 Further reflections on selected biblical scholarship

Revell 1996   As noted in Chapter 3, Revell identified three sets of semantic categories that were used in the Bible to describe characters' social position—and thereby affected the personal labels used for them. The present study does not support the place that he assigned to אִישׁ in that three-part schema, in two respects. First, I have found our noun's sortal meanings on the informational level (Revell's first category) to be far less prevalent than he acknowledged, while the relational meanings (his second category) are far more prevalent. Second and perhaps more important, Revell's schema completely overlooks the role of אִישׁ on the discourse level.

Stein 2006, 2008a   I must revisit my own prior proposals about the nature and meaning of אִישׁ. My early conclusion that it does not behave like an ordinary sortal noun appears to have been sustained. Furthermore, the emphasis on relationality (which I called "affiliation") was on the right track. That being said, like prior scholars I overlooked the active role played by אִישׁ on the discourse level of meaning. In other words, I was interpreting the noun's appearance mostly semantically, instead of mostly pragmatically. Hence, rather than positing that "the noun denotes relationship either to a group or to another party" (2008a:2), I would now say that the relationship of participants *within the audience's discourse model* is often the point.

On the informational level, membership and representation are important categories for construing אִישׁ, but less so than I had stated. I would no longer assert that the "basic meaning" of אִישׁ is 'representative member of a group' (à la Grant 1977). Rather, the basic concept appears to manifest as 'party to a prototypical situation'.

9.4.5 In appositions and other אִישׁ-headed referring expressions

Previous biblical scholarship had not satisfactorily explained how אִישׁ (or אִשָּׁה) functions when it heads an apposition. The explanations were not only at odds with linguistic and grammatical theory but also could not account for the usages in a manner that rendered the texts as informative.

At the same time, the issue has been larger than appositions per se. For אִישׁ is often

modified by a plausibly co-referential term that is not necessarily a noun itself, yet elsewhere it serves as a substantive on its own. Such cases share with appositions the feature that our noun seems, at first glance, to be semantically superfluous.

It now appears that the presence of אִישׁ as a head term is primarily a matter of discourse needs (subject also to possible pragmatic enrichment on the informational level). For example, the presence of אִשָּׁה in all ten instances of *’īššâ zônâ* 'harlot' executes one of several discourse functions, which are not needed in the 20 cases where *zônâ* appears by itself. Discourse function promises a more fruitful way of viewing אִישׁ-headed expressions than, say, the "generic noun of class" or the "genus-species" explanations that are found in biblical grammars.[11]

9.4.6 Translation equivalence

Eleven years ago, I told a roomful of Bible translators that the English noun *man* is an inadequate equivalent for אִישׁ (Stein 2008d). Now I must confess a new appreciation for just how well *man* mimics the behavior of the Biblical Hebrew אִישׁ. Those two workhorse terms qualify as ground nouns and distinctively share a plethora of discourse meanings in depicted situations. In this respect, *man* is a natural translation equivalent for אִישׁ.

Nonetheless, a significant dissonance persists in these terms' *gender* connotations—and continues to grow over time. As noted above, in recent decades, *man* has come to be ascribed with a much more lexically gendered cast than the biblical term אִישׁ possessed in its day (§1.6.6; Stein 2019). For that reason, I stand by one aspect of my prior claim: rendering אִישׁ in English as *man* usually overtranslates its male aspect. Consequently, a heavy reliance on *man* as the translation equivalent makes the Hebrew Bible seem more focused on gender than is actually the case.[12]

9.4.7 Semantic bleaching—or not

Some linguists have referred to אִישׁ as "semantically bleached" in its pronoun-like usages, especially when it is applied to non-human referents. However, for workhorse nouns, the metaphor of "bleaching" obscures more than it explains. For it focuses on the informational level at the expense of the discourse level, which is where so much is actually transpiring. Rather than being called "desemanticized" or "bleached," אִישׁ might be better regarded simply as *underspecified* on the informational level (cf. Traugott 1998:406). Its power derives from its being understated.

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[11] For Assyriologists, it might also warrant revisiting the role of determinative markers in Akkadian.

[12] Ironically, a parallel situation obtains in English regarding *man* itself. Scholars of Old English have repeatedly cautioned the translators of texts from that era about the danger of making those texts sound "much more male-oriented" than intended by their authors—which is what happens when people mechanically render the Old English noun *mann* by the contemporary English *man* (Rauer 2017:143–44, 154–55). Those two versions of what is ostensibly the same word have very different gender implications.

Instead of bleaching, we should expect what Traugott has called "a strengthening of informativeness, which can be analyzed as a kind of metonymy" (ibid.; so also Hopper and Traugott 2003:94).[13] To give two examples for our noun, both its deployment so as to iterate across entire sets and not only point to individual referents, and its extension to non-human referents, might be considered to have "strengthened" its ability to inform the audience. That is, אִישׁ in its pronoun-like usage is *more meaningful on the discourse level*.

9.5 Discussion for Scholars of Other Languages

Because the concentration of what seem to be workhorse functions into one word seems to be more pronounced in Ancient Hebrew than in English or French, אִישׁ can serve as the category's exemplar.

9.5.1 Implications for French and English

In her study of French *homme*, Schnedecker had remarked upon the strangeness of such discourse usages, and the lack of informational meaning provided; likewise, during her corpus study of English, Mahlberg had similarly wondered whether general nouns like *man* are really nouns at all (see above, §2.5.1). The present study has addressed those questions via its communication- and cognitive-based approach. The puzzling usages turn out to have good reasons behind them, even though the latter are not immediately obvious. (It bears repeating that the meaning-making process—being pragmatically motivated—is largely hidden from view; Löbner 2013:15, 58.)

The notion that I offer to explain the functioning of workhorse nouns may well strike the reader as more strange than the words' behaviors (which everyone is already used to). Yet if the meaning of a word is a matter of how it is used, then this study has made a good case for my claim—however unfamiliar it may be even to native speakers.

9.5.2 Re-situating alongside textual cohesion and reference tracking

What I call workhorse nouns have been acknowledged for their role in improving textual cohesion, and in enabling the audience to track the participants in its discourse model. I believe that a useful addition to those concepts is the notion of the speaker's frequent need to *re-situate* (reset) a participant's standing in that discourse model. It is a different perspective on the same phenomenon (putting a workhorse noun to work), but with the advantage of offering a cognitive motivation.

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[13] This view accords with Bar-Asher Siegal's new finding that "it can no longer be credibly posited" that constructions for expressing reciprocation using אִישׁ have grammaticalized. As he explains, "A more refined, and hence more accurate, approach would contend that their components still express an unspecified relation [i.e., mutual relations without regard to who plays which role] compositionally" (in press, §4.3.4).

9.5.3 From 'man' to 'husband'

A semantic link has often been noted between a given language's word for <man> (that is, the concept of an adult male—viewed statically, in terms of intrinsic features) and its word for <husband>.[14] That is, in many languages, the same word can be used for both concepts; alternatively, they are related diachronically: the word for <husband> formerly denoted <man>.[15] As discussed in the body of this dissertation, that interwoven state of affairs has been attributed to a semantic relation of inclusion. However, my model of workhorse nouns offers a different semantic bridge than <man> as 'adult male'. The intervening link may well be the more general notion of 'party to a prototypical situation'—which is shared by both 'man' and 'husband' in their actual use.

9.5.4 Additional workhorse human nouns

Three languages comprises an admittedly sparse sample, in terms of linguistic typology. The extent of the proposed workhorse category in the world's languages—whether past or present—is for now a matter of speculation. One proxy measure may possibly be seen in the study by Giacolone Ramat and Sansò (2007) of the areal (geographic) distribution across Europe of indefinite *man*-constructions (i.e., impersonal active constructions in which the subject position is filled by a noun meaning 'man', or a pronoun derived from such a noun). They consult written attestations over time, secondary literature, and contemporary native speakers. The authors find that the indefinite pronoun–like usage of *man*-cognates—which seems to involve a workhorse noun as defined in the present study—is widespread in both the Germanic and the Romance languages (although markedly less so nowadays than in former times, as noted above). Furthermore, such usages have appeared more recently in some of the most proximate Slavonic languages.

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to identify nouns in other languages that would fit in the class of workhorse nouns. However, I can suggest that prime candidates would be the acknowledged cognates and traditional translation equivalents of the Biblical Hebrew אִישׁ, such as Akkadian *amīlu*, Aramaic *gəbar*, Greek *anēr*, and Latin *vir*.

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[14] Grygiel cites the cross-linguistic reference work *Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages* (1949), for the claim that "probably in every [Indo-European] language the word for 'man' may be used for 'husband' at least in colloquial or vulgar speech" (2012:235; see also 224–25). Similarly, the online *Database of Semantic Shifts* currently lists 30 languages (from four continents) in which the same word has been used for <MAN> and <HUSBAND>, as either polysemy or derivation; and similarly 25 languages for <WOMAN> and <WIFE>. (Hebrew is not among the languages listed.)

[15] On how *man* in English became associated with the meaning 'husband', see Curzan (2003:158–68), who traces the history of the collocation *man and wife*. Her investigation contends with the complex interrelated semantic shifts in the meanings of each of the terms involved—not only *man* and *wife*, but also *woman* and *husband*. That is, a whole semantic field is involved.

9.5.5 Modern Hebrew

Given the properties of אִישׁ as a workhorse noun as treated in the present study, a reconsideration may be warranted of Lewis Glinert's (1982) assertion that the Modern Hebrew אִישׁ consists of two homonyms: a noun, and an indefinite pronoun. Rather, it appears that these manifestations can be viewed as closely related (see above, Chapter 2, note 28).

9.6 Areas for Future Research

9.6.1 Further tests to confirm the findings

A number of ways to further confirm or potentially falsify this study's findings are available. They include the following.

Interpretive Cruxes.   Apply the findings of this study to the numerous remaining interpretive cruxes that involve אִישׁ, some of which were listed in Chapter 3.

Agency Sense.   Is אִישׁ found across the full range of agency situations (cf. Hall and Waxman 1993)? Is it used consistently where the bare fact of representation is most salient, and where other alternatives would produce an over-specified ("marked") expression (Cruse 1977; Downing 1977)?

Competing Ways of Manipulating Participants.   Given that the relative complementizer *'ăšer* can serve as the head of a phrase that introduces a participant (e.g., Gen 43:16), or that admits modifying information about a participant (e.g., 1 Kgs 5:30), what determines when אִישׁ is used together with an *'ăšer* clause (e.g., Gen 43:19), as distinct from an *'ăšer* clause alone?

Preferred Term for Re-situating Participants.   I tested אִישׁ merely for its regular ability to prompt the re-situating of a participant, but in theory it should be the *cognitively preferred* term for this purpose. This claim can perhaps be tested by looking at the sets of co-references for specific biblical characters. What determines the order in which the various labels are applied to a given character? Does the determined noun phrase הָאִישׁ dominate as a label when shifts in the narrative warrant a redundant relexicalization of the referent (aside from that person's name)?

Consequential Participants.   Perhaps אִישׁ cataphorically indicates a participant's importance more often than only in the limited plural cases that I noticed. For instance, is signaling importance an implicit part of its introducing function? Its characterizing function? Does such signaling require a bare (unmodified) noun?

Use with Role-Generating Verbs.   In contemporary languages, a speaker's use of certain verbs has been shown to generate one or more associated roles that people normally perform. Such verbs activate the audience's prior knowledge about those roles.[16] If

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[16] Psycholinguist Todd Ferretti and colleagues (2001) showed that English verbs activate conceptual information about their role-fillers. Verbs prime both their typical agents (e.g., *arrest* primes *cop*) and their typical patients (e.g., *arrest* primes *criminal*). Furthermore, both schematic and syntactic information interact

so, then that knowledge should be activated even when a workhorse noun is used in place of the more specific, characteristic role noun.[17] What determines when אִישׁ is employed as a substitute for the specific term? Has pragmatic enrichment led to relational sense of אִישׁ when it is the semantic (thematic) agent or patient of a role-generating verb?

Additional Datasets. Perform the same kinds of tests on אִישׁ as it is found in other Classical Hebrew texts (Ben Sira, Qumran, and Judean Desert finds), and the usages of אִישׁ in the extant Aramaic documents from the Jewish colony on the Egyptian island of Elephantine (4th c. BCE). And perform a comparative panchronic analysis between the use of אִישׁ in Hebrew and its cognate in Phoenician/Punic (involving both the noun and the relative pronoun that share the same spelling in that language).[18]

9.6.2 Alternative theoretical approach

More sophisticated cognitive linguistic models could be constructed from the "mental spaces" and "conceptual blending" concepts developed and refined by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (e.g., Fauconnier 2004; Turner 2015), and put into practice for human nouns by Marcin Grygiel (2012). For example, perhaps it can be said that a workhorse noun regularly serves as what Turner calls a "lexical prompt for blending." Would this approach lead to the same—or at least consistent—predictions?

9.7 Conclusion

In the Bible, the noun אִישׁ basically indicates *a participant in a situation* as such. This proffered explanation for the distinctive behavior of אִישׁ is superior to that of the existing accounts—including my own prior work. It accounts elegantly for more of the data than has been heretofore achieved (not only where this noun appears, but also where it does not); and it resolves existing cruxes, including some of the most important ones. My testing failed to falsify this hypothesis, so it survives in order to be subject to future testing.

Returning to the title of the present study—the relational meanings of אִישׁ—I would say, in a word, that they are found everywhere that our noun is used: always on the discourse level of meaning, and often on the informational level, as well. Across the biblical corpus as a whole, and with the evident exception of בַּת/בֵּן 'son/daughter, offspring, member' (see Chapter 1, note 2), אִישׁ appears to be employed more often to generate relational meaning than other Biblical Hebrew nouns are, including most relational nouns.

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quickly to focus an interpreter on the relevant role knowledge. That is, thematic role concepts are verb-specific and are computed in on-line production and comprehension.

[17] Regarding characteristic role nouns, see the work of cognitive psychologist Micah Goldwater and colleagues: "The representations of verbs and role-governed categories are intimately connected because verbs are the primary linguistic medium for encoding complex relations.… It seems that every role-governed category noun has a corresponding verb or verb phrase" (2015:2).

[18] On comparative panchrony from within a grammaticalization framework, see Andrason 2011:33–34.

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Addendum A. Labels for Situating Named Participants

Locale	#	Instance	Wife =אִשָּׁה	Other אִישׁ	בַּת/בֵּן	שִׁפְחָה/עֶבֶד	אָחוֹת/אָח	פִּלֶגֶשׁ	מְיַלֶּדֶת	Other (1 ea.)
Gen 11:29	a	וַיִּקַּח אַבְרָם וְנָחוֹר לָהֶם נָשִׁים שֵׁם אֵשֶׁת־אַבְרָם שָׂרָי	1							
Gen 11:29	b	וַיִּקַּח אַבְרָם וְנָחוֹר לָהֶם נָשִׁים … וְשֵׁם אֵשֶׁת־נָחוֹר מִלְכָּה	1							
Gen 16:1		וְלָהּ שִׁפְחָה מִצְרִית וּשְׁמָהּ הָגָר׃				1				
Gen 22:24		וּפִילַגְשׁוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ רְאוּמָה						1		
Gen 24:29		וּלְרִבְקָה אָח וּשְׁמוֹ לָבָן					1			
Gen 25:1		וַיִּקַּח אִשָּׁה וּשְׁמָהּ קְטוּרָה׃	1							
Gen 29:16	a	וּלְלָבָן שְׁתֵּי בָנוֹת שֵׁם הַגְּדֹלָה לֵאָה			1					
Gen 29:16	b	וּלְלָבָן שְׁתֵּי בָנוֹת … וְשֵׁם הַקְּטַנָּה רָחֵל׃			1					
Gen 36:39		וַיִּמְלֹךְ תַּחְתָּיו הֲדַר … וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ מְהֵיטַבְאֵל	1							
Gen 38:1		וַיֵּט עַד־אִישׁ עֲדֻלָּמִי וּשְׁמוֹ חִירָה׃		1						
Gen 38:2		וַיַּרְא־שָׁם יְהוּדָה בַּת־אִישׁ כְּנַעֲנִי וּשְׁמוֹ שׁוּעַ		1						
Gen 38:6		וַיִּקַּח יְהוּדָה אִשָּׁה לְעֵר בְּכוֹרוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ תָּמָר׃	1							
Gen 4:19	a	וַיִּקַּח־לוֹ לֶמֶךְ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים שֵׁם הָאַחַת עָדָה	1							
Gen 4:19	b	וַיִּקַּח־לוֹ לֶמֶךְ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים … וְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁנִית צִלָּה׃	1							
Exod 1:15	a	לַמְיַלְּדֹת הָעִבְרִיֹּת אֲשֶׁר שֵׁם הָאַחַת שִׁפְרָה							1	
Exod 1:15	b	לַמְיַלְּדֹת הָעִבְרִיֹּת … וְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁנִית פּוּעָה׃							1	
Num 11:26	a	וַיִּשָּׁאֲרוּ שְׁנֵי־אֲנָשִׁים ׀ בַּמַּחֲנֶה שֵׁם הָאֶחָד ׀ אֶלְדָּד		1						
Num 11:26	b	וַיִּשָּׁאֲרוּ שְׁנֵי־אֲנָשִׁים ׀ בַּמַּחֲנֶה … וְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁנִי מֵידָד		1						
Num 26:33		וּצְלָפְחָד … לֹא־הָיוּ לוֹ בָּנִים כִּי אִם־בָּנוֹת וְשֵׁם בְּנוֹת צְלָפְחָד			1					
Josh 2:1		וַיָּבֹאוּ בֵּית־אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה וּשְׁמָהּ רָחָב		1						
Judg 13:2		וַיְהִי אִישׁ אֶחָד מִצָּרְעָה מִמִּשְׁפַּחַת הַדָּנִי וּשְׁמוֹ מָנוֹחַ		1						
Judg 16:4		וַיֶּאֱהַב אִשָּׁה בְּנַחַל שֹׂרֵק וּשְׁמָהּ דְּלִילָה׃		1						
Judg 17:1		וַיְהִי־אִישׁ מֵהַר־אֶפְרָיִם וּשְׁמוֹ מִיכָיְהוּ׃		1						

Locale	#	Instance	Wife =אִשָּׁה	Other אִישׁ	בַּת / בֵּן	שִׁפְחָה / עֶבֶד	אָחוֹת / אָח	פִּלֶגֶשׁ	מְיַלֶּדֶת	Other (1 ea.)
1 Sam 1:1		וַיְהִי֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶחָ֜ד מִן־הָרָמָתַ֛יִם צוֹפִ֖ים מֵהַ֥ר אֶפְרָֽיִם		1						
1 Sam 1:2	a	וְלוֹ֙ שְׁתֵּ֣י נָשִׁ֔ים שֵׁ֤ם אַחַת֙ חַנָּ֔ה	1							
1 Sam 1:2	b	וְלוֹ֙ שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים ... וְשֵׁ֥ם הַשֵּׁנִ֖ית פְּנִנָּ֑ה	1							
1 Sam 14:50		וְשֵׁ֥ם שַׂר־צְבָא֖וֹ אֲבִינֵ֑ר								1
1 Sam 14:50		וְשֵׁ֗ם אֵ֚שֶׁת שָׁא֔וּל אֲחִינֹ֑עַם	1							
1 Sam 17:12		וְדָוִד֩ בֶּן־אִ֨ישׁ אֶפְרָתִ֜י הַזֶּ֗ה מִבֵּ֥ית לֶ֙חֶם֙ יְהוּדָ֔ה וּשְׁמ֣וֹ יִשַׁ֔י		1						
1 Sam 17:4		וַיֵּצֵ֤א אִישׁ־הַבֵּנַ֙יִם֙ מִמַּחֲנ֣וֹת פְּלִשְׁתִּ֔ים גָּלְיָ֥ת שְׁמ֖וֹ מִגַּ֑ת		1						
1 Sam 21:8		וְשָׁ֡ם אִישׁ֩ מֵעַבְדֵ֨י שָׁא֜וּל בַּיּ֤וֹם הַהוּא֙ ... וּשְׁמ֖וֹ דֹּאֵ֑ג		1						
1 Sam 22:20		וַיִּמָּלֵ֞ט בֵּן־אֶחָ֗ד לַאֲחִימֶ֙לֶךְ֙ בֶּן־אֲחִט֔וּב וּשְׁמ֖וֹ אֶבְיָתָ֑ר			1					
1 Sam 25:2–3		וְאִ֙ישׁ֙ בְּמָע֔וֹן ... וְשֵׁ֥ם הָאִ֖ישׁ נָבָ֑ל		1						
1 Sam 25:3		וְאִ֙ישׁ֙ בְּמָע֔וֹן ... וְשֵׁ֥ם אִשְׁתּ֖וֹ אֲבִגָ֑יִל	1							
1 Sam 8:2	a	יְשֶׁ֥ם אֶת־בָּנָ֖יו שֹׁפְטִ֑ים ... וַיְהִ֤י שֶׁם־בְּנוֹ֙ הַבְּכ֔וֹר יוֹאֵ֔ל			1					
1 Sam 8:2	b	יְשֶׁ֥ם אֶת־בָּנָ֖יו שֹׁפְטִ֑ים ... וְשֵׁ֥ם מִשְׁנֵ֖הוּ אֲבִיָּ֑ה			1					
1 Sam 9:1		וַֽיְהִי־אִ֣ישׁ מִבִּנְיָמִ֗ין וּשְׁמ֣וֹ קִ֡ישׁ		1						
1 Sam 9:2		וְלוֹ־הָיָ֨ה בֵ֜ן וּשְׁמ֤וֹ שָׁאוּל֙		1						
2 Sam 13:1		וּלְאַבְשָׁל֧וֹם בֶּן־דָּוִ֛ד אָח֥וֹת יָפָ֖ה וּשְׁמָ֥הּ תָּמָ֑ר					1			
2 Sam 13:3		וּלְאַמְנ֣וֹן רֵ֗עַ וּשְׁמוֹ֙ יֽוֹנָדָ֔ב בֶּן־שִׁמְעָ֖ה אֲחִ֣י דָוִ֑ד								1
2 Sam 16:5		וְהִנֵּ֣ה מִשָּׁם֩ אִ֨ישׁ יוֹצֵ֜א מִמִּשְׁפַּ֣חַת בֵּית־שָׁא֗וּל וּשְׁמ֣וֹ שִׁמְעִ֔י		1						
2 Sam 17:25		וַעֲמָשָׂ֣א בֶן־אִ֗ישׁ וּשְׁמוֹ֙ יִתְרָ֣א הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִ֔י		1						
2 Sam 20:21		כִּ֡י אִישׁ֩ מֵהַ֨ר אֶפְרַ֜יִם שֶׁ֧בַע בֶּן־בִּכְרִ֛י שְׁמ֖וֹ		1						
2 Sam 3:7		וּלְשָׁא֣וּל פִּלֶ֔גֶשׁ וּשְׁמָ֖הּ רִצְפָּ֣ה בַת־אַיָּ֑ה						1		
2 Sam 4:2	a	וּשְׁנֵ֣י אֲנָשִׁ֣ים ... הָי֣וּ בֶן־שָׁא֗וּל שֵׁ֣ם הָֽאֶחָד֙ בַּֽעֲנָ֔ה		1						
2 Sam 4:2	b	וּשְׁנֵ֣י אֲנָשִׁ֣ים ... הָי֣וּ בֶן־שָׁא֗וּל ... וְשֵׁ֥ם הַשֵּׁנִ֖י רֵכָ֑ב		1						
2 Sam 4:4		וְלִיהֽוֹנָתָ֥ן בֶּן־שָׁא֖וּל בֵּ֑ן ... וּשְׁמ֖וֹ מְפִיבֹֽשֶׁת׃			1					

Locale	#	Instance	Wife =אִשָּׁה	Other אִישׁ	בַּת / בֵּן	שִׁפְחָה / עֶבֶד	אָחוֹת / אָח	פִּלֶגֶשׁ	מֵילֶדֶת	Other (1 ea.)
2 Sam 9:12		וְלִמְפִיבֹשֶׁת בֵּן־קָטָן וּשְׁמוֹ מִיכָא			1					
2 Sam 9:2		וּלְבֵית שָׁאוּל עֶבֶד וּשְׁמוֹ צִיבָא				1				
Jer 37:13		וְשָׁם בַּעַל פְּקִדֻת וּשְׁמוֹ יִרְאִיָּיה								1
Ezek 23:2–4	a	שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים בְּנוֹת אֵם־אַחַת הָיוּ׃ ... וּשְׁמוֹתָן אָהֳלָה הַגְּדוֹלָה		1						
Ezek 23:2–4	b	שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים ... וּשְׁמוֹתָן ... וְאָהֳלִיבָה אֲחוֹתָהּ		1						
Zech 6:12		הִנֵּה־אִישׁ צֶמַח שְׁמוֹ		1						
Job 1:1		אִישׁ הָיָה בְאֶרֶץ־עוּץ אִיּוֹב שְׁמוֹ		1						
Ruth 1:1–2	a	הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּשְׁנֵי בָנָיו׃ ... וְשֵׁם שְׁנֵי־בָנָיו	מַחְלוֹן			1					
Ruth 1:1–2	b	הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּשְׁנֵי בָנָיו׃ ... וְשֵׁם שְׁנֵי־בָנָיו	... וְכִלְיוֹן			1					
Ruth 1:1–2		וַיֵּלֶךְ אִישׁ מִבֵּית לֶחֶם יְהוּדָה ... וְשֵׁם הָאִישׁ אֱלִימֶלֶךְ		1						
Ruth 1:1–2		הוּא וְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּשְׁנֵי בָנָיו׃ ... וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ נָעֳמִי	1							
Ruth 1:4	a	וַיִּשְׂאוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים מֹאֲבִיּוֹת שֵׁם הָאַחַת עָרְפָּה	1							
Ruth 1:4	b	וַיִּשְׂאוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים מֹאֲבִיּוֹת ... וְשֵׁם הַשֵּׁנִית רוּת	1							
Ruth 2:1		וּלְנָעֳמִי מוֹדַע לְאִישָׁהּ ... וּשְׁמוֹ בֹּעַז׃								1
Est 2:5		אִישׁ יְהוּדִי הָיָה בְּשׁוּשַׁן הַבִּירָה וּשְׁמוֹ מָרְדֳּכַי		1						
1 Chr 1:50		וַיִּמְלֹךְ תַּחְתָּיו הֲדַד ... וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ מְהֵיטַבְאֵל	1							
1 Chr 2:26		וַתְּהִי אִשָּׁה אַחֶרֶת לִירַחְמְאֵל וּשְׁמָהּ עֲטָרָה	1							
1 Chr 2:29		וְשֵׁם אֵשֶׁת אֲבִישׁוּר אֲבִיהָיִל	1							
1 Chr 2:33		וּלְשֵׁשָׁן עֶבֶד מִצְרִי וּשְׁמוֹ יַרְחָע׃				1				
1 Chr 8:29		וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ מַעֲכָה׃	1							
1 Chr 9:35		וְשֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ מַעֲכָה׃	1							
2 Chr 28:9		וְשָׁם הָיָה נָבִיא לַיַי׳ עֹדֵד שְׁמוֹ								1
			19	25	11	3	2	2	2	5
69 =			**44**	**+**	**25**					

Addendum B. Labels for Situating Unnamed Participants (Genesis through Kings, plus Ruth)

Locale	Instance	Spkr	אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	בַּת/בֵּן	מַלְאָךְ	נַעַר/נַעֲרָה	אֶחָד	סָרִיס	שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים	אֱלֹהִים	נָבִיא	Other
Gen 16:7	וַיִּמְצָאָהּ מַלְאַךְ יְיָ עַל־עֵין הַמַּיִם בַּמִּדְבָּר	N			1							
Gen 20:3	הִנְּךָ מֵת עַל־הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר־לָקַחְתָּ	C	1									
Gen 21:17	וַיִּקְרָא מַלְאַךְ אֱלֹהִים		N			1							
Gen 21:21	וַתִּקַּח־לוֹ אִמּוֹ אִשָּׁה מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם:	N	1									
Gen 22:11	וַיִּקְרָא אֵלָיו מַלְאַךְ יְיָ מִן־הַשָּׁמַיִם	N			1							
Gen 24:65	מִי־הָאִישׁ הַלָּזֶה הַהֹלֵךְ בַּשָּׂדֶה לִקְרָאתֵנוּ	C	1									
Gen 32:25	וַיֵּאָבֵק אִישׁ עִמּוֹ עַד עֲלוֹת הַשָּׁחַר:	N	1									
Gen 35:17	אַל־תִּירְאִי כִּי־גַם־זֶה לָךְ בֵּן:	C		1								
Gen 37:15	וַיִּמְצָאֵהוּ אִישׁ	N	1									
Gen 38:2	וַיַּרְא־שָׁם יְהוּדָה בַּת־אִישׁ כְּנַעֲנִי	N		1								
Gen 38:25	לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־אֵלֶּה לּוֹ אָנֹכִי הָרָה	C	1									
Gen 41:12	וְשָׁם אִתָּנוּ נַעַר עִבְרִי עֶבֶד לְשַׂר הַטַּבָּחִים	C				1						
Exod 2:1	וַיֵּלֶךְ אִישׁ מִבֵּית לֵוִי	N	1									
Exod 2:1	וַיִּקַּח אֶת־בַּת־לֵוִי:	N		1								
Exod 2:11	וַיַּרְא אִישׁ מִצְרִי	N	1									
Exod 2:11	אִישׁ־עִבְרִי מֵאֶחָיו:	N	1									
Exod 2:19	אִישׁ מִצְרִי הִצִּילָנוּ מִיַּד הָרֹעִים	C	1									
Exod 3:2	וַיֵּרָא מַלְאַךְ יְיָ אֵלָיו בְּלַבַּת־אֵשׁ	N			1							
Exod 23:20	הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי שֹׁלֵחַ מַלְאָךְ לְפָנֶיךָ	C			1							
Exod 32:1	קוּם ׀ עֲשֵׂה־לָנוּ אֱלֹהִים אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ לְפָנֵינוּ	C								1		
Lev 24:10	וַיֵּצֵא בֶּן־	N		1								
Lev 24:10	אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית	N	1									
Lev 24:10	אִישׁ מִצְרִי	N	1									

Locale	Instance	Spkr	אִיש/אִשָּׁה	בַּת/בֵּן	מַלְאָךְ	נַעַר/נַעֲרָה	אֶחָד	סָרִיס	שַׂר-חֲמִשִּׁים	אֱלֹהִים	נָבִיא	Other
Lev 24:10	וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי׃	N	1									
Num 12:1	כִּי־אִשָּׁה כֻשִׁית לָקָח׃	C	1									
Num 16:32	יִמְצְאוּ אִישׁ מְקֹשֵׁשׁ עֵצִים בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת׃	N	1									
Num 20:16	וַיִּשְׁלַח מַלְאָךְ וַיֹּצִאֵנוּ מִמִּצְרַיִם	C			1							
Num 25:6	וְהִנֵּה אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּא	N	1									
Josh 5:13	וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ עֹמֵד לְנֶגְדּוֹ	N	1									
Judg 1:24	וַיִּרְאוּ הַשֹּׁמְרִים אִישׁ יוֹצֵא מִן־הָעִיר	N	1									
Judg 2:1	וַיַּעַל מַלְאַךְ־יְיָ	N			1							
Judg 6:8	וַיִּשְׁלַח יְיָ אִישׁ נָבִיא אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל	N	1									
Judg 6:11	וַיָּבֹא מַלְאַךְ יְיָ	N			1							
Judg 7:13	וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ	N	1									
Judg 7:13	מְסַפֵּר לְרֵעֵהוּ חֲלוֹם	N										1
Judg 8:14	וַיִּלְכָּד־נַעַר מֵאַנְשֵׁי סֻכּוֹת	N				1						
Judg 9:53	וַתַּשְׁלֵךְ אִשָּׁה אַחַת פֶּלַח רֶכֶב	N	1									
Judg 13:3	וַיֵּרָא מַלְאַךְ־יְיָ אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה	N			1							
Judg 14:1	וַיַּרְא אִשָּׁה בְּתִמְנָתָה מִבְּנוֹת פְּלִשְׁתִּים׃	N	1									
Judg 14:2	אִשָּׁה רָאִיתִי בְתִמְנָתָה מִבְּנוֹת פְּלִשְׁתִּים	C	1									
Judg 16:1	וַיַּרְא־שָׁם אִשָּׁה זוֹנָה	N	1									
Judg 17:7	וַיְהִי־נַעַר מִבֵּית לֶחֶם יְהוּדָה	N				1						
Judg 19:1	וַיְהִי אִישׁ לֵוִי גָּר בְּיַרְכְּתֵי הַר־אֶפְרַיִם	N	1									
Judg 19:1	וַיִּקַּח־לוֹ אִשָּׁה פִילֶגֶשׁ מִבֵּית לֶחֶם יְהוּדָה׃	N	1									
Judg 19:16	וְהִנֵּה אִישׁ זָקֵן	N	1									
1 Sam 2:27	וַיָּבֹא אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים אֶל־עֵלִי	N	1									
1 Sam 4:12	וַיָּרָץ אִישׁ־בִּנְיָמִן מֵהַמַּעֲרָכָה	N	1									

Locale	Instance	Spkr	אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	בַּת/בֵּן	מַלְאָךְ	נַעַר/נַעֲרָה	אֶחָד	סָרִיס	שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים	אֱלֹהִים	נָבִיא	Other
1 Sam 4:20	אַל־תִּירְאִי כִּי בֵן יָלָדְתְּ	C		1								
1 Sam 9:6	הִנֵּה־נָא אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים בָּעִיר הַזֹּאת	C	1									
1 Sam 9:16	אֶשְׁלַח אֵלֶיךָ אִישׁ מֵאֶרֶץ בִּנְיָמִן	C	1									
1 Sam 16:18	וַיַּעַן אֶחָד מֵהַנְּעָרִים	N					1					
1 Sam 16:18	הִנֵּה רָאִיתִי בֵּן לְיִשַׁי בֵּית הַלַּחְמִי	C		1								
1 Sam 17:25	וַיֹּאמֶר אִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל	N	1									
1 Sam 17:30	וַיִּסֹּב מֵאֶצְלוֹ אֶל־מוּל אַחֵר	N										1
1 Sam 23:27	וּמַלְאָךְ בָּא אֶל־שָׁאוּל	N			1							
1 Sam 25:14	הִגִּיד נַעַר־אֶחָד מֵהַנְּעָרִים	N				1						
1 Sam 28:13	אֱלֹהִים רָאִיתִי עֹלִים מִן־הָאָרֶץ׃	C								1		
1 Sam 30:11	וַיִּמְצְאוּ אִישׁ־מִצְרִי בַּשָּׂדֶה	N	1									
1 Sam 30:13	נַעַר מִצְרִי אָנֹכִי עֶבֶד לְאִישׁ עֲמָלֵקִי	C	1									
2 Sam 1:2	וְהִנֵּה אִישׁ בָּא מִן־הַמַּחֲנֶה מֵעִם שָׁאוּל	N	1									
2 Sam 1:13	בֶּן־אִישׁ גֵּר עֲמָלֵקִי אָנֹכִי׃	C	1									
2 Sam 1:15	וַיִּקְרָא דָוִד לְאַחַד מֵהַנְּעָרִים	N					1					
2 Sam 11:2	וַיַּרְא אִשָּׁה רֹחֶצֶת מֵעַל הַגָּג	N	1									
2 Sam 12:4	וַיָּבֹא הֵלֶךְ לְאִישׁ הֶעָשִׁיר	C										1
2 Sam 14:2	וַיִּקַּח מִשָּׁם אִשָּׁה חֲכָמָה	N	1									
2 Sam 17:18	וַיָּבֹאוּ אֶל־בֵּית־אִישׁ בְּבַחוּרִים	N	1									
2 Sam 17:18	וַיַּרְא אֹתָם נַעַר	N				1						
2 Sam 18:10	וַיַּרְא אִישׁ אֶחָד	N	1									
2 Sam 18:24	וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ רָץ לְבַדּוֹ׃	N	1									
2 Sam 18:26	וַיַּרְא הַצֹּפֶה אִישׁ־אַחֵר רָץ	N	1									
2 Sam 18:26	הִנֵּה־אִישׁ רָץ לְבַדּוֹ	C	1									

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2 Sam 20:11	וְאִישׁ עָמַד עָלָיו מִנַּעֲרֵי יוֹאָב	N	1									
2 Sam 20:16	וַתִּקְרָא אִשָּׁה חֲכָמָה מִן־הָעִיר	N	1									
2 Sam 21:20	וַיְהִי ׀ אִישׁ מָדוֹן	N	1									
2 Sam 23:21	וְהוּא־הִכָּה אֶת־אִישׁ מִצְרִי	N	1									
1 Kgs 11:19	וַיִּתֶּן־לוֹ אִשָּׁה אֶת־אֲחוֹת אִשְׁתּוֹ	N	1									
1 Kgs 13:1	וְהִנֵּה ׀ אִישׁ אֱלֹהִים בָּא מִיהוּדָה	N	1									
1 Kgs 13:11	וְנָבִיא אֶחָד זָקֵן יֹשֵׁב בְּבֵית־אֵל	N									1	
1 Kgs 17:9	הִנֵּה צִוִּיתִי שָׁם אִשָּׁה אַלְמָנָה לְכַלְכְּלֶךָ׃	C	1									
1 Kgs 17:10	וְהִנֵּה־שָׁם אִשָּׁה אַלְמָנָה מְקֹשֶׁשֶׁת עֵצִים	N	1									
1 Kgs 19:2	וַתִּשְׁלַח אִיזֶבֶל מַלְאָךְ אֶל־אֵלִיָּהוּ	N			1							
1 Kgs 20:13	וְהִנֵּה ׀ נָבִיא אֶחָד	N									1	
1 Kgs 20:35	וְאִישׁ אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי הַנְּבִיאִים	N	1									
1 Kgs 20:37	וַיִּמְצָא אִישׁ אַחֵר	N	1									
1 Kgs 20:39	וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ סָר	C	1									
1 Kgs 20:39	וַיָּבֵא אֵלַי אִישׁ	C	1									
1 Kgs 22:9	וַיִּקְרָא מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־סָרִיס אֶחָד	N						1				
1 Kgs 22:34	וְאִישׁ מָשַׁךְ בַּקֶּשֶׁת לְתֻמּוֹ	N	1									
1 Kgs 22:48	נִצָּב מֶלֶךְ׃	N										1
2 Kgs 1:3	וּמַלְאַךְ יְיָ דִּבֶּר אֶל־אֵלִיָּה הַתִּשְׁבִּי	N			1							
2 Kgs 1:6	אִישׁ ׀ עָלָה לִקְרָאתֵנוּ	C	1									
2 Kgs 1:9	וַיִּשְׁלַח אֵלָיו שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁיו	N							1			
2 Kgs 1:11	וַיִּשְׁלַח אֵלָיו שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים אַחֵר וַחֲמִשָּׁיו	N							1			
2 Kgs 1:13	וַיִּשְׁלַח שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים שְׁלִשִׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁיו	N							1			
2 Kgs 3:11	וַיַּעַן אֶחָד מֵעַבְדֵי מֶלֶךְ־יִשְׂרָאֵל	N					1					

Locale	Instance	Spkr	אִישׁ/אִשָּׁה	בַּת/בֵּן	מַלְאָךְ	נַעַר/נַעֲרָה	אֶחָד	סָרִיס	שַׂר־חֲמִשִּׁים	אֱלֹהִים	נָבִיא	Other
2 Kgs 4:1	וְאִשָּׁה אַחַת מִנְּשֵׁי בְנֵי־הַנְּבִיאִים צָעֲקָה	N	1									
2 Kgs 4:8	וְשָׁם אִשָּׁה גְדוֹלָה	N	1									
2 Kgs 4:17	וַתַּהַר הָאִשָּׁה וַתֵּלֶד בֵּן	N		1								
2 Kgs 4:22	שִׁלְחָה נָא לִי אֶחָד מִן־הַנְּעָרִים	C					1					
2 Kgs 4:42	וְאִישׁ בָּא מִבַּעַל שָׁלִשָׁה	N	1									
2 Kgs 5:2	וַיִּשְׁבּוּ מֵאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל נַעֲרָה קְטַנָּה	N				1						
2 Kgs 5:10	וַיִּשְׁלַח אֵלָיו אֱלִישָׁע מַלְאָךְ לֵאמֹר	N			1							
2 Kgs 6:26	וְאִשָּׁה צָעֲקָה אֵלָיו לֵאמֹר	N	1									
2 Kgs 6:32	וַיִּשְׁלַח אִישׁ מִלְּפָנָיו	N	1									
2 Kgs 7:13	וַיַּעַן אֶחָד מֵעֲבָדָיו	N					1					
2 Kgs 8:6	וַיִּתֶּן־לָהּ הַמֶּלֶךְ סָרִיס אֶחָד	N						1				
2 Kgs 9:1	וֶאֱלִישָׁע הַנָּבִיא קָרָא לְאַחַד מִבְּנֵי הַנְּבִיאִים	N					1					
2 Kgs 9:19	וַיִּשְׁלַח רֹכֵב סוּס שֵׁנִי	N										1
2 Kgs 13:21	וַיְהִי הֵם ׀ קֹבְרִים אִישׁ	N	1									
2 Kgs 17:28	וַיָּבֹא אֶחָד מֵהַכֹּהֲנִים אֲשֶׁר הִגְלוּ מִשֹּׁמְרוֹן	N					1					
2 Kgs 19:35	וַיֵּצֵא ׀ מַלְאַךְ יְיָ וַיַּךְ בְּמַחֲנֵה אַשּׁוּר	N			1							
2 Kgs 25:19	וּמִן־הָעִיר לָקַח סָרִיס אֶחָד	N					1					
Ruth 3:8	וְהִנֵּה אִשָּׁה שֹׁכֶבֶת מַרְגְּלֹתָיו׃	N	1									
Ruth 3:12	וְגַם יֵשׁ גֹּאֵל קָרוֹב מִמֶּנִּי׃	C										1
Ruth 4:13	וַתֵּלֶד בֵּן׃	N		1								
			64	**8**	**14**	**6**	**7**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**6**
115 **=**			**64**	**51**								

KEY: **Spkr** = Speaker: either a narrator (N) or a character (C).

Addendum C. Instances of the Elaboration Function in the Book of Genesis

Locale	#	Instance	Narr	Char	Rel cl	Nom cl	Copula	Appos	Subst	Exist	Comment
6:4		הֵמָּה הַגִּבֹּרִים אֲשֶׁר מֵעוֹלָם אַנְשֵׁי הַשֵּׁם׃	1					1			Ambiguous syntax
6:9		נֹחַ אִישׁ צַדִּיק	1			1					
7:2	a	שִׁבְעָה שִׁבְעָה אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ	1					1			
7:2	b	שְׁנַיִם אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ׃	1					1			
9:20		וַיָּחֶל נֹחַ אִישׁ הָאֲדָמָה	1					1			
12:11		כִּי אִשָּׁה יְפַת־מַרְאֶה אָתְּ׃		1		1					
13:8		כִּי־אֲנָשִׁים אַחִים אֲנָחְנוּ׃		1		1					
25:27	a	וַיְהִי עֵשָׂו אִישׁ יֹדֵעַ צַיִד	1				1				
25:27	b	וַיְהִי עֵשָׂו … אִישׁ שָׂדֶה	1					1			
25:27	c	וְיַעֲקֹב אִישׁ תָּם	1				1				
27:11	a	הֵן עֵשָׂו אָחִי אִישׁ שָׂעִר		1		1					
27:11	b	וְאָנֹכִי אִישׁ חָלָק׃		1		1					
34:14		לָתֵת אֶת־אֲחֹתֵנוּ לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־לוֹ עָרְלָה		1	1				1		Unique reference
39:1		פּוֹטִיפַר … אִישׁ מִצְרִי	1					1			
39:2		וַיְהִי אִישׁ מַצְלִיחַ	1				1				
41:38		אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים בּוֹ׃		1	1			1			
46:32	a	וְהָאֲנָשִׁים רֹעֵי צֹאן		1		1					
46:32	b	כִּי־אַנְשֵׁי מִקְנֶה הָיוּ		1			1				
46:34		אַנְשֵׁי מִקְנֶה הָיוּ עֲבָדֶיךָ מִנְּעוּרֵינוּ וְעַד־עַתָּה		1			1				Self-identification
47:6		וְיֶשׁ־בָּם אַנְשֵׁי־חַיִל		1						1	
			10	10	2	6	5	7	1	1	

20 out of 159 = 1 out of 8 instances of masculine singular אִישׁ in Genesis

KEY: Narr = Narration; **Char** = Spoken by a character; **Rel cl** = Modified by relative clause; **Nom cl** = In a nominal clause (verbless)
   Copula = In a copular clause; **Appos** = In non-restrictive apposition; **Subst** = Phrase or clause substitutes for the primary referring
   expression or personal pronoun; **Exist** = Appears with a predication of existence

Addendum D. Labels for the Participants in Situations Designated by *r-y-b* or *rîb*

Locale	Instance	אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה	'ādām	yārîb or mērîb	'ōyēb/ 'ōyavt	rō'eh	rē'a	'āḥ	'almānâ	ḥōr	segen	1x only
Gen 13:7	וַיְהִי־רִיב בֵּין רֹעֵי מִקְנֵה־אַבְרָם וּבֵין רֹעֵי מִקְנֵה־לֹוט					2						
Gen 26:20	וַיָּרִיבוּ רֹעֵי גְרָר עִם־רֹעֵי יִצְחָק					2						
Exod 21:18	וְכִי־יְרִיבֻן אֲנָשִׁים וְהִכָּה־אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ	2										
Exod 23:3	וְדָל לֹא תֶהְדַּר בְּרִיבוֹ:											1
Exod 23:6	לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפַּט אֶבְיֹנְךָ בְּרִיבוֹ:											1
Deut 17:8–12	דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ ... וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדֹון ... וּמֵת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא	1										
Deut 19:17	וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי־הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר־לָהֶם הָרִיב ... לִפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַשֹּׁפְטִים	2										
Deut 25:1	כִּי־יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים	2										
Deut 33:7	יָדָיו רָב לֹו וְעֵזֶר מִצָּרָיו תִּהְיֶה:											1
Deut 33:8	לְאִישׁ חֲסִידֶךָ אֲשֶׁר ... תְּרִיבֵהוּ	1										
Judg 6:31	וַיֹּאמְרוּ אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר אֶל־יֹואָשׁ ... וַיֹּאמֶר יֹואָשׁ ... הַאַתֶּם	תְּרִיבוּן לַבַּעַל	1										
Judg 8:1	וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֵלָיו אִישׁ אֶפְרַיִם ... וַיְרִיבוּן אִתֹּו בְּחָזְקָה:	1										
Judg 12:2	אִישׁ רִיב הָיִיתִי אֲנִי וְעַמִּי וּבְנֵי־עַמֹּון מְאֹד	1										
Judg 21:16, 22	וַיֹּאמְרוּ זִקְנֵי הָעֵדָה ... כִּי־יָבֹאוּ אֲבֹותָם אֹו אֲחֵיהֶם לָרִיב	אֵלֵינוּ							1				2
1 Sam 2:10	יְיָ יֵחַתּוּ מְרִיבָיו			1								
2 Sam 15:2	וַיְהִי כָּל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִהְיֶה־לֹו־רִיב לָבֹוא אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ לַמִּשְׁפָּט	1										
2 Sam 15:4	וְעָלַי יָבֹוא כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִהְיֶה־לֹו־רִיב וּמִשְׁפָּט	1										
1 Sam 24:16, 20	וְהָיָה יְיָ לְדַיָּן ... וְיָרֵב אֶת־רִיבִי ... וְכִי־יִמְצָא אִישׁ אֶת־אֹיְבֹו	1			1							
Isa 1:17	שִׁפְטוּ יָתֹום רִיבוּ אַלְמָנָה:								1			
Isa 1:23	יָתֹום לֹא יִשְׁפֹּטוּ וְרִיב אַלְמָנָה לֹא־יָבֹוא אֲלֵיהֶם:								1			
Isa 19:20	וְיִשְׁלַח לָהֶם מֹושִׁיעַ וָרָב וְהִצִּילָם:											2
Isa 41:11	יִהְיוּ כְאַיִן וְיֹאבְדוּ אַנְשֵׁי רִיבֶךָ:	1										
Isa 41:21, 28*	קָרְבוּ רִיבְכֶם ... וְאֵין אִישׁ	1										
Isa 49:3, 25	וְאֶת־יְרִיבֵךְ אָנֹכִי אָרִיב			1								
Isa 50:8	מִי־יָרִיב אִתִּי נַעַמְדָה יָּחַד מִי־בַעַל מִשְׁפָּטִי יִגַּשׁ אֵלָי:											1

Locale	Instance	אִישׁ or אִשָּׁה	*’ādām*	*yārîb* or *mērîb*	*’ōyēb/ ’ōyavt*	*rō‘eh*	*rē‘a*	*’āḥ*	*’almānâ*	*ḥōr*	*segen*	1x only
Jer 15:10	כִּי יְלִדְתִּ֫נִי אִישׁ רִיב וְאִישׁ מָד֖וֹן לְכָל־הָאָ֑רֶץ	2										
Jer 18:19	וּשְׁמַ֖ע לְק֣וֹל יְרִיבָֽי׃			1								
Mic 7:8–10	אַל־תִּשְׂמְחִי אֹיַבְתִּי֮ לִ֒י...עַ֤ד אֲשֶׁר יָרִיב רִיבִי֙ וְעָשָׂ֣ה מִשְׁפָּטִ֔י...וְתֵרֶ֣א אֹיַבְתִּ֗י				2							
Ps 31:21	מֵֽרִכְסֵ֫י אִ֥ישׁ ... מֵרִ֥יב לְשֹׁנֽוֹת׃	1										
Ps 35:1	רִיבָ֣ה יְ֭הוָה אֶת־יְרִיבַ֑י לְ֝חַ֗ם אֶת־לֹֽחֲמָֽי׃			1								
+Ps 35:3	וְהָ֘רֵ֤ק חֲנִ֣ית וּ֭סְגֹר לִקְרַ֣את רֹדְפָ֑י...											1
+Ps 35:4	יֵבֹ֣שׁוּ וְיִכָּלְמוּ֮ מְבַקְשֵׁ֪י נַ֫פְשִׁ֥י...											1
+Ps 35:11	יְ֭קוּמוּן עֵדֵ֣י חָמָ֑ס...											1
+Ps 35:19	אַֽל־יִשְׂמְחוּ־לִ֣י אֹיְבַ֣י שֶׁ֑קֶר...				1							1
Ps 43:1	שָׁפְטֵ֤נִי אֱלֹהִ֙ים ׀ וְרִ֘יבָ֤ה רִיבִ֗י מִגּ֥וֹי לֹא־חָסִ֑יד מֵ֘אִישׁ־מִרְמָ֖ה וְעַוְלָ֣ה תְפַלְּטֵֽנִי׃	1			1							1
Prov 3:30	אַל־תָּרִ֣יב עִם־אָדָ֣ם חִנָּ֑ם		1									
Prov 18:17	צַדִּ֣יק הָרִאשׁ֣וֹן בְּרִיב֑וֹ יָבֹֽא־רֵ֝עֵ֗הוּ וַחֲקָרֽוֹ׃						1					1
Prov 18:6	שִׂפְתֵ֣י כְ֭סִיל יָבֹ֣אוּ בְרִ֑יב											1
Prov 20:3	כָּב֣וֹד לָ֭אִישׁ שֶׁ֣בֶת מֵרִ֑יב	1										
Prov 25:8	אַל־תֵּצֵ֣א לָרִ֣ב מַהֵ֑ר ... בְּהַכְלִ֖ים אֹתְךָ֣ רֵעֶֽךָ׃						1					
Prov 25:9	רִֽיבְךָ֮ רִ֪יב אֶת־רֵ֫עֶ֥ךָ						1					
Prov 26:21	וְאִ֥ישׁ מִדוֹנִים [מִדְיָנִ֗ים] לְחַרְחַר־רִֽיב׃	1										
Job 31:35	מִ֤י יִתֶּן־לִ֨י ׀ שֹׁמֵ֬עַֽ לִ֗י ... וְסֵ֥פֶר כָּ֝תַ֗ב אִ֣ישׁ רִיבִֽי׃	1										
Lam 3:36	לְעַוֵּ֤ת אָדָם֙ בְּרִיב֔וֹ אֲדֹנָ֖י לֹ֥א רָאָֽה׃		1									
Neh 5:7	וָאָרִ֙יבָה֙ אֶת־הַחֹרִ֣ים וְאֶת־הַסְּגָנִ֔ים									1	1	
Neh 13:11	וָאָרִ֙יבָה֙ אֶת־הַסְּגָנִ֔ים										1	
Neh 13:17	וָאָרִ֙יבָה֙ אֵ֖ת חֹרֵ֣י יְהוּדָ֑ה									1		
2 Chr 19:10	וְכָל־רִ֣יב אֲשֶׁר־יָב֣וֹא עֲלֵיכֶ֣ם מֵאֲחֵיכֶ֣ם ׀ הַיֹּשְׁבִ֣ים בְּעָרֵיהֶ֗ם							1				
		23	**2**	**4**	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**15**
44 passages	**Number of common-noun labels:**	**64**										

* See Childs 2001:320–23, on vv. 21–29. Others construe our noun here as a pronoun, but a specific reference (to a type) better fits the context.

Addendum E. Further Instances of the Labels for Juridical Participants (Part 1)

Locale	Instance	A+	A–	B	C	D+	D–	Other Label
Gen 14:13	וְהֵם בַּעֲלֵי בְרִית־אַבְרָם:						1	בַּעֲלֵי בְרִית
Gen 20:4	אֲדֹנָי הֲגוֹי גַּם־צַדִּיק תַּהֲרֹג:		1					גוֹי
Gen 20:7	וְעַתָּה הָשֵׁב אֵשֶׁת־הָאִישׁ	1						
Deut 19:17	כִּי־יָקוּם עֵד־חָמָס בְּאִישׁ … וְעָמְדוּ … לִפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַשֹּׁפְטִים			1				
2 Sam 14:5	אֲבָל אִשָּׁה־אַלְמָנָה אָנִי			1				
2 Sam 14:8	וַיֹּאמֶר הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה			1				
2 Sam 14:9	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה הַתְּקוֹעִית אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ			1				
2 Sam 14:12	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה			1				
2 Sam 14:13	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה			1				
2 Sam 14:18	וַיַּעַן הַמֶּלֶךְ וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה			1				
1 Kgs 3:16	אָז תָּבֹאנָה שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים זֹנוֹת אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ			1				
1 Kgs 3:17	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה הָאַחַת			1				
1 Kgs 3:18*	וַתֵּלֶד גַּם־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת			1				
1 Kgs 3:19*	וַיָּמָת בֶּן־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת לָיְלָה			1				
1 Kgs 3:22	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה הָאַחֶרֶת			1				
1 Kgs 3:26	וַתֹּאמֶר הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר־בְּנָהּ הַחַי אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ			1				
1 Kgs 8:39	וְנָתַתָּ לָאִישׁ כְּכָל־דְּרָכָיו	1						
1 Kgs 20:39	וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ סָר וַיָּבֵא אֵלַי אִישׁ		1					
1 Kgs 21:10	וְהוֹשִׁיבוּ שְׁנַיִם אֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל נֶגְדּוֹ וִיעִדֻהוּ				1			
1 Kgs 21:13	וַיָּבֹאוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים בְּנֵי־בְלִיַּעַל וַיֵּשְׁבוּ נֶגְדּוֹ				1			
1 Kgs 21:13	וַיְעִדֻהוּ אַנְשֵׁי הַבְּלִיַּעַל				1			
2 Kgs 6:26	וַיְהִי מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל עֹבֵר עַל־הַחֹמָה וְאִשָּׁה צָעֲקָה אֵלָיו			1				
2 Kgs 6:28*	הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת אָמְרָה אֵלַי			1				
2 Kgs 6:30	וַיְהִי כִשְׁמֹעַ הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶת־דִּבְרֵי הָאִשָּׁה וַיִּקְרַע אֶת־בְּגָדָיו			1				
2 Kgs 8:5	וְהִנֵּה הָאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר־הֶחֱיָה אֶת־בְּנָהּ צֹעֶקֶת אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ			1				
2 Kgs 8:6	וַיִּשְׁאַל הַמֶּלֶךְ לָאִשָּׁה וַתְּסַפֶּר־לוֹ			1				
Jer 20:10	כֹּל אֱנוֹשׁ שְׁלוֹמִי שֹׁמְרֵי צַלְעִי						1	אֱנוֹשׁ שְׁלוֹמִי
Jer 23:34	וּפָקַדְתִּי עַל־הָאִישׁ הַהוּא וְעַל־בֵּיתוֹ:	1						
Jer 31:30	כִּי אִם־אִישׁ בַּעֲוֹנוֹ יָמוּת	1						
Jer 32:19	לָתֵת לְאִישׁ כִּדְרָכָיו וְכִפְרִי מַעֲלָלָיו:	1						
Jer 38:22	הִסִּיתוּךָ וְיָכְלוּ לְךָ אַנְשֵׁי שְׁלֹמֶךָ					1		
Jer 47:4	לְהַכְרִית לְצֹר וּלְצִידוֹן כֹּל שָׂרִיד עֹזֵר						1	עֹזֵר
Ezek 7:16	כֻּלָּם הֹמוֹת אִישׁ בַּעֲוֹנוֹ:	1						
Ezek 32:21	יְדַבְּרוּ־לוֹ אֵלֵי גִבּוֹרִים מִתּוֹךְ שְׁאוֹל אֶת־עֹזְרָיו						1	עֹזְרָיו
Obad 1:7	עַד־הַגְּבוּל שִׁלְּחוּךָ כֹּל אַנְשֵׁי בְרִיתֶךָ הִשִּׁיאוּךָ יָכְלוּ לְךָ אַנְשֵׁי שְׁלֹמֶךָ					2		
Ps 7:5	אִם־גָּמַלְתִּי שׁוֹלְמִי רָע						1	שׁוֹלְמִי
Ps 41:10	גַּם־אִישׁ שְׁלוֹמִי אֲשֶׁר־בָּטַחְתִּי בוֹ					1		
Ps 55:21	שָׁלַח יָדָיו בִּשְׁלֹמָיו						1	שְׁלֹמָיו
Ps 62:13	כִּי־אַתָּה תְשַׁלֵּם לְאִישׁ כְּמַעֲשֵׂהוּ:	1						
Ps 69:23	יְהִי־שֻׁלְחָנָם לִפְנֵיהֶם לְפָח וְלִשְׁלוֹמִים לְמוֹקֵשׁ:						1	שְׁלוֹמִים
Job 34:11	כִּי פֹעַל אָדָם יְשַׁלֶּם־לוֹ וּכְאֹרַח אִישׁ יַמְצִאֶנּוּ:	1	1					אָדָם
Lam 1:2	כָּל־רֵעֶיהָ בָּגְדוּ בָהּ הָיוּ לָהּ לְאֹיְבִים:						1	רֵעֶיהָ
Est 7:6	אִישׁ צַר וְאוֹיֵב הָמָן הָרָע הַזֶּה			1				
Neh 5:13	כָּכָה יְנַעֵר הָאֱלֹהִים אֶת־כָּל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָקִים אֶת־הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה מִבֵּיתוֹ וּמִיגִיעוֹ			1				
2 Chr 6:30	וְנָתַתָּה לָאִישׁ כְּכָל־דְּרָכָיו	1						
2 Chr 25:4	כִּי אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יָמוּתוּ:	1						
		10	2	21	3	4	8	

46 verses							
		Tally:					
		אִישׁ	38				
		Other terms	10				
	ONOMASIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS						
KEY	+ = אִישׁ is the term used; – = Another term is used						
A =	Yahweh is depicted as passing judgment in a forensic manner						
B =	Disputes between citizens are appealed to an authority (e.g., king) for resolution						
C =	Court proceedings are described						
D =	One's allies (in facing conflict) are mentioned						
* =	See also §6.9.7.						

Addendum E. Further Instances of the Labels for Juridical Participants (Part 2)

Locale	Instance	E+	E–	Comment	Other Label
Ps 105:14	לֹא־הִנִּיחַ אָדָם לְעָשְׁקָם וַיּוֹכַח עֲלֵיהֶם מְלָכִים:		1	Cf. 1 Chr 16:21	אָדָם
Job 16:21	וְיוֹכַח לְגֶבֶר עִם־אֱלוֹהַּ וּבֶן־אָדָם לְרֵעֵהוּ׃		3		גֶּבֶר, בֶּן־אָדָם, רֵעַ
1 Chr 16:21	לֹא־הִנִּיחַ לְאִישׁ לְעָשְׁקָם וַיּוֹכַח עֲלֵיהֶם מְלָכִים:	1		Cf. Ps 105:14	
3 verses		1	4		
	COLLOCATION-ORIENTED INVESTIGATION				
KEY	+ = אִישׁ is the term used; – = Another term is used				
E =	Juridical verb Hiphil *y-k-ḥ* 'arbitrate' is used				
RESULTS	No clearly preferred general noun is associated with this verb.				

Addendum E. Further Instances of the Labels for Juridical Participants (Part 3)

Locale	Instance	F+	F–	ṣaddîq	rāšā'	‘āmît	rē‘a	’āḥ	ba‘al	‘ēd	geber	enôš	ben-’ādām
Gen 18:25	וְהָיָה כַצַּדִּיק כָּרָשָׁע חָלִלָה לְּךָ הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל־הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט:		2	1	1								
Exod 18:16*	וְשָׁפַטְתִּי בֵּין אִישׁ וּבֵין רֵעֵהוּ	1	1				1						
Lev 19:15	בְּצֶדֶק תִּשְׁפֹּט עֲמִיתֶךָ:		1			1							
Deut 1:16*	וּשְׁפַטְתֶּם צֶדֶק בֵּין־אִישׁ וּבֵין־אָחִיו	1	1					1					
Deut 17:12	וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ אֶל־הַכֹּהֵן	1											
Deut 21:22	וְכִי־יִהְיֶה בְאִישׁ חֵטְא מִשְׁפַּט־מָוֶת וְהוּמָת	1											
Deut 25:1	כִּי־יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל־הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם	2											
Deut 25:2	וְהָיָה אִם־בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו		1		1								
2 Sam 15:2	כָּל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִהְיֶה־לּוֹ־רִיב לָבוֹא אֶל־הַמֶּלֶךְ לַמִּשְׁפָּט	1											
2 Sam 15:4	וְעָלַי יָבוֹא כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִהְיֶה־לּוֹ־רִיב וּמִשְׁפָּט	1											
1 Kgs 8:32	וְשָׁפַטְתָּ אֶת־עֲבָדֶיךָ לְהַרְשִׁיעַ רָשָׁע ... וּלְהַצְדִּיק צַדִּיק		2	1	1								
Isa 50:8	מִי־בַעַל מִשְׁפָּטִי יִגַּשׁ אֵלָי:		1						1				
Jer 7:5*	תַּעֲשׂוּ מִשְׁפָּט בֵּין אִישׁ וּבֵין רֵעֵהוּ:	1	1				1						
Jer 26:11	מִשְׁפַּט־מָוֶת לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה	1											
Jer 26:16	אֵין־לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה מִשְׁפַּט־מָוֶת	1											
Ezek 18:8*	מִשְׁפַּט אֱמֶת יַעֲשֶׂה בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִישׁ:	2											
Ezek 18:30	לָכֵן אִישׁ כִּדְרָכָיו אֶשְׁפֹּט אֶתְכֶם בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל	1											
Ps 7:12	אֱלֹהִים שׁוֹפֵט צַדִּיק		1	1									
Ps 10:18	לִשְׁפֹּט יָתוֹם וָדָךְ בַּל־יוֹסִיף עוֹד לַעֲרֹץ אֱנוֹשׁ מִן־הָאָרֶץ:		1									1	
Ps 43:1	שָׁפְטֵנִי אֱלֹהִים וְרִיבָה רִיבִי מִגּוֹי לֹא־חָסִיד מֵאִישׁ־מִרְמָה וְעַוְלָה תְפַלְּטֵנִי:	1											
Ps 58:2	מֵישָׁרִים תִּשְׁפְּטוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם:		1										1
Ps 82:2	עַד־מָתַי תִּשְׁפְּטוּ־עָוֶל וּפְנֵי רְשָׁעִים תִּשְׂאוּ־סֶלָה:		1		1								
Prov 19:28	עֵד בְּלִיַּעַל יָלִיץ מִשְׁפָּט		1							1			
Prov 29:9	אִישׁ־חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת־אִישׁ אֱוִיל	2											
Prov. 29:26	וּמֵיְיָ מִשְׁפַּט־אִישׁ:	1											
Lam 3:35	לְהַטּוֹת מִשְׁפַּט־גָּבֶר נֶגֶד פְּנֵי עֶלְיוֹן:		1								1		
Eccles 3:17	אֶת־הַצַּדִּיק וְאֶת־הָרָשָׁע יִשְׁפֹּט הָאֱלֹהִים		2	1	1								
2 Chr 6:23	וְשָׁפַטְתָּ אֶת־עֲבָדֶיךָ לְהָשִׁיב לְרָשָׁע ... וּלְהַצְדִּיק צַדִּיק		2	1	1								
		18	20	5	6	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1

28 verses												
	COLLOCATION-ORIENTED INVESTIGATION											
KEY	+ = אִישׁ is the term used; – = Another term is used											
F =	Juridical verb Qal *š-p-ṭ* 'pass judgment; provide justice' is used											
	or noun *mišpāṭ* 'judgment'											
* =	Analyzed as a reciprocal construction in Chapter 8.											* =
RESULTS	Our noun is used many times more than other general nouns.											

Addendum F. Labels Used in Proximal Deixis in Reported Speech

Locale	Head	Instance	Discourse Intro	Expressive	Juridical	At Stake
Gen 19:8	אִישׁ	רַק לָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵל אַל־תַּעֲשׂוּ דָבָר	Yes	No	Yes	Procedure
Gen 24:58	אִישׁ	הֲתֵלְכִי עִם־הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Procedure
Gen 24:65	אִישׁ	מִי־הָאִישׁ הַלָּזֶה הַהֹלֵךְ בַּשָּׂדֶה לִקְרָאתֵנוּ	Yes	No	Yes	Contract
Gen 26:11	אִישׁ	הַנֹּגֵעַ בָּאִישׁ הַזֶּה וּבְאִשְׁתּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת׃	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Gen 34:21	אִישׁ	הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה שְׁלֵמִים הֵם אִתָּנוּ	Yes	No	Yes	Contract
Num 16:26	אִישׁ	סוּרוּ נָא מֵעַל אָהֳלֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים הָרְשָׁעִים הָאֵלֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Num 16:30	אִישׁ	וִידַעְתֶּם כִּי נִאֲצוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה אֶת־יְיָ׃	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Num 22:9	אִישׁ	מִי הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה עִמָּךְ׃	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Deut 1:35	אִישׁ	אִם־יִרְאֶה אִישׁ בָּאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה הַדּוֹר הָרָע הַזֶּה אֵת הָאָרֶץ הַטּוֹבָה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Deut 22:16	אִישׁ	אֶת־בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה וַיִּשְׂנָאֶהָ׃	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Judg 19:23	אִישׁ	אַחֲרֵי אֲשֶׁר־בָּא הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה אַל־בֵּיתִי	Yes	No	Yes	Procedure
Judg 19:24	אִישׁ	וְלָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ דְּבַר הַנְּבָלָה הַזֹּאת׃	Yes	No	Yes	Procedure
1 Sam 25:25	אִישׁ	אַל־נָא יָשִׂים אֲדֹנִי ׀ אֶת־לִבּוֹ אֶל־אִישׁ הַבְּלִיַּעַל הַזֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
2 Sam 3:39	אִישׁ	וְהָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּנֵי צְרוּיָה קָשִׁים מִמֶּנִּי	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Kgs 20:39	אִישׁ	שְׁמֹר אֶת־הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה אִם־הִפָּקֵד יִפָּקֵד וְהָיְתָה נַפְשְׁךָ תַּחַת נַפְשׁוֹ	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
2 Kgs 20:14	אִישׁ	מָה אָמְרוּ ׀ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה וּמֵאַיִן יָבֹאוּ אֵלֶיךָ	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Is 39:3	אִישׁ	מָה אָמְרוּ ׀ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה וּמֵאַיִן יָבֹאוּ אֵלֶיךָ	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 22:28	אִישׁ	הַעֶצֶב נִבְזֶה נָפוּץ הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה כָּנְיָהוּ	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 22:30	אִישׁ	כִּתְבוּ אֶת־הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה עֲרִירִי גֶּבֶר לֹא־יִצְלַח בְּיָמָיו	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 26:11	אִישׁ	מִשְׁפַּט־מָוֶת לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה כִּי נִבָּא אֶל־הָעִיר הַזֹּאת	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 26:16	אִישׁ	אֵין־לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה מִשְׁפַּט־מָוֶת כִּי בְּשֵׁם יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ דִּבֶּר אֵלֵינוּ׃	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 38:4	אִישׁ	יוּמַת נָא אֶת־הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 38:4	אִישׁ	כִּי ׀ הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה אֵינֶנּוּ דֹרֵשׁ לְשָׁלוֹם לָעָם הַזֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment

Locale	Head	Instance	Discourse Intro	Expressive	Juridical	At Stake
Jer 38:9	אִישׁ	הֵרֵעוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה אֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר עָשׂוּ לְיִרְמְיָהוּ הַנָּבִיא	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Jer 38:16	אִישׁ	וְאִם־אֶתֶּנְךָ בְּיַד הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר מְבַקְשִׁים אֶת־נַפְשֶׁךָ׃	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Ezek 14:3	אִישׁ	הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה הֶעֱלוּ גִלּוּלֵיהֶם עַל־לִבָּם	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Ezek 14:14	אִישׁ	וְהָיוּ שְׁלֹשֶׁת הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּתוֹכָהּ נֹחַ דָּנִיֵּאל וְאִיּוֹב	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Ezek 14:16	אִישׁ	שְׁלֹשֶׁת הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּתוֹכָהּ	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Ezek 14:18	אִישׁ	וּשְׁלֹשֶׁת הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה בְּתוֹכָהּ חַי־אָנִי נְאֻם אֲדֹנָי יְיָ לֹא יַצִּילוּ בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת	No	No	Yes	Judgment
Jon 1:14	אִישׁ	אַל־נָא נֹאבְדָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה וְאַל־תִּתֵּן עָלֵינוּ דָּם נָקִיא	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Neh 1:11	אִישׁ	וְהַצְלִיחָה־נָּא לְעַבְדְּךָ הַיּוֹם וּתְנֵהוּ לְרַחֲמִים לִפְנֵי הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Chr 11:19	אִישׁ	הֲדַם הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה אֶשְׁתֶּה בְנַפְשׁוֹתָם	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Deut 22:14	אִשָּׁה	אֶת־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת לָקַחְתִּי	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Sam 2:20	אִשָּׁה	יָשֵׂם יְיָ לְךָ זֶרַע מִן־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Kgs 3:17	אִשָּׁה	אֲנִי וְהָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת יֹשְׁבֹת בְּבַיִת אֶחָד	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Kgs 3:18	אִשָּׁה	וַתֵּלֶד גַּם־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
1 Kgs 3:19	אִשָּׁה	וַיָּמָת בֶּן־הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת לָיְלָה	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
2 Kgs 6:28	אִשָּׁה	הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת אָמְרָה אֵלַי תְּנִי אֶת־בְּנֵךְ	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment
Gen 21:10	אָמָה	גָּרֵשׁ הָאָמָה הַזֹּאת וְאֶת־בְּנָהּ	No	No	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 9:34	אֲרוּרָה	פִּקְדוּ־נָא אֶת־הָאֲרוּרָה הַזֹּאת וְקִבְרוּהָ	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 6:32	בֵּן	כִּי־שָׁלַח בֶּן־הַמְרַצֵּחַ הַזֶּה לְהָסִיר אֶת־רֹאשִׁי	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
Gen 37:19	בַּעַל	הִנֵּה בַּעַל הַחֲלֹמוֹת הַלָּזֶה בָּא׃	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
Isa 7:4	זָנָב	אַל־יֵרַךְ מִשְּׁנֵי זַנְבוֹת הָאוּדִים הָעֲשֵׁנִים הָאֵלֶּה	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
Num 17:3	חַטָּא	אֵת מַחְתּוֹת הַחַטָּאִים הָאֵלֶּה בְּנַפְשֹׁתָם	Yes	No	No	Procedure
Jer 18:6	יוֹצֵר	הֲכַיּוֹצֵר הַזֶּה לֹא־אוּכַל לַעֲשׂוֹת לָכֶם בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל	No	No	No	Procedure
Exod 2:9	יֶלֶד	הֵילִיכִי אֶת־הַיֶּלֶד הַזֶּה וְהֵינִקִהוּ לִי	Yes	No	No	Contract
1 Kgs 17:21	יֶלֶד	תָּשָׁב נָא נֶפֶשׁ־הַיֶּלֶד הַזֶּה עַל־קִרְבּוֹ׃	Yes	No	Yes	Judgment

Locale	Head	Instance	Discourse Intro	Expressive	Juridical	At Stake
Gen 34:4	יַלְדָּה	קַח־לִי אֶת־הַיַּלְדָּה הַזֹּאת לְאִשָּׁה:	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
2 Sam 16:9	כֶּלֶב	לָמָּה יְקַלֵּל הַכֶּלֶב הַמֵּת הַזֶּה אֶת־אֲדֹנִי הַמֶּלֶךְ	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 9:11	מְשֻׁגָּע	הֲשָׁלוֹם מַדּוּעַ בָּא־הַמְשֻׁגָּע הַזֶּה אֵלֶיךָ	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
1 Sam 1:27	נַעַר	אֶל־הַנַּעַר הַזֶּה הִתְפַּלָּלְתִּי	Yes	No	No	Contract
Zech 2:8	נַעַר	רֻץ דַּבֵּר אֶל־הַנַּעַר הַלָּז לֵאמֹר	Yes	No	No	Procedure
Ruth 2:5	נַעֲרָה	לְמִי הַנַּעֲרָה הַזֹּאת:	Yes	No	No	Procedure
Ruth 4:12	נַעֲרָה	מִן־הַזֶּרַע אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן יְיָ לְךָ מִן־הַנַּעֲרָה הַזֹּאת:	No	Yes	Yes	Judgment
Is 22:15	סֹכֵן	לֶךְ־בֹּא אֶל־הַסֹּכֵן הַזֶּה עַל־שֶׁבְנָא אֲשֶׁר עַל־הַבָּיִת:	Yes	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 29:3	עִבְרִי	מָה הָעִבְרִים הָאֵלֶּה	Yes	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 14:6	עָרֵל	לְכָה וְנַעְבְּרָה אֶל־מַצַּב הָעֲרֵלִים הָאֵלֶּה	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
1 Sam 31:4	עָרֵל	שְׁלֹף חַרְבְּךָ ׀ וְדָקְרֵנִי בָהּ פֶּן־יָבוֹאוּ הָעֲרֵלִים הָאֵלֶּה וּדְקָרֻנִי	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:26	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	מַה־יֵּעָשֶׂה לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַכֶּה אֶת־הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַלָּז	Yes	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:26	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	כִּי מִי הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הֶעָרֵל הַזֶּה כִּי חֵרֵף מַעַרְכוֹת אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים:	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:32	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	עַבְדְּךָ יֵלֵךְ וְנִלְחַם עִם־הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַזֶּה:	Yes	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:33	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	לֹא תוּכַל לָלֶכֶת אֶל־הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַזֶּה לְהִלָּחֵם עִמּוֹ	No	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:36	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	וְהָיָה הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הֶעָרֵל הַזֶּה כְּאַחַד מֵהֶם	Yes	Yes	No	Procedure
1 Sam 17:37	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	הוּא יַצִּילֵנִי מִיַּד הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַזֶּה	No	No	No	Procedure
1 Sam 23:2	פְּלִשְׁתִּי	הַאֵלֵךְ וְהִכֵּיתִי בַּפְּלִשְׁתִּים הָאֵלֶּה	Yes	No	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 4:12	שׁוּנַמִּית	קְרָא לַשּׁוּנַמִּית הַזֹּאת	Yes	No	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 4:25	שׁוּנַמִּית	הִנֵּה הַשּׁוּנַמִּית הַלָּז:	Yes	No	No	Procedure
2 Kgs 4:36	שׁוּנַמִּית	קְרָא אֶל־הַשֻּׁנַמִּית הַזֹּאת	Yes	No	No	Procedure
68 instances						

Addendum G (Part 1). Reciprocal Constructions Headed by אִישׁ

	Construction
Gen 9:5	וּמִיַּ֣ד הָֽאָדָ֗ם מִיַּד֙ אִ֣ישׁ אָחִ֔יו אֶדְרֹ֖שׁ אֶת־נֶ֥פֶשׁ הָֽאָדָֽם׃
Gen 11:3	וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֗הוּ
Gen 11:7	אֲשֶׁר֙ לֹ֣א יִשְׁמְע֔וּ אִ֖ישׁ שְׂפַ֥ת רֵעֵֽהוּ׃
Gen 13:11	וַיִּפָּ֣רְד֔וּ אִ֖ישׁ מֵעַ֥ל אָחִֽיו׃
Gen 15:10	וַיִּתֵּ֤ן אִישׁ־בִּתְר֙וֹ֙ לִקְרַ֣את רֵעֵ֔הוּ
Gen 26:31	וַיִּשָּׁבְע֖וּ אִ֣ישׁ לְאָחִ֑יו
Gen 31:49	כִּ֥י נִסָּתֵ֖ר אִ֥ישׁ מֵרֵעֵֽהוּ׃
Gen 37:19	וַיֹּאמְר֖וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֑יו
Gen 42:21	וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֗יו
Gen 42:28	וַיֶּחֶרְד֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֙יו֙ לֵאמֹ֔ר
Gen 43:33	וַיִּתְמְה֣וּ הָֽאֲנָשִׁ֔ים אִ֖ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵֽהוּ׃
Exod 10:23	לֹֽא־רָא֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־אָחִ֗יו
Exod 16:15	וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֤ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֙יו֙
Exod 18:7	וַיִּשְׁאֲל֥וּ אִישׁ־לְרֵעֵ֖הוּ לְשָׁל֑וֹם
Exod 18:16	וְשָׁפַטְתִּ֕י בֵּ֥ין אִ֖ישׁ וּבֵ֥ין רֵעֵ֑הוּ
Exod 21:14	וְכִֽי־יָזִ֥ד אִ֛ישׁ עַל־רֵעֵ֖הוּ לְהָרְג֣וֹ בְעָרְמָ֑ה
Exod 21:18	וְכִֽי־יְרִיבֻ֣ן אֲנָשִׁ֔ים וְהִכָּה־אִישׁ֙ אֶת־רֵעֵ֔הוּ בְּאֶ֖בֶן א֣וֹ בְאֶגְרֹ֑ף
Exod 21:35	וְכִֽי־יִגֹּ֧ף שֽׁוֹר־אִ֛ישׁ אֶת־שׁ֥וֹר רֵעֵ֖הוּ וָמֵ֑ת
Exod 22:6	כִּֽי־יִתֵּן֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ כֶּ֤סֶף אֽוֹ־כֵלִים֙ לִשְׁמֹ֔ר
Exod 22:9	כִּֽי־יִתֵּן֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ חֲמ֨וֹר אוֹ־שׁ֥וֹר אוֹ־שֶׂ֛ה וְכָל־בְּהֵמָ֖ה לִשְׁמֹ֑ר
Exod 22:13	וְכִֽי־יִשְׁאַ֥ל אִ֛ישׁ מֵעִ֥ם רֵעֵ֖הוּ וְנִשְׁבַּ֣ר אוֹ־מֵ֑ת
Exod 25:20	וּפְנֵיהֶ֖ם אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֑יו
Exod 26:3a	חֲמֵ֣שׁ הַיְרִיעֹ֗ת תִּֽהְיֶ֙יןָ֙ חֹֽבְרֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָ֑הּ
Exod 26:3b	וְחָמֵ֣שׁ יְרִיעֹ֔ת חֹֽבְרֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָֽהּ׃
Exod 26:5	מַקְבִּילֹת֙ הַלֻּ֣לָאֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָֽהּ׃
Exod 26:6	וְחִבַּרְתָּ֙ אֶת־הַיְרִיעֹ֜ת אִשָּׁ֧ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָ֛הּ בַּקְּרָסִ֖ים
Exod 26:17	שְׁתֵּ֣י יָד֗וֹת לַקֶּ֙רֶשׁ֙ הָֽאֶחָ֔ד מְשֻׁלָּבֹ֔ת אִשָּׁ֖ה אֶל־אֲחֹתָ֑הּ
Exod 33:11	כַּאֲשֶׁ֛ר יְדַבֵּ֥ר אִ֖ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֑הוּ
Exod 37:9	וּפְנֵיהֶ֔ם אִ֖ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֑יו
Lev 7:10	לְכָל־בְּנֵ֧י אַהֲרֹ֛ן תִּהְיֶ֖ה אִ֥ישׁ כְּאָחִֽיו׃
Lev 19:11	וְלֹֽא־תְשַׁקְּר֖וּ אִ֥ישׁ בַּעֲמִיתֽוֹ׃
Lev 24:19	וְאִ֕ישׁ כִּֽי־יִתֵּ֥ן מ֖וּם בַּעֲמִית֑וֹ
Lev 25:14	אַל־תּוֹנ֖וּ אִ֥ישׁ אֶת־אָחִֽיו׃
Lev 25:17	וְלֹ֤א תוֹנוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־עֲמִית֔וֹ
Lev 25:46	וּבְאַ֨חֵיכֶ֤ם בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ אִ֣ישׁ בְּאָחִ֔יו לֹא־תִרְדֶּ֥ה ב֖וֹ בְּפָֽרֶךְ׃
Lev 26:37	וְכָשְׁל֧וּ אִישׁ־בְּאָחִ֛יו

Num 14:4		וַיֹּאמְר֖וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֑יו
Deut 1:16		וּשְׁפַטְתֶּ֣ם צֶ֔דֶק בֵּֽין־אִ֥ישׁ וּבֵין־אָחִ֖יו וּבֵ֥ין גֵּרֽוֹ׃
Deut 19:11		וְכִֽי־יִהְיֶ֥ה אִישׁ֙ שֹׂנֵ֣א לְרֵעֵ֔הוּ
Deut 22:26		כִּ֡י כַּאֲשֶׁר֩ יָק֨וּם אִ֤ישׁ עַל־רֵעֵ֙הוּ֙ וּרְצָח֣וֹ נֶ֔פֶשׁ
Deut 25:11		כִּֽי־יִנָּצ֨וּ אֲנָשִׁ֤ים יַחְדָּו֙ אִ֣ישׁ וְאָחִ֔יו
Judg 6:29		וַיֹּֽאמְרוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֔הוּ
Judg 7:13		וְהִנֵּה־אִ֗ישׁ מְסַפֵּ֛ר לְרֵעֵ֖הוּ חֲל֑וֹם
Judg 7:22		וַיָּ֣שֶׂם יְהוָ֗ה אֵ֣ת חֶ֥רֶב אִ֛ישׁ בְּרֵעֵ֖הוּ וּבְכָל־הַֽמַּחֲנֶ֑ה
Judg 10:18		וַיֹּאמְר֨וּ הָעָ֜ם שָׂרֵ֤י גִלְעָד֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֔הוּ
1 Sam 10:11		וַיֹּ֨אמֶר הָעָ֜ם אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֗הוּ
1 Sam 14:20		וְהִנֵּ֨ה הָיְתָ֜ה חֶ֤רֶב אִישׁ֙ בְּרֵעֵ֔הוּ מְהוּמָ֖ה גְּדוֹלָ֥ה מְאֹֽד׃
1 Sam 20:41a		וַֽיִּשְּׁק֣וּ ׀ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵ֔הוּ
1 Sam 20:41b		וַיִּבְכּוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵ֔הוּ עַד־דָּוִ֖ד הִגְדִּֽיל׃
2 Sam 2:16		וַֽיַּחֲזִ֜קוּ אִ֣ישׁ ׀ בְּרֹ֣אשׁ רֵעֵ֗הוּ וְחַרְבּוֹ֙ בְּצַ֣ד רֵעֵ֔הוּ
1 Kgs 8:31		אֵת֩ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יֶחֱטָ֥א אִישׁ֙ לְרֵעֵ֔הוּ
2 Kgs 3:23		וַיַּכּ֖וּ אִ֥ישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵֽהוּ
2 Kgs 7:3		וַיֹּֽאמְרוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֔הוּ
2 Kgs 7:6		וַיֹּאמְר֞וּ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֗יו
2 Kgs 7:9		וַיֹּאמְרוּ֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֜הוּ
Isa 3:5a		וְנִגַּ֣שׂ הָעָ֔ם אִ֥ישׁ בְּאִ֖ישׁ
Isa 3:5b		וְנִגַּ֣שׂ הָעָ֔ם … וְאִ֖ישׁ בְּרֵעֵ֑הוּ
Isa 3:6		כִּֽי־יִתְפֹּ֨שׂ אִ֤ישׁ בְּאָחִיו֙ בֵּ֣ית אָבִ֔יו
Isa 9:18		אִ֥ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֖יו לֹ֥א יַחְמֹֽלוּ׃
Isa 13:8		אִ֥ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֙הוּ֙ יִתְמָ֔הוּ
Isa 19:2a		וְנִלְחֲמ֤וּ אִישׁ־בְּאָחִיו֙
Isa 19:2b		וְנִלְחֲמ֤וּ … וְאִ֣ישׁ בְּרֵעֵ֔הוּ
Isa 34:15		אַךְ־שָׁ֛ם נִקְבְּצ֥וּ דַיּ֖וֹת אִשָּׁ֥ה רְעוּתָֽהּ׃
Isa 34:16		אִשָּׁ֥ה רְעוּתָ֖הּ לֹ֣א פָקָ֑דוּ
Isa 41:6a		אִ֥ישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵ֖הוּ יַעְזֹ֑רוּ
Isa 41:6b		אִ֥ישׁ … וּלְאָחִ֖יו יֹאמַ֥ר חֲזָֽק׃
Jer 5:8		אִ֛ישׁ אֶל־אֵ֥שֶׁת רֵעֵ֖הוּ יִצְהָֽלוּ׃
Jer 7:5		אִם־עָשׂ֤וֹ תַעֲשׂוּ֙ מִשְׁפָּ֔ט בֵּ֥ין אִ֖ישׁ וּבֵ֥ין רֵעֵֽהוּ׃
Jer 9:3		אִ֤ישׁ מֵרֵעֵ֙הוּ֙ הִשָּׁמֵ֔רוּ
Jer 9:4		וְאִ֥ישׁ בְּרֵעֵ֖הוּ יְהָתֵ֑לּוּ
Jer 9:19		וְלַמֵּ֤דְנָה בְנֽוֹתֵיכֶם֙ נֶ֔הִי וְאִשָּׁ֥ה רְעוּתָ֖הּ קִינָֽה׃
Jer 13:14		וְנִפַּצְתִּים֩ אִ֨ישׁ אֶל־אָחִ֜יו
Jer 19:9		וְאִ֥ישׁ בְּשַׂר־רֵעֵ֖הוּ יֹאכֵ֑לוּ
Jer 22:8		וְאָֽמְרוּ֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵ֔הוּ

Jer 23:27		אֲשֶׁר יְסַפְּרוּ אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ
Jer 23:30		מְגַנְּבֵי דְבָרַי אִישׁ מֵאֵת רֵעֵהוּ
Jer 23:35a		כֹּה תֹאמְרוּ אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ
Jer 23:35b		כֹּה תֹאמְרוּ ... וְאִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו
Jer 25:(17) 26		וְאַשְׁקֶה אֶת־כָּל־הַגּוֹיִם ... וְאֵת ׀ כָּל־מַלְכֵי הַצָּפוֹן הַקְּרֹבִים וְהָרְחֹקִים אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו
Jer 31:34a		וְלֹא יְלַמְּדוּ עוֹד אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Jer 31:34b		וְלֹא יְלַמְּדוּ עוֹד ... וְאִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו
Jer 34:15		לִקְרֹא דְרוֹר אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ
Jer 34:17a		לִקְרֹא דְרוֹר אִישׁ לְאָחִיו
Jer 34:17b		לִקְרֹא דְרוֹר ... וְאִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ
Jer 36:16		פָּחֲדוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ
Jer 46:16		גַּם־נָפַל אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ
Ezek 1:9		חֹבְרֹת אִשָּׁה אֶל־אֲחוֹתָהּ כַּנְפֵיהֶם
Ezek 1:23		וְתַחַת הָרָקִיעַ כַּנְפֵיהֶם יְשָׁרוֹת אִשָּׁה אֶל־אֲחוֹתָהּ
Ezek 3:13		וְקוֹל ׀ כַּנְפֵי הַחַיּוֹת מַשִּׁיקוֹת אִשָּׁה אֶל־אֲחוֹתָהּ
Ezek 4:17		וְנָשַׁמּוּ אִישׁ וְאָחִיו
Ezek 18:8		מִשְׁפַּט אֱמֶת יַעֲשֶׂה בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִישׁ:
Ezek 22:11		וְאִישׁ ׀ אֶת־אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ עָשָׂה תּוֹעֵבָה
Ezek 24:23		וּנְהַמְתֶּם אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו:
Ezek 33:26		וְאִישׁ אֶת־אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ טִמֵּאתֶם
Ezek 33:30		וְדִבֶּר־חַד אֶת־אַחַד אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו
Ezek 38:21		חֶרֶב אִישׁ בְּאָחִיו תִּהְיֶה:
Ezek 47:14		וּנְחַלְתֶּם אוֹתָהּ אִישׁ כְּאָחִיו
Joel 2:8		וְאִישׁ אָחִיו לֹא יִדְחָקוּן
Jonah 1:7		וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ
Mic 7:2		אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיהוּ יָצוּדוּ חֵרֶם:
Hag 2:22		וְיָרְדוּ סוּסִים וְרֹכְבֵיהֶם אִישׁ בְּחֶרֶב אָחִיו:
Zech 3:10		תִּקְרְאוּ אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ אֶל־תַּחַת גֶּפֶן וְאֶל־תַּחַת תְּאֵנָה:
Zech 7:9		וְחֶסֶד וְרַחֲמִים עֲשׂוּ אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו:
Zech 7:10		וְרָעַת אִישׁ אָחִיו אַל־תַּחְשְׁבוּ בִּלְבַבְכֶם:
Zech 8:10		וַאֲשַׁלַּח אֶת־כָּל־הָאָדָם אִישׁ בְּרֵעֵהוּ:
Zech 8:16		דַּבְּרוּ אֱמֶת אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Zech 8:17		וְאִישׁ ׀ אֶת־רָעַת רֵעֵהוּ אַל־תַּחְשְׁבוּ בִּלְבַבְכֶם
Zech 11:6		וְהִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מַמְצִיא אֶת־הָאָדָם אִישׁ בְּיַד־רֵעֵהוּ וּבְיַד מַלְכּוֹ
Zech 11:9		וְהַנִּשְׁאָרוֹת תֹּאכַלְנָה אִשָּׁה אֶת־בְּשַׂר רְעוּתָהּ:
Zech 14:13a		וְהֶחֱזִיקוּ אִישׁ יַד רֵעֵהוּ
Zech 14:13b		וְעָלְתָה יָדוֹ עַל־יַד רֵעֵהוּ:
Mal 2:10		מַדּוּעַ נִבְגַּד אִישׁ בְּאָחִיו לְחַלֵּל בְּרִית אֲבֹתֵינוּ:

Mal 3:16		אָז נִדְבְּרוּ יִרְאֵי יְיָ אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Ps 12:3		שָׁוְא ׀ יְדַבְּרוּ אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Job 41:9		אִישׁ־בְּאָחִיהוּ יְדֻבָּקוּ
Prov 25:18		אִישׁ עֹנֶה בְרֵעֵהוּ עֵד שָׁקֶר׃
Prov 26:19		כֵּן־אִישׁ רִמָּה אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Prov 27:17		וְאִישׁ יַחַד פְּנֵי־רֵעֵהוּ׃
Ruth 3:14		וַתָּקָם בְּטֶרֶם יַכִּיר אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ
Eccl 4:4		כִּי הִיא קִנְאַת־אִישׁ מֵרֵעֵהוּ
Esth 9:19		וּמִשְׁלוֹחַ מָנוֹת אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ׃
Esth 9:22		וּמִשְׁלוֹחַ מָנוֹת אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ
Neh 4:13		וַאֲנַחְנוּ נִפְרָדִים עַל־הַחוֹמָה רְחוֹקִים אִישׁ מֵאָחִיו׃
2 Chr 6:22		אִם־יֶחֱטָא אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ
2 Chr 20:23		עָזְרוּ אִישׁ־בְּרֵעֵהוּ לְמַשְׁחִית׃

Addendum G (Part 2). Reciprocal Constructions Headed by אִישׁ

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment
Gen 9:5	M			1								1					1	1			
Gen 11:3	M	1																			
Gen 11:7	M											1							1		
Gen 13:11	M				1											1		1			
Gen 15:10	M			1														1	1		
Gen 26:31	M				1													1			
Gen 31:49	M				1																
Gen 37:19	M	1														1		1			
Gen 42:21	M	1														1		1			
Gen 42:28	M															1		1			Intransitive verb
Gen 43:33	M																				Intransitive verb
Exod 10:23	M	1																1			
Exod 16:15	M	1																1			
Exod 18:7	M	1																			
Exod 18:16	M			1																	
Exod 21:14	M													1							
Exod 21:18	M													1							
Exod 21:35	M													1					1		
Exod 22:6	M													1							
Exod 22:9	M													1							
Exod 22:13	M													1							
Exod 25:20	M						1											1		1	
Exod 26:3a	F							1										1		1	Finite verb+participle
Exod 26:3b	F								1									1		1	
Exod 26:5	F							1										1		1	
Exod 26:6	F			1														1		1	
Exod 26:17	F							1										1		1	

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment
Exod 33:11	M		1												1						
Exod 37:9	M						1											1		1	
Lev 7:10	M			1														1			
Lev 19:11 *	M	1											1								
Lev 24:19 *	M		1											1							
Lev 25:14	M	1											1					1			
Lev 25:17 *	M	1											1								
Lev 25:46	M												1				1	1			
Lev 26:37	M																	1			
Num 14:4	M	1																1			
Deut 1:16	M			1														1			
Deut 19:11	M													1							
Deut 22:26	M		1												1						
Deut 25:11	M													1				1			Modifier: only 2 parties
Judg 6:29	M	1																			
Judg 7:13	M							1													
Judg 7:22	M			1															1		
Judg 10:18	M	1																			
1 Sam 10:11	M					1															
1 Sam 14:20	M		1																1		
1 Sam 20:41a	M	1																			
1 Sam 20:41b	M	1																			
2 Sam 2:16	M																		1		
1 Kgs 8:31	M		1																		
2 Kgs 3:23	M	1																			
2 Kgs 7:3	M	1																			
2 Kgs 7:6	M	1																1			
2 Kgs 7:9	M	1																			

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment
Isa 3:5a **	M					1															
Isa 3:5b	M					1				1											
Isa 3:6	M		1															1			
Isa 9:18	M																1	1			
Isa 13:8	M																1				
Isa 19:2a	M				1													1			
Isa 19:2b	M									1											
Isa 34:15	F				1							1								1	
Isa 34:16	F											1					1			1	
Isa 41:6a	M																1				
Isa 41:6b	M		1								1						1				
Jer 5:8	M																1	1			
Jer 7:5	M			1																	
Jer 9:3	M				1												1				
Jer 9:4	M																1				
Jer 9:19	F									1		1	1								
Jer 13:14	M			1														1			
Jer 19:9	M																		1		
Jer 22:8	M	1																			
Jer 23:27	M	1																			
Jer 23:30	M							1													
Jer 23:35a	M	1																			
Jer 23:35b	M									1								1			
Jer 25:26	M			1														1			Verb in v. 17
Jer 31:34a	M	1																			
Jer 31:34b	M									1											
Jer 34:15	M								1												
Jer 34:17a	M								1									1			

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment
Jer 34:17b	M								1	1											
Jer 36:16	M																				Intransitive verb
Jer 46:16	M		1																		
Ezek 1:9	F							1										1		1	
Ezek 1:23	F						1											1		1	
Ezek 3:13	F							1										1		1	
Ezek 4:17	M				1													1			Intransitive verb
Ezek 18:8 **	M			1																	
Ezek 22:11	M		1																1		
Ezek 24:23	M																	1			Intransitive verb
Ezek 33:26	M																1	1			
Ezek 33:30	M		1							1							1				
Ezek 38:21	M		1															1	1		
Ezek 47:14	M	1																1			
Joel 2:8	M										1						1	1			
Jonah 1:7	M	1																			
Mic 7:2	M																1	1			
Hag 2:22	M																	1	1		
Zech 3:10	M	1																			
Zech 7:9	M	1											1								
Zech 7:10	M										1		1				1	1			
Zech 8:10	M			1																	
Zech 8:16	M	1											1								
Zech 8:17	M												1				1		1		
Zech 11:6	M			1															1		
Zech 11:9	F																		1	1	
Zech 14:13a	M											1							1		
Zech 14:13b	M		1								1								1		

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment
Mal 2:10	M	1																1			
Mal 3:16	M				1																
Ps 12:3	M	1																			
Job 41:9	M																1	1		1	
Prov 25:18	M							1													
Prov 26:19	M		1																		
Prov 27:17	M		1																1		
Ruth 3:14	M		1																		
Eccl 4:4	M						1												1		
Esth 9:19	M						1														
Esth 9:22	M						1														
Neh 4:13	M						1											1			
2 Chr 6:22	M		1																		Cf. 1K 8:31
2 Chr 20:23	M	1																			Gapped subject
TALLIES	**125**	**30**	**16**	**13**	**8**	**3**	**7**	**8**	**3**	**8**	**2**	**8**	**9**	**9**	**2**	**4**	**16**	**45**	**19**	**15**	
Feminine	12																				
Masculine	113																				
Frequency of alterity terms:																					
rēʿa or *rəʿutâ*	75																				
ʾāḥ or *āḥôt*	45																				
* *ʿāmît*	3																				
** *ʾîš*	2																				

See Key below	Gend	PT	Sing	–CR	Niph	CS	–V	Ptcp	Infin	GapV	GapH	–CM	2ndP	Casu	Char	Lit	Front	Kin	Poss	–Hum	Comment

KEY:				
Gend = grammatical gender of head noun.				
PT = prototypical construction, as defined in §8.4.9.				
Sing = singular transitive verb.				
–CR = the verb's subject is not co-referential with the two-part noun phrase, which functions syntactically as an adjunct.				
Niph = Niphal verb stem marks the reciprocal function.				
CS = collective singular subject is co-referential with the two-part noun phrase.				
–V = no verb in the reciprocal clause.				
Ptcp = predicate is a participle rather than a finite verb.				
Infin = predicate is an infinitive rather than a finite verb.				
GapV = Gapped verb = clause inherits its verb from the previous clause.				
GapH = Gapped head = clause inherits the first term of its two-part noun phrase from the previous clause.				
–CM = No case mark = the two reciprocating nouns are directly juxtaposed, without an intervening preposition or the like.				
2ndP = couched in the second person, as a directive.				
Casu = Casuistic = protasis in a case law formulation.				
Char = construction functions to characterize the referent.				
Lit = applies the kinship-based alterity term literally to close kin.				
Front = Fronted = the two-part noun phrase is articulated prior to the verb.				
Kin = the alterity term is specifically in terms of kinship: *ʾāḥ/āḥôt.*				
Poss = mutual relationship is with something possessed by the other member.				
–Hum = application to nonhuman entities.				

Addendum H. Tabulated Meanings of Masculine אִישׁ in the Bible's First Three Books

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
GEN					
2:23		כִּי מֵאִישׁ לֻקֳחָה־זֹּאת	Man	Situate	
2:24		עַל־כֵּן יַעֲזָב־אִישׁ אֶת־אָבִיו וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ	Man	Situate	
3:6		וַתִּתֵּן גַּם־לְאִישָׁהּ עִמָּהּ וַיֹּאכַל	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
3:16		וְאֶל־אִישֵׁךְ תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
4:1		קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְיָ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
4:23		כִּי אִישׁ הָרַגְתִּי לְפִצְעִי	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
6:4		אַנְשֵׁי הַשֵּׁם	—	Elaborate Upon	
6:9		אֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת נֹחַ נֹחַ אִישׁ צַדִּיק	—	Elaborate Upon	
7:2	a	תִּקַּח־לְךָ שִׁבְעָה שִׁבְעָה אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ	—	Elaborate Upon	
7:2	b	שְׁנַיִם אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ	—	Elaborate Upon	
9:5		מִיַּד אִישׁ אָחִיו אֶדְרֹשׁ אֶת־נֶפֶשׁ הָאָדָם	—	Reciprocal	
9:20		וַיָּחֶל נֹחַ אִישׁ הָאֲדָמָה	—	Elaborate Upon	
10:5		נִפְרְדוּ אִיֵּי הַגּוֹיִם בְּאַרְצֹתָם אִישׁ לִלְשֹׁנוֹ	—	Distribute	
11:3		וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ	—	Reciprocal	
11:7		אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ אִישׁ שְׂפַת רֵעֵהוּ	—	Reciprocal	
12:20		וַיְצַו עָלָיו פַּרְעֹה אֲנָשִׁים וַיְשַׁלְּחוּ אֹתוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
13:8		כִּי־אֲנָשִׁים אַחִים אֲנָחְנוּ	—	Elaborate Upon	
13:11		וַיִּפָּרְדוּ אִישׁ מֵעַל אָחִיו	—	Reciprocal	
13:13		וְאַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם רָעִים	Affiliate	Elaborate Upon	
13:16		אִם־יוּכַל אִישׁ לִמְנוֹת אֶת־עֲפַר הָאָרֶץ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
14:24		וְחֵלֶק הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר הָלְכוּ אִתִּי	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
15:10		וַיִּתֵּן אִישׁ־בִּתְרוֹ לִקְרַאת רֵעֵהוּ	—	Reciprocal	
16:3		וַתִּתֵּן אֹתָהּ לְאַבְרָם אִישָׁהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
17:23		כָּל־זָכָר בְּאַנְשֵׁי בֵּית אַבְרָהָם	Affiliate	Situate	
17:27		וְכָל־אַנְשֵׁי בֵיתוֹ	Affiliate	Re-situate	
18:2		וְהִנֵּה שְׁלֹשָׁה אֲנָשִׁים נִצָּבִים עָלָיו	Agent	Situate	
18:16		וַיָּקֻמוּ מִשָּׁם הָאֲנָשִׁים	Agent	Re-situate	
18:22		וַיִּפְנוּ מִשָּׁם הָאֲנָשִׁים	Agent	Re-situate	
19:4	a	וְאַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר אַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם נָסַבּוּ עַל־הַבַּיִת	Affiliate	Situate	
19:4	b	וְאַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר אַנְשֵׁי סְדֹם נָסַבּוּ עַל־הַבַּיִת	Affiliate	Re-situate	
19:5		אַיֵּה הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר־בָּאוּ אֵלֶיךָ הַלָּיְלָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
19:8	a	שְׁתֵּי בָנוֹת אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָדְעוּ אִישׁ	Man	Reference point	
19:8	b	רַק לָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵל אַל־תַּעֲשׂוּ דָבָר	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
19:9		וַיִּפְצְרוּ בָאִישׁ בְּלוֹט מְאֹד	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
19:10		וַיִּשְׁלְחוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים אֶת־יָדָם	Agent	Re-situate	
19:11		וְאֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר־פֶּתַח הַבַּיִת	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
19:12		וַיֹּאמְרוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים אֶל־לוֹט	Agent	Re-situate	
19:16		וַיַּחֲזִקוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים בְּיָדוֹ	Agent	Re-situate	
19:31		וְאִישׁ אֵין בָּאָרֶץ לָבוֹא עָלֵינוּ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
20:7		וְעַתָּה הָשֵׁב אֵשֶׁת־הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
20:8		וַיִּירְאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים מְאֹד	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
23:6		אִישׁ מִמֶּנּוּ אֶת־קִבְרוֹ לֹא־יִכְלֶה מִמְּךָ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
24:13		וּבְנוֹת אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר יֹצְאֹת לִשְׁאֹב מָיִם	Affiliate	Situate	
24:16		וְאִישׁ לֹא יְדָעָהּ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
24:21		וְהָאִישׁ מִשְׁתָּאֵה לָהּ מַחֲרִישׁ	Agent	Re-situate	
24:22		וַיִּקַּח הָאִישׁ נֶזֶם זָהָב	Agent	Re-situate	
24:26		וַיִּקֹּד הָאִישׁ וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ	Agent	Re-situate	
24:29		וַיָּרָץ לָבָן אֶל־הָאִישׁ	Agent	Reference point	
24:30	a	כֹּה־דִבֶּר אֵלַי הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
24:30	b	וַיָּבֹא אֶל־הָאִישׁ	Agent	Reference point	
24:32	a	וַיָּבֹא הָאִישׁ הַבַּיְתָה	Agent	Re-situate	
24:32	b	לִרְחֹץ רַגְלָיו וְרַגְלֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר אִתּוֹ:	Subordinate	Situate	
24:54		וַיֹּאכְלוּ וַיִּשְׁתּוּ הוּא וְהָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר־עִמּוֹ	Subordinate	Re-situate	
24:58		הֲתֵלְכִי עִם־הָאִישׁ הַזֶּה	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
24:59		וְאֶת־עֶבֶד אַבְרָהָם וְאֶת־אֲנָשָׁיו:	Subordinate	Re-situate	
24:61		וַתֵּלַכְנָה אַחֲרֵי הָאִישׁ	Agent	Reference point	
24:65		מִי־הָאִישׁ הַלָּזֶה הַהֹלֵךְ בַּשָּׂדֶה לִקְרָאתֵנוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
25:27	a	וַיְהִי עֵשָׂו אִישׁ יֹדֵעַ צַיִד	—	Elaborate Upon	
25:27	b	אִישׁ שָׂדֶה	—	Elaborate Upon	
25:27	c	וְיַעֲקֹב אִישׁ תָּם	—	Elaborate Upon	
26:7	a	וַיִּשְׁאֲלוּ אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם לְאִשְׁתּוֹ	Affiliate	Situate	
26:7	b	פֶּן־יַהַרְגֻנִי אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם עַל־רִבְקָה	Affiliate	Situate	
26:11		הַנֹּגֵעַ בָּאִישׁ הַזֶּה וּבְאִשְׁתּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת:	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
26:13		וַיִּגְדַּל הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
26:31		וַיִּשָּׁבְעוּ אִישׁ לְאָחִיו	—	Reciprocal	
27:11	a	הֵן עֵשָׂו אָחִי אִישׁ שָׂעִר	—	Elaborate Upon	
27:11	b	וְאָנֹכִי אִישׁ חָלָק:	—	Elaborate Upon	
29:19		טוֹב תִּתִּי אֹתָהּ לָךְ מִתִּתִּי אֹתָהּ לְאִישׁ אַחֵר	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
29:22		וַיֶּאֱסֹף לָבָן אֶת־כָּל־אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם	Affiliate	Situate	
29:32		כִּי עַתָּה יֶאֱהָבַנִי אִישִׁי:	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
29:34		עַתָּה הַפַּעַם יִלָּוֶה אִישִׁי אֵלַי	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
30:15		הַמְעַט קַחְתֵּךְ אֶת־אִישִׁי	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
30:18		אֲשֶׁר־נָתַתִּי שִׁפְחָתִי לְאִישִׁי	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
30:20		הַפַּעַם יִזְבְּלֵנִי אִישִׁי	Spouse (Husband)	Re-situate	
30:43		וַיִּפְרֹץ הָאִישׁ מְאֹד מְאֹד	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
31:49		כִּי נִסָּתֵר אִישׁ מֵרֵעֵהוּ:	—	Reciprocal	
31:50		וְאִם־תִּקַּח נָשִׁים עַל־בְּנֹתַי אֵין אִישׁ עִמָּנוּ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
32:7		וְאַרְבַּע־מֵאוֹת אִישׁ עִמּוֹ:	Subordinate	Enumerate	
32:25		וַיֵּאָבֵק אִישׁ עִמּוֹ עַד עֲלוֹת הַשָּׁחַר:	Agent	Situate	
32:29		כִּי־שָׂרִיתָ עִם־אֱלֹהִים וְעִם־אֲנָשִׁים וַתּוּכָל:	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
33:1		וְעִמּוֹ אַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת אִישׁ	Subordinate	Enumerate	
34:7		וַיִּתְעַצְּבוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים וַיִּחַר לָהֶם מְאֹד	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
34:14		לָתֵת אֶת־אֲחֹתֵנוּ לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־לוֹ עָרְלָה	—	Elaborate Upon	
34:20		וַיְדַבְּרוּ אֶל־אַנְשֵׁי עִירָם	Affiliate	Situate	
34:21		הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה שְׁלֵמִים הֵם אִתָּנוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
34:22		אַךְ־בְּזֹאת יֵאֹתוּ לָנוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים לָשֶׁבֶת אִתָּנוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
34:25		וַיִּקְחוּ שְׁנֵי־בְנֵי־יַעֲקֹב ... אִישׁ חַרְבּוֹ	—	Distribute	
37:15	a	וַיִּמְצָאֵהוּ אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
37:15	b	וַיִּשְׁאָלֵהוּ הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
37:17		וַיֹּאמֶר הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
37:19		וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocal	
37:28		וַיַּעַבְרוּ אֲנָשִׁים מִדְיָנִים סֹחֲרִים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
38:1		וַיֵּט עַד־אִישׁ עֲדֻלָּמִי וּשְׁמוֹ חִירָה׃	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
38:2		וַיַּרְא־שָׁם יְהוּדָה בַּת־אִישׁ כְּנַעֲנִי וּשְׁמוֹ שׁוּעַ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
38:21		וַיִּשְׁאַל אֶת־אַנְשֵׁי מְקֹמָהּ	Affiliate	Situate	
38:22		וְגַם אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם אָמְרוּ	Affiliate	Situate	
38:25		לְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־אֵלֶּה לּוֹ אָנֹכִי הָרָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
39:1		פּוֹטִיפַר סְרִיס פַּרְעֹה שַׂר הַטַּבָּחִים אִישׁ מִצְרִי	—	Elaborate Upon	
39:2		וַיְהִי אִישׁ מַצְלִיחַ	—	Elaborate Upon	
39:11	a	וְאֵין אִישׁ מֵאַנְשֵׁי הַבַּיִת שָׁם בַּבָּיִת׃	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
39:11	b	וְאֵין אִישׁ מֵאַנְשֵׁי הַבַּיִת שָׁם בַּבָּיִת׃	Affiliate	Situate	
39:14	a	וַתִּקְרָא לְאַנְשֵׁי בֵיתָהּ	Affiliate	Re-situate	
39:14	b	הֵבִיא לָנוּ אִישׁ עִבְרִי לְצַחֶק בָּנוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
40:5	a	וַיַּחַלְמוּ חֲלוֹם שְׁנֵיהֶם אִישׁ חֲלֹמוֹ	—	Distribute	
40:5	b	אִישׁ כְּפִתְרוֹן חֲלֹמוֹ	—	Distribute	
41:11		אִישׁ כְּפִתְרוֹן חֲלֹמוֹ חָלָמְנוּ׃	—	Distribute	
41:12		אִישׁ כַּחֲלֹמוֹ פָּתָר׃	—	Distribute	
41:33		וְעַתָּה יֵרֶא פַרְעֹה אִישׁ נָבוֹן וְחָכָם	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
41:38		הֲנִמְצָא כָזֶה אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים בּוֹ׃	—	Elaborate Upon	
41:44		וּבִלְעָדֶיךָ לֹא־יָרִים אִישׁ אֶת־יָדוֹ וְאֶת־רַגְלוֹ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
42:11		כֻּלָּנוּ בְּנֵי אִישׁ־אֶחָד נָחְנוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
42:13		אֲנַחְנוּ בְּנֵי אִישׁ־אֶחָד	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
42:21		וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocal	
42:25		וּלְהָשִׁיב כַּסְפֵּיהֶם אִישׁ אֶל־שַׂקּוֹ	—	Distribute	
42:28		וַיֶּחֶרְדוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocal	
42:30		דִּבֶּר הָאִישׁ אֲדֹנֵי הָאָרֶץ אִתָּנוּ קָשׁוֹת	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
42:33		וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֵינוּ הָאִישׁ אֲדֹנֵי הָאָרֶץ	—	Re-situate	
42:35		וְהִנֵּה־אִישׁ צְרוֹר־כַּסְפּוֹ בְּשַׂקּוֹ	—	Distribute	
43:3		הָעֵד הֵעִד בָּנוּ הָאִישׁ	—	Re-situate	
43:5		כִּי־הָאִישׁ אָמַר אֵלֵינוּ	—	Re-situate	
43:6		לְהַגִּיד לָאִישׁ הַעוֹד לָכֶם אָח׃	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
43:7		שָׁאוֹל שָׁאַל־הָאִישׁ לָנוּ וּלְמוֹלַדְתֵּנוּ	—	Re-situate	
43:11		וְהוֹרִידוּ לָאִישׁ מִנְחָה	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
43:13		וְקוּמוּ שׁוּבוּ אֶל־הָאִישׁ׃	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
43:14		וְאֵל שַׁדַּי יִתֵּן לָכֶם רַחֲמִים לִפְנֵי הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
43:15		וַיִּקְחוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים אֶת־הַמִּנְחָה הַזֹּאת	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:16	a	הָבֵא אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים הַבָּיְתָה	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:16	b	כִּי אִתִּי יֹאכְלוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים בַּצָּהֳרָיִם׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:17	a	וַיַּעַשׂ הָאִישׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר אָמַר יוֹסֵף	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:17	b	וַיָּבֵא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים בֵּיתָה יוֹסֵף׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:17	c	וַיָּבֵא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים בֵּיתָה יוֹסֵף׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:18		וַיִּירְאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים כִּי הוּבְאוּ בֵּית יוֹסֵף	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:19		וַיִּגְּשׁוּ אֶל־הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר עַל־בֵּית יוֹסֵף	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
43:21		וְהִנֵּה כֶסֶף־אִישׁ בְּפִי אַמְתַּחְתּוֹ	—	Distribute	
43:24	a	וַיָּבֵא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים בֵּיתָה יוֹסֵף	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:24	b	וַיָּבֵא הָאִישׁ אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים בֵּיתָה יוֹסֵף	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
43:33	a	וַיִּתְמְהוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
43:33	b	וַיִּתְמְהוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ׃	—	Reciprocal	
44:1	a	מַלֵּא אֶת־אַמְתְּחֹת הָאֲנָשִׁים אֹכֶל	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
44:1	b	וְשִׂים כֶּסֶף־אִישׁ בְּפִי אַמְתַּחְתּוֹ׃	—	Distribute	
44:3		וְהָאֲנָשִׁים שֻׁלְּחוּ הֵמָּה וַחֲמֹרֵיהֶם׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
44:4		רְדֹף אַחֲרֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
44:11	a	וַיְמַהֲרוּ וַיּוֹרִדוּ אִישׁ אֶת־אַמְתַּחְתּוֹ אָרְצָה	—	Distribute	
44:11	b	וַיִּפְתְּחוּ אִישׁ אַמְתַּחְתּוֹ׃	—	Distribute	
44:13		וַיַּעֲמֹס אִישׁ עַל־חֲמֹרוֹ	—	Distribute	
44:15		כִּי־נַחֵשׁ יְנַחֵשׁ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר כָּמֹנִי׃	—	Elaborate Upon	
44:17		הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר נִמְצָא הַגָּבִיעַ בְּיָדוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
44:26		כִּי־לֹא נוּכַל לִרְאוֹת פְּנֵי הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
45:1	a	הוֹצִיאוּ כָל־אִישׁ מֵעָלָי	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
45:1	b	וְלֹא־עָמַד אִישׁ אִתּוֹ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
45:22		לְכֻלָּם נָתַן לָאִישׁ חֲלִפוֹת שְׂמָלֹת	—	Distribute	
46:32	a	וְהָאֲנָשִׁים רֹעֵי צֹאן	Party to prototypical situation	Elaborate Upon	
46:32	b	כִּי־אַנְשֵׁי מִקְנֶה הָיוּ	—	Elaborate Upon	
46:34		אַנְשֵׁי מִקְנֶה הָיוּ עֲבָדֶיךָ	—	Elaborate Upon	
47:2		וּמִקְצֵה אֶחָיו לָקַח חֲמִשָּׁה אֲנָשִׁים	Member	Consequential	
47:6		וְאִם־יָדַעְתָּ וְיֶשׁ־בָּם אַנְשֵׁי־חַיִל	—	Elaborate Upon	
47:20		כִּי־מָכְרוּ מִצְרַיִם אִישׁ שָׂדֵהוּ	—	Distribute	
49:6		כִּי בְאַפָּם הָרְגוּ אִישׁ וּבִרְצֹנָם עִקְּרוּ־שׁוֹר׃	Party to prototypical situation	Consequential	
49:28		אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר כְּבִרְכָתוֹ בֵּרַךְ אֹתָם׃	—	Distribute	
EXOD					
1:1		אִישׁ וּבֵיתוֹ בָּאוּ׃	—	Distribute	
2:1		וַיֵּלֶךְ אִישׁ מִבֵּית לֵוִי	Member	Situate	
2:11	a	וַיַּרְא אִישׁ מִצְרִי	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
2:11	b	מַכֶּה אִישׁ־עִבְרִי מֵאֶחָיו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
2:12		וַיַּרְא כִּי אֵין אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	1
2:13		וְהִנֵּה שְׁנֵי־אֲנָשִׁים עִבְרִים נִצִּים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	
2:14		מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט עָלֵינוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	1
2:19		אִישׁ מִצְרִי הִצִּילָנוּ מִיַּד הָרֹעִים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate	1
2:20		לָמָּה זֶּה עֲזַבְתֶּן אֶת־הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
2:21		וַיּוֹאֶל מֹשֶׁה לָשֶׁבֶת אֶת־הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
4:10		לֹא אִישׁ דְּבָרִים אָנֹכִי	—	Elaborate Upon	
4:19		כִּי־מֵתוּ כָּל־הָאֲנָשִׁים הַמְבַקְשִׁים אֶת־נַפְשֶׁךָ׃	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
5:9		תִּכְבַּד הָעֲבֹדָה עַל־הָאֲנָשִׁים וְיַעֲשׂוּ־בָהּ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
7:12		וַיַּשְׁלִיכוּ אִישׁ מַטֵּהוּ	—	Distribute	
10:7		שַׁלַּח אֶת־הָאֲנָשִׁים וְיַעַבְדוּ אֶת־יְיָ אֱלֹהֵיהֶם	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
10:23	a	לֹא־רָאוּ אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocate	
10:23	b	וְלֹא־קָמוּ אִישׁ מִתַּחְתָּיו	—	Distribute	
11:2		וְיִשְׁאֲלוּ אִישׁ מֵאֵת רֵעֵהוּ וְאִשָּׁה מֵאֵת רְעוּתָהּ	—	Distribute	
11:3		גַּם הָאִישׁ מֹשֶׁה גָּדוֹל מְאֹד בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate/Consequential	
11:7		לְמֵאִישׁ וְעַד־בְּהֵמָה	Human being	Reference point	
12:3		וְיִקְחוּ לָהֶם אִישׁ שֶׂה לְבֵית־אָבֹת	—	Distribute	
12:4		אִישׁ לְפִי אָכְלוֹ תָּכֹסּוּ עַל־הַשֶּׂה׃	—	Distribute	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
12:22		לֹא תֵצְאוּ אִישׁ מִפֶּתַח־בֵּיתוֹ עַד־בֹּקֶר:	—	Distribute	
12:44		וְכָל־עֶבֶד אִישׁ מִקְנַת־כָּסֶף	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
15:3		יְהוָה אִישׁ מִלְחָמָה	—	Elaborate Upon	
16:15		וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocate	
16:16	a	לִקְטוּ מִמֶּנּוּ אִישׁ לְפִי אָכְלוֹ	—	Distribute	
16:16	b	אִישׁ לַאֲשֶׁר בְּאָהֳלוֹ תִּקָּחוּ:	—	Distribute	
16:18		אִישׁ לְפִי־אָכְלוֹ לָקָטוּ:	—	Distribute	
16:19		אִישׁ אַל־יוֹתֵר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד־בֹּקֶר:	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
16:20		וַיּוֹתִרוּ אֲנָשִׁים מִמֶּנּוּ עַד־בֹּקֶר	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
16:21		וַיִּלְקְטוּ אֹתוֹ בַּבֹּקֶר בַּבֹּקֶר אִישׁ כְּפִי אָכְלוֹ	—	Distribute	
16:29	a	שְׁבוּ אִישׁ תַּחְתָּיו	—	Distribute	
16:29	b	אַל־יֵצֵא אִישׁ מִמְּקֹמוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי:	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
17:9		בְּחַר־לָנוּ אֲנָשִׁים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
18:7		וַיִּשְׁאֲלוּ אִישׁ־לְרֵעֵהוּ לְשָׁלוֹם	—	Reciprocate	
18:16		וְשָׁפַטְתִּי בֵּין אִישׁ וּבֵין רֵעֵהוּ	—	Reciprocate	
18:21	a	וְאַתָּה תֶחֱזֶה מִכָּל־הָעָם אַנְשֵׁי־חַיִל	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
18:21	b	יִרְאֵי אֱלֹהִים אַנְשֵׁי אֱמֶת שֹׂנְאֵי בָצַע	—	Elaborate Upon	
18:25		וַיִּבְחַר מֹשֶׁה אַנְשֵׁי־חַיִל מִכָּל־יִשְׂרָאֵל	Member	Situate/Consequential	
19:13		אִם־בְּהֵמָה אִם־אִישׁ לֹא יִחְיֶה	Human being	Reference point	
21:7		וְכִי־יִמְכֹּר אִישׁ אֶת־בִּתּוֹ לְאָמָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:12		מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:14		וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה	Party to prototypical situation	Reciprocate/Consequential	
21:16		וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:18	a	וְכִי־יְרִיבֻן אֲנָשִׁים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:18	b	וְהִכָּה־אִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ בְּאֶבֶן אוֹ בְאֶגְרֹף	Party to prototypical situation	Reciprocate/Consequential	
21:20		וְכִי־יַכֶּה אִישׁ אֶת־עַבְדּוֹ אוֹ אֶת־אֲמָתוֹ בַּשֵּׁבֶט	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:22		וְכִי־יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:26		וְכִי־יַכֶּה אִישׁ אֶת־עֵין עַבְדּוֹ אוֹ־אֶת־עֵין אֲמָתוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:28		וְכִי־יִגַּח שׁוֹר אֶת־אִישׁ אוֹ אֶת־אִשָּׁה	Man	Situate/Consequential	
21:29		וְהֵמִית אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה	Man	Situate/Consequential	
21:33	a	וְכִי־יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:33	b	אוֹ כִּי־יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:35		וְכִי־יִגֹּף שׁוֹר־אִישׁ אֶת־שׁוֹר רֵעֵהוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Reciprocate/Consequential	
21:37		כִּי יִגְנֹב־אִישׁ שׁוֹר אוֹ־שֶׂה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
22:4		כִּי יַבְעֶר־אִישׁ שָׂדֶה אוֹ־כֶרֶם	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
22:6	a	כִּי־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ־כֵלִים לִשְׁמֹר	Party to prototypical situation	Reciprocate/Consequential	
22:6	b	וְגֻנַּב מִבֵּית הָאִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
22:9		כִּי־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ . . . כָּל־בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁמֹר	—	Reciprocate/Consequential	
22:13		וְכִי־יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ־מֵת	—	Reciprocate/Consequential	
22:15		וְכִי־יְפַתֶּה אִישׁ בְּתוּלָה אֲשֶׁר לֹא־אֹרָשָׂה	Man	Situate/Consequential	
22:30		וְאַנְשֵׁי־קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי	—	Elaborate Upon	
25:2		מֵאֵת כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִדְּבֶנּוּ לִבּוֹ תִּקְחוּ אֶת־תְּרוּמָתִי:	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
25:20		וּפְנֵיהֶם אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocate	
28:21		פִּתּוּחֵי חוֹתָם אִישׁ עַל־שְׁמוֹ תִּהְיֶיןָ לִשְׁנֵי עָשָׂר שָׁבֶט:	—	Distribute	
30:12		וְנָתְנוּ אִישׁ כֹּפֶר נַפְשׁוֹ	—	Distribute	
30:33		אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִרְקַח כָּמֹהוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
30:38		אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲשֶׂה כָמוֹהָ לְהָרִיחַ בָּהּ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
32:1		כִּי־זֶה מֹשֶׁה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָנוּ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם	—	Elaborate Upon	
32:23		כִּי־זֶה מֹשֶׁה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָנוּ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם	—	Elaborate Upon	
32:27	a	שִׂימוּ אִישׁ־חַרְבּוֹ עַל־יְרֵכוֹ	—	Distribute	
32:27	b	וְהִרְגוּ אִישׁ־אֶת־אָחִיו	—	Distribute	
32:27	c	וְאִישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵהוּ	—	Distribute	
32:27	d	וְאִישׁ אֶת־קְרֹבוֹ:	—	Distribute	
32:28		וַיִּפֹּל מִן־הָעָם בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא כִּשְׁלֹשֶׁת אַלְפֵי אִישׁ:	Member	Enumerate	
32:29		כִּי אִישׁ בִּבְנוֹ וּבְאָחִיו	—	Distribute	
33:4		וְלֹא־שָׁתוּ אִישׁ עֶדְיוֹ עָלָיו:	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
33:8		וְנִצְּבוּ אִישׁ פֶּתַח אָהֳלוֹ	—	Distribute	
33:10		וְהִשְׁתַּחֲווּ אִישׁ פֶּתַח אָהֳלוֹ:	—	Distribute	
33:11		כַּאֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר אִישׁ אֶל־רֵעֵהוּ	—	Reciprocate	
34:3	a	וְאִישׁ לֹא־יַעֲלֶה עִמָּךְ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
34:3	b	וְגַם־אִישׁ אַל־יֵרָא בְּכָל־הָהָר	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
34:24		וְלֹא־יַחְמֹד אִישׁ אֶת־אַרְצְךָ	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
35:21		וַיָּבֹאוּ כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־נְשָׂאוֹ לִבּוֹ	—	Situate	
35:22	a	וַיָּבֹאוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים עַל־הַנָּשִׁים	Man	—	
35:22	b	וְכָל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֵנִיף תְּנוּפַת זָהָב לַיְיָ:	—	Situate	
35:23		וְכָל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־נִמְצָא אִתּוֹ	—	Situate	
35:29		כָּל־אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר נָדַב לִבָּם	Man	Reference point	
36:1		וְכֹל אִישׁ חֲכַם־לֵב אֲשֶׁר נָתַן יְיָ חָכְמָה	—	Situate	
36:2		כָּל־אִישׁ חֲכַם־לֵב אֲשֶׁר נָתַן יְיָ חָכְמָה בְּלִבּוֹ	—	Situate	
36:4	a	וַיָּבֹאוּ כָּל־הַחֲכָמִים . . . אִישׁ־אִישׁ מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ	—	Distribute	
36:4	b		—	Emphasis	
36:6		אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה אַל־יַעֲשׂוּ־עוֹד מְלָאכָה	Man	Indefinite pronoun–like	
37:9		וּפְנֵיהֶם אִישׁ אֶל־אָחִיו	—	Reciprocate	
39:14		פִּתּוּחֵי חֹתָם אִישׁ עַל־שְׁמוֹ	—	Distribute	
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7:8		וְהַכֹּהֵן הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת־עֹלַת אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	1
7:10		לְכָל־בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן תִּהְיֶה אִישׁ כְּאָחִיו:	—	Reciprocate	
10:1		וַיִּקְחוּ בְנֵי־אַהֲרֹן נָדָב וַאֲבִיהוּא אִישׁ מַחְתָּתוֹ	—	Distribute	
13:29		וְאִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה כִּי־יִהְיֶה בוֹ נָגַע	Man	Situate/Consequential	
13:38		וְאִישׁ אוֹ־אִשָּׁה כִּי־יִהְיֶה בְעוֹר־בְּשָׂרָם בֶּהָרֹת	Man	Situate/Consequential	
13:40		וְאִישׁ כִּי יִמָּרֵט רֹאשׁוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
13:44		אִישׁ־צָרוּעַ הוּא טָמֵא הוּא	—	Elaborate Upon	
14:11		וְהֶעֱמִיד הַכֹּהֵן הַמְטַהֵר אֵת הָאִישׁ הַמִּטַּהֵר	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
15:2	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי יִהְיֶה זָב מִבְּשָׂרוֹ זוֹבוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
15:2	b		—	Emphasis	
15:5		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּמִשְׁכָּבוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	1
15:16		וְאִישׁ כִּי־תֵצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ שִׁכְבַת־זָרַע	Man	Situate/Consequential	
15:18		וְאִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אִישׁ	Man	Reference point	
15:24		וְאִם שָׁכֹב יִשְׁכַּב אִישׁ אֹתָהּ	Man	Situate/Consequential	
15:33		וּלְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב עִם־טְמֵאָה:	Man	Reference point	
16:21		וְשִׁלַּח בְּיַד־אִישׁ עִתִּי הַמִּדְבָּרָה:	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	1
17:3	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט שׁוֹר	Member	Situate/Consequential	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
17:3	b		—	Emphasis	
17:4	a	דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
17:4	b	וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא מִקֶּרֶב עַמּוֹ:	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
17:8	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל … אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲלֶה עֹלָה	Member	Situate/Consequential	
17:8	b		—	Emphasis	
17:9		וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא מֵעַמָּיו:	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
17:10	a	וְאִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל … אֲשֶׁר יֹאכַל כָּל־דָּם	Member	Situate/Consequential	
17:10	b		—	Emphasis	
17:13	a	וְאִישׁ אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל … אֲשֶׁר יָצוּד צֵיד חַיָּה	Member	Situate/Consequential	
17:13	b		—	Emphasis	
18:6	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ אֶל־כָּל־שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ לֹא תִקְרְבוּ	Man	Situate/Consequential	
18:6	b		—	Emphasis	
18:27		כִּי אֶת־כָּל־הַתּוֹעֵבֹת הָאֵל עָשׂוּ אַנְשֵׁי־הָאָרֶץ	Affiliate	Situate/Consequential	
19:3		אִישׁ אִמּוֹ וְאָבִיו תִּירָאוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
19:11		וְלֹא־תְשַׁקְּרוּ אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ:	—	Reciprocate	
19:20		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־אִשָּׁה שִׁכְבַת־זֶרַע	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:2	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל … אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמֹּלֶךְ	Member	Situate/Consequential	
20:2	b		—	Emphasis	
20:3		וַאֲנִי אֶתֵּן אֶת־פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
20:4		מִן־הָאִישׁ הַהוּא בְּתִתּוֹ מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמֹּלֶךְ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
20:5		וְשַׂמְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת־פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Re-situate	
20:9		כִּי־אִישׁ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת־אָבִיו וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:9			—	Emphasis	
20:10	a	וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:10	b	אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	1
20:10	c	אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף אֶת־אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:11		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אָבִיו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:12		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־כַּלָּתוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:13		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־זָכָר מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:14		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת־אִשָּׁה וְאֶת־אִמָּהּ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:15		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן שְׁכָבְתּוֹ בִּבְהֵמָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:17		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִקַּח אֶת־אֲחֹתוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:18		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־אִשָּׁה דָּוָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:20		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת־דֹּדָתוֹ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:21		וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת־אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
20:27		וְאִישׁ אוֹ־אִשָּׁה כִּי־יִהְיֶה בָהֶם אוֹב	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:3		וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה … אֲשֶׁר לֹא־הָיְתָה לְאִישׁ	Spouse (Husband)	Reference point	1
21:7		וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ לֹא יִקָּחוּ	Spouse (Husband)	Reference point	
21:9		וּבַת אִישׁ כֹּהֵן כִּי תֵחֵל לִזְנוֹת	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
21:17		אִישׁ מִזַּרְעֲךָ לְדֹרֹתָם אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בוֹ מוּם	Member	Situate/Consequential	
21:18	a	כִּי כָל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ מוּם לֹא יִקְרָב	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
21:18	b	אִישׁ עִוֵּר אוֹ פִסֵּחַ	—	Elaborate Upon	
21:19		אוֹ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִהְיֶה בוֹ שֶׁבֶר רָגֶל	—	Elaborate Upon	
21:21		כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־בּוֹ מוּם מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן	Member	Reference point	
22:3		כָּל־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִקְרַב מִכָּל־זַרְעֲכֶם	Member	Situate/Consequential	
22:4	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן	Member	Situate/Consequential	

Local		Passage	Informational level	Discourse level	'Another'
22:4	b		—	Emphasis	
22:4	c	אֹו אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־תֵּצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ שִׁכְבַת־זָרַע׃	Man	Situate/Consequential	
22:5		אֹו־אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בְּכָל־שֶׁרֶץ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
22:12		וּבַת־כֹּהֵן כִּי תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ זָר	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
22:14		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יֹאכַל קֹדֶשׁ בִּשְׁגָגָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
22:18	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל . . . אֲשֶׁר יַקְרִיב קָרְבָּנֹו	Member	Situate/Consequential	
22:18	b		—	Emphasis	
22:21		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יַקְרִיב זֶבַח־שְׁלָמִים	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
24:10	a	וְהוּא בֶּן־אִישׁ מִצְרִי	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
24:10	b	וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי׃	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
24:15	a	אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי־יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
24:15	b		—	Emphasis	
24:17		וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
24:19		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתֹו	—	Reciprocate	
25:10	a	וְשַׁבְתֶּם אִישׁ אֶל־אֲחֻזָּתֹו	—	Distribute	
25:10	b	וְאִישׁ אֶל־מִשְׁפַּחְתֹּו תָּשֻׁבוּ׃	—	Distribute	
25:13		תָּשֻׁבוּ אִישׁ אֶל־אֲחֻזָּתֹו׃	—	Distribute	
25:14		אַל־תֹּונוּ אִישׁ אֶת־אָחִיו׃	—	Reciprocate	
25:17		וְלֹא תֹונוּ אִישׁ אֶת־עֲמִיתֹו	—	Reciprocate	
25:26		וְאִישׁ כִּי לֹא יִהְיֶה־לֹּו גֹּאֵל	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
25:27		וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת־הָעֹדֵף לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר מָכַר־לֹו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
25:29		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יִמְכֹּר בֵּית־מֹושַׁב עִיר חֹומָה	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
25:46		וּבְאַחֵיכֶם בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל אִישׁ בְּאָחִיו לֹא־תִרְדֶּה בֹו	—	Reciprocate	
26:37		וְכָשְׁלוּ אִישׁ־בְּאָחִיו כְּמִפְּנֵי־חֶרֶב וְרֹדֵף אָיִן	—	Reciprocate	
27:2		אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא נֶדֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ נְפָשֹׁת	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
27:14		וְאִישׁ כִּי־יַקְדִּשׁ אֶת־בֵּיתֹו קֹדֶשׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
27:16		וְאִם מִשְּׂדֵה אֲחֻזָּתֹו יַקְדִּישׁ אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
27:20		וְאִם־מָכַר אֶת־הַשָּׂדֶה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
27:26		לֹא־יַקְדִּישׁ אִישׁ אֹתֹו	—	Indefinite pronoun–like	
27:28		אַךְ־כָּל־חֵרֶם אֲשֶׁר יַחֲרִם אִישׁ	Party to prototypical situation	Reference point	
27:31		וְאִם־גָּאֹל יִגְאַל אִישׁ מִמַּעַשְׂרֹו	Party to prototypical situation	Situate/Consequential	
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